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  Preface
In the present age of globalisation most cities are under heavy pressure to un-
dertake drastic urban transformation to enhance their competitiveness. The 
emergence of large urban development and redevelopment projects, so-called 
urban mega projects, is presented as a strategic choice. These projects have 
a significant impact, social, economic and political, on the area and the city 
involved. They do however face urban mangers with a complex situation. In 
most cases, not only are both the public sector and the private sector involved 
in the development process, but global players also play a significant role. The 
flow of finance and the transfer of know-how across city and national borders 
has a major influence on the way such projects are managed and the degree 
of success eventually achieved. A combination of complexity and uncertainty 
can make any such development a lengthy business.
Shanghai’s Pudong New Area development is one such urban mega project, 
but one that is being developed at a speed that few comparable projects have 
ever achieved. The annual construction area of Pudong was equal to total an-
nual construction area for the whole of Spain. It was not only the physical 
transformation of Pudong in little more than a decade that has fascinated 
outsiders, its economic growth and social change are equally impressive. How 
could the project be carried out at such a speed? What policies and man-
agement strategies did local government adopt to deal with such complex-
ity and uncertainty? While some credit the strong hand of an authoritarian 
state, there is little academic support for such a view. For example, it is dif-
ficult to explain why market participants, particularly multinationals, flocked 
to Pudong and poured in billions of dollars in spite of all the risks associat-
ed with such activities. It is also hard to believe that state compulsion could 
have been sufficient by itself to achieve the resettlement of hundreds of thou-
sands of households. The present research was prompted by a practical ques-
tion, namely how could the Shanghai Pudong New Area development be im-
plemented so rapidly? As the research proceeded, a further more theoretical 
question arose, concerning the extent to which the way the Pudong New Area 
development was carried out reflected the characteristics of a developmental 
state.
The study aimed to provide a better understanding of how this urban mega 
project was carried out in Shanghai within a context of globalization, how 
global and local influences affected a local urban development process, and 
how it was possible for public-private partnerships to become involved. The 
research examined the initiatives and decision-making processes involved 
in the Pudong development and carried out a detailed analysis of the factors 
that contributed to its speed. Those factors included the different strategies 
adopted by local government and the ways in which investment and finance 
were mobilised, the development process was facilitated and different par-
ticipants became involved. The study suggested that in this development the 
guidance provided by local government and the collaboration between the 
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public sector and the private sector reflected some of the main features of the 
developmental state.
It is hoped that the experience gained and lessons learned from this 
project will serve as an inspiration for similar large-scale urban development 
projects in other countries, developed and developing.
This research was qualitative, based on a single case study. The study is 
multi-disciplinary, crossing the boundaries of various fields of research, rang-
ing from political science and economics to urban studies. It covers a wide 
range of topics related to area development, including globalisation, architec-
ture, urban planning, urban management, urban economics, land policy, fi-
nance, real estate management and public–private partnership.
Yawei Chen
Delft, January 2007
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 1 Introduction
In the present age of globalisation cities are under heavy pressure to under-
take drastic urban transformation. Urban (re)development (also called urban 
renewal, urban revitalisation and urban regeneration), is strategically impor-
tant to enhancing the competitiveness of a city, transforming its image and 
strengthening its position in the global urban system. Cities have adopted a 
variety of strategies: some cities have been successful, others have continued 
to move down the global urban hierarchy. The present research attempts to 
give a better insight into the logic underlying this dynamic phenomenon by 
exploring an explosive urban development project in Shanghai that has fas-
cinated the world for the last 20 years. The most interesting question is how 
to explain the speed achieved by Shanghai’s urban transformation of Pudong, 
a large-scale area development project that took place within a context of 
global-local interaction. The discussion of globalisation touches upon two as-
pects related to area development: one is the rise of the network society, that 
transformed the relationship between traditional organisations operating 
within cities and provided the foundation for new styles of urban governance 
and public private collaboration; the other is the formation of a global urban 
network resulting from economic globalisation and global financial flow. At 
the same time it must be appreciated that area development is rooted in the 
local political and economic situation. The formulation of an area develop-
ment strategy is directly influenced by the way the particular locality views 
itself and the outside world and the way political and economic institutions 
function within the area development process. In this research, the context 
provided by the developmental state was the key factor in gaining an under-
standing of the situation in Pudong.
 1.1 Changing cities - local response 
in a global age
Urban developments are characterised by ‘complexity, dynamics and diver-
sity’ (Dekker and van Kempen, 2004; Roberts & Sykes, 2000; Borja and Castells, 
1997). The complex internal and external forces at work in cities play a role 
not only in defining a complex, dynamic and diverse socio-political world but 
also, increasingly, in cities’ political, economic, social and cultural interna-
tionalisation, presenting major challenges to the existing urban system. Glo-
balisation generates and accelerates enormous fluctuations in cross-border 
economic processes, in the flow of capital, labour, goods, raw materials and 
travellers, and the resulting concentration and global dispersal of manufac-
turing, services and international business. When global market forces start 
up new ventures well outside their traditional territories, they have the effect 
of promoting free trade, the free flow of technology, know-how and finance 
and, more generally, capitalism and the key role played by the market in glo-
[  ]
bal and national economies. In Local and Global Management of Cities in the In-
formational Age (Borja and Castells 1997), Daniels (1993) explained the relative 
failure of the Canary Wharf project in London’s Docklands (see Figure 1.1) in 
terms of the speculative strategy adopted by the Canadian company Olympia 
& York (now bankrupt), which proved unable to absorb the shock of lower em-
ployment levels in financial services in London and New York in the first half 
of the 1990s. Daniels concluded:
‘the expansion of services in the international market has brought to the 
global urban system a higher degree of flexibility and, in the last analy-
sis, of competition than existed previously. As the experience of Canary 
Wharf shows, the results of large-scale city planning and development 
projects in the cities have become hostage to external international fac-
tors over which there is little control.’
The series of challenges, political, economic and social, that cities face today, 
show how complex, dynamic and diverse urban systems have become. An ur-
ban manager has to try to maintain the well-being of all his city’s residents, 
weak and strong. He also has to strengthen the city’s status, if possible con-
Figure 1.1 London Docklands in 2006
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necting it to the worldwide network of cities 
and enabling it to benefit from participating 
in the global urban system. In an age when 
capital, talented people and knowledge can 
so easily move from one corner of the globe 
to another, cities need to be competitive and 
attractive. For many cities, the benefits flow-
ing from global connection are vital to their 
survival. To meet these challenges and to 
take advantage of changing fortunes through-
out the world, the new urban agenda needs 
to shift the focus of its policies away from 
regulation and distribution to the promotion 
of economic growth and competitiveness. 
This need has placed urban revitalisation and 
competitiveness at the centre of urban inter-
vention (Swyngedouw, 2005).
During the last several decades the efforts 
cities have been making to remake or rein-
vent themselves have become more apparent. 
Cities continuously redefine their ‘survival’ 
strategies to adapt to the new economic reali-
ty. Kooiman (1993, p. 46) implies that the proc-
ess of adapting capacity to needs in urban 
government, a process that he terms ‘govern-
ability’, is required to govern such a dynam-
ic, complex and diverse socio-political world. 
What strategies can be tried to keep up with 
change, globally and locally, and to maintain 
the advantages and competitiveness that a 
city needs for survival? A number of research-
ers have attempted to answer this question. 
Borja and Castells (1997, p. 14 and p. 98) for 
example, suggested that connectivity, inno-
vation and institutional flexibility are prime 
requirements for enhancing a city’s competitiveness and global significance. 
They also argued that a general awareness of global challenges led to the un-
dertaking of large-scale projects of urban transformation, a phenomenon that 
has emerged in cities all round the world. Such projects involve a cooperative 
alliance between the public, private and civic interests and a shared desire for 
the city to progress, politically, economically, socially and culturally.
All this has led to the emergence of large-scale urban transformation 
projects, so-called ‘Urban Mega Projects’ (UMPs), projects which are consid-
Figure 1.2 Large urban development projects in the 
Netherlands. Kop van Zuid, Rotterdam
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ered to be particularly significant to the remaking of a city because of their 
size or impact on part of the city, or on the city and its surrounding region 
as a whole (Carmona, 2003, p. 15). Although a UMP is commonly defined as 
‘a single and unitary project, planned, designed and implemented according 
to determined phases, with different stakeholders, clear goals and objec-
tives, a responsible authority and a predetermined cost and benefit structure’ 
(Carmona, 2003, p. 15), in reality the development of such large-scale urban 
projects tends to be more complex. Even if the goals and phases are clearly 
defined, changes and alterations are almost unavoidable because of the scale 
of the project and the length of time it takes. Some projects are conceived to 
revive decayed city centres, others aim to bring new life to abandoned indus-
trial areas or old harbours, others again are designed to revitalise a decaying 
waterfront area.
In recent years the UMP has attracted a good deal of international atten-
tion in urban studies, well-known examples being London’s Docklands, La 
Défense in Paris, Amsterdam’s Zuidas and Rotterdam’s Kop van Zuid (see Fig-
ure 1.2). Projects of this kind are good sources of material for discovering how 
‘the local emerges in [a] globalising world’ (Appadurai, 1996, p. 18). Shang-
hai’s Pudong New Area development provides an example that is extreme in 
terms of the area covered by the project, the speed of construction and eco-
nomic growth achieved and, last but not least, the complexity faced during 
China’s dramatic transition (see Table 1.1). This fascinating UMP is famous for 
the speed with which the area reinvented itself and pushed the metropolis 
of which it formed a part into a new phase of urban development. Pudong’s 
19% economic growth from a very low base has been a source of amazement 
for outsiders. Also surprising has been the volume of investment, from inside 
and outside China, that poured into a society that many believed to be tra-
ditionally enclosed and bureaucratic, where deep-rooted distrust and conflict 
between government and market was the norm, where the state forged ahead 
with its reform agenda but was unclear about the precise direction in which it 
was heading, and where tremendous urban challenges and potential instabil-
ity lay ahead (Common, 2000).
Outsiders want to know how the development in Pudong could be imple-
mented so quickly. The most cynical question asked by outsiders is what en-
couraged people to gamble in such a risky environment? What made investors 
flock to Pudong? Is this case unique? If not, what lessons does it teach? The 
speed of the Pudong development not only raises questions about a particu-
lar development but also raises a series of issues of concern to current UMP 
research. Has the speed achieved by this UMP been matched by other Chinese 
UMPs? Is the speed of development achieved by Chinese UMPs directly linked 
to China’s institutional and socio-economic environment? Can Chinese UMPs 
be said to be affected by global-local interaction? How do local urban manag-
ers in China handle the balance between external stimuli and local response?
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 1.2 Shanghai - global meets local
‘In a globalising world, cities at or near the top of the international ur-
ban hierarchy are among the favoured few – New York, London and To-
kyo – that have acquired large economic, cultural and symbolic roles. 
Among a handful of regional aspirants, such as Hong Kong, Miami and 
Sao Paulo, Shanghai has reasonable long-term prospects’ (Yusuf and Wu, 
2002, p. 1213).
Shanghai’s development and transformation has led to its being put forward 
as an example of a city that has accepted the challenge of embracing globali-
sation as a quick way of bringing itself into prominence as a world city (Yusuf 
and Wu, 2002; Wei and Leung, 2005; Olds, 2001; Wu, 2000 and 2003; Han, 2000). 
In the last ten years, Shanghai (see for its location Figure 1.3) has been among 
the fastest developing cities in the world, possibly the fastest (Bergère, 2004). 
Sassen’s recent research (2005) has named Shanghai as a leading candidate 
for global city status .
‘As much as in Western market societies, China’s urban development de-
pends upon (and its development options are limited by) the country’s global 
connections’ (Logan, 2002, p. 9). Its history of close connection with outsiders 
has meant that Shanghai, like many of China’s major cities, has had both ‘a 
Chinese side and a global one’ (Logan, 2002, p. 9). The economic importance of 
Table 1.1 Comparison of world large-scale urban development projects
Project  
Name
Kop van Zuid, 
Rotterdam,  
the Netherlands
Barcelona: Port 
Vell, Port Olympic 
and Forum 2004
London Docklands,  
UK Pudong New Area, Shanghai, China
Main 
Program
Office and 
apartments
Leisure/congress Office and apartment Office, apartments, leisure, retail, exhibition/
congress, industrial buildings, port, docks and 
warehouse,  airport, etc.
Land Area 90 ha 525 ha 1,725 ha 52,200 ha, among which:
Lujiazui Functional Zone 4,277 ha;
Waigaoqiao Functional Zone 9,713 ha;
Jinqiao Functional Zone 7,486 ha;
Zhangjiang Functional Zone 11,531 ha 
Dev. Corp. dS+V Port of Barcelona, 
1992 Olympics org,
2004 Forum org
London Docklands 
Development 
Corporation  
Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone development 
(Group) Co., Ltd (1,450 ha*); 
Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone Administrative 
Committee (850 ha*);
Jinqiao (Group) Co., Ltd. (2,372 ha*);
Zhangjiang High-tech Park Development Co., 
Ltd. (1,700 ha*)
Time Line 1984-2010 1985-2004 1980-1998-2010 1990-
* The figure only means the total volume of land that has been developed by each organisation by the end of 2004, not 
the amount that is taken charge of by each organisation. The total volume of land is not available, since the transfer of 
land from the local government of Shanghai to the four organisations in Pudong continues through a gradual process.
Source: Zandbelt & vandenBerg, 2005; Sun, 1999; SPNASB, 2005
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Shanghai was established during its century-long history of development as 
a centre for transport and trade in the Yangtze delta. Its economic prosperity 
attracted not only migrants from the surrounding regions but also business-
men from around the world. Shanghai rose to prominence in the middle of 
the 19th century, when British and other Western powers divided up the city 
into extraterritorial concessions and set up their own industries and fi nancial 
institutions. Shanghai was China’s fi rst industrial centre and gateway for for-
eigners wishing to enter inland China. British, French and other colonial pow-
ers built exclusive ‘settlements’ along the west bank of the Huangpu; within 
these settlements they exercised complete control. They also brought in large 
amounts of foreign investment, helping the city’s booming economy and ur-
ban development. The fl ow of capital, ideas and technologies linked East and 
West in a context of imperialism, transforming Shanghai’s urban structure 
and architectural style (Chen, 2003) (see Figure 1.4 and 1.5).
The adoption of a Maoist strategy after 1949 meant that until the end of 
the 1970s Shanghai and other Chinese cities remained largely cut off from 
the global urban network. The Maoists pursued a policy of isolation focused 
on industrialisation. Mao was determined to achieve maximum industrial 
growth, if necessary at the expense of urban consumption and agriculture 
(Kirby, 1985; Chan, 1992; Lin, 2002). After 1949, the culturally and architectur-
ally diverse urban fabric was restructured to conform with the Maoist version 
of communist ideology, characterised by anti-urbanism, heavy industrialisa-
tion, fi rm state control, and the elimination of all traces of bourgeois iden-
Figure 1.3 Location of Shanghai. Shanghai is one of the fourteen coastal cities that were 
opened to foreign investors in the 1980s
SHANGHAI
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Figure 1.4 The transformation of the Bund, Shanghai. Top: The Bund 
in the nineteenth century; centre: The Bund in the 1930s; bottom: The 
Bund today
Sources: top: Li, 2006; centre: Wang and Xia, 2001; bottom: CNAP
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tity. The importance of a satisfactory residential environment was disregard-
ed and little investment was made in housing or infrastructure. Shanghai’s 
commercial activities were neglected. Planners converted commercial sites 
for light industrial use, making as few changes as possible. More than 4,000 
factories were set up, occupying a quarter of the area of the city centre (Wu, 
1999, p. 209). As the population continued to grow, the extremely high popu-
lation density caused living conditions to deteriorate even further. ‘The ex-
treme conditions of high density, dilapidated infrastructure, and mixed land 
use pattern’ made the task faced by Shanghai in its efforts to become a world 
city extremely challenging (Wu, 1999).
The transition from Maoism to a post- Maoist market system, which began 
in 1978, ushered in a new strategy which valued efficiency over equity, indi-
vidual creativity over collectivism and regional competitive advantage over 
the defence of ideology (Castells, 2000b; Nolan, 2005). The new order placed 
greater emphasis upon rapid economic growth and efficiency and ‘[increased] 
roles for markets in the circulation of goods, services, capital and wage labour’ 
through the implementation of new reforms and the introduction of the open-
door policy (Olds, 2001, p. 110). Economic reform and the introduction of the 
open-door policy had enormous consequences for China’s traditional values, 
culture, way of life and, in due course, its urban landscape. With the increase 
in prosperity, more investment flowed into infrastructure, housing and office 
building. The scale of activity and rate of growth depended on whether the 
city was located in China’s thriving, booming east or less developed west. But 
there were signs of development everywhere.
Since then Shanghai, with other leading Chinese cities such as Shenzhen, 
has entered a phase of explosive urbanisation. Taking advantage of its his-
torical status as an international financial centre, cosmopolitan centre and 
city of global architectural styles, and with the support of central government, 
Shanghai determined to regain its position as the ‘Paris of the East’ and to 
establish itself as a significant international economic, financial and trading 
Figure 1.5 Former concessions in Shanghai before 1949. Left: buildings in the foreign concession were 
greatly influenced by European styles of architecture. Such buildings are still to be seen in downtown 
Shanghai, though they are vanishing rapidly, 2006. Right: European style buildings have become part of 
Shanghai’s urban landscape, 2004
Source left: CNAP
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centre on the western rim of the Pacific Ocean. The introduction of reforms 
and the open-door policy accelerated economic growth and brought into be-
ing a new mechanism for urban development. The economic boom of the 
1990s put Shanghai under pressure to do something about the increasing de-
mand for office space and the housing shortage. Many foreign businesses and 
banks were moving to Shanghai, which in 1994 had much less high quality 
office space than other Asian cities: Bangkok, for example, had five times as 
much, Singapore 15 times as much and Hong Kong 23 times as much (Olds, 
2001, p. 185). Many foreign companies were forced to operate out of four- or 
five-star hotels while waiting for new offices to be built. Moreover, as the in-
come of Shanghai residents increased – the per capita annual disposable in-
come of urban households increased sevenfold between 1990 and 2003 – a 
growing number of people became interested in investing in real estate and 
buying their own houses on the housing market (established in the 1980s). 
Demand was further stimulated by the privatisation of housing. Not surpris-
ingly, the phase of construction and reconstruction that took place in the 
1990s became known as ‘the Great Build’ (see Figure 1.6).
The phase of construction and reconstruction that took place in the 1990s 
turned out to be one of the biggest the world had ever seen. In her book New 
Shanghai: the Rocky Rebirth of China’s Legendary City (Pamela Yatsko (2001, p. 26) 
quoted a comparison made by Alan Edward, a British World Bank consultant 
based in Shanghai, between the pace of building in Shanghai and the pace he 
had experienced elsewhere:
‘What’s happening here [in Shanghai] reminds me of Britain in the 1960s, 
when we got the economy moving after the war and knocked down eve-
rything in sight – only here the scale is far wider. The Shanghai govern-
Figure 1.6 Shanghai - Great Build, 1990 onwards
Source: CNAP
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ment has decided that by 2010 Shanghai will be equal to any interna-
tional metropolis in the world in term of infrastructure services. Lots 
of cities around China are developing, but Shanghai can outpace all of 
them’.
The development of large-scale urban projects is ‘deeply implicated in glo-
balisation processes’ (Olds, 2001, p. 34). This is especially true in Chinese cit-
ies whose economic activities and urban transformations have been defined 
and shaped since China adopted its open door policy to enable it to integrate 
into the global market in an era of globalisation. Shanghai’s development had 
all the characteristics of an extremely large development project (Wu, 2000a, 
p. 351) The development of Pudong was seen as the key to the transformation 
of Shanghai in the 1990s (see Figure 1.8). Below are a number of comments 
made by Western researchers who witnessed the drastic changes which took 
place in Pudong in a mere 10 years. Fishman (2005) called the astonishing 
changes in Pudong ‘the propaganda of hope’. He wrote:
‘Nowhere is this contrast more dramatic than with Pudong, Shanghai, 
and indeed, China’s, iconic glass skyline. Across Huangpu from The 
Bund, and rising from land that was once fields, Pudong is a parallel 
twenty-first century downtown growing in fulfilment of an implausible 
fifteen-year-old pronouncement that a great urban centre ought to oc-
cupy the swampy, low-lying turf. Officials call it the “microcosm of Chi-
na’s Economic Miracle”, and it is in fact a kind of miracle.’
Tim Clissold (2005, p. 243), author of Mr. China, was amazed by the change 
achieved by Pudong in ten years; it seemed to him that Shanghai was swept 
up in a kind of ‘mad dash for growth’:
‘I remember seeing the occasional water buffalo squelching around in 
Figure 1.7 Xintiandi - an example of the transformation of downtown Shanghai in 2004
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the mud and an ancient courtyard where women with perfect white hair 
and faded blue cotton jackets hobbled across the flagstones to push joss 
sticks into huge piles of ash in the three-legged bronze incense burn-
ers. Ten years later, the field had disappeared forever but the courtyard 
had been preserved and made into a museum. It stood just opposite the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange. The crush of skyscrapers towered eighty sto-
ries above the courtyard roofs, the towers of steel and glass overwhelm-
ing the stooping curves of the old eaves and cracked glaze on the tiles; 
no one burns incense there anymore.
Furthermore, the roads through the industrial parks behind the city 
stretch for miles towards the horizon, past huge car-assembly plants, 
software institutes, and microchip foundries. Shanghai has been swept 
up in the same mad dash for growth that had gripped Shenzhen and 
Zhuhai in the days after Deng’s Southern Tour.’
Indeed Pudong presents not only a microcosm of Shanghai’s unstoppable 
urban development but also a rocketing microcosm of Shanghai’s economic 
miracle. In less than a decade Shanghai erected a glittering new skyline with 
thousands of skyscrapers, miles of elevated highways and bridges over the 
Huangpu and a tributary of the Yangtze, and completed the urbanisation of 
Pudong, formerly a dilapidated settlement on the east bank of the Huangpu. 
Many foreign observers have been captivated by glossy pictures of Shanghai’s 
gleaming office towers, sumptuous hotels, luxury malls and countless new-
ly-built apartments and villas. Today, when tourists stroll along the famous 
Bund, where nineteenth-century European-style buildings created a skyline 
unlike any other in China, it is to get a better view of the futuristic skyscrap-
Figure 1.8 Pudong New Area, the face of Shanghai’s future in 2006
Source: CNAP
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ers of Pudong’s new waterfront, across the river. Outsiders are fascinated by 
the tremendous and dazzling changes taking place in Shanghai and won-
der where the city got so much power and such a passion to reposition itself. 
What strategies were developed to create such an accumulation of capital 
and such an inflow of local and foreign businessmen and global investors? 
While some people credit the undoubted role played by the state and the un-
elected Communist party, the strong hand of an authoritarian state alone is 
insufficient to explain why so many investors and multinational corporations 
flocked to Shanghai to set up shop in Pudong. There must have been some es-
sential factors that persuaded those mature market players to take the risk of 
investing in such an immature market.
The present research was designed to bring to light and explain these fac-
tors. Shanghai provides an excellent source of material on which to base an 
examination of the developmental strategies adopted for Chinese urban de-
velopment, and for use as reference by other cities for comparison and in-
struction. To support the case study, a theoretical framework was established 
to explain how globalisation and the interplay between global and local influ-
ences are creating a new global urban system and new relationships between 
state and market. Figure 1.9 shows where the theoretical development of this 
research positions large-scale area development in the context of global-lo-
cal interaction. Two themes are discussed from a global aspect: network soci-
ety and network management to show how a new style of urban governance 
influences area development, and the growth of global and globalising cities 
to demonstrate the key role played by international capital flow in the crea-
tion of urban space. From a local aspect, the paradigm of the developmental 
state is used as a working hypothesis to explain the driving forces and the 
logic behind local government’s strategic development in the context of a de-
velopmental state, and to provide a theoretical framework for the dynamic 
relationship between global and local, between central government, local gov-
ernment, business and local residents, all of which influence the nature of 
power-sharing in the management of urban development in China.
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 1.3 Globalisation - networking and a 
new style of urban governance
One of the most notable features of the 1980s was the increasing internation-
alisation of political and social developments which took place in parallel 
with the internationalisation of the economy brought about by globalisation 
and the increasing role played by information technology. The 1980s and early 
1990s saw an explosive rise in the number of analyses of globalisation from 
various theoretical perspectives (e.g. Castells, 1989, 2000a and 2000b; Harvey, 
1989a, 1989b and 1996a; Sassen, 1996a, 2000 and 2001a; Amin, 1997; Hall, 2003; 
Robertson, 1988; Beck, 1997; Knox, 1996a and 1996b; King, 1990a and 1990b; 
Appadurai, 1996). The general conclusion was that globalisation is a multi-
dimensional phenomenon, involving highly intricate interaction between a 
whole variety of social, political and economic institutions across a spectrum 
of geographical scales (Dicken et al., 1997, p. 3; Jessop, 1999; Olds, 2001, p. 19).
Network society
Although the concept of globalisation is subject to ongoing theoretical discus-
sion and is in many ways vague and even confusing, the implications of cur-
rent globalisation processes for city development call for careful study. The 
network society is a common feature of the way globalisation theory is devel-
oped by the authors mentioned above. Manuel Castells, an influential sociolo-
gist and author of the seminal trilogy The information age: Economy, society 
and culture (1996, 2000a), identified the emergence of the network society as 
determining the morphology of our society in the information age. The net-
work society, Castells argued, operates in accordance with its own network 
logic (2000a). He proposed the term ‘network society’ to explain how network 
logic has transformed the world economy and the perception of space and 
place in the era of cyberspace. The network society is the social structure of 
the information age, the product of a combination of informationalism, capi-
talism and globalism, in which concentrations of wealth, power and socio-
economic cultural symbols are connected in a way that can be explained by 
the logic of its basic network structure. The network society is made up of 
networks of production, power and experience which construct a culture of 
virtuality in global flows that transcend time and space. According to Castells, 
in a network society time is organised by space. He therefore explained the 
current social structure in terms of the space of flows and the space of places 
(Castells, 1996, p. 376). Instead of the traditional place, that derives its form, 
function and meaning from a physical entity, the space of places is the spa-
tial organisation of our common sense, characterised by exclusive, high-end 
urbanism, longevity and identity. The space of places is transitory, baseless, 
borderless, open and unknown. It conforms to the market and is uncontrol-
lable (Kooijman and Wigmans, 2003). Selection is an important feature of net-
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work logic. Organisations that are connected to the network benefit from the 
availability of capital and information; organisations that are not connected 
are excluded from such benefits. Inclusion and exclusion result from a pro-
cess of selection.
As cities begin to experience the flow of technological, social, economic 
and global transformation (Savitch and Kantor, 2002, p. 3), the internationali-
sation of cities increasingly forces them to prepare for more and more inten-
sive competition for resources, business, and people (Borja and Castells, 1997, 
p. 204). Port cities were the first to experience such changes. The modernisa-
tion, containerisation and computerisation which took place in the 1980s and 
1990s not only provided better access to global port cities but also led to a 
series of transformations as those cities attempted to deal with intensified 
competition from other port cities, near and far (Bird, 1971; Hoyle, 1989; Chen, 
2003). The three European port cities, Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg, com-
pete actively with one another for market share. Shanghai, as a fast growing 
Chinese city on the west Pacific rim, not only uses the facilities provided by its 
deep-water port to compete with the neighbouring Ningbo, but also attempts 
to seize market share from more distant neighbours, such as Hong Kong and 
Singapore. Competition has put pressure on cities to reinvent themselves in a 
way that will sustain their image as effective and attract businesses and peo-
ple (businessmen, residents, tourists etc.). Most port cities needed to expand 
their old harbours and set up new harbours to handle the enormous increase 
in maritime transportation and the size of ships. Rapid modernisation of har-
bours, involving mechanisation and introduction of specialised docking facili-
ties led to a need for more space and capital, but less labour. The infrastruc-
ture connecting the port to the city has had to be improved to provide a more 
effective and efficient distribution service. Ports have increasingly grown into 
a complex mixture of port, shipping industry, heavy industry, high-tech in-
dustry, tax-free zone and logistics centre, a mixture of functions very different 
from those of a traditional port. Consequently, industries originally located in 
the port area or within the city boundary have tended to move out of the city 
to look for new space in which to expand, or have been persuaded to make 
way for urban redevelopment. This trend towards comprehensive transforma-
tion has given the traditional port a completely new form and image, combin-
ing elements of high technology, improved quality and environmental friend-
liness. The changes imposed on port cities, locally and globally, are typical of 
responses to the challenges that cities face today.
Network management and a new style of urban governance
In a network society, borders between different parties are blurred, and the 
traditional clear-cut demarcation between the public sector and the private 
sector is replaced by a relationship of interdependence. Klijn (2005) illustrated 
the complexity of government decision making in a network situation, involv-
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ing a clash of different strategies. He proposed two strategies for dealing with 
networks in urban development projects that have a network-like character: 
one to manage processes within the network (process management), and one 
to change the characteristics of the network (institutional design). However, 
although institutional design may facilitate networking by changing the for-
mal or informal rules governing access, it is generally ‘difficult to implement 
and usually takes a lot of time’ because of the amount of criticism and resist-
ance generated (Klijn, 2005, p. 334). Klijn and Teisman (2000) pointed out the 
relationship between network management and the development of public 
private partnership (PPP). Public-private partnership finds its application in a 
network society in a situation ‘where policy problems have to be tackled in 
networks of interdependent organisation, both public and private’ (Klijn, 2005, 
p. 328). They argued that in a network society the development of public pri-
vate partnerships is actually a process of developing trust between different 
participants. Trust needs to be developed on three levels: public private inter-
action in the search for an interesting project (process management), public 
private partnership to realise the project (project management) and network 
development. The effect of such changes is a more actively participating and 
collaborative institutional system that shares different concerns and listens 
to different voices from the business community or society at large. In many 
countries local government has had to face strong financial and managerial 
pressure, especially in cases in which the budget was insufficient to provide 
the social facilities required by a rapidly growing population. This pressure 
has forced the public sector to change its bureaucratic way of thinking and 
become an entrepreneur, adopting a competitive stance. The search for in-
novative ways to respond and adapt quickly and effectively to economic and 
social changes, for ways of reducing the deficiencies in public service deliv-
ery systems and for mechanisms which will work in a situation of limited or 
dwindling resources, has become the most important motive for the introduc-
tion of public private partnership and private financial initiatives into large-
scale urban development projects.
 1.4 Globalisation - global urban networks, 
global and globalising cities
The paradigm of the world city
Globalisation and new information technologies have played a key role in the 
transformation of cities, since the new global economy is articulated terri-
torially around networks of cities. Cities, for their part, not only become in-
volved in the transformation, but are affected by network logic and economic 
and political globalisation. In the words of Friedmann (1995, p. 22), cities are 
centres ‘through which flow money, workers, information [and] commodities’ 
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with the result that they ‘articulate the economic relations of their surround-
ing field of their region into the global. Key structures of the world economy 
are necessarily situated in cities’ and cities are ‘both shaped by their position 
in the new international division of labour and integral to the contemporary 
globalisation process’ (Sassen, 1991, p. 4). The realisation that the city is a key 
stakeholder in the process of globalisation has led contemporary studies of 
globalisation to advance the debate on the paradigms of the world city and 
the global city (Gregory, 1995, p. 303; Brenner, 1998, p. 5; Yeoh, 1999, p. 607) 
led by Friedmann and Sassen (see Friedmann, 1986 and 1995; Friedmann and 
Wolff, 1982; Sassen, 1991, 1995, 1996a, 1996b, 2001a, 2002 and 2005; Gregory, 
1995, p. 303; Brenner, 1998, p. 5; Yeoh, 1999; Knox, 1996a and 1996b; Thrift, 
1986; Borja and Castells, 1997; Castells, 2000a and 200b and Taylor, 1997, 2001 
and 2004). According to Friedmann, global capital uses world cities as ‘bas-
ing points’ and ‘organising nodes’ in the spatial organisation of international 
production and markets. As such, in the world economy these major cities 
‘concentrate the infrastructure and the servicing that produce a capability for 
global control’ (1986, p. 319). He defined the world city hierarchy as ‘a class of 
cities that play a leading role in the spatial articulation of the global economic 
system’ (Friedmann, 1986, p. 73 and 1998, p. 26). Saskia Sassen, author of the 
influential book The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (1991, 2001), also 
argued that such global control capability is ‘essential if geographic dispersal 
of economic activity is to take place under continued concentration of owner-
ship and profit appropriation’ (1995, p. 63). Sassen sees global cities as ‘key 
command and control points in the global economy … key locations for trans-
national corporate head offices, the location of specialised producer servic-
es and also the primary markets for these specialised services and financial 
products’ (Sassen, 2001, pp. 3-11). Global capital flow, financial organisations 
and agencies, headquarters of multinational corporations, international 
transport, communications, fashions and mass culture tend to concentrate in 
the three global cities, London, New York and Tokyo.
One of the merits of Sassen’s book is that it put an Asian city on the agen-
da of Western urban studies, reflecting, of course, the rise of the Japanese 
economy. It denied the dichotomy between Western and Asian cities, cities 
which had previously been considered to be fundamentally different. Follow-
ing Sassen’s ideas (1991) about the global city, Smith and Timberlake (1995) 
argued that global cities might be better conceived as a network of global ur-
ban centres rather than just London, New York and Tokyo. An examination of 
more than a hundred cities led Taylor (Taylor, 2001; Taylor et al., 2002a and 
2002b) to define the world city network as ‘an interlocking network with three 
levels – network, nodes (cities) and sub-nodes (global service firms)’ (Taylor, 
2002b, p. 2377). As the term ‘global city’ gained popularity, alternative termi-
nology was introduced to refer to the interrelated global spatial structure. 
Well-known examples include ‘global network of cities’ (King, 1990, p. 12), 
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‘world system’ (Smith and Timberlake, 1995, p. 94) and ‘global urban network’ 
(Lo and Yeung, 1998, p. 10). The efforts of various researchers to develop, re-
fine and extend arguments in the literature on the global city, coupled with 
Sassen’s response in the second edition of The Global City (2001), led to the 
idea of the global city, originally based on the function of London, New York 
and Tokyo, becoming the ‘global city model’, a more wide-ranging theory on 
the nature of all cities, to varying degrees, in the contemporary, increasingly 
globalised, world economy (Jones, 2002, p. 339).
Global cities and transnational urban networks have recognised that cit-
ies and city-regions have become the forces driving economic globalisation 
(Lo and Yeung, 1998). Cities, for their part, are increasingly dependent on their 
articulation with the global economy for their standards and modes of liv-
ing, and only survive by orienting themselves towards the space of flow (Cas-
tells, 2001); the unpredictable and erratic nature of today’s network society 
means that their success is uncertain (Harvey, 1989) which is why the new 
frontier for urban management involves getting each city ready to face global 
competition, since ‘the welfare of a city’s citizens depends on that’ (Borja and 
Castells, 1997). Furthermore, the paradigm of the world city provides ‘an ana-
lytical construction that seeks to capture what is partial reality in these cities’ 
(Sassen, 2001b, p. 2358). Studies of the global city have used such things as 
corporate headquarters, international financial services, advanced producer 
services, advanced telecommunication facilities and other supporting social 
and physical infrastructure as variables to reveal the pattern shared by global 
cities.
Although research into the paradigm of the global city and the world city 
opens up a new perspective on the role of the city in an integrated world 
economy, criticisms have been made about those paradigms. Three such criti-
cisms are worthy of mention here.
First, a number of critics believe that discussions of the global city have 
failed to consider the large number of cities, especially cities in emerging na-
tions, that either have experience with setting up links with the world econ-
omy or occupy niches at the bottom of the hierarchy (Gregory, 1995, p. 304; 
Yeoh, 1999, p. 608). Since Sassen focused on cities that she saw as occupy-
ing the top of the current hierarchy, later debates on the global city have dis-
cussed how to include other cities in other places to illustrate the impasses 
and paradoxes of globalisation (Oncu and Weyland, 1997, p. 6). The real ques-
tion is whether the concept of the global city is applicable to more than the 
few centres first suggested by Sassen. Some studies have argued that the glo-
bal city might better be conceived as a network of globalised urban centres 
(Smith and Timberlake, 1995; Savitch, 1996; Jones, 2002). Others have suggest-
ed that the global cities at the core of the global urban network may be nei-
ther permanent nor permanently out of reach (Short 2004). The term ‘globalis-
ing city’ seems better suited to this dynamic phenomenon, because it links 
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the ‘non-global cities’, cities that are attempting to become global cities, to 
the core set of cities that typically satisfy most criteria for being classified as 
‘global cities’.
The second criticism claims that the role of the state and the relationship 
between the nation state and the global city has never been adequately ad-
dressed. Some researchers believe that the importance of national boundaries 
is diminishing and see the possibility of conflicts between the nation state 
and the global city. Castells (1989, 2000a) argued that the ‘space of flows’ was 
superseding the ‘space of places’. Friedmann (1995) wrote that cities and in-
terurban networks appeared to be replacing the state as the basic territorial 
infrastructure of capitalist development. Ohmae (1995) suggested an apparent 
‘uprooting’ of the economy and a ‘disconnection’ of social relationships be-
tween global cities and national states as national borders became redundant. 
Short and Kim (1999, p. 128) suggested that a city’s efforts to ‘delink and de-
couple’ itself from the national economy would lead to the economic auton-
omy of that city as part of the globalisation process. Others actually believed 
that the nation state can benefit from the development of the global city and 
that the state can play a crucial role in forging a world city strategy to pro-
mote cities as places for the accumulation of global capital. The strength of a 
nation’s economy is, after all, significantly affected by the performance of its 
world cities. (Saito, 2003; Swyndegow, 1996; White, 1998; Hill and Kim, 2000; 
Kamo, 2000; Saito and Thornley, 2003; Wang, 2004). Although cities all over the 
world ‘clamour to subscribe to this globalising logic as they jostle for places 
in the new urban Utopia’ (Yeoh, 1999), the development of global city func-
tions is ‘partly filtered through layers of local institutions and the local legal 
and administrative framework’ (Sassen, 2001b, p. 2538). They therefore reject 
the idea of conflict between the global city and the nation state. For exam-
ple, Hill and Kim (2000) criticised the globalist view that the imposition of a 
single global system on nation states reduces the importance of those states. 
Their comparison of New York and two East Asian cities, Tokyo and Seoul, not 
only showed the importance of the state in helping Tokyo to become a world 
city but also suggested that there are actually two distinct kinds of global city, 
market-centred bourgeois global cities like New York, and state-centred politi-
cal bureaucratic global cities like Tokyo.
The third criticism is that most of the existing literature on the global city 
is heavily ethnocentric (Anglo-American) and New York and London are over-
represented (Saito, 2003). Since analysis of the global city takes as its norm 
traditional Anglo-American neo-classical economics, setting a high value on 
a free market economy, private property rights and minimum state inter-
vention, its limited capacity for explanation and tendency to exaggerate the 
convergence effect of the global economy has given rise to some scepticism 
(Amin and Graham, 1997; Thrift, 1997; Hill and Kim 2000). After all, ‘Economic 
globalisation, including world city hierarchies, rest upon political accommo-
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dations within and among nation-states’ (Pauly, 1997; Hill and Kim, 2000).
The global-local nexus and the creation of urban space
The global city analysis of a specific locality is at its most vulnerable ‘when 
it moves beyond describing the characteristics of global cities and begins to 
explain the processes and governance mechanism that created and sustained 
them’ (Douglass, 2000). This weakness has led to the emergence of literature 
which takes into account the local situation and the interaction between glo-
bal and local in the creation of urban space. This interaction is reflected in 
the studies done by Robertson (1988), Beck (1997) and Castells (1999), in which 
they examined the dynamics and dialectics of the relationship between glo-
bal and local. Their view of globalisation theory saw the network society as 
an open-ended process and, in particular, a process of change in which socie-
ties balance their perception of their traditional (national, regional and local) 
identities and socio-cultural characteristics against global constraints. This 
more dialectical approach suggests that while globalisation has an impact on 
cities, the cities themselves play a key economic, socio-cultural and political 
role affecting the nature of the globalisation process (Harvey, 1989a; Amin and 
Thrift, 1994; Sassen, 1996a; Borja and Castells, 1997). This global-local dualism 
is also referred to by Oncu and Weyland (1997, p. 1) as ‘the optics of the local’, 
describing the way that ‘globalisation articulates with distinctive ensembles 
of class, culture, power constellations and patterns of state/society relations 
specific to each locality’.
Globalisation has also given rise to a proliferation of local and regional ar-
ticulations of cultural forms, representing the reality of local response and 
resistance to the forces of globalisation (Cartier, 2001, p. 260). The positive in-
fluence of globalisation on various economic aspects of urban life may some-
times be counterbalanced by the negative effects suffered by certain groups. 
These negative effects can include a fear of the loss of local identity and cul-
ture, deterioration in social or environmental conditions and social confron-
tation caused by the increasing polarisation of winners and losers. Yeoh (1999, 
pp. 609-610) summarised:
‘The emerging literature elaborates the interplay between local and glo-
bal forces in the characterisation of these cities as bearing the spatial 
impress of ebbs and flows of foreign direct investment, imports and 
exports, and migrant labour (Godfrey, 1996; Harvey, 1996; Hicks and 
Nivin, 1996; Kaplan and Schwartz, 1996; Nijman, 1996; Walker, 1996), as 
a marketplace for global information (Boyle et al., 1996), as nodes and 
networks of advanced telematics and new communication technologies 
(Thrift, 1996; Graham, 1994 and 1997) and as a site for corporate control 
function (Ho, 1998; Perry et al., 1998; Yeung, 1998) and industrial agglom-
erations (Fujita and Hill, 1993 and 1995; Perry and Tan, 1998). Another 
vein that can be traced in the literature focuses on skilled international 
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migration as a process contributing to the production of the global city 
(Beaverstock, 1996a and 1996b; Beaverstock and Smith, 1996; Findlay et 
al., 1996).’
When global and local forces interact, urban space as a product is neither 
place-bounded and local, nor solely the result of flows of hypermobile capital, 
people, images, icons, signs and symbols. Instead ‘the reality is that globali-
sation is variously embraced, resisted, subverted, and exploited as it makes 
contact with specific cultures and settings’ (Knox, 1996a, p. 126). The transfor-
mation of urban space is achieved by large-scale projects of urban develop-
ment and redevelopment (Borja and Castells, 1997, p. 158). Olds (2001) pointed 
out five aspects of the effects of globalisation on the creation of urban space, 
based on his research on Vancouver and Shanghai:
the development and restructuring of the international financial system 
increases the availability of finance and credit through foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI);
the globalisation of property markets is linked to the globalisation of fi-
nance and the restructuring of FDI;
transnational corporations take advantage of the global financial system 
and the globalisation of the property market to cooperate with the state in 
large scale urban projects round the world;
the flexibility of social relationships, world social networks and epistemic 
communities increases, especially those that have the resources and power 
to affect the decision-making process for place-bounded projects;
travelling and networking promote the kind of knowledge transfer and ex-
change of information capable of influencing large-scale urban develop-
ment and redevelopment.
These five aspects show the ability of globalisation to mobilise global finan-
cial systems and knowledge transfer to influence large-scale place-bounded 
urban development and redevelopment projects. However, Olds also showed 
that a state with a tradition of proactive legal development, political impe-
tus, and access to major resources of capital, can play a crucial role in the 
decision-making process and the formulation of development strategies. This 
finding applies with special significance to the East Asian developmental 
states. Hill and Kim (2000), Fujita (2003), Saito and Thornley (2003) spoke of 
the decisive role played by the state as promoter in helping Tokyo develop as 
a global city and its active participation in one of the flagship urban develop-
ment projects. A similar example of the active role played by the state can be 
found in Singapore’s development into a global (or globalising) city (Sim et al., 
2003) and Taipei (Wang 2004). Nor is the influence of the state absent in cities 
that advocate market-led entrepreneurship. Swyngedouw (2005, p. 68) pointed 
out that despite the rhetoric of market-led and privately sourced investment, 
n
n
n
n
n
[  ]
large-scale European urban development projects are ‘decidedly and almost 
without exception state-led, and largely state-financed’. In fact the state took 
a leading role in the development process in ten of the thirteen cases he ex-
amined. It is important to realise that the geo-economic powers of contempo-
rary world cities are embedded in the transnational flow of capital, commodi-
ties and labour that are articulated and disarticulated within local territories, 
and that central and local government play important roles in creating them. 
Whether or not a country or city is able to take advantage of a particular geo-
political situation depends on the ability of national politics to respond to 
the external environment (Wang, 2004, p. 385 and p. 397). To understand the 
motives underlying Shanghai Pudong’s ambitious plan and choice of devel-
opment strategy, it is important to understand the institutional framework 
within which the state found itself.
 1.5 The rise of the developmental state
The paradigm of the developmental state
Network logic defines a new relationship between government and business 
in urban development, enabling both sides to adapt to an open system. Dif-
ferences in local institutions and local culture mean that different states may 
respond differently to the challenges they face. Castells (2000a and 2000b) ex-
amined the way that developmental states in East Asia differ from network 
states in Europe and described the different strategies used by different states 
to respond to global constraints in the local situation. In newly industrialised 
Asian countries1, different forms of developmental state, specific to each soci-
ety, appear to have been instrumental in the process of building or rebuilding 
a nation or city. These states are typically managed by political figures who 
are largely autonomous (Castells, 1998, p. 289). There have been many discus-
sions on the concept of the developmental state, by for example Chalmers 
Johnson (the researcher who introduced the concept), Manuel Castells, Peter 
Evans, Alice Amsdem, Steve Chan, Cal Clak and Danny Lam and other schol-
ars in the field of development theory.
The paradigm of the developmental state comprises a collection of theo-
ries, descriptions, and assertions which relate economic performance to in-
stitutional arrangements centred on the state. According to Johnson (1995, p. 
28), a capitalist developmental state can be defined as a state which promotes 
a long-term entrepreneurial approach by an industrial elite made up of key 
business groups, and resists any possibility of compromising growth which 
might result from demands by special interest groups. According to this defi-
   Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong and Taiwan.
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nition, a capitalist developmental state must operate a state-guided capitalist 
development system or, in other words, must combine a plan-rational econo-
my with market-rational political institutions. Castells (1998) defines the de-
velopmental states as ‘a state [which] establishes as its principle of legitimacy 
its ability to promote and sustain development, understanding by develop-
ment the combination of steady high rates of economic growth and structural 
changes in the productive system, both domestically and in its relationship 
to the international economy’. Low (2004, p. 5) argued that the characteristics 
of a developmental state include an authoritarian, paternalistic government, 
usually hegemonic, acting from a commanding height to mobilise economic 
and political resources. Xia (2000) lists four of the more important features of 
the developmental state:
the state plays an active role in and has a collaborative relationship with 
the economy;
industrial policy is laid down by the government;
development is controlled by a dictatorship;
the executive has full control of legislative institutions or their administra-
tive machinery.
For the developmental state, ‘development is not an end in itself but a means 
to become competitive in the world economy, to survive both as a state and 
as a society’. According to Castells (2000b), becoming competitive in the world 
economy, ‘…was first their way of surviving, both as a state and as a society. 
Second, it was their only way to assert their national interests in the world…
by affirming the only legitimacy principle…: economic development’. It fol-
lows that the developmental state needs a high degree of trust and a close 
relationship between government and the private sector (Rueschemeyer and 
Putterman, 1992). ‘A network approach enables a new explanation to be con-
structed to accommodate those practices in China that differ in important 
respects from those of Japan and the “four little dragons2”’. According to Xia, 
all East Asian countries have one institutional feature in common, a combi-
nation of networks and networking. (Xia, 2000, pp. 4-5 and p. 38). Xia (2000) 
actually argued that ‘developmental states can be treated as a mechanism of 
governance of the political economy that is characterised by a series of net-
works’, since ‘the East Asian developmental states have all pursued a strategy 
of networking and have been moving towards becoming network societies’.
China’s rise as a developmental state
‘China doubled its standard of living in just over nine years, as against 50 
years for the US, 17 years for Japan and a little over a decade for South 
   Also known in the West as Asian Tigers.
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Korea’ (Verdú, 1999, p. 6).
Economic reform and the open-door policy were part of the survival strategy 
to ‘ensure China’s entry into the capitalist global economy and into the infor-
mational paradigm, using lessons learned from Asian “tigers”. Maoism did not 
bring prosperity to the Chinese people. When Deng Xiaoping initiated eco-
nomic and government reforms in the late 1970s, he faced the dilemma that 
the state was both the solution and part of the problem’ (Castells, 2000b). In 
1978, recognising the limitations of Mao’s economic strategy, Deng Xiaoping 
proposed the creation of a hybrid system, a ‘socialist market system’. This 
paradoxical undertaking was inspired by the success with which the four 
Asian Tigers achieved their economic miracles in the 1970s. Deng took the 
road of economic reform, following the prevailing capitalist models of pro-
duction while continuing to build socialism. Deng believed that reform and 
openness were essential to China’s modernisation. According to Deng, ‘The 
only hard truth is development. Without development, there will be no stabil-
ity’ (Xia, 2000, p. 75).
China’s integration into the global market began on a false note in the ear-
ly 1980s with the special economic zone policy. Four export processing zones 
were created to attract investment from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan and 
elsewhere. Each aimed to offer foreign investors cheap labour and land, tax 
breaks and social discipline. Particular attention was paid to multinationals 
that could be used as export platforms. The zones were designed to be physi-
cally and legally separate from the rest of China, to prevent the contamina-
tion of socialism. Castells (2000b, p. 313) pointed out that the most important 
weakness in this approach was that Chinese leaders failed to understand that 
what multinationals wanted was to penetrate the Chinese market, planting 
seeds of investment for future expansion outside the limited area occupied 
by the special economic zones. The approach did however succeed in stimu-
lating the growth of Chinese business networks operating inside China. These 
ethnic business networks were essential to contemporary Chinese develop-
ment, but they came to life in China by taking advantage of the opportunity 
provided by the open-door policy. Investment in China was risky, but could 
yield investors very high profits in a largely untapped market, with negligi-
ble labour costs, provided they could work out how to operate in what was a 
highly complex environment. By the late 1980s, after the establishment of in-
vestment networks based in Hong Kong and Taiwan, capital flowed in, much 
of it from overseas Chinese, from Singapore, Bangkok, Penang, Kuala Lumpur, 
Jakarta, California, New York, Canada, Australia and indeed all over the globe. 
The statistical pre-eminence of Hong Kong was, in fact, a reflection of the 
management of plural sources of investment, administrated and to a large 
extent controlled by Chinese business networks, more than ever interlinked 
and based on family relationships, in spite of fierce rivalry in specific mar-
kets and projects. Indeed, overseas Chinese business networks have been the 
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main intermediaries between global capital, including overseas Chinese capi-
tal, and China’s markets and its producing and exporting sites. China’s multi-
ple links with the global economy are local, i.e. achieved through connections 
between overseas Chinese business and local and provincial governments in 
China, the sui generis capitalist class that Hsing called the ‘bureaucratic entre-
preneurs’ (Hsing, 1999).
The earliest trials took place in a number of special economic zones (SEZs). 
Subsequently the reform was extended to hundreds of enclaves, later spread-
ing to individual coastal cities and regions. China opened its once rigidly con-
trolled economy in a way that allowed both domestic Chinese and foreign 
nationals to flourish, deftly handling the conflict between communism and 
capitalism by brushing aside economic ideology.
The reconfiguration of the relationship between state and market accel-
erated the speed of development in Chinese cities, particularly in those cit-
ies that were important to China’s strategic development. Shanghai, as Chi-
na’s most important economic centre, served the national strategic need to 
become involved in economic globalisation. The city’s aim was to reposition 
itself on the map of globally competitive metropolises as a leading inter-
national economic, financial and trading centre on the western Pacific rim. 
Shanghai’s urban development strategy inevitably reflected the dictatorship 
of development common to all developmental states. The promotion of eco-
nomic growth and the enhancement of competitiveness was given pride of 
place in Shanghai’s new urban agenda, with the aim of attracting investment, 
especially from abroad. The plan was to establish special economic zones for 
sector building and to carry out large-scale urban projects to comprehensive-
ly improve the appearance of the city’s physical environment. For Shanghai 
the establishment of Pudong New Area was a project that would combine 
both parts of the plan. An even more outstanding feature of Shanghai’s de-
velopment compared with that of other cities was the major role played by 
the state, involving a synergic collaboration between local and central govern-
ment.
China’s transitional economy should not be thought of as a combination of 
an efficient market-oriented private sector and a costly and inefficient public 
sector. Rather, a distinction has developed between state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) run by central government, enterprises run by the Peoples’ Libera-
tion Army (PLA) and enterprises run as local government initiatives. In other 
words the non-state sector is still dominated by public ownership and man-
agement. The new capitalist class is made up of individuals (more often than 
not members of the Communist party) whose access to resources stems from 
their control of government institutions and finance. Using these resources, 
they invest in business on behalf of the government institutions they repre-
sent, by themselves, in association with other institutions, or, increasingly, in 
conjunction with foreign investors. These mixed enterprises form the core of 
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China’s new capitalism, a capitalism which is highly decentralised, following 
the contours of provincial and local alliances and the business networks to 
which they connect. It is oligopolistic in local markets and competitive na-
tionally and internationally and knows that it must generate enough surplus 
to pay a share to higher levels of government, not directly involved in busi-
ness, and to indispensable participants in local and provincial enterprises. 
Guthrie (2006, p.130) argued that ‘strict classifications of business organiza-
tions do not capture the variety of organizations that behave like capitalist 
firms in China. An analysis of economic development in China must focus on 
what it means to operate like a capitalist firm rather than on official catego-
ries’.
By the mid-1990s this development of ‘bureaucratic capitalism’ was com-
pletely under state supervision. But as the market economy spread, the in-
creasing influence of foreign markets and financial resources and the rapid 
increase in the number of gumin (stock-crazy speculators) made it increasing-
ly difficult for the state to maintain political control. More market orientation 
will be unavoidable. This does not mean any lessening of the scope for mixed 
enterprises or ‘mixed ownership’. In fact, the development of mixed owner-
ship was a one of the main topics raised by private Chinese entrepreneurs at 
the 2003 China Private Enterprises Consortium.
Area development strategy - an emergent process in the context of a 
developmental state
Contemporary area development is not local in the same sense as it was de-
cades ago. In the words of Castells, area development involves both the ’space 
of places’ and the ’space of flows’. Certainly, area development is place-relat-
ed, in that it has to deal with place-related urban problems. Important mat-
ters which need to be addressed include land, infrastructure, and property. 
The totality of the local context provided by local institutions and urban gov-
ernance – ‘the space of places’ – determines the way that area development 
is carried out. Increasing integration into the global economy, international 
financial systems and international systems of information transfer, exposes 
area development activities to influences exerted by global forces, interna-
tional corporations and global financial movements. Uncertainty and the risk 
of external influence (‘the space of flows’) affecting local area developments 
and development strategies are increasing. These two aspects of current area 
development influence both area development strategies and the way differ-
ent participants became involved in the development.
The evolution of area development has also necessitated development 
strategies to deal with complex and dynamic uncertainty, and these strate-
gies too need to evolve. Mintzberg (1994, p. 24; Mintzberg et al., 1998, pp. 11-12) 
listed three different types of strategies for strategic planning:
deliberate - strategies that are realised as planned;n
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unrealised - strategies that are never realised;
emergent - strategies that were realised though never expressly intended.
As Mintzberg suggested, formulating a strategy is a learning process. In his 
view, real-world strategies need to mix deliberate strategies with strategies 
that are purely emergent, so that control is exerted without impeding the 
learning process (see Figure 1.10). Although in most cases those responsible 
for managing urban development tend to take the traditional approach of 
formulating strategies before development starts, they still have to address 
emerging situations and adjust existing measures to suit changing require-
ments.
In the context of a developmental state, both deliberate and emergent 
strategies are needed to deal with existing and emerging challenges in area 
development. Developmental states have a strong tendency to participate in 
urban development both in policy-making and actual practice. In this glo-
bal era, the feeling of a need to guide cities’ development is becoming even 
stronger. Since the fate of a developmental state’s cities has a profound ef-
fect on its fortunes, the state is fully entitled, in its own long-term interest, to 
help its cities position themselves to their best advantage in the developing 
global urban network. Thus a deliberate strategy can be useful. On the other 
hand, a city’s transformation is largely a response to pressure and challenges 
imposed by globalisation and competition from other developing cities. The 
developmental state, born in response to globalisation and so extremely alert 
n
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to changes brought about by globalisation, needs to be sensitive to changes in 
the urban development process and to be willing to formulate emergent strat-
egies to respond quickly to changes. We may therefore expect to see strategies 
put into practice for testing, changing and re-testing before they are finally 
adopted. The formulation of development strategies will be an evolutionary 
process.
 1.6 Research design
Case study
The research took the form of a case study. Typically a case study examines a 
phenomenon in its ‘real-life’ context and therefore is not restricted to a ‘snap-
shot’ taken at a single point in time. The various changes that are deemed 
relevant, which often occurred over time, are described and analysed. The 
choice of case study as research method is inevitable because of the empiri-
cal void surrounding the subject. It would seem that research that monitors 
and evaluates is particularly important in the explosive and dynamic phase 
in which Shanghai currently finds itself. Although a case study cannot satisfy 
the requirement for systematic verification, it is essential for any attempt to 
provide insight into a particular object of research (Yin, 1984 and 1989; Stake 
,2000). The research involved in the case study, mostly qualitative, could be de-
scribed, following Yin, as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contempo-
rary phenomenon in its real-life context when the boundaries between phe-
nomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources 
of evidence are used’ (Yin, 1989, p. 23)3.
A characteristic of the research strategy followed by a case study is that us-
ing the unit of analysis – the defined scope of the case – makes it possible to 
gain an insight into the complexity of the coherence between factors which 
define certain processes and phenomena. The character of the unit was not 
at the forefront of this case study. The result of the study should therefore 
not be viewed as a monograph based on a single discipline. The case study 
concentrated on a selection of factors and developments relating to the pro-
cess of globalisation and the open-door policy implemented by the Chinese 
government in the 1990s. Nor does the study profess to view the study object 
‘city’ as an isolated unit, since this would be incompatible with the approach 
selected and the idea that a space can be detached from its geography, its lo-
   Yin (1989, p. 29) defines five components of a research design for case studies: the question addressed by the 
study; its propositions (which direct attention to things that should be examined as part of the study), if any, the 
units into which it is analysed (defining the case), the logic linking the data to the propositions and the criteria 
for interpreting the findings. For further details, see Yin (1989).
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cation and its nationality (Castells, 2000a; Harvey, 1996; Sassen, 1996b, 2001a 
and 2002).
The dissertation does not attempt to describe every aspect of a city like 
Shanghai. It would be impossible to set unequivocal spatial boundaries to the 
current urban dynamic. Indeed the object of study is not the city of Shanghai 
in its empirical spatial form, but the current dynamic of the network society 
and the repositioning of cities and the way in which this is, or could be, man-
aged. It follows that any research into the explosive development of Shang-
hai in general and the area development in Pudong in particular must make 
constant reference to the literature on urban theory in the context of globali-
sation (Harvey, 1989b and 1996; Amin, 1997; Hall, 2003; Robertson, 1988; Beck, 
1997; Knox, 1996a and 1996b; King, 1990a and 1990b; Appadurai, 1996; Olds, 
2001), the network society (Castells, 2000a and 2000b; Sassen, 1996a; Graham, 
1994), global and globalising cities (Sassen, 2001; Friedmann, 1986 and 1998; 
Short, 2004; Yeoh, 1999; Hall, 1991; Knox and Taylor, 1995; Hill and Kim, 2000; 
Clark, 1996; Taylor, 1996; Taylor et al., 2002a and 2002b) and global-local articu-
lation (Borja and Castells, 1997; Oncu and Weyland, 1997; Brenner, 1998; Hall, 
1991; Knox, 1996a; Gregory, 1995; Hall and Hubbard, 1996), the associated rise 
of network management (Klijn, 2005; Klijn and Teisman, 2000; De Bruijn et al., 
2002; Marin and Mayntz, 1991; Kickert et al., 1997; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004; 
Goodin, 1996; Graeber, 1993; Thompson et al., 1991; Mintzberg, 1994; Mintz-
berg et al., 1998; Osborn 2000), China study and especially China-related ur-
ban study (Wu, 2000a, 2000b, 2003a, 2003b; Yusuf and Wu, 2002; Guthire, 2006) 
and, most important, the theory of the developmental state (Johnson, 1995; 
Castells, 2000a and 2000b; Xia, 2000; Chan et al., 1998; Woo-Cuming, 1999; 
Huff, 1995; Huff et al., 2001; Low, 2004; Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; Wade, 1990; 
Rueschemeyer and Putterman, 1992; Leftwich, 1998). Important points of de-
parture are found in urban theory, political economic theory, social theory 
and urban planning and management theory (particularly urban manage-
ment theory).
The speed and explicit nature of the changes, on so many levels, make 
Shanghai exceptionally suited to a thorough case study, suggesting new 
points of interest and subjects for discussion relating to the urban policy of 
other Chinese cities which also see repositioning as a challenge but have not 
yet taken up the gauntlet as energetically as Shanghai. The newly emerg-
ing Shanghai is no longer simply a unique location, chosen at random, but 
a place where history is being written, history in which the characteristics 
of the network society are becoming an integral part of Chinese culture. The 
research strategy assumed certain relationships in which urban development 
characteristics, patterns, trends in the network society, developmental state 
etc. could be expressed in extenso. Shanghai seemed to be an ideal place for 
this intention. After all, Shanghai amazes everyone who has the chance to 
look around and experience the place for himself, so surely it is logical to in-
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quire about the nature of the dynamic that led to such rapid development.
Problem statement
The aim of the research was to provide a better understanding of how a huge 
urban redevelopment project managed to achieve such a speed. The research 
considered the role of the public sector and the private sector and their in-
terrelationship in urban development activities, to discover how the public 
sector and the private sector collaborate in an era of globalisation, and how 
partnerships develop and how they function (especially in the area of real es-
tate) in a particular environment. The idea for this PhD research was based 
on one main empirical question: What were the main factors responsible for the 
speed achieved by the Pudong development? Meanwhile, the theoretical research 
question is: To what extent did the development of the Pudong New Area reflect the 
characteristics of the developmental state?
Scientific and practical relevance
The research had three main goals:
To add to the literature on emerging cities in an era of globalisation. - For a 
long time, urban studies have concentrated on Western industrialised cit-
ies and their role in the global urban hierarchy. Little attention has been 
paid to cities in other continents. A similar criticism has been addressed to 
the study of global urban systems by critics such as Gregory (1995, p. 304), 
Oncu and Weyland (1997, p. 2 and 6) and Knox (1996a, p. 126) who point-
ed out that the conspicuous absence in globalisation literature of cities in 
emerging nations even led to the creation of a new term, ‘globalising cit-
ies’, to refer to ‘other’ cities in ‘other’ places. The research examined the 
impasses and paradoxes of globalisation in the realisation that there are 
different levels of world city beyond those considered by traditional urban 
studies. An opportunity was provided in this research to explore the trans-
formation of Shanghai, one of the most spectacular transformations of any 
city in the world. The experience and lessons learned during Shanghai’s 
active pursuit of ‘the rhetoric of opening up to the global’ in a system that 
had long be closed and had only just allowed itself to reap the benefits of 
globalisation, could well be useful to other cities taking the path to globali-
sation.
To make a useful contribution to the literature by linking two different do-
mains, political economics and urban study, to reach a better understand-
ing of urban management and area development. - To some extent the 
research pioneered the use of the theory of the developmental state to ex-
plain how participants in an area development project make decisions and 
the motives which lay behind decisions on area development strategies. 
It also used a network approach to explain the connection between con-
text and behaviour. It overcame the disadvantages of the actor-centred ap-
1.
2.
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proach, which tends to pay special attention to the actors but neglects the 
structural framework within which their actions take place. On the other 
hand, ‘a network approach enables research into the developmental state 
to transcend the existing form of the developmental state and move to a 
higher level of abstraction and generalisation to assess it more structurally’ 
(Xia, 2000).
To make a useful contribution to the study of urban China by combining 
a multidisciplinary approach with first-hand in-depth experience. - The 
study of China has gained ground recently as a result of China’s explosive 
development and economic success. However, there are few well docu-
mented accounts of rapidly growing ‘globalising cities’ in China. Recently 
a number of researchers have acknowledged China’s fascinating urban 
developments from a variety of research perspectives, e.g. Borja and Cas-
tells (1997), Castells (2000b), Friedmann (2005), Wu (2000a, 2000b, 2003a and 
2003b), Olds (1997 and 2001), Yusuf and Wu (2002), Zhang (2003), Wei et al. 
(2006) and Zhang (2002). As the rapid development of Chinese cities is di-
rectly related to China’s decision to open up its economy and its intention 
to integrate into the global economy within 25 years, Chinese society fac-
es even more intense challenges on its way to internationalisation arising 
from conflicts between global and local, traditional and modern. Chinese 
urban development and urbanisation involves intense contradictions. It 
is hoped that this study will help to satisfy people’s curiosity about Chi-
na’s area development practice. Shanghai has always served as a model for 
other Chinese cities, whether in the 1930s or in the Maoist era. The Pudong 
development was not just a flagship project intended to transform Shang-
hai’s urban process. The strategies used in the project and their implica-
tions for area development and urban governance may be valuable assets 
for Chinese policy-makers involved in the development of thousands of 
cities in urban China, large, medium or small, in the next several decades.
Method
The research was carried out on different levels and used many different 
sources of data, following a procedure known as ‘triangulation’ (Yin, 1984, pp. 
89-92). This means that multiple sources of data (and research levels) were 
used when establishing events and their interconnections. Wherever possible, 
data from one source was checked against data from another source. Data 
was obtained from a combination of existing sources and in-depth interviews.
The on-site field work was conducted in October and November 2002, June 
and July 2004, and July 2006. Interviews were conducted with people that had 
participated in different stages of the Pudong development. Interviewees in-
cluded planners, government officials in related government departments, 
project managers in development companies, real estate developers, banks, 
multinational organisations and academic researchers in institutes and uni-
3.
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versities, increasing the likelihood that the data that was acquired was valid 
and reliable. Existing sources provided an abundance of documents, including 
urban plans, master plans, policy memos, reports and so on. In-depth inter-
views were held to gather information that could not be obtained from exist-
ing sources and were used to assist in interpreting the data. The interviews 
also served to complement and interpret other material, helping to clarify ob-
scurities which arose during the analysis, correct possible errors, and to check 
whether the interpretation as set out in the draft report was acceptable. (for 
further details see Appendix A). A wide variety of methods was used to trian-
gulate the research findings and so check the relationships observed, estab-
lish clear cross-references and refine the analysis.
The research concentrated on changes which had been under way since 
the 1990s, a period which saw a radical turnround in national politics and a 
relatively significant widening of the opportunities offered by the network so-
ciety. In connection with the large-scale urban development project Pudong 
development, the government became strongly involved in the city’s objec-
tives, so that both central and local government became totally committed. 
The moments at which significant changes took place during the period un-
der research would have been difficult to identify without empirical research. 
The ‘measuring points’ of changes which can be differentiated within munici-
pal policy seem after all (on the basis of a reasoning, or arising during the 
course of the research) to vary (too much) in terms of time. Thus different 
stages could be identified within the period covered. The following highlights 
could sometimes be clearly defined, sometimes not so clearly, depending on 
the nature of the subject.
Type of research
In view of the exploratory and discursive character of the research, any argu-
mentation had to be based on the plausibility of its interpretations. Because 
the development project took place during a period of change, it was inevi-
table that the character of the research would to some extent be exploratory. 
However, the aim remained to provide fruitful insights, theoretical and em-
pirical, based on the findings of the case study. The research could not be said 
to have followed the principle ‘theory first then empiricism’. Rather it was 
characterised by a cyclical process of reclassification and reinterpretation of 
the material. The course followed by the research did not match the sequence 
in which the results are presented in the following chapters.
 1.7 Outline of the dissertation
Chapter 1 has introduced the research and presented the theoretical frame-
work of the investigation. It started with a discussion of the phenomenon of 
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drastic urban transformation in an era of globalisation and went on to consid-
er the explosive urban development in Shanghai that the world has found so 
fascinating. A theoretical discussion was presented of the impact of globali-
sation on cities and urban governance and a new relationship between state 
and business based on the interplay between global and local. The question 
was raised whether the speed that was achieved by Shanghai’s urban trans-
formation can be explained in terms of the framework provided by global-lo-
cal interaction. A conceptual framework was introduced, taking Castell’s anal-
ysis of the network society and the paradigm of the developmental state as 
important working hypotheses to explain the nature of global-local articula-
tion and the relationship between state and business in a specifically Chinese 
urban context and how the interrelationship between global and local was re-
flected in Shanghai’s strategy for area development.
Chapter 2 gives a detailed description of the initiatives and decision-mak-
ing processes involved in the development of Shanghai’s Pudong New Area. 
The chapter also considers why Shanghai, seeking to rediscover its lost glory 
in a global context, selected Pudong to fulfil its ambitious plan for the city’s 
nirvana. An analysis is presented of the roles played in the decision-making 
process by central government, local government and the market, the coordi-
nation between the parties involved and the way that global-local interaction 
affected the development strategies as they evolved during the process.
Chapter 3 considers in depth the factors that contributed to the speed of 
the Pudong development, including the different strategies adopted by local 
government to speed up the development process, the way in which invest-
ment and finance was mobilised, how the development process was facilitat-
ed and the way in which different participants became involved. Issues high-
lighted in this chapter include finance, land, infrastructural development and 
the closely related local real estate market.
Chapter 4 considers how it was possible to achieve such speed. The para-
digm of the developmental state is used as a working hypothesis to explain 
the changing roles played by the public sector, market forces and society at 
large and the motivation underlying various area development strategies. The 
emphasis is on economic development, collaboration or partnership with the 
private sector, global and local, and the pragmatic strategic approach.
Chapter 5 summarises the main findings on the factors which affected the 
speed of development. The chapter also speculates on the implications of net-
working for Chinese culture, the limitations of the developmental state, and 
the relevance of Pudong’s experience to other large-scale urban development 
projects.
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 2 Pudong - from local 
initiative to national 
strategy
‘The government of the city faces a paradox. On the one hand, globalisa-
tion enhances the role of local governments (the principle of proximity), 
and large, complex action programmes that are also highly localised re-
quire precisely institutions and political bodies that keep very closely to 
their territories. On the other hand, local governments have little or no 
international presence; they are subject to legislation, and depend for 
their resources on national governments (and sometimes regional gov-
ernments too); they have a relatively weak position with respect to pub-
lic or private economic groups; large-scale strategic action plans are not 
in their field of responsibility (or are only partially so); and furthermore 
they correspond to a metropolitan city that is fragmented in institution-
al terms’ (Borja and Castells, 1997, p. 174).
 2.1 Introduction
The old saying that a Shanghainese ‘prefers a bed in Puxi to a house in Pu-
dong’ vividly describes the unpopularity of Pudong before 1990, at which time 
the district contained a mixture of harbour industry, low-quality housing, in-
adequate infrastructure and vast stretches of farmland. Located along the 
east bank of the Huangpu, ‘Pudong’ in its widest sense refers to that part of 
Shanghai which is located on the east bank of the Huangpu, an area of ap-
proximately 2,000 km2, 30% of Shanghai’s territory. The official name for the 
Pudong which formed the subject of the research is Pudong New Area, an area 
defined by administrative boundaries. In 1990 it was defined as a 350 square 
kilometre triangular area, east of the Huangpu, southwest of the Yangtze and 
north of Chuanyang, similar in size to the central area of the city of Shanghai, 
with a population of 1.1 million. The size of the area was officially increased 
to 522 km2 in 1992 (see Figure 2.1).
Pudong’s harbour activities, warehouses and harbours were developed be-
fore 1949. Further heavy industry was added after 1949, manufacturing prod-
ucts including textiles, steel, chemicals and building materials. The harbour 
activities were also expanded. Businesses built housing estates near their 
premises to accommodate their employees. By the beginning of 1980s the Pu-
dong urban area had grown to 60 km2. The greater part of this urban area was 
located along Pudong’s waterfront (see Figure 2.2). In the 1960s Shanghai tried 
to expend along the east bank into Pudong, mainly to ease its serious over-
crowding problem.
At the beginning of the 1980s a proposal was put forward to turn Zhangyang 
Road (one of Pudong’s few main streets) into a new Nanjing Road for Pudong. 
(Nanjing Road is Shanghai’s most famous shopping street.) The proposal was 
rejected. An important factor was the lack of any connection between the 
two banks of the Huangpu apart from an old twin-lane tunnel, built before 
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1990. The same factor also contributed to Pudong’s lagging economy, lack of 
industry and lack of employment opportunities. In 1990 the GDP of Pudong’s 
1,272 businesses was Yuan 1 billion (US$ 12 million), about 8% of Shanghai’s 
total GDP. Most of the businesses were involved in low-tech heavily pollut-
ing industries, such as petrochemicals, harbours, steel and iron and building 
materials. The service sector was not well developed in Pudong, including a 
growing retail sector, but hardly any development in banking or insurance. 
The stagnant economy in Pudong led many of Pudong’s residents to search 
for work on the other side of the Huangpu. On the foggy morning of 10 De-
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cember 1987, a tragic accident occurred when hundreds of thousands of peo-
ple from Pudong tried to board the ferry to Puxi to get to work. The crowds 
boarding were so great that passengers began to tread on one another. Eleven 
people were trodden to death and about eighty were seriously injured (Feng 
and Wang, 2000; p. 553). A later report blamed the accident on the poor infra-
structure linking Pudong to downtown Shanghai. The report urged the Shang-
hai Municipal Government (SMG) to push ahead with its proposals for the to-
tal transformation of Pudong.
 2.2 Local initiative, open debate
The introduction of the central planning system in the 1950s led to China’s 
land, housing and real estate markets being dismantled and replaced by an 
allocation system to balance supply and demand. By the end of the 1970s the 
command economy, under the control of the Communist Party, had severe-
Figure 2.2 Pudong before the development. Top: Pudong in the early twentieth century, 
seen from Puxi; bottom: Pudong shortly before the development in 1990, seen from Puxi
Source: Wang and Xia, 2001
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ly distorted all of China’s markets, not just the commodity market (Lal, 1995, 
p.1480). Before economic reform, the private sector was simply prohibited. Af-
ter the reform and the introduction of China’s open door policy, academics at 
national and local level were among the first to discuss new ideas for restor-
ing the market mechanism. In Shanghai, local planners like Huang Fuxiang 
and his team from the Shanghai Urban Planning and Design Institute (SUPDI), 
later jointed by researchers in economics, law and sociology, began to explore 
new ideas and techniques for dealing with China’s emerging market system. 
These researchers4 were particularly interested in the concept of globalisation 
and its possible impact on China and its development, economic and other-
wise. They concluded that two possible trends might exert a powerful influ-
ence on the fate of Shanghai. The first was a shift in the centre of economic 
activity from the West (the Atlantic area) to the East (the Pacific area), with 
the western rim of the Pacific Ocean5 as the possible centre of the boom. The 
second trend, associated with the further opening up of China and its integra-
tion into the world economy, involved a shift in economic development from 
south China, with its pioneering cities like Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Xiamen, to 
the north and east, and subsequently from the east to central and western 
China. Shanghai enjoyed a strategic location between these two movements. 
The researchers believed that without proper preparation, Shanghai would 
be unable to handle the approaching economic boom. Their primary concern 
was with urban planning, later extended to include issues such as land re-
form and real estate investment.
One aim of this preparation was to replace the old urban planning sys-
tem with a new system that would take into account the market mechanism 
and the value of land and buildings. The nationwide debate at the end of 
the 1970s on whether housing should be treated as a commodity, reinforced 
the belief that more ideas could be borrowed from countries with a market 
economy (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3 for a more detailed explanation). Local 
planners became interested in American-style zoning, and Hong Kong’s out-
line zoning plan (OZP), both of which took account of the value of land. In 
contrast to other more area-based zoning systems, the OZP operated at the 
more detailed level of small blocks and included regulations governing the 
function, price, height and shape of the buildings making up each block. Local 
researchers favoured the OZP approach and later adopted it in the land policy 
for the Pudong development.
A second aim was to find new ‘engines’ to power the city’s growth. Lo-
   Based on interviews held in October and November 2002 with Huang Fuxiang, senior planner at the Shanghai 
Urban Planning and Design Institute and Li Zhanjun, a Shanghai Social Science Academy researcher.
   Local researchers saw this zone as extending from Seoul and Tokyo via Bohai Bay, the Yangtze delta, the Pearl 
delta, Kuala Lumpur and Manila to Sydney and Campbell.
[  ]
cal researchers examined the concept of the central business district (CBD) 
and the role such districts play in the American economy. They saw the CBD 
concept as relevant to the redevelopment of Shanghai’s downtown area, at 
one time the financial and trading centre for the entire Far East. In 1986, af-
ter years of study, they proposed fifteen plans for redeveloping the waterfront 
areas along the Huangpu – the Bund, Shiliupu and Lujiazui (in Pudong) – all 
based to some extent on the ideas referred to above (see Figure 2.3). The plans 
were presented at two international conferences on waterfront development. 
Since this was the first international presentation of the work of Shanghai’s 
planners, their plans attracted a good deal of attention from their foreign 
counterparts, and even attracted interest from overseas investors. Encour-
aged by this positive response, the planners decided to take their proposals a 
stage further by treating the combination of the Bund and Pudong’s Lujiazui 
as a the new centre of Shanghai, rather than the traditionally accepted com-
bination of the Bund and the People’s Plaza. Meanwhile, urban planners at 
the SUPDI, under the leadership of Huang Fuxiang, began to make plans for 
the redevelopment of the Bund and Shiliupu (two waterfront areas along the 
Huangpu in Puxi) and Lujiazui (the Pudong waterfront directly opposite the 
Bund). This was the first appearance in these plans of two Western planning 
concepts, the central business district and waterfront redevelopment. This at-
tempt to accommodate western concepts in the redevelopment plan was in 
fact the planners’ response to the growing business opportunities for Shang-
hai after China opened its doors to the outside world. As Huang Fuxiang re-
calls (2002):
‘.... I started to collect information about CBDs in 1978, a time when 
many visitors were coming to Shanghai. Many of them came not just 
for tourism but also to look for business opportunities and possible new 
markets. The businessmen were the most sensitive. I had the opportu-
nity to talk to them. Many of them asked questions about investment 
in hotels, and this drew my attention to new planning concepts like the 
CBD. After my visit to the US World Trade Centre – the twin towers de-
stroyed on 11 September 2001 – I began to understand the role played 
by the CBD in the American urban economy. This was the start of our 
further research into CBDs.’
The significant role played by the CBD in American cities persuaded Huang 
Fuxiang and his colleagues to include this new concept in their design plans 
for Pudong, to enable Pudong to perform its new role.
In May 1987 SMG set up the Pudong Development Research Consultation 
Group to carry out preparatory studies for the development of Pudong. This 
group, led by deputy mayor Ni Tianzeng, included Chinese and foreign experts 
in urban architecture, planning, finance, real estate and related areas. Lin 
Tongyan from the US, an expert in bridge construction, was one of the most 
active foreign advocates of the Pudong development and attracted consider-
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able international attention to the project. On 1 May 1988 the results of the 
study were discussed at an international conference organised by the Pudong 
Development Research Consultation Group; 140 international experts on ur-
ban development discussed with local leadership, including Jiang Zemin, Zhu 
Rongji and Wang Daohan, the feasibility of the Pudong development and the 
future of Pudong. The final version of the master plan for Pudong was com-
pleted in October 1989. In this version the area of Pudong was planned to in-
crease to 150 km2 and the population from 0.9 million to 1.5 million.
While the private sector was already responding positively, local govern-
ment was being urged to give the planning permission required before any 
new development project could begin. In February 1988 the Central District 
Plan for Lujiazui (a 1.7 km2 waterfront area in Pudong directly opposite the 
Bund in the Puxi district) defined for the first time the function of Lujiazui as 
central business district. Between 1.8 and 2.4 million m2 of floor space were 
Figure 2.3 CBD plan in 1994 that interlink both Puxi and Pudong (left) and Location of the Central Business 
District (CBD) in Shanghai. Draft proposals for the first waterfront redevelopment plan were included in the 
Huangpu River Bank redevelopment project, initiated in 2002 (right)
Sources: left: Sun, 1999; 
right: Shanghai Urban Planning Administrative Bureau, 2003
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proposed, much more than originally planned. The change was partly due to 
the influence of officials from the Institute d’Aménagement et d’Urbanisme 
de la Région Ile de France6 (IAURIF) in Paris, who provided SMG with technical 
assistance in planning the restructuring of the city and developing a metro-
politan planning strategy (Olds, 1997, pp. 115–116).
In 1992 central government seized the opportunity provided by the de-
velopment and opening up of the Pudong area, China’s largest development 
project, to revive its strategy of developing Shanghai into an international 
economic, financial and trading centre – the ‘dragon’s head’ that would pow-
er the growth of the Yangtze basin (Shun, 1999, p. 121). A steadily increasing 
number of foreign institutions and firms were invited to assist SMG in its ef-
forts to prepare a strategic plan for restructuring the city. The World Bank and 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) both funded tangible projects (e.g. bridges 
and road systems) and strategic planning for Shanghai’s geographical and 
sectoral restructuring.
The international debate on planning concepts played a significant role in 
pushing through economic reform at central and local level. The involvement 
of academics from different fields nationwide contributed to the construction 
of a new theoretical political and economic framework justifying the intro-
duction of various reforms. The debate provided a platform for the transfer of 
knowledge, particularly about the application of a more market-oriented ap-
proach to planning at local and international level.
It is interesting to note that the first ideas for developing Pudong can be 
traced back to the 1920s and 1930s, when Sun Yat-sen, the first Chinese presi-
dent, was pressing for the modernisation of China in general and Shanghai in 
particular. A similar plan was proposed by local planners in the early 1980s as 
a way of dispersing the population of Shanghai’s downtown Puxi area into the 
west bank of the Huangpu. Puxi no longer had sufficient space to accommo-
date its ever-increasing population and new developments in the traditional 
business centre. Moreover Shanghai’s outdated infrastructure was only suf-
ficient for its former structure and was no longer able to increase capacity 
to meet the increasing demands imposed by a growing city. These pressures 
constantly challenged urban planners and managers to come up with solu-
tions, and later contributed to the idea of developing something new and at-
tractive. The first formal discussions on developing a modern central business 
district in Shanghai took place in 1979-1984. The master plans for Shanghai 
prepared by SUPDI in 1982 and 1984 both proposed a multinational urban 
system to disperse the population and provide more space for urban devel-
opment: Pudong was one option (Wu, 2000). The 1984 master plan proposed 
building a new airport in Pudong to supplement the old Hongqiao airport. The 
   Institute for Urban Planning and Development of the Paris Ile de France Region.
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Figure 2.4 Shanghai Master Plan. Left: Draft of Shanghai Master Plan 1959. Right: Shanghai Master Plan 1996
Source: Shanghai Urban Planning Institute (brochure)
Draft of Shanghai Master Plan (1959)
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Figure 2.4 Shanghai Master Plan. Left: Draft of Shanghai Master Plan 1959. Right: Shanghai Master Plan 1996
Source: Shanghai Urban Planning Institute (brochure)
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1996 Shanghai master plan was even more significant for Pudong’s future be-
cause, unlike previous master plans such as the 1959 version, this new ver-
sion took a more wide-ranging view of the city, including both Puxi and Pu-
dong. In this new version more urban districts were designated for Pudong, 
supplemented by new infrastructure and public facilities. Pudong, once com-
pletely ignored, suddenly began to enjoy the same amount of attention from 
the planners that it had enjoyed 60 years earlier (see figure 2.4).
The Pudong proposal was strongly supported by the local leadership. The 
mayor of Shanghai, Wang Daohan, even proposed that Pudong should be set 
up as a special economic zone, attracting investment by means of tax and pol-
icy concessions similar to those already being experimented with in southern 
China. The economic aspects of his ideas were taken further in Shanghai’s 
June 1984 strategic development plan, which proposed designating Pudong as 
a new economic development zone with tax and policy concessions to attract 
investment. The proposal to develop Pudong was submitted to central govern-
ment. The State Council reacted positively to the basic idea and instructed 
SMG to ‘create conditions for the development of Pudong and prepare for the 
construction of the new area…’ (Wan and Yuan, 2001, p. 27; Sun, 1999). The 
latest version of the Shanghai master plan also identified the Lujiazui area as 
the site for the future extension of the historic downtown district across the 
Huangpu.
 2.3 Decision-making - local versus national
Even though there was never any lack of local initiatives to develop Pudong, it 
actually took decades before anything was done. There could be several rea-
sons for the prolonged delay. 
First was the matter of political sensitivity. Political consideration of the 
possibility of war or military attack (for example, civil war between Taiwan 
and mainland China or an attack by one of the two superpowers) prevented 
Shanghai from exploiting its vast coastal territory, which during the cold war 
was seen as part of the ‘front line’. Huang Fuxiang (personal interview, 2002) 
explained the reasoning as follows:
‘China had previously followed a closed-door policy. In the light of the 
hostile environment in which China found itself during the cold war 
and the psychological pressure China faced from the United States and 
the former USSR, [it is easy to understand] that Pudong was not consid-
ered suitable for development because of its front-line location so close 
to the coast. The pressure only lessened in 1986, with the improvement 
in relations with the US and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. With 
the approval of central government, we then began to look to see how 
foreign cities dealt with investors and investment. We discovered that 
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they worked with a series of market concepts that were absent in China. 
We were more familiar with Russian concepts of urban planning, and so 
had no knowledge of detailed quantity and quality measurement. Rath-
er, approval of a master plan largely depended on the most senior of the 
higher ranking officials.’
Second, Shanghai’s strategic location and the significant role it played in the 
national economy as the most important tax generator (one sixth of all na-
tional revenue) made it impossible for central government to risk any lack 
of care in guiding its development. Li Zhanjun (personal interview, 2002), of 
Shanghai’s Academy of Social Sciences (SASS), spoke of Shanghai’s important 
position as ‘gate keeper of China’s economy’, and said that any suggestion to 
develop Pudong or Shanghai could have a significant impact on the country 
as a whole. This was a case where the national interest took priority over lo-
cal interests.
Third, the Chinese system of public administration had long kept Shang-
hai under tight control and thwarted any efforts to change. As one of the four 
cities directly governed by the State Council (Zhixiashi), Shanghai had little 
autonomy and was required to send almost all its proposals (including pro-
posals for large urban redevelopment projects) to central government for ap-
proval before taking any further action. This resulted in many proposals being 
blocked by central government because they were seen as conflicting with the 
national interest.
Fourth, the strict financial control exercised by the state left Shanghai with 
little scope for reallocating its resources to urban development. The payment 
of 80% of its annual revenue to central government left Shanghai with hardly 
enough to maintain its day-to-day expenditure on urban infrastructure, let 
alone to invest in vast backward areas like Pudong.
Little by little, as economic reform began to progress and China opened up 
to the outside world, barriers to local initiatives to develop Pudong appeared 
to be falling away. Internationally, the end of the cold war saw a lessening in 
the hostility of China’s political environment; locally, both central and local 
government began to appreciate that Shanghai was rapidly losing its advan-
tages to the cities in South China. If no reforms were carried out in Shanghai, 
the economic advantages that Shanghai had enjoyed for so long could be-
come problems for China’s economy. In June 1988 therefore SMG established 
the Pudong Development (Administrative) Office. Between April and August 
1989, local politicians like Zhu Rongji, Huang Ju and Ni Tianzeng were heav-
ily involved in the preparation of plans to develop Pudong, but the tight con-
trol exerted by central government would never allow Shanghai to carry out a 
project as large as the Pudong development.
Although much preparatory work had been done at local level and Shang-
hai continued to lobby for a position comparable to that given to the cities 
of South China to allow it to speed up its urban development, central gov-
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ernment was hesitant about what decision to make. The lack of progress in 
Shanghai also reflected the range of opinions on the open door policy at cen-
tral level. Central government was concerned about Shanghai but hoped that 
delaying Shanghai’s development would enable it to use experience gained 
in South China to reduce the risk. Li Zhanjun (personal interview, 2002) de-
scribed Shanghai’s situation at the time as follows:
‘…. As in the case of the Shenzhen development, there were difference 
of opinion between leading figures in central government. For example 
Chen Yun, one of the leading decision-makers, had never been to Shen-
zhen. These differences made it impossible to promote and implement 
nationwide reform. So central government deliberately made Shanghai 
start slowly and kept a careful eye on what was going on elsewhere (in 
Shenzhen and other leading centres of reform). But central government 
did consider improving the status of Shanghai, for example by setting 
up a central stock exchange, since Shanghai once had China’s only cen-
tral stock exchange. Meanwhile, central government was also giving 
consideration to allowing Shanghai to experiment with land lease, set-
ting up an urban development fund and sharing revenue with central 
government.’
Academics have different opinions about why the delay lasted so long. West-
ern researchers like Yatsko (2000, p. 20) blamed the delay on the city’s politi-
cal situation. In the early 1980s few politicians with a background in Shanghai 
held positions in national decision-making bodies in Beijing or enjoyed close 
relationships with leading figures in central government. This meant that 
Shanghai was poorly positioned politically, a fact that Chinese researchers 
consider highly significant. Shanghai’s star showed the first signs of ascend-
ance in the mid-1980s, when Beijing decided to transfer Jiang Zemin (in 1985) 
and Zhu Rongji (in 1987) to take up leading positions in central government. 
The promotion of these two senior officials from Shanghai, both of whom 
were technocrats and well-educated, established connections between local 
and central government, so restoring Shanghai’s voice in the capital. Academ-
ics have different opinions about why the delay lasted so long. Western re-
searchers like Shanghai’s ascendance coincided with Deng’s nomination of 
Shanghai party secretary Jiang Zemin as his heir-apparent at the end of June 
1989. Jiang was the first in a long line of Shanghai officials to be appointed to 
top central government posts in the 1990s. He in turn was followed by Zhu 
Rongji, first as vice premier then, till 1998, as premier. Shanghai’s new leaders 
used their influence to lobby for the Pudong development and persuade Bei-
jing to let Shanghai retain a larger share of its revenues and foreign earnings. 
Chinese researchers consider this to be less significant. Even though the poli-
ticians with a Shanghai background were more numerous and better able to 
understand Shanghai’s situation, they were actually less able to give the city 
their open support. Chinese political culture requires newly promoted lead-
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ers to deal impartially with every city and province, so Jiang’s new position as 
party secretary and later president actually made it more difficult for him to 
support Shanghai.
The events in Tian’anmen Square were thought to affect the timing of cen-
tral government’s discussion on whether Shanghai should be opened up to 
external economic influence. The embargo imposed by the United States and 
the European Union placed restrictions on China’s political and economic ex-
change with many western countries including the US and the countries of 
the EU. Foreign direct investment (FDI) almost came to a halt. Investors were 
frustrated by the change and wondered what would come next. Would China 
remain stable and continue its promised economic reform? The new political 
and economic environment made it easier to persuade people at the high-
est level in government who refused to accept the open door policy, and to 
reach a consensus on Shanghai’s development between reformists and con-
servatives in the interests of China’s future. To open up Shanghai, the eco-
nomic heart of China, to foreign investors, central government needed to con-
vince the world that the open door policy was permanent and so avoid China 
having to carry the entire investment on its own. Discussion continued, with 
particular attention being paid to the choice of location. The compromise de-
cision was to develop a relatively isolated area that would have a relatively 
minor impact on Shanghai’s economy if things went wrong. Pudong was seen 
as the best choice. At the mayor of Shanghai’s annual international consulta-
tion conference in October 1989, Mayor Zhu Rongji officially introduced the 
Pudong development strategy and invited foreign investors to invest in Pu-
dong.
The lobbying for development approval for Pudong became more intense 
as local leadership sensed that there was now a good chance of the Pudong 
development becoming reality. Since Jiang Zemin had gone to Beijing immedi-
ately after the events in Tian’anmen Square, he preferred to keep silent about 
the Shanghai issue. Instead he advised local politicians to lobby a number of 
key decision-makers in central government. First to be lobbied was Deng Xi-
aoping, the architect of China’s open door policy, during his annual summer 
vacation in Shanghai. Deng agreed that he should have included Shanghai 
with South China earlier on, and supported the Pudong development. During 
his visits to Shanghai in 1990, 1991 and 1992, he also pointed out the impor-
tance of developing Pudong to the revival of Shanghai and to stimulating the 
economic development of the Yangtze region (see Figure 2.5) and the nation 
as a whole:
‘……Shanghai currently has everything it needs to speed up [its devel-
opment]. Shanghai has obvious advantages in terms of human resourc-
es, technology and management, and its influence could be enormous. 
Looking back, [I realise that] one of my main mistakes was not including 
Shanghai when I designated the four Special Economic Zones. If I had 
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done so, the Yangtze delta and the whole Yangtze valley, and indeed the 
prospects for implementing economic reform and an open door policy 
nationwide, would have been very different.’ (Deng, 1993, p. 376)
This new analysis, emphasising the regional significance of the Pudong devel-
opment, strengthened central government’s original arguments in favour of 
the development, not only as a temporary political issue but, more important, 
as coinciding with the national strategy, after ten years of economic reform, 
to extend the process of reform northwards from South China to benefit wid-
er areas of the country.
When Deng ceased to be an official leader of China his hope was that the 
Shanghai issue would pass to one of the other top leaders, for example the 
president, Yang Shangkun. Instead, with Yang’s support, the request of Shang-
hai was passed to the premier, Li Peng, and Chen Yun, both hard-liners and 
suspicious of the opening up of Shanghai. On 26 February 1990, after suc-
Figure 2.5 Shanghai, the Yangtze delta and the Yangtze basin 
Source: Yantze River Resources Base, 2007; National Bureau of Statistics 
of China, 2005b
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cessfully lobbying the majority of hard-line leaders, local politicians submit-
ted the Application to develop Pudong to the State Council. During the waiting 
period, further extensive lobbying was carried out to secure a final compro-
mise between reformists and conservatives in central government. In March 
1990, vice premier Yao Yilin and selected colleagues on the State Council car-
ried out fieldwork in Pudong, reporting their findings to the State Council as 
a whole (see Box 2.1) (Sun, 1999, p. 117). Their report further clarified the rela-
tionship between Pudong and Shanghai and suggested that Shanghai should 
learn from the Shenzhen development how to set itself up as an international 
metropolis, with special emphasis on developing the service sector in Pudong.
The report was finally approved on 12 April 1990. On the same day the 
State Council submitted the Pudong development proposal to the Stand-
ing Committee of the People’s Congress, where it was approved in principle. 
On 18 April 1990 no less a person than hard-line premier Li Peng went to 
Shanghai and officially announced the approval of the Pudong development. 
This gesture on the part of central government demonstrated the consen-
sus reached by central government decision-makers. Pudong New Area was 
granted the status of a sub-municipality, a status higher than that enjoyed 
by an ordinary urban district, giving it more autonomy in medium-sized in-
vestments and projects. It should however be borne in mind that central gov-
ernment’s decision was made in the national interest, not in the interests of 
Pudong or Shanghai.
After the Pudong development had received central government approval, 
the idea of linking that development to the future of Shanghai’s hinterland, 
the prosperous Yangtze delta and the vast Yangtze valley (for details see Box 
2.2) received further attention at both central and local level. In 1992 the link 
was formally established as national strategy for the Pudong development 
Box 2.1 State Council guidelines for the Pudong development
Aim: To develop Pudong as a modern district with a rational development 
structure, an efficient public transportation system, comprehensive urban 
infrastructure, a rapid telecommunication system and a sustainable natural 
environment
Strategy guidelines:
n Open door policies to stimulate development: adopt special preferential 
policies to attract foreign investment, technology and management 
from Hong Kong and elsewhere; open up certain services including 
finance, insurance, and retailing.
n Economic reform to stimulate opening up and development: set up 
experiments to establish Shanghai stock exchange and securities centre, 
a free-trade zone and the commercialisation of land use rights.
n The development of Pudong should not only play its part in reviving 
Shanghai and linking the city to the global economy but should also 
serve as the economic driving force for the Yangtze river delta and the 
Yangtze river valley, with effects extending to the country at large, so 
complying with economic reform and the national interest.
Source: Wan and Yuan, 2001, pp. 27-28
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(Huang 1993). As the first to propose such an idea, Deng Xiaoping, architect 
of China’s reform and open door policy, reiterated the point in his visits to 
Shanghai in 1991 and 1992:
‘……Developing Pudong will not only have a significant impact on Pu-
dong but will also be decisive to Shanghai’s development as a base for 
the development of the Yangtze delta and the Yangtze valley.’ (Deng, 
1993, p. 366) 
Interestingly, Deng’s proposal was much in line with the thinking of the fa-
mous supporter of reform and world-famous Chinese sociologist and anthro-
pologist Fei Xiaotong, who also favoured the integration of Pudong with its 
hinterland, though for very different reasons. Fei had been writing proposals 
for the development of the Yellow river delta and for the economic revital-
isation of Shanghai ever since 1978. Although a strong supporter of Shang-
hai’s reform, he foresaw the problems that would be caused by developing 
isolated special economic zones (SEZs) in South China and was deeply con-
cerned about the increasing conflict between regional and national interests. 
If Pudong was to be developed like other SEZs, not only Shanghai but also 
the hinterland which came under its influence would become more and more 
independent of central government control. As he saw it, Pudong, and indeed 
Shanghai, should, rather like Hong Kong, be developed as a centre of trade, fi-
nance, information, transportation, science and technology, forming part of a 
vast market in the surrounding region and sufficiently attractive to generate 
international interest. Equally important, the development of Shanghai and 
Pudong should be undertaken under central government leadership (Kagami, 
2002, pp. 47-48). Although for different reasons, both Deng and Fei empha-
sised the regional importance of the Pudong development and its importance 
to the national interest.
This proposal was later approved and accepted by central government. At 
several national conferences and party congresses (1992, 1994, 1995) China’s 
president Jiang Zemin emphasised the strategic role played by Shanghai in 
China’s economic development:
as China’s major trading centre, providing access to what was expected 
would by the end of the decade be the world’s tenth largest trading nation;
As the ‘dragon’s head’ (the principal economic powerhouse) for the coun-
try’s largest integrated economic area then developing in the Yangtze basin, 
in which one-third of China’s population produced more than 50% of the 
country’s industrial and agricultural output;
as the major economic anchor in the Yangtze delta region, in which 160 
million people (13% of China’s population) account for more than 27% of 
the country’s industrial output.
There were several reasons for the favourable reception of this proposal by 
central government.
n
n
n
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First, it coincided with the reformists’ long-term national strategy to grad-
ually extend economic reform from the south of China to the north, and from 
the coast to the hinterland, allowing more Chinese citizens – the 200 mil-
lion Chinese responsible for 30% of China’s GDP – to benefit from reform. The 
growth of Shanghai, the largest port city and one of the country’s tradition-
al economic centres, should stimulate the development of the Yangtze delta 
and the Yangtze valley, both of which relied heavily on the Yangtze for the 
transport of their products to Shanghai and the transport of the goods they 
required from Shanghai. In the early 1980s, China designated four cities on 
Box 2.2 The Yangtze river delta and the Yangtze river valley
The Yangtze river (in Chinese Changjiang), whose length of 6,300 km makes 
it the third longest river in the world, connects the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau 
with the East China Sea, and has immeasurable ecological importance. Its 
drainage area covers 1.8 million km2. The Yangtze river delta (in Chinese 
Changjiang sanjiaozhou), an area of 100,100 km2 round the mouth of the 
Yangtze River, includes Shanghai, the southern part of Jiangsu (including 
Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou, Nanjing, Zhenjiang,Yangzhou, Taizhou and 
Natong) and the northern part of Zhejiang (including Hangzhou, Jiaxing, 
Huzhou, Ningbo, Shaoxing and Zhoushan) and has a population of 135 
million. The triangle formed by Shanghai, Nanjing and Hangzhou is the most 
prosperous area of the Yangtze river delta and indeed of China as a whole. By 
2001 the Yangtze river delta area had become Asia’s most populous urban 
region, containing 10.4% of China’s population in 2.2% of China’s land area 
and producing 22.1% of China’s GDP, 24.5% of the its revenue and 28.5% 
of its total import-export volume. GDP per capita in the Yangtze river delta 
is 35,040 yuan (US$ 4,232), 3.7 times the average national GDP per capita, 
10,561 yuan (US$ 1,275).
The Yangtze river delta offers a number of advantages, including regulatory 
and administrative structures better able to accommodate economic growth 
than those in many other parts of China. The region’s infrastructure is 
expanding rapidly, with new express highways along key corridors, express 
rail services, new housing and services and the supplier and service industry 
base required by foreign joint ventures. As a result, the region is receiving 
significant amounts of direct investment from multi-nationals.
The region covered by the Yangtze river valley (or the Yangtze river basin) 
(in Chinese Changjiang liuyu) includes Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Anhui, 
Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Sichuan and Yunnan. It extends 
2,000 km from Shanghai on the East China Sea, to beyond Sichuan, the 
country’s second most populous province, has a watershed covering 1.8 
million km2 and a population of more than 400 million, just over one third 
of China’s total population, The region is one of China’s most economically 
important, generating about half of China's gross industrial and agricultural 
output.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2005b; China Statistical Information Web;  
Canada China Business Forum
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the south-east coast to serve as test beds for economic reform and the open 
door policy. Although not in the vanguard of China’s economic reform, the de-
velopment of the Yangtze delta region since 1978 had led to the provision of 
the kind of good infrastructural facilities and skilled labour required for fur-
ther economic improvement. At the end of 1980s and the 1990s, China began 
to shift the focus of economic development northwards to the Yangtze delta, 
where Shanghai provided a centre for economic and cultural development. 
The development of the Yangtze River Delta, as shown in Table 2.1, proved the 
significance of the strategic move.
Second, it should strengthen the regional leadership of Shanghai and stim-
ulate the creation of a win-win situation that would intensify more structured 
regional interaction between Shanghai and its hinterland, reduce unnecessary 
competition and so enhance the overall competitiveness of the Yangtze delta 
and the provinces and cities along the Yangtze. Its strategic location in the 
Yangtze basin, its strong economic foundation and its abundance of skilled 
manpower made Shanghai more potentially attractive to foreign investment 
in higher-grade industries than any city in South China. The Pudong devel-
opment should be able to help Shanghai, and indeed China, to realise these 
ambitions.
Third, by considering the interests of other provinces and cities, central 
government hoped to reduce any worries or jealousy that might be aroused 
by fears that the approval of the Pudong development might mean the loss of 
attention by central government and the absorption of all available domestic 
and foreign investment by Pudong. Prime Minister Li Peng (1990) raised two 
issues involving the Pudong project at a national conference held on 2 August 
1990. He said that the whole nation should support the decision to go ahead 
with the Pudong development as part of the nation’s economic development:
‘…… One thing that should be borne in mind is that now the econom-
Table 2.1 Comparison of main economic indicators in the 15 cities in the Yangtze River Delta with China
Indicators
Total Average annual rate of increase (%)
Yangtze  
delta National
Percentage of  
national average Yangtze  
delta National
Percentage 
higher than 
national average2004 2003
GDP (billion yuan) 2760.46 13651.50 20.20 19.50 15.40 9.50 5.90
Comprising: Manufacturing 
and construction  
(billion yuan)
1538.74 7238.70 21.30 – 17.60 11.10 6.50
Services (billion yuan) 1098.63 4338.40 25.30 – 14.10 8.30 5.80
Fixed assets  
(billion yuan)
1317.71 7007.30 18.80 19.20 24.40 15.80 -1.40
Retail sales of consumer 
goods (billion yuan)
795.63 5395 14.70 15.10 14.90 13.30 1.60
Total value of foreign trade 
export
204.52 593.40 34.50 31.60 47.50 35.40 12.10
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2005b, p. 15
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ic situation is improving, and we have just announced the approval of 
the Pudong Development Zone in Shanghai and are making the eighth 
five-year plan (1990-1995), certain regional governments are becoming 
impatient and afraid of falling behind. Each province has sent people 
to Beijing [to lobby] and to convey [their wishes] to the State Council 
and the State Planning Committee…. Another thing is that since the an-
nouncement of Pudong Development Zone, some provinces and cities 
have been feeling very uneasy. All of them wanted to get more invest-
ment from Hong Kong, Taiwan and other sources of foreign investment. 
Some want to establish new development zones because existing zones 
are not big enough, others want to set up new development zones on 
the pretext of coordination with the Pudong Development Zone. In my 
view everyone should be perfectly clear about this issue. The decision 
to develop and open up Pudong is a very important strategic measure, 
which concerns not only the development of Shanghai but also the eco-
nomic development of the Yangtze valley and indeed the country as a 
whole. We need to concentrate on this project and make a good job of 
it. If one place sets up a development zone and then other places do the 
same, the end result could be that none of them is done well. Many of 
the world’s economists agree with the idea of opening up and develop-
ing Pudong. They have made many suggestions, but have also warned us 
not to invest too much in development zones. These opinions deserve 
careful consideration. The principle is simple: whichever projects you 
want to realise will require money, foreign capital and domestic capi-
tal…. During the next ten years we should concentrate our efforts on 
improving existing development zones ….’ 
Central government not only repeatedly emphasised its support at numer-
ous national events and on frequent visits to Shanghai and Pudong, but also 
introduced a range of preferential policies to support the implementation of 
the Pudong development. Words of support were followed by deeds, includ-
ing 10 preferential policies adopted in March 1990, 9 regulations issued on 
10 September 1990 and 10 other preferential policies adopted in March 1992 
(see summary in Box 2.3). The first 10 policies included not only policies al-
ready introduced for other SEZs and Economic Technological Development 
Zones but also a number of policies introduced specially for Pudong, such as 
tax deductions and exemptions and preferential conditions for infrastructur-
al investment. These policies were given practical form in regulations issued 
in September 1990. The second 10 policies issued in 1992 not only delegated 
more authority to Shanghai but also gave the city the privilege of attracting 
investment by issuing stock and bonds. Shortly before the Party’s fifth Central 
Committee Plenum in September 1995, central government adopted 18 more 
‘extraordinary’ policies to speed up the development, including permission for 
foreign banks locating in Pudong to conduct business in local currency, grant-
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ing projects in Pudong the status of ‘national priority projects’ and allocating 
Pudong annual government loans of 700 million yuan (US$ 90 million). These 
policies later proved to be decisive in helping Pudong to establish its privi-
leged position as a financial and trading centre. It is interesting to note how 
global influences began to affect not only the Pudong development decision-
making process but also the way in which the final goal would be achieved. 
Attention has already been drawn to the way the open debate initiated at lo-
cal level called on international knowledge and expertise to assist Shanghai 
in shaping its goals for Pudong, and the way that central government used 
opinions from and suggestions by international experts to support its deci-
sion to go ahead. Research showed that these opinions were not simply used 
Box 2.3 Preferential policies adopted by central government to aid the development of 
Shanghai and Pudong
1. Ten preferential policies adopted in March 1990, included:
n Allowing foreign investors to invest in the service industry (including 
finance, retail and trading) in Pudong (forbidden in other parts of 
China)
n Allowing foreign investors to use foreign finance to set up banks in 
Shanghai and Pudong
n Allowing foreign trade organisations to trade from warehouses in 
Pudong’s tax-free zone
n Accepting the principle of leasing land for value; encouraging foreign 
investors to enter into land development contracts
n Allowing Pudong to retain a certain amount of revenue for its further 
development.
2. Ten preferential policies adopted in March, 1992, included:
n Allowing Chinese and foreign trading companies to set up warehouses 
in the Waigaoqiao area
n Allowing large state-owned enterprises located in Pudong New Area to 
carry on import-export activities
n Allowing the setting up of non-industrial projects
n Allowing stocks and bonds to be issued to support the Pudong 
development and allowing bonds issued by other regions to be traded 
in Shanghai
n Allowing Shanghai to issue commercial bonds in the amount of 500 
million yuan (US$ 1 million);
n Allowing Shanghai to issue bonds in the amount of 100 million yuan 
(US$ 12 million) over and above the permitted quota
n Provision by central government of a US$ 200 million low-interest 
annual loan to Shanghai, over and above the existing US$ 100 million 
annual loan
n Allowing Shanghai to issue US$ 100 million extra ‘B ‘shares
n Allowing Shanghai to have US$ 100 million extra over and above the 
original US$ 200 million.
Source: Huang, 1997, p. 76
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by the state as a pretext but were given serious consideration at both local 
and central level.
 2.4 Articulating global and local - planning, 
architecture and management
‘Globalisation should be conceived of as a contingent and multicentric mesh 
of interactive processes that operates on a variety of scales’ (Wigmans, 2001; 
Kooijman and Wigmans, 2001). Globalisation is not just a matter of capital 
flows, but also involves the dissemination of knowledge, including ideas and 
images relating to architecture and planning. Western planning experience 
has had its effect on the wider systematic changes taking place in China, as 
shown by the involvement of foreign expertise during the planning debate 
and the adoption of foreign planning concepts and ideas in Shanghai.
Analysts are becoming increasingly interested in the role played by world-
wide networks of knowledge-based experts with sufficient power and re-
sources to affect decisions in arenas like foreign policy, economic policy or, as 
in the present case, property development and urban planning. Internation-
ally famous architects invited to design master plans for huge urban projects 
in global cities round the world form part of a network of professionals with 
recognised expertise and competence in particular fields, e.g. the prepara-
tion of urban master plans, and have an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that field. This is the new ‘professional-managerial class’ 
associated with information processing activities related to the restructuring 
Box 2.4 Chronology of the Pudong development decision-making process
1979-1984:  Local debate and feasibility study
1984:  (June) Shanghai strategic development plan
1986:  Shanghai master plan
1987:  Pudong Development Research Consultation Group starts its research 
into the Pudong development
1987:  Pudong master plan
1988:  Pudong Development Research Consultation Group organises an 
international conference on the Pudong development
1988:  SMG sets up the Pudong Development (Administrative) Office
1990:  Deng Xiaoping visits Shanghai and proposes to link the Pudong 
development with the development of the Yangtze delta and the 
Yangtze basin
1990:  Vice premier Yao Yilin and colleagues from the State Council carry out 
fieldwork in Pudong
1990:  Pudong development proposal submitted by the State Council and 
approved in principle by the Standing Committee of the People’s 
Congress
1990:  Officially announcement of the Pudong development.
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of the world economy (Castells, 1989, p. 348).
In the early 1990s a number of urban development concepts, e.g. zoning, 
the CBD, enterprise zones and tax-free zones, and their associated images, 
such as super-high-rise buildings as symbolic landmarks, eco-architecture 
and intelligent architecture, mainly formulated by French, American and Jap-
anese planning and architectural experts, were introduced into Shanghai in 
the early stages of planning for what was to be one of the world’s largest in-
ternational financial centres, the Lujiazui central finance district. This trans-
fer of ideas was initiated and guided by representatives of SMG, in association 
with Paris-based representatives of the French government. In 1992 SMG su-
pervised the marketing of the development of Lujiazui, a process that would 
need to rely on speculative property investment from Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
various branches of central government.
A steadily increasing number of foreign institutions and firms also assist-
ed SMG in its efforts to devise a strategic plan for restructuring the city. In 
the 1980s and 1990s the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
helped to guide Shanghai’s territorial and sectoral restructuring by assisting 
in environmental planning and the preparation of strategic plans for a met-
ropolitan transport system. In 1990 ADB sponsored research into the develop-
ment of infrastructure (water and electricity) for Pudong’s 522 km2. In 1991-
1992, ADB commissioned Chreod Ltd., of Ottawa, Canada (in association with 
PPK Consultants and Kinhill Engineers of Australia) to prepare a strategic plan 
for Pudong (for a summary see McLemore, 1995). The United Nations (in this 
case UNDP) was one of the first bodies to become involved in research into 
the Pudong development, though it actually would have preferred new sat-
ellite towns to be built along the Hujia Highway (leading from Shanghai to 
Jiading) and the Hujin Highway (leading from Shanghai to Ningbo). In its view, 
the lack of a bridge across the Huangpu would make it impossible for the Pu-
dong development to make full use of Shanghai’s existing infrastructure. Chi-
nese experts presented arguments showing the advantages of Pudong. Even 
though Pudong‘s infrastructure was poor, it already housed the main infra-
structure for the Shanghai area (sewage, electricity and harbour facilities) and 
could accommodate a second airport for Shanghai. But what Shanghai really 
wanted was to recover its lost business and service sector. New areas along 
the Hujia and Hujin highways could only become new satellite towns, not 
central business districts, and so could not support the function formerly per-
formed by the Bund, Shanghai’s historical CBD. Pudong, only 500 metres from 
the Bund, offered much better opportunities. The discussion finally ended in 
Pudong’s favour.
One of the most powerful global influences affecting the Pudong initia-
tive came from France, not only because of the good political relationships 
between China and France in general, and between Shanghai and Paris in 
particular, but also because of Shanghai’s special colonial ties with France 
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and the cultural and architectural influence exerted by the French style. In 
February 1988 the central district plan for the 1.7 km2 of Lujiazui prepared by 
SUPDI finally clarified Lujiazui’s function as CBD. The amount of floor space 
proposed was between 1.8 and 2.4 million square metres. According to Huang, 
the senior planner, the Lujiazui proposal was so bold that the Shanghai Urban 
Planning Bureau did not even dare to include it in the approval procedure at 
local level. The later change in the way in which the proposal was perceived 
was partially due to the influence of officials from the Paris-based Institute 
for Management and Urban Planning for the Isle de France region (IAURIF). 
In September 1985, IAURIF signed cooperative agreements with SMG and the 
Beijing municipal government to provide technical assistance on metropoli-
tan planning issues. The formation at this time of professional and social re-
lationships between individual Parisian and Shanghainese politicians and of-
ficials laid the foundation for the eventual involvement of Global Intelligence 
Corps (GIC) in Shanghai (Olds, 1997, 2001). The key French official guiding the 
creation of this relationship was Gilles Antie, a geographer and town planner 
and IAURIF’s director of international affairs. The collaboration was promoted 
by the French government, which foresaw a vast untapped market for French 
businessmen as Shanghai opened up. Since the state still plays a enormously 
significant part in business activities in China and guanxi (system of relations 
or personal connections based on mutual benefits) is a vital element in do-
ing business with the Chinese, these efforts could be seen as a further step 
towards building up the good, stable and trusting relationships necessary for 
French businessmen to operate smoothly in Shanghai.
A further example of the collaboration between Shanghai and the French 
was the international tendering process for consultancy for the 1.7 km2 Pu-
dong-Lujiazui financial centre in 1992 (see Figure 2.6 and 2.7). The cost of 
sponsoring this process was shared by SMG and a number of French firms. A 
number of famous architects active on the world stage, such as Richard Rog-
ers (USA), Dominique Perrault (France) and Toyo Ito (Japan), were invited to 
develop master plans for key areas such as Lujiazui. Other internationally 
known architects that played an advisory role during the development of the 
plan included Jean Nouvel, Ove Arup Partnership, Norman Foster and Associ-
ates, Renzo Piano and James Stirling. None of these elite foreign designers had 
worked in China before, but SMG wanted to employ global architectural ce-
lebrities with a clear understanding of what a futuristic 21st-century interna-
tional centre should look like (Olds, 1997, p. 117). Olds concluded that the fact 
that this foreign input had little impact on the eventual master plan hardly 
mattered, because their role was largely promotional: ‘Lujiazui was simply 
branded by the world’s design elites, and SMG made full use of their “signa-
tures” to achieve broader goals than the practical development of the 170 ha 
area’ (Olds, 2001, p. 234). The inclusion of the resulting images in brochures 
and on websites attracted greater amounts of global capital into Pudong.
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The lack of Chinese experience meant that the location was treated as a 
tabula rasa. The creative references used by the ‘global architects’ were not 
derived from Chinese cities, hardly bore any relationship to the existing situa-
tion and took no account of implementation problems such as the relocation 
of existing inhabitants. The local context was largely ignored. Seemingly eve-
Figure 2.6 On-site investigations by Chinese and foreign architects between July and 
November 1992
Source: Wang and Xia, 2001
Figure 2.7 Bidding for design consultation of the Lujiazui Financial Center project 
between Chinese and foreign architects, November 1992
Source: Wang, 2003
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ry city was treated the same way. The proposed plans drew on their authors’ 
considerable experience with global cities. For example, the Ito proposal drew 
heavily on a 1992 master plan for the redevelopment of a large site in Ant-
werp, and Perrault’s plan was heavily influenced by references to situations in 
New York, Venice and Paris (Olds, 2001, p. 215). All of this shows that Castells’ 
‘space of flows’ is also reflected in the tendency to create architectural uni-
formity between new directional centres in different societies (Castells, 1996, 
p. 417). As Rogers put it, ‘Shanghai is a modern city, and they are shaped by 
the same kind of pressures all over the world’ (quoted in Olds, 2001, p. 208). It 
seems that the global forces involved in the local development of Shanghai 
tended to underestimate the genius loci and the complex network of relation-
ships between global and local.
Nevertheless, the information and knowledge provided was not without 
value to the actual planning. Many of the proposals were in fact adopted by lo-
cal Shanghainese planners, but in a more pragmatic and practical way, adapt-
ed to the local situation. This was a case where global information was adapt-
ed to suit the local environment, illustrating that the articulation of global and 
local characteristics is dualistic, dynamic and under constant tension. The 
relationship between global and local is contextual (Kooijman and Wigmans, 
2001, p. 324). Globalisation is an open-ended process which involves balancing 
global and local opportunities and threats (Robertson, 1988, pp. 27-28). 
Pudong’s Jinmao Tower provides a good example: a modern skyscraper, in-
spired by modern architecture, but an object of pride to the Chinese because 
Figure 2.8 Plans submitted with bids for consultation on the design of Lujiazui financial centre 
Source: Wang and Xia, 2001
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of its respect for traditional values. As shown in Box 2.5, its design and en-
gineering was an interesting, constructive ‘local-global collaboration’. The 
design has become one of the most appreciated architectural designs of all 
of Pudong’s high-rise. ‘In fact, through Pudong’s Lujiazui district the Chinese 
authorities have followed a policy of bringing in international design firms 
to work with local design institutes, with the objective of creating of a truly 
“international city”. They are not only looking for skyscraper design expertise, 
but also for an injection of formal innovation into a somewhat tired local ar-
chitecture scene.’ (Ruano, 1999, p. 33)
The Jinmao Tower was developed by the state-owned China Shanghai For-
eign Trade Centre (CSFTC). In 1993 CSFTC organised an international design 
competition and invited seven famous international firms of architects to 
present designs for the tower. The jury was split between those who support-
ed the design prepared by the American company SOM and those who sup-
ported a Japanese design. The design by SOM was described as a giant Chi-
nese pagoda or bamboo shoot, and had considerable appeal in the particular 
context. According to Wigmans and Chen (2006, pp. 58-64), SOM adopted the 
form of a Chinese ancient pagoda (some also connected the form with the 
form bamboo shoot or pencil) – a traditional tower-like landmark in Chinese 
cities – and transformed it into a modern skyscraper with a metal and glass 
façade that is completely digitally controlled. The physical shape of the Jin-
mao Tower gently steps back to create a rhythmic pattern as it rise upwards. 
The lowest segment of the building is sixteen stories high and each succeed-
ing segment is 1/8th smaller than its predecessor. By doing so, it imitates the 
traditional Chinese number series of the reduced rates that is also used in 
Figure 2.9 Lujiazui Financial Centre, an emerging platform for global capital flow and 
knowledge transfer
Source: CNAP
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the architectural concept of the Chinese pagodas. The result of those princi-
ples gives especially the top of the Jinmao Tower a similar visual expression 
as the top of the pagodas. In addition, the detailed design of Jinmao Tower 
also shows an attempt to creatively embrace Chinese traditional elements of 
architecture and landscape design in this modern skyscraper, like the use of 
round gates in Chinese garden, the folk windows from north China, or the tra-
ditional golden-water bridges. See further explanation Xing and Zhang (1999), 
Ma (2000), Zhang and Yu (2001). Like the general director of SOM states: the 
Jinmao Tower “in some way evoked the culture and memory of China, that 
was unmistakably Chinese”. SOM’s bid was declared the winner7.
Interestingly, the design and construction schedule for the tower contained 
an element of Chinese superstition in the recurrence of the number eight, a 
Chinese symbol for fortune: Each segment’s height is reduced by one-eighth 
of the original base height and continues until the segment height is eight 
   In the end the SOM design was awarded the commission, thanks to its successful balance between local tradi-
tions and modernity and the attention it paid to the local context. As the jury observed, plan no. 65 (the one de-
signed by SOM) was ‘a product that combines Chinese traditional culture and modern technology, an extension 
and development of Chinese pagoda-style architecture, and a continuity of the Shanghai haipai style architecture 
in Pudong - a pluralist, pragmatic, commercial and cosmopolitan culture, open to participation by the masses 
and a mixture of eastern and western culture (Zhang, 2000, pp. 8-10).
Box 2.5 Details of the Jinmao Tower
Site area: 23,611 m2
Total construction area: 200,079 m2
Total height: 420.5 m
Construction began: 10 May 1994
Construction finished: 28 August 1997
Operation started: End of 1998
Consortium of General Management: Shanghai Construction Co. Ltd (China)
OBAYASHI (Japan)
SGE (France)
CHAVENE (Hong Kong)
Sub-contractor for external wall: Gartner (Germany)
Sub-contract for elevator: Mitsubishi (Japan)
Sub-contractor for air conditioning: ROM (Germany)
Sub-contractor for electricity: CEGELEC (France)
Sub-contract for IT: SET& E (Singapore)
Internal Design: BLD and DRDC (US); B+H (Canada) 
Hotel Management: HYATT (US)
Property Management: Shanghai Jinmao Property 
Management Ltd.;
IMTECH (Netherlands). 
Source: Zhang, 2000
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levels. At this point the Hotel begins and each segment reduces one-eighth 
of the 8-level segment until it reaches the 88th level. Eights also appears in 
Jinmao’s advanced structural engineering system, which ferities the building 
against the typhoon’s winds and earthquakes typical of the region’. The tower 
is built around an Octagon-shaped concrete shear wall core surrounded by 
8 exterior composite supercolumns and 8 exterior steel columns (Xing and 
Zhang, 1999, p. 35; Qiao, 2003; Hu, 2004). Besides, the number of floors and the 
street number were both 88; the building was completed on 28 August, 1997 
and opened in 1998.
Besides presenting a powerful combination of Chinese and Western archi-
tectural design concepts, the large number of local and international concerns 
involved in the tower’s construction, emphasised Jinmao Tower’s character as 
a work of global-local collaboration. PriceWaterhouseCoopers and a Chinese 
company were invited to investigate the market and conduct a feasibility 
study. The shareholders favoured general contracting as better suited to the 
Chinese context. Two Chinese and two foreign companies set up a consorti-
um to undertake general project management. A tendering process was used 
to select the best general contractor and sub-contractors. More than seventy 
companies, Chinese and foreign, were invited to act as consultants or became 
involved in the construction process. The involvement of international know-
how was an important factor in controlling the project’s budget, duration and 
quality, all matters which normally caused headaches in Chinese construc-
tional projects. Foreign experience in the design of high-rise buildings was 
particularly important, because the Jinmao Tower, which was to be the high-
est building in China, actually conflicted with a number of local regulations. 
These conflicts were solved by negotiation with local government, a process 
which also allowed the local authorities to learn from international experi-
ence and improve existing regulations on skyscraper design. The Jinmao Tow-
er (see Figure 2.10), now a Chinese standard, can be considered an interesting 
high-rise building, based on American standards but mediated by traditional 
values to produce a westernised image of a modern building along more do-
mestic lines. The building’s architectural vocabulary expresses local identity 
and historical roots while providing an anchorage point and concrete physi-
cal space for the globalising economy (Sassen, 1998). It represents a fusion of 
global and local. In general terms, using Castells’ terminology, it reflects the 
physical articulation of the relationship between the space of flows and the 
space of places.
Design and urban planning are not the only areas that reflect global influ-
ence on local transformations. In fact after the official start of the Pudong de-
velopment in 1990 international collaboration became more intense in many 
areas. The World Bank and ADB funded both tangible infrastructure and en-
vironmental projects such as bridges and sewage treatment plants. Nanpu 
Bridge and Yangpu Bridge were the first two projects realised by Shanghai 
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with the help of international loans from ADB. To get these two projects un-
der way, ADB introduced a tendering system, offered technical assistance and 
training for the project team and introduced modern project management 
concepts (ADB, 1997a and 1997b). The experience helped Shanghai to adapt 
more quickly to new techniques of bridge design and maintenance. The col-
laboration also resulted in the introduction of efficient management strate-
gies for finance, project management, organisation management and trans-
parency on the Shanghai side, assisting the growing adoption of international 
standards. A small number of other organisations from different countries 
also participated in Pudong development projects, e.g. the Japan Interna-
tional Cooperation Agency (JICA), a research group that assisted the Japanese 
Government in preparing its China loan (Zhou, 2004). In 1990, JICA cooperat-
ed with Shanghai in research into the feasibility of the development of the 
Waigaoqiao tax-free zone. In the same year, delegates from the Japanese Bank 
and Japanese insurance experts went to Pudong to evaluate the potential of 
Pudong as a financial centre. Shortly afterwards, a group of Japanese archi-
tects, planners and legal experts went to Pudong for a consultative confer-
ence to discuss the Pudong development with their Chinese counterparts.
Figure 2.10 Jinmao Tower, a landmark in Pudong, Shanghai that combines Chinese traditional culture and 
modern technology 
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The relationship between Shanghai and the rest of the world is based on 
mutual interest and benefit. After decades of seclusion the Shanghainese 
began to demonstrate a willingness to understand and learn from the world 
outside. Local politicians shared an awareness of their lack of advanced tech-
nology and management skills and experience in large-scale urban redevelop-
ment (Li, 2002). This awareness and eagerness to learn was encouraged by an 
increasingly pragmatic attitude at central and local level towards strategies 
for reform. This pragmatism involved a willingness to borrow experience from 
the outside world regardless of ideological considerations, and a keenness to 
experiment. Deng Xiaoping once pointed out the importance of experiment 
in the context of the Pudong development: ‘Someone has to make the first at-
tempt and guide things a new way. Whoever is first must be prepared to fail, 
but failing is not important. My hope is that the Shanghainese will become 
more open-minded and bolder and will develop faster’ (Deng, 1993, p. 367). 
This attitude was repeatedly encouraged by other central government leaders. 
On a visit to Shanghai in 1993, Zhu Rongji, a former mayor of Shanghai who 
later became prime minister, said: “Shanghai should create a new administra-
tive system for the new Pudong development, and implement a new efficient 
form of government adapted to the process of modernisation.” Jiang Zemin 
(1997), former Secretary to Shanghai’s Communist Party and later president 
of China, encouraged Pudong to take a leading role in ‘creating a new style of 
administration, upgrading the service sector and opening up to the outside 
world’. Meanwhile the outside world was displaying a strong interest in Chi-
na in general and Shanghai in particular, partly for historical reasons such as 
Shanghai’s former ties with the West and its old reputation as the ‘Paris of the 
Far East’, and partly because of its strategic location, its readiness to adopt 
new ideas and its willingness and ability to connect with the outside world.
 2.5 From draft to reality
After long preparation, much public debate between government officials, 
professional researchers and planners from China and abroad and increasing 
amounts of assistance from international experts, central and local govern-
ment were able to get a clear picture of Pudong’s future. But more needed to 
be done if this ambitious project was ever to be realised. Even though the fea-
sibility of the Pudong development had been subjected to intense examina-
tion, it took till 1990 before any concrete plan was prepared. Pudong research-
er Li Zhanjun (personal interview 2002) commented on the lack of planning 
and implementation strategy faced by local government before the Pudong 
development was announced:
‘When the Pudong development started, its planning was done in a 
hurry. [In fact] there was no initial plan, master plan or strategy. Even 
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though there had been some preliminary research and suggestions for 
the Pudong development, they were more in the nature of proposals, ex-
plain why Pudong should be developed and what the advantages were 
of the Pudong development. But after the announcement was made, the 
new focus had to be on how it should be implemented and operated. 
My impression is that the decision was made before any planning was 
done.’
Huang (personal interview 2002) also recalled his experience of making hur-
ried plans for Pudong, confirming the embarrassing situation in which the lo-
cal government found itself immediately prior to Li Peng’s announcement of 
the Pudong development:
‘Knowing that Li Peng would come to announce the approval of the Pu-
dong development, [local politicians wanted to give the impression of 
having a concrete plan for Pudong]. My colleague Xu and I were asked 
by the director of SUPDI to prepare a detailed plan by the beginning of 
April. Because of the lack of time, we used several thousand photos we 
had previously collected, in an attempt to demonstrate our previous 
ideas about Pudong’s development. Luckily, our work was quite success-
ful….’
Nevertheless, once the Pudong development project was officially announced, 
local politicians made it very clear that urban planning should be given top 
priority. This lesson was probably learnt from the results of extensive research 
into experience with the special economic zones in South China, where cha-
otic development without urban planning resulted in a deterioration in the 
environment of the cities affected and discouraged participation by outside 
investors8. SMG not only required a good plan, but also emphasised the need 
to plan individual sectors to achieve the goal of economic sustainability. If 
sector development was not handled differently from the way it was done in 
the south, there would be insufficient incentive for investment. Accordingly a 
sector plan was made in parallel with the preparation of the Pudong master 
plan (see Figure 2.11), pointing out the detailed designation of the econom-
ic functions in this area. The sector plan included a financial zone, a trading 
zone, a tax-free zone, an export processing zone and a high-tech park. The 
   Urban planning in Western countries faces problems of rigidity: urban planning in China has to cope with both 
rigidity and chaos. The rigidity in Chinese urban planning results from the inflexibility of the planning tools and a 
long approval process that takes little account of dramatic urban changes. The chaos results from the weakness 
with which the local authority ensures that approved plans are followed. Developers, from within and outside 
China, with their strong financial backing, can easily change the details. Even Pudong, a district with a better 
reputation for ensuring its plans are followed, still occasionally had to bow to the requirements of important 
stakeholders or investors, as in the case of Jinmao Tower, which was originally allowed a height of 360 metres but 
eventually reached a height of 420 metres, and the World Trade Centre, which was allowed a height of 380 metres 
but in the end reached a height of 460 metres.
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financial, trading and tax-free zones would be the first of their kind in China; 
the high-tech park would concentrate on IT and biological and medical de-
velopment. Many of the ideas come from what they have learned from the 
experiences in western countries or the Asian tigers in East Asia. Although 
local managers and planners lacked experience in these sectors, they had to 
take the risk, in the belief that an advanced economic structure would lay the 
foundation for the city’s future prosperity.
October 1989 saw the completion of the draft master plan. The Master 
Plan for Pudong New Area (1992), as is shown in Figure 2.11, designated Pu-
dong as a new multi-functional district that would fulfil all the requirements 
of a modern metropolis, with a reasonable development framework, a mod-
ern transportation network, a complete infrastructure, modern information 
systems and a good ecological environment. Its development would be inte-
grated into the revival and renewal of Puxi, so helping to develop Shanghai 
into an economic and financial centre for international trade (Sun, 1999). The 
urban structure of Pudong includes three developing axes and five main sub-
Figure 2.11 Pudong master plan 1992
Source: Wang and Xia, 2001
G
A. Lujiazui-Huamu Function Zone
B. Beicai-Zhangjiang Function Zone
C. Qingning Temple-Jinqiao Function Zone 
D. Waigaoqiao-Gaoqiao Function Zone 
E. Zhoujiadu-Liuli Function Zone 
F. Wangqiao Industrial Zone
G. Huaxia Commercial Tourism Zone
H. Pudong International Airport
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districts. The five sub-districts are divided according to their main function. 
Each sub-district has its own work area, residential area, business centre and 
other facilities. Sub-districts are separated by green space. Account is taken of 
the ecological environment. The five sub-districts were designated as follows:
Lujiazui-Huamu - designated as a 30 km2 financial and trading zone and 
administrative centre, with a population of 500,000; Lujiazui would become 
part of Shanghai’s CBD;
Waigaoqiao-Gaoqiao - designated as a 62 km2 tax-free zone, with a popula-
tion of 300,000;
Qingning Temple-Jinqiao - designated as a 33 km2 export processing zone, 
specially targeting potential FDI; population 450,000;
Zhoujiadu-Liuli - designated as a 35 km2 industrial zone, with a population 
of 550,000;
Beicai-Zhangjiang - designated as a 17 km2 high-tech zone, with a popula-
tion of 220,000. 
The master plan, which was in fact more in the nature of a strategic plan, de-
fined the goal of the development, the urban structure and how the project 
should be implemented, rather than specifying the fixed figures as parameters 
for urban planning, as is shown in Box 2.6. It also took account of market forces. 
This was one of the earliest master plans in which all possible aspects of im-
plementation were properly designed. The draft Pudong master plan was later 
discussed at local and central level. SUPDI finalised the Pudong master plan on 
31 March 1992, after extensive consultation. In its final form the master plan 
covered an area of 400 km2 with a 1992 population of 1.1 million. The plan em-
phasised the wider context of the Pudong development, in particular the effect 
it would have on its vast hinterland, the Yangtze River delta and the Yangtze 
River Valley, the provinces and cities along the Yangtze River, and indeed the 
outside world. Not only would new techniques be learned and new experience 
be gained but the economic development of Pudong would establish a link with 
the global economy. The plan further clarified the specification of the five zones 
by setting boundaries and providing clear functional descriptions.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Box 2.6 Pudong New Area master plan - implementation timetable (1992)
1. Initial phase (1991-1995) - the emphasis in this stage was to be on the 
construction of urban infrastructure; urban development and redevelopment 
was to be focused on priority areas (areas designated by the master plan as 
priority areas for the development of infrastructure and other facilities).
2. Main development phase (1996-2000) - in this stage priority was to be 
given to providing a highway system and other infrastructure for the 
Pudong area as a whole. Development was to be continued in priority 
areas within each sub-district. The basic image was to be established of 
Pudong as a modern multi-functional district.
3. Continuous development phase (after 2000): a further 20-30 or more years 
of continuous urban development leading to the achievement of the goals 
set by the master plan.
Source: Sun, 1999
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The master plan highlighted the importance of infrastructure development 
and those environmental factors which would affect the spatial quality of Pu-
dong New Area. The section of the plan dealing with infrastructure empha-
sised the importance of developing Pudong as a transport hub, with harbour, 
airport and railway facilities, and information technology to handle the need 
for high-speed economic growth, estimated at 15-20% per annum by 2020. To 
make the long-term goal more feasible, the new plan not only redesigned a 
number of the city’s main roads (the inner ring road, the outer ring road and 
Century Avenue) to enable them to cope with the enlargement of Pudong, but 
also identified a series of priority infrastructural projects, including:
building Nanpu Bridge, Yangpu Bridge and Pudong’s inner-ring road to con-
nect Pudong and Puxi;
rebuilding and widening Yanggao Road to connect all sub-districts;
building four piers in Waigaoqiao and rebuilding internal waterways, to fa-
cilitate water transportation;
increasing telephone capacity to 100,000 lines;
carrying out a feasibility study into extending metro line 2 to Pudong;
building Waigaoqiao electricity plant (500,000 volt power network);
building an extra water plant (Lingqiao); investigating new sources of wa-
ter in Pudong;
extending the capacity of the Pudong gasworks; looking into the possibility 
of a district heating system using natural gas from the East China Sea;
Related projects, such as building a 10 million square meter residential 
area and associated public buildings (a five-year project). (see Figure 2.12).
The section of the plan dealing with environmental factors included designs 
for parks and gardens that would be integrated into local facilities for tour-
ism and entertainment. For example, a 1.4 km2 area at the intersection of 
Century Avenue, the Inner Ring Road, the no. 2 metro line and Yanggao Road, 
was designated to become Century Park, the biggest urban park in Shanghai. 
Large-scale urban green space within and between urban blocks and residen-
tial neighbourhoods and green corridors outside urban districts were also 
designed to guarantee that Pudong would not be totally built-up but would 
contain a generous amount of green space. For example, the Lujiazui Green 
Area, a triangular area bordered by Yincheng Zhong Road, Lujiazui Road and 
Yincheng Dong Road, was designated as the major green space in the centre 
of Lujiazui Financial District (see Figure 2.13). The area would be surround-
ed by a number of top class office buildings for organisations such as Bank 
of China, the HSBC Tower, Jinmao Tower, Shanghai Stock Exchange Centre, 
Shanghai World Trade Centre etc. One billion yuan (US$ 0.12 billion) was in-
vested to make this green area a reality, nine-tenths of which was used for 
the relocation of a large polluting factory and thousands of households (Gong 
personal interview in 2002). As a result, by the end of 2004 Pudong had the 
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
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highest public green area per capita of all of Shanghai’s 18 districts. Public 
green area per capita in Pudong was 25.44 m2, twice as much as the average 
for Shanghai as a whole and almost 20 times as much as in the Huangpu and 
Luwan Districts, the districts containing the Bund (SMSB, 2005; SPNASB, 2005).
In accordance with the master plan, a series of follow-up plans were pre-
pared containing master plans for each development zone, specifying in de-
tail such matters as function, zoning, and urban design principles. For exam-
ple, in accordance with the master plan for Pudong, Lujiazui FTZ, a 30 km2 
development zone, was functionally divided into four parts, a business area, 
a financial area, a residential area and an administrative area. A zoning plan 
was prepared defining the site area, site use and plot ratio (see Figure 2.14) 
and the land areas available for leasing. A special style of urban design was 
introduced in Pudong to define the urban character of Lujiazui FTZ and the 
main skyline of Pudong (see Figure 2.18). A transportation plan was developed 
to optimise the transport system in Lujiazui FTZ. 
Waigaoqiao Free-Trade Zone, Jinqiao Export-Processing Zone and Zhang-
jiang-High-tech Park all followed the same kind of planning process as Lujia-
Figure 2.12 Infrastructure plan of Pudong
Source: Shanghai Urban Planning Institute (brochure)
A. Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone
B. Zhangjiang High-tech Park
C. Jinqiao Export processing Zone 
D. Waigaoqiao Tax Free Zone 
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Figure 2.13 Top: Lujiazui Green Area; centre: green area in 
neighbourhoods; bottom: Century Park
Sources: top and bottom: Wang, 2003; centre: CNAP
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zui Financial and Trade Zone to work out details of the master plans for those 
zones. Figures 2.15, 2.16 and 2.17 show the results of these planning efforts 
for each development zone. Four priority areas were designated, including 1.5 
km2 in Lujiazui (overlapping the 1.7 km2 Pudong-Lujiazui financial centre), 4 
km2 in the Waigaoqiao tax-free zone and harbour area and a 4 km2 industrial 
park in Jinqiao Export-Processing Zone. These priority areas were to be given 
priority in matters affecting design, investment and government-financed in-
frastructure development.
Detailed plans were also prepared and put into effect for key areas such 
as Lujiazui Financial Centre (see further in Section 2.3) and Century Avenue, 
the road forming the main axis of Pudong. For all the necessary design work 
a number of international design firms were invited to provide ideas and con-
cepts to turn these projects into reality, either by public competitive tender or 
direct appointment.
Clearly correct decisions on how to manage this mega-project would be 
crucial to its success. Shanghai decided to negotiate for central government 
support while at the same time establishing its own strategy for managing 
the project. Central government support was important. If central government 
Figure 2.14 Zoning Plan of Lujiazui Financial and Trade Zone
Source: Wang, 2003
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continued to follow the policy of taking everything from Shanghai and leav-
ing no taxation at local level, there would be no hope of Shanghai ever getting 
the project going, particularly in the light of the need for mass relocation. Box 
2.7 details the changes in the treatment of local taxation following China’s 
reform. In 1988 Shanghai finally succeeded in negotiating a fiscal contracting 
system similar to that operated by Guangdong and Fujian in south China, al-
lowing it to keep all revenue above a predetermined amount. SMG intensified 
its taxation negotiations with central government in the hope of achieving a 
healthier budget by being allowed to pay a fixed amount of tax to central gov-
ernment instead of having to hand over almost all its tax revenue. Most other 
large cities had already been given permission to do this shortly after 1978. 
SMG hoped that a more relaxed taxation policy would provide sufficient start-
up funds to begin to develop Pudong’s infrastructure and start work on relo-
cation. SMG knew that central government would not provide direct financial 
support and therefore asked permission for Pudong to tap other channels of 
investment, such as bank loans (particularly international low-interest loans) 
and debt bonds. Permission was later given for it to accept a certain volume 
of low-interest loans and to borrow against public debt bonds, both of which 
practices were generally forbidden in China without central government ap-
proval. Central government also called on ministries and provinces to partici-
pate by investing in Pudong. 
Having negotiated a better deal from central government, Shanghai started 
Figure 2.15 Detailed plan of Waigaoqiao Free-Trade Zone
Source: Ye, 2003
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to consider how it should manage this huge project. Who should handle the 
implementation? How should the project be implemented? Where would the 
money come from? Funds derived from central government and local taxa-
tion would never be sufficient. Details given below of some of the ensuing dis-
cussions give a general idea of how strategies were developed at local level. A 
more detailed account of the implementation of the Pudong project is given 
in Chapter 3.
Who was to handle the implementation? Traditionally all aspects of ur-
Figure 2.16 Detailed plan of Jinqiao Export Processing Zone
Source: Ye, 2003
Box 2.7 Reform of Shanghai’s taxation policy in the 1980s
n Between 1950 and 1983, Shanghai had to pay 86.8% of its tax revenue 
to central government, retaining just 13.2%
n In 1984, taxation reform led to Shanghai being allowed to retain 23.54% 
and pay the remaining 76.46% to central government
n In 1987, a second reform allowed Shanghai to pay 10.5 billion yuan 
(US$ 1,27 billion) annually to central government and use the 
remainder for developing local economies and urban renewal
n In 1988, Shanghai negotiated the same kind of tax treatment enjoyed by 
cities in South China.
Source: Gamble, 2003, p. 9; Wan and Yuan, 2001, p. 19
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ban development, including organisation, management and finance, were left 
in the hands of government, but the government seemed unable to make a 
good job of handling urban redevelopment projects of this kind. It seemed to 
SMG that the government should concentrate on providing better adminis-
tration and efficient service to the market and leave the development to the 
market. The same thinking applied to the tendency in the political reforms 
in progress at the time to separate the government from business activi-
ties. On the other hand, SMG wanted to ensure that the project would run 
smoothly and in accordance with the wishes of central government. It there-
fore decided to establish a development company in each of the four zones 
to take charge of land development and subsequent real estate development. 
Because these companies were publicly funded, SMG could make sure that 
they represented government’s interests. On the other hand, following the 
trend set by Chinese political reform, SMG would not need to involve itself in 
business activities. The hidden agenda might have been that the government 
would take no responsibility and run no risk if one of the companies ran into 
problems, e.g. debt or a financial dispute. Thus each of the four development 
Figure 2.17 Detailed plan of Zhangjiang High-tech Park
Source: Brochure of Shanghai Urban Planning Institute
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companies, in Lujiazui, Jinqiao, Waigaoqiao and Zhangjiang, became a sort of 
hybrid company, representing the government and the public interest but op-
erating commercially. In August 1990 Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone, Jinqiao 
Export Processing Zone, and Waigaoqiao Tax-free Zone each established its 
own development company. Zhangjiang followed suit soon after. A land hold-
ing company was also set up to expropriate village land in preparation for fu-
ture development.
How should the project be implemented in practice? The Pudong master 
plan suggested a number of possible development strategies. One strategy 
was to give priority to urban planning, infrastructure and the creation of a 
favourable economic environment, to ensure that Pudong would eventually 
become a high-quality, green and forward-looking urban district. A second 
strategy was to adopt a system of ‘rolling development’, to ensure that all 
available funds were used efficiently. This strategy would mean that initial de-
velopment would be small-scale, concentrating on developing priority areas. 
Each development zone would focus on developing its sector in its priority 
area. Special financial support would be given to the development of priority 
areas. The infrastructure that would be provided by each development com-
pany would follow the same rule. Any private investor considering investment 
Figure 2.18 Urban design of Lujiazui Financial and Trade Zone
Source: Ye, 2001
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would certainly be aware of these priority areas. A third strategy was to start 
by implementing priority projects, usually infrastructural projects that would 
form the backbone of Pudong’s infrastructure. SMG prepared a list showing 
what municipal infrastructure SMG would provide each year, so that inves-
tors visiting Pudong could be confident about priorities, even if at the time of 
their visit all they could see was a building site. The emphasis on infrastruc-
tural development was a prevalent feature of China’s economic reform, since 
the Chinese strongly believe that upgrading the infrastructure is essential for 
economic development.
Where was the money to come from? Local taxation and various kinds of 
loans had provided a start-up fund to get the project going, but the size of the 
fund was far from sufficient. SMG wanted to use all possible channels to raise 
funds. One possible method was to lease land use rights. SMG decided that 
all land would have to be purchased (by leasing the land use rights) and land 
allocation would no longer be permitted. This approach is common in coun-
tries with different market systems but it was no easy decision to adopt such 
an approach in 1990s China. A second method was to involve private finance. 
Central government guidelines opened the way to foreign investment. In his 
announcement of the Pudong development, Li Peng welcomed the participa-
tion of ‘foreign enterprises, investors from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan and 
overseas Chinese’. He promised that the central government would establish 
preferential conditions and an improved investment environment to encour-
age such participation (Li, 1990). This was followed by extensive research into 
possible ways of encouraging private finance and foreign direct investment. 
Even the sector plans aimed to attract foreign investment by establishing tax-
free zones or export-processing zones. To make investment even more attrac-
tive, SMG adopted several local policies specifically designed to attract FDI. 
SMG also looked into ways of attracting investment in Pudong from ministries 
and neighbouring provinces. Shanghai had strong traditional ties with other 
provinces because of the many decades for which it had acted as China’s pro-
duction and trading centre. While central government was calming down the 
disturbed relationships between Shanghai and other provinces caused by the 
Pudong development, both central government and SMG felt it necessary and 
desirable to involve domestic capital from the hinterland. Last but not least, 
SMG thought of using the stock market, debt bonds and other similar means 
as possible sources of finance.
How could private finance be attracted to Pudong? Initially central govern-
ment adopted a series of preferential policies to stimulate development; these 
were immediately followed by further preferential policies adopted by SMG. 
Shanghai hoped that the combination of these policies and the huge poten-
tial market would interest the private sector in investing in Shanghai rather 
than South China. However, the message still needed to be sent out to the 
business world. While international conferences and invitations to tender for 
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consultancy work helped to build up awareness of the Pudong development, 
they were nowhere near sufficient to reach business communities abroad. Lo-
cal politicians therefore decided to adopt city marketing strategies to adver-
tise the project. For example, in October 1990 a group of Shanghai delegates, 
including the mayor of Shanghai, visited Japan to promote the development 
to Japanese businessmen. Similar visits were subsequently made to other 
countries.
How should a traditionally bureaucratic public sector operate within a mar-
ket-oriented system? SMG also appreciated the importance of an efficient 
government to create investor confidence. In 1990, shortly after the public an-
nouncement of the Pudong project, SMG established the Pudong Development 
Office. At that time Pudong was little more than the name of a piece of land 
on the east bank of the Huangpu. In fact the land belonged to three districts, 
Huangpu, Nanpu and Nanhui, and two counties, Shanghai and Chuansha. 
Since Pudong Development Office had no land of its own, its role was limited 
to research and planning for the Pudong development and coordinating the de-
velopment of Pudong with the three districts and two counties. Obviously the 
realisation of a plan as ambitious as the Pudong development would have been 
completely impossible without an efficient administrative organisation, knowl-
edgeable about the way the market works and totally focused on the develop-
ment. SMG feared that if the administration of Pudong continued along the 
same lines as before, with five separate authorities, the Pudong development 
would rapidly become a power struggle, with each authority trying to protect 
its own local interests. This fear prompted SMG’s decision to set up a new ad-
ministrative organisation for Pudong, so in 1993 it set up the Pudong New Area 
Administration Committee to take charge of administration and replace the 
original Pudong Development Office. All the land previously belonging to the 
three districts and two counties was transferred to the Pudong New Area.
Once the administration had been sorted out, the next task was to set up 
a workable organisation to provide a proper level of service to the market 
and society. As the government’s main task in the Pudong project was to at-
tract investors by ensuring a market environment with increased transpar-
ency, fair competition and clear regulation, local government decided to try 
to provide an efficient and effective service through a combination of ‘small 
government’, employing as few personnel and offices as possible, ‘big service’, 
putting the emphasis on bureaucratic efficiency, and ‘big society’, transferring 
functions other than supervision and regulation to associations and NGOs. A 
‘one-stop’ system was introduced to ensure that investors found the process 
of getting approval for investment projects fast and relatively painless, be-
cause all the red-tape could be sorted out at the Pudong Investment Centre. 
Further steps were taken to minimise the control and presence of the admin-
istrative organisation and to delegate government control to self-regulating 
professional associations or development corporations.
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 2.6 Local, national and global forces
The development of Pudong coincided with a series of changes, global, na-
tional and local. The world was moving into an era of globalisation, in which 
ideas, information and capital began to flow wherever they would be well re-
ceived. China’s implementation of economic reform and its open door policy 
radically altered the political and economic scene. China’s approach to eco-
nomic reform was gradual but pragmatic, involving learning from the outside 
world, experimenting with new strategies and trying to find the best solution 
as much for urban development as for economic reform. As China’s most im-
portant economic centre, Shanghai occupied a significant position in China’s 
national strategy. Even though the Shanghainese had been working for years 
on reviving their city and transforming the backward area of Pudong, it took 
years more work at local level to prepare for the proper opportunity to achieve 
a consensus between central decision-makers. The events in Tian’anmen 
Square created such an opportunity, with both reformists and conservatives 
agreeing to support the Pudong development as part of the national strategy 
to save China’s still incomplete economic reform.
Several factors contributed to the acceleration of the final decision on 
the Pudong development: the creation of a strong consensus at local level 
achieved by public debate and discussion, coupled with the combined efforts 
of professionals and experts, government officials, local leadership, the busi-
ness world and the international community. Public debate, which had never 
before been part of China’s closed planning procedure, helped to encourage 
people with different points of view to state their requirements and interests 
and so allow agreement to be reached on the goals to be achieved. Second, the 
Pudong development decision took into account both political consequences 
and national economic concerns, making it easy for central government and 
the local government to find common ground in supporting the decision. It is 
interesting to consider the efforts made by the central government to balance 
the conflicting interests of Shanghai and various other provinces. By creating 
the win-win strategy of linking Pudong’s development with the development 
of its vast hinterland, the central government created new alliances which 
would support the Pudong project not only politically but also financially. In 
this way, central government helped to create an enabling environment that 
the local government could never have created alone. Third, the project was 
characterised by the intrusion of various kinds of international forces into a 
variety of fields, not limited to architecture and urban planning. This intru-
sion was encouraged partly by local willingness to embrace new ideas, new 
information and even the principles and legal frameworks applied within the 
international community, partly by recognition that this kind of interaction 
was the only way to rebuild Shanghai as a world city, and partly by interna-
tional interest in China’s vast untapped market. These factors all helped to 
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speed up the interaction between global and local plainly visible in almost 
every aspect of the Pudong development.
Globalisation is a contingent, non-uniform, temporal mesh of processes 
that do not lead to simple homogenisation; globalisation also initiates a myr-
iad of local interpretations and transformations. Despite the tendency of ar-
chitecture ‘[to escape] from the history and culture of each society’ (Castells, 
1996, p. 417), the example of Shanghai shows that questions about the urban 
impact of globalisation should really address the dynamics of the global–lo-
cal nexus. And, as has been shown, globalisation processes have a myriad of 
ideological dimensions derived from history and local culture, and these di-
mensions play a significant role in the processes underlying the building of a 
globalising city.
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 3 Managing a large-scale 
urban development - 
Pudong New Area
‘The metropolitan city in our time is an economic, social and function-
al reality in the making’. ‘Large-scale urban projects are today what 
defines the building of the metropolitan city’. ‘The idea of creating a 
sense of city nowadays poses a critical question that large-scale urban 
projects must answer: the dialect between centrality and mobility…….’ 
(Borja & Castells, 1997, pp. 152-162).
  Introduction
In our information age, large-scale works in metropolitan cities perform the 
function of linking individual localities to the global economy. Shanghai, seek-
ing to rediscover its lost glory in a global context, selected Pudong to fulfil its 
ambitious plan for the city’s nirvana. Shanghai not only hoped to recover the 
position in the global economy that it had enjoyed in the 1930s but also fore-
saw the influence such a large-scale project could have on the city’s economic, 
social and cultural objectives and the way that influence could spread to the 
hinterland. This chapter attempts to explain how the enormous Pudong de-
velopment project was organised and managed in what was, after all, a tran-
sitional period. It also aims to explore the circumstances that contributed to 
the choice of the measures selected and what economic and social conse-
quences this enormous project might have within its boundaries and beyond. 
A discussion of land policy and infrastructural development and the way they 
affected the development of Pudong and the growth of the real estate market, 
appears in Sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
 3.1 Land policy reform and development
‘Land is the essential raw material of all property development projects…’, as 
Syms (2002, p. 55) once put it. Much research into urban studies, planning and 
land policy issues has found that land policy and land development plays 
a crucial part in economic development and urban restructuring (Wigmans, 
1998; Needham, 2003). While land tenure and land policy is established within 
a specific institutional setting, land development depends on a host of factors 
outside the boundaries of the particular locality. These factors may be eco-
nomic, financial or social; they may involve the management of land-use or 
the operation of the property market. Land issues concern not only land re-
sources and capital but also the various parties directly or indirectly involved 
with land resources by virtue of ownership or use rights. Clearly, efficient 
land usage and the proper balancing of the interests of the different parties 
involved in land transfer, including the economically disadvantaged, influ-
ences the speed and results of urban development or redevelopment. Thus a 
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knowledge of the treatment of land is important to a proper understanding 
the Pudong development.
In 1990, at the start of the Pudong development, the transformation of 
Shanghai’s land market, part of China’s gradualist programme of urban land 
reform which started at the beginning of the 1980s, was still in progress. The 
two parallel markets in land and real estate in operation at the time kept 
overseas and Chinese investors separate from one another, providing little 
scope for penetration or manoeuvring by global capital. The Shanghainese, 
who hoped to use foreign investment as one of the main sources of finance 
for the Pudong development, sought to break down existing restrictions on 
the admission of foreign capital to the Chinese property market by establish-
ing a new land market that would give Chinese and foreign investors an equal 
chance of participating in land transfers and land development. The success 
of this breakthrough would depend on the extent to which the newly estab-
lished market could ensure the growth of a market in property, the involve-
ment of foreign investors and the balancing of the interests of the various 
interest groups.
 3.1.1 Land policy reform
Land policy reform in China
‘Gradualist urban land reform forms an intrinsic part of the incremental eco-
nomic reforms in transitional China’ (Zhu, 1999). The emphasis on social 
equality in a planned economy in China’s original land system was shifted 
to support the move to establish a land market that would take account of 
Figure 3.1 Pudong under construction, 2006
Source: CNAP
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the value of land. The main feature of land policy between 1949 and 1978 was 
the confiscation of land from the rich (landlords) and its redistribution to the 
poor. Urban land became state-owned, farmland became collectively owned. 
The state allocated urban land to danweis (state-owned businesses) free of 
charge, for an indefinite period, and the constitution prohibited transactions 
in land. Land was not considered to be a commodity and was allocated no 
value. In the planned economy, central and local government decided what 
and how much the danweis should produce and how much profit they would 
be allowed to keep. Meanwhile, collectively owned land in rural areas was 
converted to state-owned land through land acquisition. When the state ac-
quired land from a farmer, the farmer received a compensation package that 
included employment opportunities, housing compensation, compensation 
for loss of crops and an urban residence licence making him eligible for wel-
fare benefits including medical insurance, pension and retirement plans, ac-
cess to higher-quality schools and subsidised goods not available to peasant 
farmers (Cheng, 2003, pp. 110-111). The land tenure system devised between 
1949 and 1978 greatly influenced the structure of land-use and gave rise to a 
number of land-use problems that had to be dealt with in later reforms, such 
as the mixture of industrial and residential premises created by the earlier al-
location system. This mixture could be found in many cities in which danweis 
and housing for their employees were located side by side, and was the prime 
cause of the damage to the residential environment caused by industrial pol-
lution. By the end of the 1970s more than 20,000 factories had been set up in 
the centre of Shanghai’s Puxi district, causing enormous pollution problems. 
The land allocation system, and the consequent competing interests of local 
government, developers, factories and individual households, acted as a pow-
erful barrier to the later establishment of a land market.
After the introduction of the open door policy, China adopted a land-use 
rights system of tenure similar to the leasehold tenure system common in 
the West, treating land separately from buildings and improvements. More 
precisely, China borrowed the experience of Hong Kong and Singapore, both 
of which share a Chinese cultural background, are characterised as ‘devel-
opmental states’ (see Chapter 1) and have years of successful experience in 
the transfer of land for value (Chan, 1999, p. 54; Li et al., 2000, p. 349). Box 3.1 
gives a detailed account of the features of the land tenure system in opera-
tion in Hong Kong and Singapore. In both cases government owns most, if not 
all, of the available land, and thus exerts an almost monopolistic control over 
land supply, planning and development. Both governments use land to gener-
ate revenue. In Hong Kong, the leasing of land by public tender maximises 
the value of land and makes a considerable contribution to Hong Kong’s eco-
nomic development and government revenue. These advantages have been 
taken into account in the various laws and regulations introduced in China 
affecting land ownership and land tenure. The interesting thing is the flex-
[  ]
ibility and opportunities for land development created by China’s land policy, 
a policy which like the related legal framework did not evolve over time, as it 
did in most European countries, but was based on experiences borrowed from 
other countries operating a leasehold tenure system. Thus though the sys-
tem of land tenure was mature even when it was introduced, it still allowed 
the adoption of the kind of innovative land development strategies tried in 
other countries. According to the People’s Republic of China Land Administra-
tion Act 1986, as amended in 1998, the state owns all urban land and farming 
collectives own all rural land. ‘The nature of the Chinese land tenure system 
means that there is no private ownership of land in China’ (Chan, 2003, p. 138). 
‘Land-use rights’ are being commercialised in accordance with the People’s Re-
public of China, Assignment and Transfer of Use Rights on State-owned Land 
in Urban Areas, Temporary Regulation, 1990. China had no intention of cre-
ating a capitalist style market in land, with full ownership rights, but aimed 
to separate use and management from ownership; state ownership remained 
the key. These basic principles had direct consequences for later compulsory 
land acquisition (zhengdi), land development and relocation.
Since 1978 Chinese land policy has undergone a long process of transfor-
mation, starting by allowing the land allocation system to coexist with a land 
market and then gradually integrating the two into a single market. In 1980 
the State Council drafted the first regulations on the use of building land by 
a Chinese joint venture involving a foreign partner. This was the first regu-
lation to refer to payment for land-use. The 1986 Land Administration Act 
made it legal for private organisations to use state-owned land, but not until 
Box 3.1 Land policy in Hong Kong and Singapore
Hong Kong and Singapore have different approaches to state intervention 
in the economy. Hong Kong prefers to avoid government intervention in 
the market, Singapore has a significant level of state intervention. Yet both 
operate essentially the same land policy, in that both apply the principle of 
land transfer for value by leasing land.
Hong Kong has adopted a leasehold land tenure system, with all land 
owned by government. A purchaser does not buy ownership but a lease to 
use the land for a specified period. ‘Land for non-institutional use is generally 
leased to the highest bidder at public auction for a period of not less than 
75 years. The buyer pays a large lump-sum and a small annual rent. Because 
the only purpose of the rent is to serve as a legal symbol of the lessor/lessee 
relationship, the lump-sum payment for a given land lease approximates to 
the value of the land. Most leases are transferable and the market in land is 
in fact a market in land leases’ (Peng and Wheaton, 1994, p.267; Hui 2001, p. 
600).
Singapore has both leasehold tenure and freehold tenure. Since 80% of 
the land is state-owned and private land is scarce, ‘developers tend to depend 
on the state to release land for development through land sales with leases 
varying from 30 years to 99 years. Leases for residential development are 
mostly for 99 years’.
Source: Sim et al., 2002, p. 458
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April 1988 was China’s constitution amended to permit the transfer of land-
use rights from the state to a third-party for a predetermined period (Cheng, 
2003, p. 113). Once the legal framework had been established introducing 
the concept of urban land-use rights, the State council went on to issue the 
1991 Provisional Regulation on Granting and Transferring Land-use Rights on 
State-owned Land in Cities and Towns, which gave practical guidance to any-
one wishing to let, transfer, rent or mortgage land-use rights (Valletta, 2001; 
Cheng, 2003). The same regulation distinguished two kinds of transactions in 
land, transfer of land-use rights by sale and purchase and leasing of land-use 
rights. Two other Acts, the 1989 Provisional Land-use Taxation of State-owned 
Urban Land Act and the 1993 Provisional Land Value Increment Tax on State-
owned Land Act, required all danweis and individuals using state-owned land 
to pay a land-use tax. Further, a land value increment tax was levied on any 
profit made on a transfer of land-use rights exceeding 20% of the total cost. 
The primary rationale behind this and subsequent reforms was to attract for-
eign investment in property and restructure the land supply and land allo-
cation system to increase economic efficiency (Olds, 2001, p. 173). Although 
resistance from local interest groups meant that at first the laws were not ac-
tively enforced, the change in land-use regime combined with increasing eco-
nomic competition between cities for cross-border investment had a positive 
impact on land development, government finance and urban growth, with lo-
cal government as the major player in urban development.
Land policy reform in Shanghai and the establishment of a local land market
Central government laid down certain basic principles governing land reform 
at local level, but local officials still had to work out the operational details. 
Shanghai started to charge foreign investors for land-use rights in 1986. To 
develop a land lease system of its own which would be better suited to the 
market system and more efficient operationally, Shanghai examined the legal 
framework for land tenure in Hong Kong and the operational procedures fol-
lowed in Hong Kong’s land lease operations. The city hoped that if it took the 
Hong Kong system as its model, it too would earn a substantial income from 
land leasing which would help to reduce the budget deficit it faced for infra-
structural development.
From the 1980s onwards a series of local regulations were introduced in 
Shanghai to operationalise the national land reform program. For example, 
the Transfer of Land-use Rights in Shanghai Regulations, approved on 29 No-
vember 1987, marked Shanghai’s first formal move towards land reform (Lu, 
1999, p. 66). These regulations laid down the rights and obligation of inves-
tors, the procedures to be followed to obtain land-use rights and the responsi-
bilities attached to such rights. It also set ten standard fee levels for land-use 
based on the use to which the land would be put. Fees ranged from 60-100 
yuan (US$ 7.1-12)/m2 in the central commercial area to 0.5 yuan (US$ 0.06)/
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Figure 3.2 Land prices in Shanghai’s Puxi and Pudong, 1994. Top: Standard land prices in Shanghai’s Puxi, 
1994; bottom: two-standard land prices in Pudong, 1994
Source: SPNASB, 1994
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m2 in rural areas. In 1991 the municipality adjusted the standard fee range 
to 130-0.5 yuan (US$ 15.6-0.06)/m2 and later still, as the market in real estate 
developed, 170-0.5 yuan (US$ 20.4-0.06)/m2. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the land 
value in the publication of the first standard land-use fees. It also shows that 
in the early stages Pudong had much less valuable high-priced land than Puxi, 
which improved greatly since Pudong development started. The regulations 
came into effect on 1 January 1988, the year in which the first land lease auc-
tion was held in Shanghai’s Hongqiao district, using procedures developed in 
Hong Kong. Six foreign real estate developers took part. The price achieved 
depended on the total construction area, and reflected the true market val-
ue, rather than simply the area of undeveloped land, as had previously been 
the case. The price also included a provision for infrastructure to be provid-
ed by government. In the end the 1.29 hectare site was leased to a Japanese 
developer for US$ 485 per square metre (Zhao, personal interview, 2002). The 
success of the Hongqiao auction encouraged the Shanghai authorities to in-
troduce land leasing more widely. However, fear of strong opposition from 
existing interest groups and the possibility that failures might discourage fu-
ture investment led to the decision to conduct a pilot project in a limited area 
before applying the reform to the city as a whole. Pudong, newly established 
as a development zone and in the frontline of the testing of Shanghai’s mar-
ket system, was the perfect place for such a project. The Draft Pudong New 
Area Planning and Construction Administration Regulation and the Pudong 
New Area Land Administration Regulation (1990) required organisations and 
real estate developers to lease land-use rights in Pudong by tender, auction 
or direct negotiation. Land could be leased for periods of between 40 and 70 
years. Pudong was in fact the first of Shanghai’s districts to introduce land 
lease procedures.
Both the transfer of land-use rights by sale (tudi suoyouquan churang) and 
the leasing of land-use rights (tudi zulin) were based on the principle of sepa-
rating land-use rights from land ownership. The state or its representatives 
were able to transfer land-use rights to a future user, whether an individual, a 
developer or an organisation, for a defined period of time and at a price based 
on the value of the land. Transfers by sale and by leasing differed in two re-
spects. When land-use rights were transferred by sale, the purchaser enjoyed 
full rights of occupation, use, and benefit during the period specified and, sub-
ject to certain limitations, was entitled to trade those rights. When the rights 
were leased, the lessee only enjoyed the right to occupy the land; the right to 
trade the land-use rights remained with the owner of the land. The other dif-
ference concerned the size and method of payment. If the rights were trans-
ferred by sale, the land-user had to pay a one-time land-use transfer fee; if 
the rights were leased, the lessee paid an annual rent (Zhou, 2003, p. 254). The 
leasing of land-use rights for an indefinite period was introduced in the mid-
dle of the Asian economic crisis. The aim was to provide flexibility for inves-
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tors who were finding difficulty in obtaining a large bank loan because of the 
prevailing economic climate. This change in approach to land leasing demon-
strates the flexibility with which Shanghai reacted to a changing market.
Pudong required all land development in its administrative area to be con-
ducted along commercial lines, with all land-use rights transferred by sale or 
leasing. The same principle was also applied to land allocated to businesses 
before 1990. The state had allocated land in the Pudong urban area for various 
businesses and residential areas dozens of years ago, and a number of real es-
tate developments had been started on land allocated in the 1980s, before the 
issue of the master plan for Pudong in 1990-1991. The businesses and residen-
tial areas concerned were therefore granted land-use rights which included a 
redevelopment option. The effect of this depended on the provisions of the of-
ficial Pudong master plan. If the original function of the land was incompatible 
with the new plan, the business could relocate to a larger site. Residential are-
Figure 3.3 Government-fixed land price levels in Shanghai in 1994 (left) and 2000 (right)
Source: SPNASB, 2001Area 1 has the highest price level.
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as could be relocated either to the new site for the business or to a neighbour-
hood specially designed and constructed for relocation. Otherwise the busi-
ness could redevelop the land to a higher floor-to-area ratio and higher quality 
to create more space for commercial use. In the first case the state would pro-
vide a certain amount in compensation for the interruption to the company’s 
production and the effort of relocation. The compensation paid to relocated 
businesses could be used to purchase land-use rights on a new piece of land 
at a preferential price negotiated with the state. In the second case the organi-
sation would be allowed to carry out redevelopment after paying a preferential 
price for the transfer of land-use rights (Wan and Yuan, 2001, p. 98). Even if an 
organisation was allowed to go ahead with its redevelopment plans, ‘the value 
of this option would be quite different from what it would be to the owner of 
a property in a market economy, where the redevelopment option can be sold 
and has no expiry date’ (Fu et al., 1999, pp. 49-78). If land was traded or occu-
Figure 3.3 Government-fixed land price levels in Shanghai in 1994 (left) and 2000 (right)
Source: SPNASB, 2001Area 1 has the highest price level.
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pied illegally, the occupiers were not only fined but also had to pay back the 
full fee for the transfer of land-use rights. The effect of these measures was to 
include every kind of organisation in the process of land commercialisation, 
creating equal opportunities for existing users and newcomers.
Besides regulating the commercialisation of existing urban land, Pudong 
also regulated the process of expropriating collectively owned agricultural 
land, using a ‘land bank’ system to ensure that enough land was held in re-
serve for further expansion. Pudong New Area covered 520 km2, of which 300 
km2 was still farmland. When government wanted to expropriate farmland 
it paid the first 30% of the going rate of compensation as a deposit. The re-
maining 70% would be paid when it needed to use the land. The expropria-
tion of farmland was the main way of maintaining the land bank system. 
Unlike urban land, land in China’s rural areas was owned by farmers col-
lectively and was considered their living capital. Expropriation of farmland 
involved not only land value but also the social compensation due to people 
who lost their property and living capital. Consideration also needed to be 
given to employment and pensions. The commercialisation of land not only 
prevented the loss of state resources but also helped to generate substan-
tial amounts of capital for later investment in the development of land and 
infrastructure. In 1996 for example, payments received from organisations 
wishing to redevelop a total of 3.85 km2 of land allocated to them for com-
mercial use amounted to no less than 1.5 billion yuan (US$ 18.16 million). 
By 1995 the total revenue generated from the leasing of land-use rights had 
reached 1.1 billion yuan (US$ 13.29 million) plus US$ 52 million, a total of 
US$ 185 million. By 2000, more than 100 billion yuan (US$ 12.08 billion) had 
been raised for infrastructural development from land transfer fees (Shi et 
Box 3.2 Why the leasing of land-use rights was more suitable for Pudong
At first Pudong generally aimed to sell land-use rights, but the Asian 
economic crisis made this approach difficult. The transfer of land-use rights 
by sale required a one-off payment for the use of the land, but many foreign 
investors based in Asia were affected by the economic downturn and were 
unable to risk such a large high-risk investment in land development. In 
many countries even commercial banks were in trouble, sometimes even 
facing bankruptcy, making it difficult for investors to obtain the necessary 
loans. In 1997 the number of land deals began to decrease dramatically. 
In the same year, in reaction to the unexpected economic situation and to 
maintain steady development and involvement by investors, the Pudong 
New Area Planning and Land Bureau issued the first regulation on the 
leasing of land-use rights – Provisional Methods for Leasing State-owned 
Land in Pudong New Area (Pudong xinqu guyou tudi shiyongquan zhuanrang 
zhanxing banfa). In 1999, after completion of the pilot project in Pudong, 
the Shanghai Municipal Government issued an official document on leasing 
land-use rights in Shanghai, Provisional Methods for Leasing State-owned 
Land in the Shanghai Municipality (Shanghaishi tudi shiyongquan zhuanrang 
zhanxing banfa)
Source: Zhou, 2003, p. 254
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al., 2003, p. 13).
Investors could purchase or lease land-use rights by negotiation, by ten-
der or at auction, at a price based on standards established by the local mu-
nicipality, but in the following ten years only a few dozen pieces of land were 
transferred by tender. The majority of deals were arranged by negotiation, a 
flexible yet opaque process which many critics argued lacked fairness. What 
more concerned the government was that it had less say than the developers 
in the negotiation process. On 1 July 2001 the People’s Government of Shang-
hai issued its Decision on Amendment of Methods for Granting Land-use 
Rights in Shanghai laying down that land-use rights for land to be used for 
commercial purposes were always to be acquired by public tender. In the sec-
ond half of 2001, land-use rights on 137 pieces of land in Shanghai were trans-
ferred by tender, either public or invited (China Daily, August 21, 2003). Even 
though the process of making the market in land more open and transparent 
had only just begun, it had already provided more information to developers 
lacking the benefit of local connections and created more awareness amongst 
members of the public interested in participating in the decision-making re-
lating to a development plan.
A series of laws, policies and regulations established at national, local and 
district level provided the legal framework for land issues (Box 3.3). Many lo-
cal government departments were involved in providing interpretations and 
making the laws enacted by central government more workable at local lev-
el. Consequently various amendments and reforms were made at various 
times in response to the changing situation. Since 1988 Shanghai has made 
much use of land leasing to attract FDI, restructure the city, generate capi-
tal for infrastructural projects and fund new housing for existing residents, 
mainly in suburban locations (Olds, 2001, p. 184). In about ten years Pudong 
earned more than 100 billion yuan (US$ 12.08 billion) from land leasing, most 
of which was invested in infrastructure. The practical aspects of this regula-
tion are further examined and analysed below. 
 3.1.2 Land development organisations
Land situation in Pudong before 1990
A number of serious issues had to be addressed before the Pudong develop-
ment could begin. Pudong was still an underdeveloped area, lacking basic in-
frastructure and with a very varied population density. The 8% of the area that 
was urbanised occupied 43.5 km2 along the Huangpu waterfront. It contained 
a concentration of the most polluting industries (including harbour industries 
and chemical, steel and textile plants) and accommodated half the popula-
tion of Pudong. Although Pudong as a whole had a relatively low average pop-
ulation density (2,727 per km2), the population density in the urbanised sec-
tion was extremely high (18,230 per km2), a level even higher then the average 
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Box 3.3 Laws, policies and regulations concerning land
The most important state laws and regulations on land include:
n People’s Republic of China Land Administration Act 1986, as amended 
and reissued, Chairman of the PRC, decree no. 8, implemented 1-1-1999
n Provisional Land-use Taxation of State-owned Urban Land Act, issued in 
1989
n People’s Republic of China Tentative Provisional Regulation on Granting 
and Transferring Land Rights on State-owned Land In Cities and Towns, 
Chairman of the PRC, decree no. 55, implemented 19-5-1990
n Provisional Regulation on Granting and Transferring Land-use Rights on 
State-owned Land in Cities and Towns 1991
n Provisional Land Value Increment Tax on State-owned Land Act 1993
n People’s Republic of China Real Estate Administration Act 1994, Chairman 
of the PRC, decree no. 29, implemented 15-7-1994
n People’s Republic of China Provisional Land Administration Act, State 
Council of the PRC, decree no. 256, implemented 1-1-1999
The most important local laws and regulations on land in Shanghai include:
n Transfer of Land-use Rights in Shanghai Regulations 1987
n Methods for Transferring Land-use Rights in Shanghai, implemented 1-1-
1997, as amended and reissued by the People’s Government of Shanghai, 
decree no. 101, 14-5-2001
n Provisional Methods for Leasing State-owned Land in the Municipality 
of Shanghai, (Shanghaishi tudi shiyongquan zhuanrang zhanxing banfa) 
implemented 31-5-1999, as amended and reissued by the People’s 
Government of Shanghai, decree no. 119, implemented 1-4-2002
n Notes on the Implementation of Land-use Fee Management Methods by 
Shanghai Housing And Land Management Bureau, HFDZJ (2002) no. 5, 
implemented 8-1-2002
n Notes on the publishing of the Proposal on Reform of City Real Estate 
Construction Projects (Land Acquired through Tender and Auction) 
Approval Procedures, Office of the People’s Government of Shanghai, 
HFBF (2002) no. 7, implemented 10-2-2002
n Notice on the publishing of Methods of City Land-use Fee Collection 
Management, by Shanghai Municipal Finance Bureau and Shanghai 
Municipal Building and Land Resources Management Bureau, HFDZJ 
(2002) no. 242, implemented 1-7-2002
The most important laws and regulations on land in Pudong include:
n Draft Pudong New Area Planning and Construction Administration 
Regulation 1990
n Pudong New Area Land Administration Regulation 1990
n Provisional Methods for Leasing State-owned Land in Pudong New Area 
(Pudong xinqu guyou tudi shiyongquan zhuanrang zhanxing banfa) 1997
Source: SMHLRAB and SMSB, 2001, 2002, 2003
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population density of Puxi (11,300 per km2) (Wan and yuan 2001, p. 90)9. If the 
land development and real estate development were to be implemented in 
accordance with the master plan, the waterfront area would become a finan-
cial and trading centre, with proper infrastructure and a high quality envi-
ronment, implying that most of the factories (sources of pollution) and their 
associated housing would have to be relocated to make way for new construc-
tion. Projects of this kind need vast amounts of investment, not only for land 
development and infrastructure but also for the relocation of factories, house-
holds and other businesses and the improvement of environmental quality. 
Thus capital has to be raised, for example by land leasing, relocation has to 
be arranged, and organisation and management techniques have to be devel-
oped for land development. The next section looks in more detail at the way 
in which Pudong handled land development.
Development companies - organisations for land development in Pudong
Traditionally land development was handled by public bodies or state-owned 
enterprises. In the case of Pudong however, the local municipality could 
hardly obtain a sufficient budget from central government nor could it spare 
enough from its own budget. Moreover, traditional government-controlled 
urban renewal had proved to be neither cost-effective nor efficiently imple-
mented. If Pudong was to be developed, the local municipality would have 
to find some way to handle land development more effectively and efficient-
ly. Serious consideration was given to setting up a development company. 
Shanghai local government looked into what was done in the United King-
dom, where development companies play a crucial role in land development. 
Local government gives the development company a piece of land and a sum 
of money for investment. The company is then responsible for developing, 
operating, marketing, and selling the land, operating like any other company, 
generating its income from the proceeds of leasing or selling the land. After 
20-30 years, local government reclaims the land and assumes any debts left 
behind by the development company. In the end Shanghai decided to adopt a 
modified model that appeared to be better adapted to the situation in Shang-
hai. The development company would be a kind of state-owned enterprise or 
public company acting as mediator and implementer in land development. 
The municipality would pay for its share in the company by providing land 
and would not be required to invest a large amount of capital which it did not 
actually possess. The development companies would be public companies but 
   The population density of Shanghai is much higher than in European and American cities. For example, The 
Hague, the most densely populated city in the Netherlands, has a population density of only 5,674 per km2. For 
comparison, the average population density in Rotterdam is 2,901 per km2 and in London 4,679 per km2, though 
some districts reach 11,027 per km2.
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operate as commercial enterprises. They would need to be economically effi-
cient and raise investment capital themselves, but at the same time would be 
required to represent the public interest, or the interests of the local author-
ity. They would in fact be tightly controlled by that authority and its various 
departments, which in some cases would be acting as shareholders.
In August 1990 development companies were established in three devel-
opment zones, the Lujiazui Financial and Trade Zone, the Jinqiao Export Pro-
cess Zone and the Waigaoqiao Tax-Free Zone. Funding was provided by the lo-
cal authority and its various departments, including the finance department 
and the land administration department, the Shanghai Urban Construction, 
Investment & Development General Corporation (also known as Shanghai 
Chengtou, responsible for infrastructural projects in Shanghai) and financial 
organisations such as Shanghai International Trust & Investment Co. Ltd. The 
same approach was taken in developing Zhangjiang High-tech Park in 1992, 
followed by some municipal-level development zones, including Liuli, Huaxia, 
Wangqiao, Sunqiao, Huamu and Xinghuo. Pudong Land (Holding) Ltd. was set 
up to act as land bank, specialising in expropriating village land to support 
the land development companies in case the existing stock of land proved 
insufficient.
At first the four development companies had little money. The main val-
ue provided by government was land. Shortly after their establishment each 
company received a cheque from the SMG enabling it to buy 5.51 km2 of land 
from the municipal land bureau at a relatively low price, in effect subsidis-
ing the transfer of land to developers. Later on more land was transferred to 
the four main development companies in Lujiazui, Jinqiao, Waigaoqiao and 
Zhangjiang. By 1995 61.589 km2 of land area had been transferred to these 
companies, equivalent to a government investment of 6.13 billion yuan (US$ 
14 million). Thus, ‘land transfer’ (and land commercialisation) was achieved by 
a process which did not actually involve the transfer of funds (zijin kongzhuan, 
tudi shizhuan) since ultimately the development company received the land 
and the cheque went back to the municipality. SMG’s investment in the initia-
tive fund made it a major shareholder in each of the development companies, 
giving the government a voice in the development of each zone. The develop-
ment companies, partly representing the government, had the job of develop-
ing the land and selling the land leasing rights. They were directly involved in 
land development, providing infrastructure and arranging relocation.
The development of a block of land involved the development company in 
a large number of tasks, including making a plan, finding a real estate devel-
oper, relocating existing residents, industries and businesses, developing the 
land and transferring it to a developer. This would have taken a long time if 
all the tasks had to be performed by the same company. How could the pro-
cess be speeded up? Interestingly, the solution was found in the close collabo-
ration between subsidiaries or joint ventures set up by the development com-
[ 0 ]
pany acting alone or with partners. Each subsidiary specialised in a different 
aspect of land or real estate development, as for example in the case of the 
Shanghai Lujiazui Development (Group) Company Limited (SLDC) described 
in Box 3.4. The involvement of subsidiaries allowed a development company 
to manage the whole land development process very efficiently. SLDC, for ex-
ample, had 54 subsidiaries, each of which specialised in one part of the de-
velopment task, for example relocation, land development, construction of 
housing stock for relocation, real estate development or interior decoration. 
Each subsidiary was responsible for its own operations and co-operating with 
other subsidiaries. If SLDC decided to work on the redevelopment of a block 
in the Lujiazui Financial and Trade Zone (FTZ) a number of subsidiaries would 
collaborate in carrying out the complete land development process.
Any land development project in Lujiazui FTZ generally involved demolish-
ing old houses, relocating households to a new neighbourhood, finding alter-
native employment for labour displaced from land expropriated from a rural 
area, and land redevelopment to provide what is known in China as ‘seven 
connections and one level’10. The final stage involved leasing the land, i.e. 
transferring the land-use rights to a private developer. In the relocation phase, 
SLDC set up a project, prepared plans to gain permission for land-use, to es-
tablishes a timescale (for land-use), to obtain permission to lease state-owned 
land, and to expropriate collective farm land where necessary. Next a reloca-
tion company, e.g. Lujiazui City Construction Company, stepped in as subcon-
tractor for the relocation project. Shanghai’s relocation regulations prescribed 
that relocation projects could be only carried out by certified relocation com-
panies. An independent auditor would be hired to assess the value of the area 
to be demolished and to advise SLDC how much it should pay its subsidiary 
Lujiazui City Construction Company for the entire relocation project. The 
cost was based on the number of households and businesses relocated. The 
real estate developer who would build in this block would later pay the cost 
of relocation. If a relocation district was available but households preferred 
monetary compensation, Lujiazui City Construction Company would negoti-
ate the amount of compensation to be paid per square metre. If no homes 
were available for occupation by relocated households whose former homes 
had been demolished, the company was responsible for working out what ar-
rangements could be made and how much compensation should be paid for 
the inconvenience (over and above the relocation compensation) until the af-
fected households had been rehoused. When farmland was expropriated, the 
company had to work out how to compensate farmers for the loss of land and 
find them fresh employment. Zhanghong Ltd. (Zhanghong Shiye Gongsi), anoth-
0   ‘Seven connections and one level’ is the description applied to land that has been levelled and provided with 
roads, power, telecommunications, water supply , a sewage system, mains gas and district heating. 
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er SLDC subsidiary, whose speciality was arranging retraining and providing 
new employment, would become involved at this stage.
Meanwhile the preparation of the relocation neighbourhood would be un-
der way. If SLDC’s stock of relocation housing was insufficient, the relocation 
project would be deadlocked. SLDC had already leased a large piece of land in 
Jinyang, a new neighbourhood that is capable of accommodating 100,000 peo-
ple. It also had Huamu, another large relocation area used for relocated farm-
ers that used to live and work in Huamu Town and were generally unwilling 
to relocate outside the administrative area of Huamu Town and wanted to live 
as close as possible to their old neighbours. SLDC regularly subcontracted the 
task of building relocation housing to one or more of its subsidiaries.
When the relocation phase was complete, SLDC, which would already have 
prepared its plans for land development and the development of related in-
frastructure, would start work immediately. SLDC sub-contract the provi-
sion of infrastructure to its civil engineering subsidiary and ask its subsidi-
Box 3.4 Shanghai Lujiazui Development (Group) Company Ltd. (SLDC)
SLDC was one of five companies established by SMG in August 1990 to take 
charge of land development in the Lujiazui financial and trade zone. SMG’s 
original investment consisted of a bank loan of 2 million yuan (US$ 0.24 
million) and a cheque for 170 million yuan (US$ 20.6 million) which SLDC 
immediately returned to SMG to pay for the transfer of land-use rights on 
25.13 km2 of land. SLDC had a registered capital of 2.7 billion yuan (US$ 0.2 
billion) and held shares in 54 companies. SLDC’s development planning 
division, one of the group's more important divisions, was responsible 
for urban planning and negotiating the leasing of land with interested 
investors. The marketing division carried out market research and developed 
marketing strategies. The City Infrastructure Construction Management 
Company provided a whole range of the services (including after-sale 
services) necessitated by the fact that the land was leased, solving all the 
kinds of problems investors might face during the construction process. 
Together these divisions were responsible for the entire land development 
process, including planning, marketing, research and coordination. On 28 
August 1992, SLDC and Shanghai International Trust set up the Shanghai 
Lujiazui Finance & Trade Zone Development Co. Ltd. On 31 December 
1994, this company obtained a stock exchange listing as a way of mobilising 
public finance. The government remained the major shareholder in the new 
company (60%), a further 27% being held by foreign investors, a new force 
in the Chinese financial world. The raising of funds from foreign investors 
achieved a significant degree of success, though less success was achieved 
in raising funds from the general public. It is safe to assume that the main 
aim of the foreign investors was to enter the Chinese market (and of course 
to make a profit). When SLDC became a limited company in 1997 the original 
name Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone Development Company was changed 
to Shanghai Lujiazui Development (Group) Company Ltd.
Sources: website of Lujiazui Financial & Trade Zone Development Co. Ltd.; 
Gong, personal interview 2002; Zhao, personal interview, 2002).
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ary specialising in construction materials to provide the necessary materials. 
The property management subsidiary would take charge of existing real es-
tate. The design and planning subsidiary would provide advice on architec-
tural design and planning and various construction companies (Jinhaiou or 
Zhangyang Road commercial building construction companies) specialising 
in commercial building would act as subcontractors in the construction of the 
commercial and other facilities needed by the new neighbourhood or block.
This collaboration between different subsidiaries under the leadership of 
one parent company made the whole process of land development more ef-
ficient and effective in the way it allocated tasks and minimised time and 
cost. The allocation of land development tasks enabled SLDC to provide a de-
tailed plan for each step of the redevelopment process. Each subsidiary was 
clear about its own tasks. SLDC, by sub-contracting specific tasks to partners 
it could rely on (its subsidiaries), could concentrate on planning, land devel-
opment, land leasing, marketing, and to a certain extent, real estate devel-
opment. Thus it was not only able to obtain an overview of the process as 
a whole but also had the energy to attend to clients and inward investment. 
This form of organisation, with the development company directing the col-
laboration between different subsidiaries, all experienced with working with 
one another and with a confidence in one other based on practical experience, 
ensured that everyone worked towards the common goal: the completion of 
the land development in the least possible time and at the least possible cost.
The management strategies employed by development companies such as 
SLDC actually provide a vivid example of a combination of process manage-
ment and project management, a matrix organisation structure embracing 
both hierarchy and horizontal features, as described in project management 
and process management theory (Harrison, 1992). The parent companies (the 
development companies) took the lead in administering the various tasked 
involved in land development and coordinating the division of tasks between 
their subsidiaries, arranging time schedules and promoting strategies to 
present the projects and products to the market. The subsidiaries, on the oth-
er hand, concentrated on the phases or tasks for which they had been made 
responsible, the whole being coordinated by the parent company. Each sub-
sidiary was a business entity in its own right and so had a certain measure of 
autonomy, could make its own decisions and was responsible and accounta-
ble for its own business results. It negotiated with other subsidiaries on a fully 
commercial basis. The relative ease with which the parent company could or-
ganise its subsidiaries to participate in a specific phase of the project reduced 
the amount of uncertainty in the design of the project and could also reduce 
the costs involved in the cooperation between subsidiaries (even though the 
subsidiaries were independent of one other). Parent companies did not ex-
clude the possibility of subcontracting business to outside companies. The in-
volvement of the private sector actually encouraged development companies 
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to cooperate with outside developers or even to form joint ventures (again as 
subsidiaries) to carry on part of their business. The combination of centrali-
sation and decentralisation helped the development companies to create a 
more efficient land development organisation.
 3.1.3 Land development-mechanism
Land development strategies
Attracting investment in land development or real estate development of 
smaller blocks was no easy business. Interviews with private investors in 2002 
and 2004 showed that investors who came to look at Pudong were concerned 
with a variety of issues ranging from the likely profitability of their invest-
ment, the risks involved, the market situation, the presence of an adequate 
infrastructure, the local legal environment and the attitude of the govern-
ment in general. Some were prepared to take greater risks than others: some 
were more familiar with the local investment climate and local culture and 
some had more market experience. It would hardly have been possible to de-
fine a standard strategy to fit all needs and appeal to vastly different groups 
of investors. A standard approach would find it difficult to reflect and adapt to 
changes in the economic and political situation. It seems that development 
companies were well aware of this problem and therefore adopted a flexible 
approach to target different kinds of domestic and foreign investors, who 
might be ministries, provinces, neighbouring cities (or companies supported 
by them) or even banks. Investment could also come from the global market-
place.
When a development company had acquired the land it needed, it had four 
ways of obtaining the investment required for further development11.
One way was for the development company to set up a joint venture with 
an organisation in the private sector, a foreign or Hong Kong-based company. 
A number of Hong Kong companies were actually set up by Chinese investors, 
but because money from Hong Kong was considered a foreign investment, the 
joint venture company could obtain tax exemptions or deductions. The devel-
opment company contributed the land it held, the foreign investors provided 
the capital. The terms on which profits and risks were shared was determined 
contractually. All four development companies took this approach, setting 
up joint ventures to develop smaller pieces of land. For example, Lujiazui Fi-
nancial and Trade Zone United Development Ltd. was a joint venture set up 
   Based on interviews with Zhao Dehe, a researcher at Shanghai Municipal Construction & Management Com-
mission, Li Zhanjun, a researcher at Shanghai Social Science Academy, Li Jianeng, former director of Pudong 
Urban Planning Bureau, and Chen Min, Deputy director of Lujiazui Development (Group) Company Ltd, held in 
October and November 2002.
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by SLDC and a developer in Hong Kong, and Fortune World Development Ltd 
was a joint venture set up by SLDC and a developer in Thailand (Chen, 2003, p. 
109).
The second way was for the development company to use the newly expro-
priated land as security for a land development loan from a Chinese bank. The 
loan could then be used to upgrade the undeveloped land with ‘seven con-
nections and one level’, the usual Chinese standard for land made available 
for leasing, which also implies that the land is totally clear and that all previ-
ous occupiers have been relocated. Land in this condition could be leased to 
other developers at a much higher price, and the proceeds used to repay the 
loan. In some cases, a development company even persuaded a bank (more 
usually a bank with an overseas background or a Chinese bank with branches 
in Hong Kong or Macau12) to enter into a joint venture in real estate devel-
opment by providing land below the current market price. This kind of joint 
venture between banks and development companies was banned by central 
government in the mid-1990s. In the early 1990s the banks received strong 
political encouragement to support the Pudong development, but the finan-
cial sector became increasingly concerned about the profit they might earn by 
land deals and the risks that might be created by the ongoing reform of the 
Chinese banking sector.
The third way was for the development company to set up a public com-
pany and have it listed it on the stock exchange. All four development compa-
nies had their companies listed on the stock exchange, so introducing private 
shareholders into state-owned organisations (Chen, 2003, p. 109). One conse-
quence was that it became possible for market fluctuations to influence the 
financing, and so the functioning, of what were still essentially state-owned 
organisations.
The fourth and last way was for the development company to sell develop-
ers land-leasing rights on smaller pieces of land. Investors could choose be-
tween raw land and developed land: both were available. The price was reg-
ulated by SMG, but could to some extent be varied by negotiation. Learning 
from Hong Kong’s experience, SMG set the price of land-leasing rights accord-
ing to the use to which the land was to be put and the total permitted floor 
area, rather than the area of raw land. In 1993 the Fujita Group, a Japanese 
company, bought the land-use rights on one square kilometre of raw land in 
Jinqiao Export Processing Zone for further land development and infrastruc-
ture construction.
   Local companies generally preferred partners with an overseas background, since this allowed the collabora-
tion or joint venture to take advantage of preferential policies such as tax deductions and exemptions.
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Private sector involvement
How did investors react to this flexible strategy? Interestingly enough, the 
flexible land development strategy resulted in a dynamic pattern of private 
sector involvement. Even if the main goal was always to make a profit, differ-
ent groups of private sector participants were involved at different stages of 
the Pudong development. Strategies for determining when and where to in-
vest varied according to the interests, capacity and limitations of the private 
sector.
The timescale presented in Table 3.1 shows which public and private sector 
groups participated in the Pudong development by taking advantage of pref-
erential policies, establishing land strategies, becoming involved in land de-
velopment or simply leasing small blocks of land for future land or real estate 
development.
First period (1990-1992)
Most of the companies involved in Pudong were supported by ministries, 
provinces or neighbouring cities or districts, often attracted by preferential 
treatment. These companies were extremely active in the early stages of the 
development and still remain active but more as market participants rather 
than merely as providers of political support. The buildings they developed at 
the time are known as shengbu lou13, buildings developed by companies and 
organisations supported by provinces and ministries. A total of 67 properties 
in Lujiazui FTZ fell into this category. Although some investors were rela-
tively well-informed about the market mechanism, many were inadequately 
prepared to operate in a competitive market more concerned with cost-ben-
efit analyses and balance sheets, and so suffered enormous problems during 
the Asian economic crisis, from which they took years to recover (Lu, 2002). 
Another significant group of investors was made up of Chinese commercial 
and investment banks, which until the mid-1990s were allowed to invest in 
real estate. These banks were persuaded by a combination of political will14 
and economic interest to participate in land development by granting loans, 
engaging in property development or setting up direct joint ventures in land 
development. They too received various kinds of preferential treatment, com-
parable to that received by shengbu lou. Finally, a handful of foreign inves-
tors, mainly large companies which already had some experience in China or 
   Shengbu lou refers to the buildings financed by Chinese companies that are directly or indirectly linked with 
ministries or provincial or local governments. The so-called shengbu lou policy granted preferential treatment on 
land price and taxation to those Chinese companies that had direct or indirect links with ministries or provincial 
or local governments at the beginning of the Pudong development. The same policy was reinstated in 1998 dur-
ing the Asian economic crisis after Pudong’s real estate market had suffered major losses. As a result, 37 shengbu 
lou were built in Lujiazui Financial and Trade Zone, mostly concentrated in the Zhuyuan area. 
   Most banks in China are state-owned. 
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formed part of the global Chinese business network, made a limited number 
of experimental investments in land development or real estate development 
in Pudong.
Second period (1993-1996)
Foreign investors (real estate developers) started to become significant par-
ticipants in the Pudong development. In the early stages many foreign inves-
tors were still concerned about the Chinese political system and the effect it 
might have on real estate investment. Daring overseas Chinese businessmen 
from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore were among the 
first to experiment with small-scale projects in the new real estate market. 
Their understanding of China and their special guanxi enabled them to adapt 
more easily to the local Chinese environment. Other Asian investors (e.g. from 
Japan and Korea) that shared or were influenced by a similar culture, for ex-
ample Confucianism, also benefited from a better understanding of local cus-
toms and conventions and so felt more confident about entering the market. 
As the infrastructure improved and the real estate market increased in size, 
investors who had previously been concerned about the risk of investing in 
China became more confident, and a number of Western investors began to 
take an interest in property development in Pudong.
Third period (1997-1999)
Private investment slowed down dramatically. The Asian economic crisis had 
an enormous impact on all participants in the bank and real estate sectors. 
Small investors who were caught in the middle of the construction process 
or lost financial support from the banks or simply were unable to find ten-
ants, went bankrupt. Even larger domestic and foreign investors, with strong 
financial support, suffered huge losses. Many construction projects, for exam-
Table 3.1 Timetable showing the involvement of the public sector and various private 
sector groups
Public sector Year Private sector
SMG, CG until 1990 Multinationals, foreign governments
SMG, PNAG, CG, MIN 1990-1993 Companies suported by ministries, provinces, local 
districts; commercial banks; (a start) domestic and 
foreign real estate developers
SMG, PNAG, zonal development 
companies and their branches
1994-1997 Companies suported by ministries, provinces, 
local districts; commercial banks, other real estate 
developers
SMG, PNAG, zonal development 
companies and their branches
1998-2000 Companies supported by ministries, provinces, 
local districts; commercial banks, a smaller number 
of real estate developers
SMG, PNAG, zonal development 
companies and their branches
since 2000 A greater number of real estate developers, 
companies supported by ministries, provinces, and 
local districts
SMG: Shanghai Municipal Government; PNAG: Pudong New Area People’s Government; CG: Central 
Government; MIN: Chinese government ministries.
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ple The World Financial Centre, an investment by the Japanese Mori Group, 
had to be suspended. The Super Brand Mall, an investment by the Thai Chi-
atai Group, had to be suspended when the failure of a number of Thai banks 
which were providing loans for the project made it impossible for the group 
to pay its French construction company. Only with the assistance of local gov-
ernment was the group finally able to reach agreement with a number of Chi-
nese banks to support the continuation of the project.
Fourth period (2000 onwards)
The real estate market reached a low point and began to improve. More in-
vestment began to arrive, from China and abroad. Two groups of investors de-
serve special mention. The first, a group of domestic private companies, nota-
bly absent at the beginning of the Pudong development, provided new blood 
for the real estate sector. These companies, mostly small, lacked capital and 
knowledge of the real estate market but caught up quickly in the years follow-
ing the Asian economic crisis. Some, such as Greenland Group, Dahua Group 
and Forte Group, increased enormously in size, experience in the property 
market and management skills. The second group was made up of foreign in-
vestment companies, all quite new to the market. These companies were not 
particularly interested in becoming involved in real estate projects as such 
but more in becoming involved in the Shanghai property market through 
share ownership. So far foreign investors, domestic private companies and 
state-owned real estate companies have almost all been able to find a place 
in the Pudong real estate market.
While Pudong was trying to attract private sector companies such as local 
developers and financial organisations, they by no means ignored local busi-
nesses15, universities, public organisations and state-owned businesses in 
other provinces or supported by other ministries. It was hoped that the in-
volvement of as many investors as possible would enable Pudong not only to 
develop a property market relatively rapidly but, more important, to develop 
its economic function, so giving further impetus to the property market. The 
same approach was emphasised in the strategy used to facilitate land devel-
opment, related functional developments and real estate development. In fact 
such strategies were fully in line with Shanghai’s approach of setting up a 
‘project-based, implicitly pro-growth coalition between China and interna-
tional capital’ to be involved in urban restructuring (Fu, 2002, p. 107). This ap-
proach was more open to outside influence than the approach adopted in the 
   These enterprises were not concerned with the real estate sector as such, but might invest in real estate by 
for example building their own offices, factories or warehouse. Most of them were active in businesses of particu-
lar interest to Shanghai, such as banking, insurance, technology and logistics.
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1980s by most other Chinese cities.
We examined a number of collaborative arrangements set up by SLDC be-
tween 1990 and 1995. During this period four joint ventures were set up in 
Lujiazui FTZ, each aiming to develop land and channel money from the stock 
market into land development (see Box 3.5). Most private investors appeared 
to be frightened of participating in land development because of the high risk. 
Uncertainty about the future of Pudong, the sizeable gap between plan and 
reality, the lack of adequate infrastructure and experience with collaboration 
between local public companies and development companies all contributed 
to the risks considered in the feasibility studies conducted by private sector 
organisations. Despite a generally conservative attitude towards large-scale 
land development projects, at the beginning of the 1990s local and foreign in-
vestors tended to prefer to become involved in the development of smaller 
blocks of land or in smaller real estate development projects, even though the 
risk was still very great. Private sector organisations, particularly foreign in-
vestors, were prepared to lease small blocks of land for further development 
provided that ‘seven connections and one level’ had already been provided. 
Exceptions included the joint ventures between the four development com-
panies and state-owned banks including Bank of China, China Commercial 
and Industrial Bank, China Construction Bank, a number of local banks such 
as Pudong Development Bank and some state-owned insurance companies. 
While the decision to become involved may have been be based on expected 
profit and calculated risk, undoubtedly political pressure from central govern-
ment also played a part. Central government’s declared intention to support 
the Pudong development could well have had the same effect on state-owned 
banks as it had on a number of ministries and provinces. Similar exam-
ples can be found in other development zones. For example, Jinqiao Export 
Processing Zone set up two joint ventures. The first was set up in cooperation 
Box 3.5 Land development joint ventures established in Lujiazui FTZ (1990-1995)
1. In October 1991, SLDC and China People’s Insurance Company, China 
People’s Insurance Company (Shanghai), Hong Kong Hongs Development 
Ltd. and Hong Kong Shanghai Ltd. set up the Shanghai Lujiazui Financial 
and Trade United Ltd. joint venture, with a capital of US$ 98 million, to 
develop 69.56 ha in Lujiazui FTZ. SLDC held 55% of the shares.
2. In 1991, SLDC and Shanghai Investment & Development Trust, Shanghai 
Investment Trust (a Chinese Construction Bank subsidiary) and China Real 
Estate Development Group (Shanghai) set up Shanghai Zhongcheng Ltd., 
with a capital of 61.8 million yuan raised on the stock exchange, for land 
development.
3. In July 1992, SLDC and Chiatai Group set up Shanghai Fortune World Ltd. 
to develop a first tranche of 15 ha along the Lujiazui waterfront.
4. In August 1992, SLDC and Shanghai Investment & Development Trust set 
up Shanghai Lujiazui Financial and Trade Zone Development Shareholder 
Ltd., with a capital of 15 million yuan raised on the stock exchange, to 
develop 1.51 km2.
Source: Pudong Almanac Committee, 1994
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with the Pudong branches of China Commercial and Industrial Bank, China 
Construction Bank, China Agricultural Bank and the Shanghai Investment & 
Development Trust. The total investment was 340 million yuan; 51% of the 
shares were held by Jinqiao. The second was set up in cooperation with Hong 
Kong Construction and Investment Ltd., a subsidiary of Bank of China (Hong 
Kong), and China Merchants Group (Hong Kong). The total investment was 
200 million yuan; 51% of the shares were held by Jinqiao. Waigaoqiao Tax-free 
Zone also set up a joint venture, the Waigaoqiao United Development Compa-
ny for Land Development, involving Shanghai Trust Ltd., Bank of China, Hong 
Kong Construction and Investment Ltd. and China Merchants Group (Hong 
Kong). The total investment was 200 million yuan; 55% of the shares were 
held by Waigaoqiao (SMHLRA, 1992, p. 40).
One interesting public-private land development collaborations was For-
tune World Ltd., a joint venture between SLDC and the Thailand-based Chi-
atai Group16. This joint venture was set up at a time when Pudong was still 
not a particularly appealing investment prospect. Even though the Nanpu 
bridge had been constructed to connect the two sides of the Huangpu, Pu-
dong had nothing to offer investors except an ambitious plan, a number of 
preferential government policies and the reality of a dilapidated area. Few 
private sector organisations were brave enough to invest, but Xie Guomin, 
president of Chiatai Group and a man with enormous experience of working 
in China, foresaw the potential of the ambitious Pudong development plan. 
His interest was warmly welcomed by the local authority, which encouraged 
Chiatai Group to enter into discussions with Lujiazui Finance & Trade Zone 
Development Co. Ltd. (SLDC) (later renamed Lujiazui Development (Group) 
Company Ltd.) on ways of cooperating and sharing cost and risk. SLDC had 
land but needed capital for infrastructure. Chiatai Group had capital. On 16 
April 1992 a contract was signed between SLDC, Chiatai Group (Thailand) and 
Hong Kong Fortune Limited (a Chiatai Group subsidiary). The purpose of the 
contract was to establish the Fortune World Development Ltd joint venture 
to develop 40 ha of raw land in Lujiazui Financial & Trade Zone, immediately 
opposite the Bund. Chiatai provided the capital and SLDC provided the land. 
The duration of the contract was 88 years, starting on 18 July 1992, but the 
company reserved the right to extend the life of the contract at the end of 
the initial 88 year period. The registered capital was US$ 30 million. It was 
agreed that SLDC would hold 50% of the shares, Chiatai Group (Thailand) 15% 
   The Thailand-based Chiatai Group was one of the earliest foreign companies to invest in China after the 
introduction of the open door policy. In the first 10 years the Chiatai Group concentrated mainly on food and 
agricultural production. Years of experience working in the Chinese market helped the Chiatai Group to develop 
strong links with the Chinese government and the Chinese business community. The Chiatai brand is well known 
throughout China thanks to the company’s sponsorship of a popular television program which was broadcast in 
China for many years.
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and its Hong Kong Fortune Ltd. subsidiary the remaining 35%, representing 
a total investment of 115,061,000 yuan. The block to be developed was situ-
ated between Chengzhong Road, Lujiazui West Road, Century Avenue, and 
Bingjiang Road, and was to be used for luxury office buildings and hotels. For-
tune World’s main potential customers were international companies, corpo-
rations and business groups.
Land development requires a huge amount of capital, a long development 
period (usually 3-5 years) and acceptance of the uncertainty created by a 
number of years’ market risk. It was important for Fortune World to make a 
profit and maintain a healthy balance sheet. The company’s large initial in-
vestment (230 million yuan) made it impossible for it to wait for the land de-
velopment to be completed, so it decided to put the land on the market in 
parallel with its development work. To ensure steady demand, whether from 
ordinary clients or the stakeholders, the company adopted the principle of 
accepting the best price offered or the earliest available contract. To attract 
high-class investors, it paid special attention to upgrading the infrastructure 
in its block. Although the provision of infrastructure at district level was sup-
posed to be the responsibility of the public sector, Fortune World knew that if 
it was left to the public sector it would have a long wait before the infrastruc-
ture was complete. It therefore decided to do what it could itself. A total of 
300 million yuan was invested in infrastructural projects including Fortune 
World’s section of Riverside Avenue (completed on 1 July 1997), a 35 KV un-
derground power station, Dongning Road and a drainage system serving the 
Fortune World area. This strategy, essentially a marketing strategy, had posi-
tive results. Nine pieces of land were leased in the seven years between 1992 
and 1999, including five in the first term (88.9% of the total land available in 
that term) and three in the second term (39.3% of the total land available in 
that term). Between 10 November 1993 and 31 December 1993, four of the six 
Figure 3.4 Planning model for Fortune World
Source: Wang and Xia, 2001
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available pieces of land were leased, representing 75.5% of the total amount 
available. The highest leasing price obtained in the period was US$ 598/m2 for 
the X1-3 block, which was to be used to build the Shangri-la hotel. Between 
1994 and 1995, Fortune World leased 4 pieces of land for a total of US$ 200 
million, all received in the same year. Thus the joint venture was able to re-
Figure 3.5 a Landmark buildings in the Fortune World area. Top: Jinmao Tower (left), 
Tomson Luxury Appartment and Super Grand Mall; bottom: the main buildings in the 
Fortune World area give Pudong its skyline
Figure 3.5 b Bird’s-eye view of the Fortune World area
Source: CNAP 
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cover its entire initial investment from the profit earned in the first year. The 
annual profit after taxation was 133,000 yuan (US$ 16,062.80).
After Fortune World’s success with its first term of land development and 
land leasing, it purchased a further 13.9 ha of raw land from SLDC in prepara-
tion for a second term. The total investment in land for both terms togeth-
er was 1.5 billion yuan. 30 ha of land has since been developed. Dozens of 
factories, including the Lixin shipyard and a tobacco machinery factory, and 
more than 1,000 households were relocated. In all, more than 200,000 m2 were 
demolished. Over seven years the joint venture made a profit of 690 million 
yuan, enabling the two shareholders to share a profit of 590 million yuan, a 
yield of more than 250% on a total investment of 2 billion yuan (US$ 24.15 
million). Shangri-la Hotel, a Kerry Properties Ltd. investment, was the first 
building to be open for business. In 2006 several landmark projects were com-
pleted or in construction, including the Shenmao tower, now renamed Citic 
Bank tower (an investment by the Japanese Mori Group), Tomson Luxury Ap-
partment (Tomson Group (Taiwan)), Shangri-la Hotel, phases I and II (Hong 
Kong Shangri-la Hotel Group) and Super Grand Mall (Chiatai Group).
Evolution of the public-private partnership (PPP) mechanism
Chapter 1 described the networking and dependencies between the public 
and private sectors in a network society, which provide the framework for the 
application of the PPP mechanism. However, during the evolution of China 
as a developmental state, traditional Chinese public administration practice 
kept the public and private sectors poles apart; each minded its own business. 
Figure 3.5 a Landmark buildings in the Fortune World area. Top: Jinmao Tower (left), 
Tomson Luxury Appartment and Super Grand Mall; bottom: the main buildings in the 
Fortune World area give Pudong its skyline
Figure 3.5 b Bird’s-eye view of the Fortune World area
Source: CNAP 
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Generally the public sector dominated everyday life, leaving the private sector 
struggling for survival. This traditional relationship would inevitably change 
with the introduction of economic reform and the open door policy. A direct 
consequence, as described later in Section 3.4, was the importance of private 
finance to total investment in Pudong (some finance came from public or-
ganisations or enterprises participating in the Pudong development as private 
investors). Earlier sections have referred to the penetration of global capital 
into Pudong through FDI and the significant role played by the Chinese glo-
bal business network in facilitating development in Chinese cities generally 
and Pudong New Area in particular. Private investors were determined to play 
an increasing role in the integration with the new and unknown (capitalist) 
world and global economic structures. The public sector wanted to involve 
the private sector in the Pudong development to allow it to benefit from its 
advanced knowledge, available capital and understanding of the free market. 
These motives make it easier to understand why the involvement of private 
finance, especially foreign investment, was always a key part of the strategy 
for facilitating land development (Wang, 2000). Pudong appears to have fol-
lowed the same idea of involving private finance by forming partnerships 
with organisations in the private sector, particularly overseas developers like 
Fortune World. However, as Klijn and Teisman (2000) pointed out (see Chap-
ter 1 for a more detailed analysis), in a network society the development of a 
PPP requires the creation of ‘trust’ between the various participants. For Pu-
dong to be able to involve private investors, it had to create an atmosphere 
of mutual trust and understanding between the public sector and the private 
sector, allowing or even encouraging collaboration between the two. How 
could Pudong’s public sector create the necessary atmosphere of trust?
In fact Pudong’s public sector seems not to have abandoned its determina-
tion to dominate the project and to control the progress of the Pudong devel-
opment as a whole. Clearly its role in initiating the project, developing the 
implementation strategy and later actively participating in various aspects of 
the redevelopment, entitled it to a good deal of say. Nevertheless, it did take 
certain steps to attract the private sector, for example by improving the legal 
framework to allow the private sector more flexibility, give it more say, and 
subject it to less control and frustration. Local government began to openly 
consult the private sector for advice and later developed a series of prefer-
ential policies to break down barriers and reduce the level of taxation for in-
vestors. As discussions on the Pudong development became more lively, the 
private sector began to show interest in the commercial possibilities. Interac-
tion between the two sides led to local planners experimenting with drawing 
up a master plan that would be more flexible and better adapted to the needs 
of the private sector. They also began to experiment in new land-use arrange-
ments taking account of land value, a highly innovative measure at a time 
when there was still no market in land in Shanghai. This preparatory work 
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helped Pudong to create a Chinese version of a land market and to explore 
the still infant local real estate market. This move proved to be well suited to 
Pudong’s needs. To make the process more adaptable and oriented to the long-
term, the government invited various individuals, from China and abroad, to 
suggest improvements to the master plan and the feasibility studies for indi-
vidual key projects.
To make the private sector more confident about investing in underdevel-
oped areas, central and local government established a series of preferential 
policies including tax deductions, cheaper land prices and a ‘one-stop’ service 
for approving investment. These policies encouraged a number of investors to 
become more interested in participating in the Pudong development. As has 
already been said, the public sector hoped that more private finance would 
be attracted to Pudong and so boost the real estate market as more private 
sector organisations became involved. The public sector therefore adopted a 
more relaxed attitude towards PPP and its implementation, to advance the 
cause of ‘attracting alternative finance and private investment’. In the early 
1990s Pudong was the only place where foreign banks were allowed to carry 
on business in Chinese currency (renminbi), a practice which was still prohib-
ited in other parts of China. Chinese companies had been allowed to estab-
lish their own foreign trade companies in Pudong since 1990, while elsewhere 
in the country Chinese companies were forbidden to carry on import-export 
business directly but were required to go through state-appointed trading 
companies which had exclusive rights of representation for foreign trade. All 
these measures led to private sector involvement from an unprecedentedly 
complex mix of local, regional, national and international organisations, rang-
ing from public organisations, publicly funded agencies and organisations 
and NGOs to banks and, most important of all, private sector organisations, 
as shown in Figure 3.6.
Compared with the level of public-private partnership in urban redevel-
opment projects in Western Europe (e.g. London’s Docklands development or 
the Kop van Zuid project in Rotterdam), the nature of public-private partner-
ships in the Pudong development was different in a number of ways. First, the 
transparency of the process was limited. Local government still dominated 
the decision-making process on all matters concerning development, decid-
ing whether or not to involve external shareholders, which organisations were 
invited to participate and to what extent. The private sector had the capital, 
the expertise and the freedom to decide whether or not to become involved. 
The system of urban planning and administration limited the transparency of 
the decision-making process by limiting the number of decision-makers. The 
position was quite different in Europe, where there is much more concern 
with transparency. Second, the emphasis in the Pudong development was al-
ways on the speed with which the development could be got under way. All 
efforts, including the involvement of the private sector, were therefore geared 
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to stimulating investment and speeding up development. The same approach 
could be found in other developing Chinese cities. The third difference was 
the increasing role played by FDI. Interestingly, investments from Hong Kong 
and Taiwan accounted for almost half the total FDI in Pudong. In fact many 
of the international investors who invested in Pudong in the early stages had 
some kind of Chinese background or connections, and the injection of capital 
they provided greatly stimulated the development of the infant Pudong. The 
global Chinese business network actually became a go-between, linking the 
Chinese economy to the global capital market, providing a good channel for 
bringing funding, modern techniques and information into what was still a 
relatively closed Chinese society.
For the Pudong development, local government preferred to attract pri-
vate investment rather than encouraging PPP; a number of European cities 
prefer to make use of PPP before examining the feasibility of local involve-
ment in urban development. Consequently Chinese PPP are more flexible 
and much more result-oriented. The general hope was that the introduction 
of PPP would achieve four goals, the provision of finance, the speeding up 
of urban development and redevelopment, the improvement of efficiency in 
public services and the creation of social benefits far beyond the interests of 
the private sector. In Pudong public-private partnerships became involved in 
several kinds of project, including land development, urban renewal and the 
provision of infrastructure. The earliest attempt to involve the private sector 
was in the construction of the Nanpu and Yangpu bridges. A loan from the 
Asian Development Bank enabled the two bridges to be constructed right at 
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the start of the Pudong development, providing vital access from Shanghai’s 
downtown area to the still underdeveloped Pudong area. Later collaborations 
between the public and private sectors mainly involved land development. As 
already mentioned, the Fortune World joint venture gave the public sector the 
funding needed to complete one particular piece of land development. At the 
end of the 1990’s, the public sector used its co-financing strategy to boost low 
cost - low return urban renewal projects involving private developers. Chry-
santhemum Park is a typical example. The Pudong New Area Administration 
Centre’s real estate bureau provided 400 million yuan (US$ 48.31 million) to 
co-finance this redevelopment project under the terms of a contract entered 
into with the developers. After 2000, the public sector began to use Build-Op-
erate-Transfer (BOT) and Build-Own-Operate (BOO) to attract private invest-
ment in public projects such as water management and the development of 
green space.
Changes in the approach to PPP reflected the changing environment en-
countered by Pudong during its development. At first local government had 
little money and experience and so needed help from private developers. 
Once the development was properly under way and the key infrastructure 
projects had been completed, more investors became interested, but few were 
interested in urban renewal projects offering high risk and low return. The co-
financing approach helped to attract more investors to such projects. After a 
dozen years of development, Pudong had built itself a new image and had be-
come known for high quality standards. The hope was that the use of BOT or 
BOO would encourage the private sector, especially international investors, to 
provide advanced technology and management skills.
It has been noted that these projects forced the public sector to reinvent 
itself, to become more business-oriented, more efficient and more goal and 
service oriented, by introducing ‘local state corporatism’ or ‘mixed entrepre-
neurship’. Although in China local governments and their officials form part 
of the administrative apparatus, part of the ‘state’, they are also distinct enti-
ties, separate from central government and the rest of society, with their own 
agendas, and increasingly with their own resources. This was especially true 
of the newly established development companies, pre-eminent representa-
tives of the front line of entrepreneurial Chinese local government, which 
operated with relative autonomy and were far removed from the central 
doctrine of top-down planning. These companies worked bottom-up, city-
wide and at district level, simultaneously involved in many different building 
projects involving private developers and investors from all round the world.
Instances of public-private collaboration and public-private partnership in 
Pudong demonstrate a complex global-local connection and interaction. On 
the one hand, the role of the public sector was still central in deciding what 
mechanism was applied and which partners were accepted. On the other 
hand, there were signs of increasing influence from market forces and the 
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market mechanism, encouraging both parties in the coalition to adopt market 
principles for land development.
First, the public sector continued to play a central and dominant role in 
the Pudong development generally and in the projects in which PPP was ap-
plied. The traditional bureaucratic structure had not yet been superseded by 
the new kind of open structure favoured by the growing network society. The 
public sector, especially the SMG, hung on to its position as ‘owner’, directing 
the design and implementation of the Pudong development while still con-
sulting the private sector and involving outsiders in decision-making. It was 
able to maintain this position because of its resources, namely state-owned 
land and the right to expropriate. All design and construction work needed its 
approval. It had the power to mobilise people, households and society. Though 
the power of the public sector is incomparably weaker than the power wield-
ed by a government-dominated society, strong political leadership can play 
an important role in initiating ideas, putting forward opinions and stimulat-
ing development by supporting the private sector. The redevelopment of New 
York’s Manhattan provides a good example. However, as the global-local axis 
becomes more articulated, the traditional top-down structure will weaken, as 
seen in practice in the Fortune World and other PPP projects. Local authorities 
can even manage to bypass a bureaucratic structure and enable horizontal 
collaboration with pioneering mediatory and development companies.
Second, the flexibility demonstrated by allowing public-private interac-
tion and public-private partnerships reflects the Chinese belief that the end 
is more important than the means. This pragmatic approach on the part of 
Chinese reformers and city managers increases the speed with which they 
can assimilate useful experiences from others and adapt them to their own 
situation and enables them to react more quickly to changing situations and 
new problems. In its pursuit of market-oriented reforms, Shanghai showed 
itself to be creative in borrowing and applying free market concepts that 
were relatively ideology-free and so could easily be adapted to suit the pre-
vailing ideological constraints. Much useful experience with the operation of 
the free market and new financial mechanisms was ‘borrowed’ and actively 
used in the Pudong development. Several kinds of capital market were estab-
lished in Pudong, including a stock market, a futures market, a gold market 
and a ‘property rights exchange’. A number of ‘free market principles’ were 
also used to guide the reform of the market in urban land. One new feature 
of Shanghai’s land policy was the designation of special experimental zones 
coupled with the identification of priorities and the provision of facilities to 
stimulate private initiatives and test the reaction of the free market. These 
kinds of measure encouraged competition between different parts of the 
same city, and indeed between different Chinese cities, particularly the ‘open’ 
coastal cities.
Third, the involvement of FDI and the significance of the Chinese global 
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business network reflect the complex global-local involvement in the Pudong 
development. The increasing amount of FDI had a direct and increasing im-
pact on the growth of Pudong and Shanghai’s GDP, reflecting the developing 
integration of the local economy and the global economy during the reform 
era. The form of urban design and the dominant activities in a city increas-
ingly reflect the nature of the link with global capital markets. The urban de-
velopment in Pudong-Shanghai enabled local government to attract FDI but 
at the same time reduced the level of central government control on manage-
ment and the complex financial constructions and international transfers of 
capital generated by that development. The financial mechanisms underlying 
Shanghai’s urban development show how integration into the global system 
of capital flows made it increasingly difficult for government to control such 
flows and to oversee the different joint ventures, each with its own way of 
generating funds. The explosive growth of Shanghai over such a short period 
mainly resulted from ad hoc decisions by many participants, and from inter-
ests, compromises, conflicts and alliances triggered by economic reform. The 
way that the developmental state, assisted by local state corporatism, gen-
erated local connections with the global network, for example through the 
development companies, proves that it is impossible to protect government 
from exposure to the demands of powerful global forces, to the logic of glo-
balisation. The process of globalisation and the outcome of the process of ur-
ban and financial development represents a challenge to the autonomy of the 
state. Full integration into the market economy makes it increasingly difficult 
for the government to stand aside. A developmental state cannot remain iso-
lated from and unaffected by the impact of globalisation (Chen, 2004; Chen 
and Wigmans, 2005).
 3.1.4 Relocation
Relocation is one of the most contentious issues in most urban redevelop-
ment projects, not only in the West but also in the developing world (Wu, 
2002). In China the aim of land development is to provide a piece of raw land 
with ‘seven connections and one level’, ready for further real estate develop-
ment. In many cases making such a piece of land available means either that 
a significant number of households and businesses have to be relocated from 
an existing urban area or a piece of rural land has to be acquired. The relo-
cation process therefore has a direct impact on everyone involved and, con-
sequently, changes all aspects of local life, business and even society. The 
development of Pudong, especially the four development zones and the devel-
opment of large-scale infrastructure, required more land, which immediately 
increased the speed which land was acquired and extended the relocation 
process into rural Pudong. The total gross floor area demolished and reset-
tled increased from 1.2 million m2 in 2000 to 2.2 million m2 in 2001, then to 
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2.7 million m2 in 2002. It is claimed that 22,214 households and 136 blocks of 
flats were involved in the relocation process (SMHLRAB and SMSB, 2001, 2002, 
2003). In Lujiazui Financial and Trade Zone (Lujiazui FTZ) alone, two areas of 
one square kilometre each had been developed by the end of 1993, followed 
by 3.08 km2 by the end of 1995 and 6.80 km2 by the end of 2000. This meant 
that a total of 7,517 households and 178 businesses had been relocated by 
1993, 13,300 households and 340 businesses by 1995 and 27,000 houses and 
738 businesses by the end of 2001 (Pudong Almanac Board, 1993, 1995, 2000 
and 2002).
While China’s central planning system may be undergoing a transition to 
a market economy, it still takes a very different view of the relocation of city 
dwellers, because most of them live in public housing provided by the mu-
nicipal housing department or the state as employer. Instead of residential 
mobility being determined by free choice, in China urban households wanting 
to move to a different location have to depend on the availability of accom-
modation provided by the employer or the municipality. Unlike tenancy in a 
mature market economy, the rights conferred by socialist tenancy ‘equalled 
or exceeded in many ways those conventionally associated with “owner-
ship”, and certainly were far stronger than those associated with conven-
tional tenancy in the United States’ (Marcuse, 1996, p. 135; Wu, 2004, p. 457). 
The strength of these rights means that relocated households are able to 
negotiate the level of compensation. Employers play a significant role in the 
provision of housing, a role generally played by the supply side in a mature 
housing market. As housing underwent a gradual reform from rental to own-
ership17, employers continued for some considerable time to play the role of 
provider of housing, either providing their employees with subsidised hous-
ing or becoming involved in the commoditisation of what was formerly public 
housing, again at a subsidised price. Employers continued to play a significant 
role even during relocation, representing the interests of their employees, the 
tenants of their housing stock, in negotiations between the employees, the 
municipality and the developer. A lack of power and capital means that inter-
est groups representing relocated households generally found themselves in 
a weak position when facing government or market forces. However, unlike 
the position in many other countries where lobbies and activists make a busi-
ness of expressing the opinions of particular groups, in Chinese society the 
protection of the interests of affected groups does not simply depend on the 
   Housing reform started in China in 1979. The main aim of the reform was to use commoditisation to change 
the welfare allocation of housing by the central planning regime into a market system. The gradual reform pro-
ceeded along two parallel lines: a housing market was gradually established to provide homes to be sold at mar-
ket price and public housing was sold at a subsidised price to encourage home ownership. At the same time the 
provision of housing by allocation was gradually reduced. In fact the welfare allocation system was only abolished 
in 2000, 20 years after the start of housing reform.
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strength of those groups; the public sector has the responsibility and moral 
duty to protect the weak. Wu (2004, p. 454) comments that ‘the speed of re-
location cannot be explained by the authoritarian character of the state as 
the state itself is undergoing transformation and has seen significant decen-
tralisation’. Nor can it simply be explained as entirely market-oriented. ADB’s 
Bruce Murray (personal interview, 2002) has given the following account of 
the basic thinking underlying the regulations on relocation:
‘...the central planning system (requires) government to take responsi-
bility for jobs, health and housing. It is accepted that if the government 
deprives you of your home or work, it has to provide replacements. This 
is how a central planning system works…’
Whatever the reasons for relocation, it is important that relocated households 
are fairly compensated for the inconvenience and uncertainty suffered dur-
ing and after relocation. Life after relocation should be at least as good and 
preferably better than before. The following account of the legal framework 
that guided the practical implementation of relocation in Pudong, and the 
disputes caused by relocation, is intended to provide a clearer picture of the 
problems encountered during relocation.
Evolution of relocation policy
As market reform continued in China, the need for new legislation and regula-
tions became increasingly obvious, and a number of laws devised to meet the 
requirements of the central planning system needed to be amended to suit 
Figure 3.7 Demolition in Pudong
Source: CNAP
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the market mechanism. The legal framework for relocation faced the same 
challenge. Box 3.6 lists a number of important national and local laws, regu-
lations and policies relating to relocation. The regulations covered two main 
issues, compulsory land acquisition and resettlement of displaced residents 
(urban and rural households). The laws and regulations on the acquisition of 
farmland and the resettlement of rural households were different from those 
on the acquisition of urban land and resettlement of urban households. The 
differences are discussed in more detail below. 
Regulations on the compulsory acquisition of land
The regulations on the compulsory acquisition of land form an important part 
of the legal framework for relocation. In countries that allow private owner-
ship, land acquisition or expropriation is achieved by the government exercis-
ing its right to take privately owned property for public use (Needham, 2003; 
Chan, 2003). In China land belongs to the state. People or organisations which 
occupy or use land are not owners of that land, which means that zhengdi 
(compulsory land acquisition) is actually the compulsory withdrawal of land-
use rights and restoration of those rights to the state, the owner of the land. 
Zhengdi was legalised by the constitution of the People’s Republic of China 
in 1978, as amended in 1993. Under the constitution, other relevant laws in-
clude Articles 2, 37 and 58 of the People’s Republic of China Land Administra-
tion Act, Articles 19, 21 and 25 of the People’s Republic of China Real Estate 
Administration Act and Articles 17, 26, 42 and 47 of the People’s Republic of 
China Tentative Provisional Regulation on the Grant and Transfer of Land-use 
Rights on State-owned Land in Cities and Towns. According to this legislation, 
compensation was to be based on 6-10 times the average production value 
of arable land in the three years prior to acquisition. An organisation acquir-
ing vegetable fields in a suburban area was required to make payment to the 
state-regulated New Vegetable Field Development Construction Fund. Com-
pensation standards were further regulated by local government to suit the 
local situation. The acquisition of farmland required prior approval for the 
conversion of that land into land for building. Further the acquisition of more 
than 35 ha of basic farmland or arable land other than basic farmland, or of 
more than 70 ha of any other land, required the approval of the State Coun-
cil. The acquisition of urban land, on the other hand, only required to form 
part of the relevant city plan, and permission for demolition to be granted 
by the appropriate administrative department. Because of the importance of 
land acquisition in providing land for the expansion of Chinese cities, local 
governments were required to set up a land acquisition system and a land 
reserve. Even Pudong has been experimenting in using a land bank to reserve 
land. Only in August 2004 did Shanghai issue its first land reservation regula-
tion ‘Methods for Reserving Land in Shanghai’.
The resettlement of households needs to start as soon as the process of 
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Box 3.6 Laws and regulations on resettlement compensation and land acquisition
1. People’s Republic of China Land Administration Act 1986, as amended and 
reissued by Chairman of the PRC, Decree no. 8, implemented 1-1-1999
2. People’s Republic of China Provisional Land Administration Act 1998, State 
Council of the PRC, Decree no. 256, implemented 1-1-1999
3. Urban Building Demolition Administration Act, State Council Decree no. 
78, Implemented 1991-3-22, as amended and reissued by Chairman of the 
PRC, Decree no. 8, implemented 1-1-1999
4. Administrative Decision Procedure on Urban Building Demolition, Ministry 
of Construction, implemented 1-1-2004
5. Provisional Opinion on Urban Building Demolition Evaluation, Ministry of 
Construction, implemented 1-1-2004
6. Provisional Administrative Regulations for Housing Demolition Appraisal 
in Shanghai , Shanghai Municipal Housing and Land Resources 
Administration Bureau, HFDZS (2002), no. 0067, implemented 16-10-2001
7. Shanghai Urban Building Demolition Administration and Implementation 
Regulations, People’s Government of Shanghai Decree no. 111, 
implemented 1-11-2001
8. Resettlement Compensation Standard for Demolition of Urban 
Buildings (circular), Shanghai Municipal Housing and Land Resources 
Administration Bureau, Shanghai Municipal Construction and 
Administration Committee and Shanghai Municipal Price Bureau HJS 
(2001) no. 51, implemented 1-11-2001
9. Definition of Land Lot Grading Demolition Compensation and 
Resettlement, Shanghai Housing and Land Resources Administration 
Bureau, HFDZC (2002) no. 40, implemented 14-1-2002
10. Declaration of Resettlement Compensation Standard for Urban Residential 
Building, Shanghai Municipal Building and Land Resources Management 
Bureau and Shanghai Pricing Bureau, HFDZ (2002), no. 10, implemented 
19-2-2002
11. Payment and Usage of Shanghai Urban Buildings Demolition and 
Resettlement Compensation, Shanghai Municipal Building and Land 
Resources Management Bureau and People’s Bank of China (Shanghai 
Branch), HFDZC (2002), no. 289, implemented 17-6-2002
12. Shanghai Urban Relocation Administration Regulation, implemented 1-11-
2002
13. Problems in Adjusting the Lowest Compensation Standard for Building 
Resettlement for Different Districts and Counties, Shanghai Municipal 
Building and Land Resources Management Bureau, Shanghai Municipal 
Construction and Management Committee and Shanghai Municipal Pricing 
Bureau, HFDZ (2003), no. 162, implemented 8-5-2003
14. Acquisition of Collectively-owned Land, Resettlement and Compensation 
for the Demolition of Housing on that Land Regulations, People’s 
Government of Shanghai, HIFF (2002) no. 13, implemented 4-1-2002
15. Resumption and Resettlement Compensation for Collectively-owned Land 
in Shanghai Regulation, People’s Government of Shanghai, HFF (2002) no. 
13, implemented 1-4-2002
Sources: SMHLRAB and SMSB, 2001, 2002, 2003
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compulsory land acquisition has begun. Two kinds of resettlement can be 
distinguished. Relocation of urban households involves changes in the loca-
tion of housing, travel time and cost and possibly the character of the neigh-
bourhood, where households are no longer located close to the breadwin-
ner’s place of work. Unlike their urban counterparts, farm workers will have 
built their own homes on their own (collectively owned) land, so when a farm 
worker is relocated he loses not only his land but also his home and his social 
environment. For this reason, different relocation procedures were applied to 
the two different situations.
Even though national regulations ‘lay down the broad principles of com-
pensation, they do not specify the amount of compensation to be paid except 
that land-use rights holders should be suitably compensated. The law does 
not define what is meant by ‘suitable compensation’, nor is there any guid-
ance as to how suitable compensation should be assessed. Local governments 
are authorised to determine the detailed implementation according to local 
circumstance, especially as regards the amount of compensation to be paid’ 
(Chan, 2003).
Relocation of urban households
The earliest regulations on urban relocation in China during the reform era 
were drawn up to regulate the relocation of urban households necessitated by 
projects designed to relieve congestion. The housing shortage and low quality 
of housing stock in Chinese cities brought about by lack of investment meant 
that the top priority task for central and local government at the beginning 
of the reform was to alleviate the housing conditions of households living in 
dangerous or highly congested conditions. These congestion relief projects 
were originally carried out by public organisations and supported by public 
funds. Because the original aim was to improve public welfare, the earliest re-
location regulations failed to take account of market value and so inevitably 
experienced growing pains as relocation became involved in full-scale urban 
redevelopment. Consequently regulations on relocation had to be amended, 
modified or even abolished to suit an increasingly commercialised relocation 
process. For example, households were later required to share the cost of re-
location because of the benefits they received. The privatisation process al-
lowed households that were originally tenants to purchase their new homes 
at a subsidised price.
Shanghai took a similar approach to arranging its own relocation of urban 
households. Since housing conditions in Shanghai were amongst the worst 
to be found in any Chinese city, it can easily be understood that the relief of 
congestion came high on the local government agenda, and the earliest relo-
cation regulations were introduced to regulate the relocation necessitated by 
a congestion relief project designed and implemented, with the aid of gov-
ernment finance, at the end of the 1980s. The 365 Gongcheng (Project 365) was 
[  ]
a relocation program set up by Shanghai Municipal Government, with the 
help of a government investment of one billion yuan, aimed at redeveloping 
3.65 million m2 of the most dilapidated housing in Shanghai by 2000. The liv-
ing space allocated to each relocated household was calculated according to 
the number of people in the household. In February 2001, while the project 
was still in progress, Shanghai Municipal Government published Document 
No 68 which laid down that government would no longer finance urban re-
newal projects, but would introduce preferential policies, such as reduction 
of or (in extremely congested areas) exemption from land leasing fees and 
infrastructure costs, to attract private developers to become involved in ur-
ban redevelopment. In practice the document turned out to have a number of 
drawbacks. It laid down that compensation for relocation would depend on 
the size of the family making up the household. This encouraged households 
to try to increase the amount of compensation by registering the names of as 
many family members as possible as forming part of the household, so allow-
ing their relatives to share any benefits resulting from relocation. Cai Yutian, 
director of the Shanghai Housing and Land Resources Administrative Bureau, 
described the dilemma to a journalist from the Phoenix Hong Kong TV chan-
nel in the following terms (Caijing Dianduidian, July 31, 2003):
“...Because before (under the terms of the old document) we used the 
number of people in the household as the basis for calculating com-
pensation, the more people in the household, the higher the compensa-
tion would be. Many people were desperate to improve their quality of 
life and would take any opportunity they could to do so. They wanted 
to get as much improvement and as much housing space as possible, 
Figure 3.8 Jinyang Xincun (Jinyang New Village), a neighbourhood designed specially to 
accommodate households relocated from Pudong and Puxi
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so they tried to move as many people as possible into their households. 
In one of the worst cases I met, as many as 30 people were found to 
have moved into a household which before relocation occupied no more 
than a single room. The relocation project was generally well received 
and supported at local level. However, when people played these sorts 
of trick, others who used to have bigger and better housing conditions 
but fewer people in their households (and who did not cheat) felt them-
selves unfairly treated.”
This problem led the public sector to a change of approach: on 1 November 
2002 a new regulation, the Shanghai Urban Relocation Administration Regula-
tion, was issued to prevent this kind of cheating. According to this regulation, 
the compensation received by a household would be calculated on the basis 
of the living space it formerly occupied. Compensation for relocation was also 
revised in line with changes in the real estate market. The real estate market 
in Shanghai had grown rapidly and with it the price of housing. Increasing 
house prices directly influenced the level of compensation laid down by lo-
cal government for relocated households. Table 3.2 shows the compensation 
standards used for relocation after 1 July 2003. The highest compensation 
standard, 4,700 yuan per square metre of building land in the Lujiazui Central 
Financial District, was almost as high as the price of city centre land in Puxi. 
The rapid increase in the cost of relocation made the relocation of house-
holds from a congested urban area almost impossible for a private company 
to afford, which explains why the Pudong New Area Government proposed to 
assist private developers willing to take on an urban renewal project by subsi-
dising the cost of compensation.
Relocation of rural households
Compensation for the relocation of rural households took into account not 
only loss of property, as in the case of their urban counterparts, but also loss 
of production, loss of employment and the greater social benefits enjoyed by 
urban households. For rural households the compensation standard set for 
urban households was increased by an additional resettlement subsidy based 
on the number of persons dispossessed. The size of the payment was calcu-
lated by dividing the amount of land acquired by the average arable land per 
person in the expropriated land unit. The standard payment to each person 
requiring resettlement was based on 4-6 times the average production value 
of the acquired land in the three years prior to acquisition, except that the 
maximum payment per hectare of acquired land could not exceed 15 times 
the average production value in the three years prior to acquisition. If the 
land compensation and resettlement subsidy payments were insufficient to 
maintain the dispossessed farmers’ original quality of life, local government 
could approve an increase in the size of the resettlement subsidy, subject to 
the restriction that the total payment could not exceed 30 times the average 
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production value in the three years prior to acquisition. The compensation 
package not only included the resettlement subsidy but also compensation 
for improvements and loss of crops. The standard, set by local government, 
was generally 3-4 times the average production value in the three years prior 
to acquisition.
Beside compensation, arrangements for resettling rural households also 
included provisions for pensions, medical insurance and loss of employment. 
Since dispossessed farmers were deprived of their production capital (their 
land) and so become unemployed, local government was responsible for 
finding fresh employment or for providing job training until they were able 
to find new jobs. Dispossessed farmers were also entitled to reside in urban 
areas and enjoy social benefits, again something that local government was 
required to provide as part of the relocation package. However, the way that 
these various arrangements were made varied substantially from one munici-
pality to another, depending on local will and capacity.
Relocation of businesses
The relocation of businesses formed another important part of the reloca-
tion process. Compared with the relocation of households, relocation of busi-
nesses was relatively simpler. Even though the land belonged to the state, 
government accepted the reality of the business’s years of presence and was 
prepared to compensate for the loss caused by relocation. Of course the com-
pensation would in due course be recovered from the investor buying the 
land-use rights. Once urban planning has been approved, there is little point 
in discussing whether or not a business should move: the question is how 
compensation should be negotiated to benefit the business and its employees. 
Table 3.2 Standard compensation rates (2003) 
Level 
of area Area
Lowest compensation/m2 
construction area (yuan) 
3A Tangqiao Xin Lu, Pudian Road, Yanggao 
Nanlu, Yuanshen Road, East bank of Huangpu 
River
4,170
3B Within the inner-ring road, Level three area 
out of A Area in Level three, and Huamu Town
3,900
3C Level three area except those included in A 
and B
3,500
4A Jiyang Road, Huannanyi Evenue, Yanggao 
Nan Road, Chuanyang River, Luoshan Road, 
Yanggao Bei Road, Zhaojiagou and the border 
of level three 
3,150
4B Level four area except those included in A 2,700
5 1,891
6 1,668
Note: 1 yuan = US$ 0.12
Source: SMHLRAB and SMSB, 2004
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Thus it is more important for the relocated business to concentrate on ne-
gotiating compensation for relocation and loss of working hours and finding 
itself a satisfactory new location. The amount of compensation always had to 
be based on the standard for the location as issued each year by SMG.
Managing relocation projects in Lujizaui Financial Centre
Relocation is a complicated process. How was relocation managed? What 
rules were followed? To what extent did the relocation regulations protect 
the interests of the various interest groups? The example of the relocation re-
quired for the construction of Lujiazui Financial Centre provides an insight 
into the way in which the relocation process was handled in Pudong. The ar-
ea used to be highly urbanised, densely occupied by factories and housing for 
their employees. The relocation of households and businesses was the first 
task to be dealt with before Lujiazui could be redeveloped. In Pudong, several 
issues needed to be considered in any relocation project. In an interview, Tang 
Yicun, director of the Division of Real Estate Management, Construction Bu-
reau and Real Estate and Land Management Bureau at the Pudong New Area 
Administration Centre (now Pudong People’s Government), described the vari-
ous requirements that need to be met before relocation could start:
“First, only relocation companies that hold a relocation certification are 
allowed to work on relocation. Thanks to this certification system, the 
government can at least ensure that these companies understand the 
procedures and regulations relating to relocation and have the exper-
tise required to do the work. Pudong has 18 companies that hold such 
a certificate. Second, a relocation project needs to fulfil the full range 
of requirements for a relocation certificate before it can be permitted 
Figure 3.9 A neighbourhood in Huamu, Lujiazui Financial and Trade Zone, built to 
accommodate relocated rural households
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to proceed. These requirements include the setting up of a project, ap-
proval of a land-use plan, time scale and size, approval for leasing of 
state-owned land, time scale and size and expropriation if the land is 
collectively owned. Third, any dispute which arises in connection with 
relocation will first go to the Construction Bureau. In the event of failure 
to reach agreement the dispute will be passed to the local court as an 
ordinary civil case.”
Lujiazui City Construction Development Company Ltd (LCCDCL), a subsidiary 
of SLDC, founded in 1991, was one of the 18 relocation companies in Pudong 
that held the required relocation certificate. SLDC published its zoning plan 
and its available land notice. When a real estate developer decided to lease a 
block and the contract between SLDC and the real estate developer had been 
signed, SLDC would immediately contract LCCDCL to handle the relocation of 
households and businesses. SLDC would call in a consultant to assist in cal-
culating its total costs and LCCDCL would hire another consultant to calculate 
the cost of compensation and the operational fee. For this project. As soon as 
the two sides had completed their calculations, price negotiation would begin. 
SLDC would have to pay a deposit to the developer before the project began. 
The developer would in due course be called on to pay the cost of relocation. 
Relocation of businesses and households could begin as soon as the project 
had been officially approved. Official approval implied official acceptance of 
the project by the urban planning bureau as being in conformity with the 
master plan for the area, the granting of planning permission and permission 
Figure 3.10 Mix of factories and low-grade housing in the area that became the Lujiazui 
Financial Centre (1990)
Source: Wang and Xia, 2001
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to lease state land, both subject to a prescribed time scale and size, and any 
necessary expropriation of collectively owned rural land.
A large part of the relocation involved the relocation of business, industrial 
or otherwise. Two issues need to be considered by LCCDCL: first, the standard 
compensation for the relocation of that business and, second, the loss that 
business could be expected to incur during the relocation period. LCCDCL’s 
first task was to work out its own figures for the value of the property of the 
affected business, the value of stock on hand, the salaries of employees, the 
size of the area to be demolished and, most important, the future of existing 
employees. These figures would then be compared with corresponding figures 
prepared by the business affected. The future location of the business (usually 
on a larger site) would be made known, and negotiations would begin. Some-
times agreement would have to be imposed from above, by the parent com-
pany or a higher level of administration. The cost of leasing new land for the 
relocated business was deducted from the amount of compensation.
By comparison, the relocation of urban households and rural households 
(farmers) was more complicated. In Pudong most urban households lived as 
tenants in public housing built by their employers, though some had homes 
of their own. The initial procedure was the same in both cases. When a block 
was to be relocated, LCCDCL would visit the neighbourhood and put up notic-
es or hand out leaflets explaining the relocation procedure and the expected 
level of compensation. Each household was free to choose compensation in 
the form of a new home or cash. Consultative meetings were arranged to deal 
with any questions. If housing was not yet available for a relocated household, 
a negotiated amount of compensation would be paid until housing became 
available. The size of the compensation payment would increase if housing 
was not made available within the legally prescribed period (normally three 
months, and generally not more than one year). Once the project design had 
been approved as conforming with the local master plan and zoning plan, 
households facing relocation could no longer object to the project itself but 
could continue to object to the way that relocation was handled or the level of 
compensation. If a residential neighbourhood was demolished and replaced 
by a new residential neighbourhood (a rare situation in Lujiazui), the origi-
nal residents were in principle entitled to return to that neighbourhood. If a 
household was unwilling to accept the deal offered, it could appeal to Pudong 
New Area Government’s Real Estate Management Bureau. If the Real Estate 
Management Bureau was unable to get the parties to agree, the appeal would 
be passed to a court for final decision.
The initial procedure for resettling rural households was much the same 
as for urban households, but differed in the employment and welfare ar-
rangements made for farmers who had lost their land and their jobs. A large 
number of the rural inhabitants of Pudong were affected by the relocation 
required by the rapid expansion of Pudong’s urban area. Statistics show that 
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since 1990, 178,663 farmers have been resettled, of which 128,706 were classi-
fied as active workers and 49,957 as retired. In an interview given in October 
2002, Gong Qiuxia, a planner with SLDC who used to work for Pudong Land 
(Holding) Company (recently merged with SLDC), described the problems con-
tinuously faced by her former company in relocating rural households:
“Unlike the relocation situation in Puxi, in Pudong we had to deal with 
both expropriation and relocation. This meant that we had to accept the 
special responsibility of finding new jobs for members of relocated ru-
ral households, because we took away not only their land but also their 
production capital and production capacity. We not only had to provide 
them with a new identity as city dwellers but also needed to find em-
ployment for them. To deal with this problem Pudong Land (Holding) 
Company set up a job centre which provided a variety of training pro-
grammes all year round. Each year the company received a government 
grant from a special employment fund which enabled it to set up new 
enterprises to employ the relocated farmers. Regrettably most of these 
enterprises failed completely. The few exceptions were property man-
agement companies and companies concerned in some way with green 
space. The jobs they provided, for example as security guards or in prop-
erty management, cleaning or the maintenance of green space, were 
very popular among relocated farmers, since they required little in the 
way of technical knowledge or a disciplined approach, neither of which 
tended to be present in farmers aged between 35 and 45…”
The change faced by relocated rural households was enormous. Most of 
them had mixed feelings about relocation. On the one hand they become city 
dwellers, a status that most of them saw as highly desirable because it al-
lowed them to enjoy welfare benefits only provided to city dwellers; on the 
other hand the new life meant they lost their land and their jobs, and the 
new urban condominiums were very different from their traditional two-sto-
rey houses in the country. Responsible relocation procedures generally took 
the following into account: first, the wish to be relocated into or near the area 
where the relocated households used to live, together with their neighbours 
from the same village; second, specific housing requirements, as for exam-
ple two rooms facing south instead of one facing north and one facing south, 
allowing guests to be met in the grandparents’ bedroom rather than in the 
living room. Most important, the relocation of rural households meant an in-
crease in the amount of compensation to be paid to cover loss of employment. 
People younger than 45 who found jobs for themselves received a one-time 
compensation payment of about 150,000 yuan (US$ 18,115.94). For the remain-
der SLDC was required to provide free training programmes in new working 
skills and then find new employment. People older than 45 were treated by 
SLDC as retired and granted pensions. For the young the chance of a better 
life was much greater; for the more elderly the situation was more doubtful. 
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The grant of a pension meant that they enjoyed a stable income that they 
had never previously enjoyed, but their psychological attachment to the old 
way of life was much greater. SLDC also had to cover the cost of 15 years pen-
sion, medical insurance and other economic compensation for the new labour 
force resulting from compulsory land acquisition. The most difficult cases 
were people who were not old enough to be granted a pension but lacked the 
education and experience required to gain employment. People aged between 
35 and 45 took longest to adjust to the change, and therefore fared worst. 
They were unable to absorb much training and were unsuited to a competi-
tive job market. In some cases unemployment, sickness or some kind of con-
flict eventually made the reaction of members of this group to relocation and 
the companies they saw as responsible, more extreme and violent.
Conflicts in relocation projects: what went wrong?
Relocation played an important part in the Pudong urban redevelopment 
process. Without the smooth handling of land acquisition and the relocation 
of existing occupants it would have been impossible to carry out the subse-
quent development of land and real estate. Any resistance at local level to a 
decision to relocate could easily delay the development process indefinitely. 
In fact the relocation required for the Pudong project was typical of the large-
scale relocation required by urban redevelopment in Shanghai and indeed in 
China as a whole. Between 1991 and 2000 Shanghai demolished 26 million 
m2 and relocated 0.66 million households. Since the beginning of the reform 
period about one tenth of the entire population of Shanghai had to be relocat-
ed. Table 3.3 shows the enormous amount of relocation in Shanghai between 
1995-2004, a period which saw a dramatic increase in the rate of Shanghai’s 
urbanisation. The area of urban land increased fivefold in the ten years be-
tween 1990 and 2000, as compared with only tenfold in the 40 years between 
1950 and 1990. As the table shows, the greater part of the relocation process 
affected households.
With so many people and so much building involved in relocation, it is 
quite surprising to learn that residents were generally pleased to be relocated, 
as shown by a relocation survey carried out in Shanghai (Wu, 2004). The ma-
jority of respondents benefited from improvements in housing quality. The 
move from old public housing, with no proper hygiene facilities, no mains wa-
ter, no mains drainage and no private kitchen or lavatory, to a new apartment 
with better equipment and facilities and more space, certainly represented 
an improvement. On the other hand, both government (represented by Lujia-
zui and the other development companies) and those relocated still suffered 
from relocation. The cost in money and human resources and, more impor-
tant, the psychological damage caused by the loss of a familiar life style and 
the uncertainty created by a new environment, were enormous. Considering 
only the projects in which LCCDCL was involved, records show that since 1991 
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about 26,839 households and 653 business and industries were relocated to 
allow the creation of the Lujiazui Financial Centre, the Zhuyuan Trade District, 
the Tangdong, Longyang and Yangdong districts, the central green area and 
Century Avenue. Two million m2 of buildings were demolished. The effort in-
volved in the relocation would have been sufficient to move a medium-sized 
town. LCCDCL had to come up with standard compensation averaging 30-50 
million yuan (US$ 3.62 - 6.04 million) for each business relocated and about 
200,000 yuan (US$ 24,154.59) for each household relocated, not to mention 
money spent on new land and housing. Even though there were regulations 
in place to protect the interests of various interest groups, in practice reloca-
tion procedures could still go wrong. The most tragic conflicts in the Pudong 
development resulted from the imbalance between supply (by government) 
and demand from relocated households.
The fieldwork carried out in 2002 and 2004 included a series of interviews 
on relocation issues with members of relocated households, local government 
officials, local researchers and real estate developers. The following list, also 
based on a study of disputes which arose in Shanghai in the last few years, 
presents some of the findings and comments made by various groups of in-
terviewees on the possible causes of conflicts and disputes.
Problems involving government included:
Neither of the relocation regulations (no. 68 and no. 111) granted equal le-
gal status to relocated households wishing to defend their rights. For ex-
ample, the purpose of relocation as part of an urban renewal project was 
to enable real estate developers to carry on their work, not to allow the 
creation of infrastructure to benefit the public at large. Households threat-
ened with relocation should have had equal rights to negotiate the reloca-
tion plan and to decide whether or not they were prepared to be relocated. 
In practice it was almost impossible to stop a project once it had been of-
ficially approved.
1.
Table 3.3 Building resettlement in Shanghai 1991-2004
Year
Number of 
resettlements 
(units)
Of which
residential (%)
Floor space 
resettled
(10,000 m2)
Of which
residential (%)
1995 75,777 97.25 322.77 78.66
1996 89,132 97.03 342.95 75.48
1997 79,857 96.91 479.67 75.71
1998 78,205 96.10 452.22 76.06
1999 75,185 98.04 342.50 72.46
2000 70,606 96.72 365.77 78.83
2001 73,728 97.53 515.65 74.98
2002 101,097 97.64 644.53 75.25
2003 80,858 97.80 584.93 81.29
2004 42,415 97.97 308.40 232.52
Note: Figures apply to ten central urban districts.
Source: SMSB, 2005, p.379
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There was no independent supervision of the implementation of relocation 
policy at local level. Even though there were some good relocation projects, 
such as those required by the building of the Nanpu and Yangpu bridges, 
many other projects were sources of tension. Households often suspected 
that the compensation procedure was unfair or corrupt.
Relocation companies, most of which were owned by a public body or pub-
lic company, were contracted to carry out relocation projects. As commer-
cial undertakings, their main objective was to make a profit. It was there-
fore always possible that a relocation company would attempt to reduce 
the level of compensation paid for relocation and retain the balance as in-
come. (This possibility led to changes in the wording of contracts between 
government and relocation companies. Whereas previously government 
paid a relocation company an agreed sum to cover the entire relocation, 
today the amount is based on the number of households relocated.)
Sometimes the quality of the relocation company did not come up to the 
required standard. Even though the companies generally provided as much 
information as possible, visiting the affected neighbourhoods to discuss 
what was going to happen, there were still cases when households were 
angered by the lack of proper information, and felt cheated or threatened.
The compensation policy might have been advantageous at one time, but 
then failed to satisfy affected households when the situation in the hous-
ing market changed. In the early 1990s households were dissatisfied with 
the housing provided by government as compensation because it was too 
far away or the quality was poor. When relatively affordable housing be-
came available, people preferred monetary compensation. But at the end of 
the 1990s, when the market price of housing rocketed, the level of mone-
tary compensation provided by government was insufficient to pay for new 
housing. Problems tended to arise – and did in fact occur – in the absence 
of alternative housing solutions, such as public rental housing.
Relocation regulations were often at odds with other types of regulation, so 
increasing the likelihood of conflict. For example, job creation regulations 
allowed the unemployed, most of whom were older, uneducated and dif-
ficult to place in a normal job, to support themselves by using their homes 
as handicraft workshops or to sell breakfasts. If those people were relocat-
ed to an apartment, usually in a purely residential neighbourhood instead 
of their former mixed-function district, it was hardly possible for them to 
go on making a living. This immediately gave rise to conflicts.
Relocation also involved the feelings households had for their homes. This 
problem could not easily be solved by financial compensation. When gov-
ernment failed to appreciate that the difficulties households might face 
were not purely financial, clashes were likely to arise during the negotia-
tion process.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
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The interviews also drew attention to sociological problems:
Unlike the situation created by relocation projects in other countries, in 
China most conflicts were about the level of compensation rather than the 
propriety of the project. Compensation standards were not fixed but could 
vary within specified limits. Not unnaturally, households subject to reloca-
tion tended to demand the highest permitted amount (or more) whereas 
the relocation company tended to try to negotiate a lower amount. When 
compromise proved impossible, quite severe conflicts could arise. In some 
cases these conflicts led to tragedy, like suicide or the murder of a relo-
cation company staff member, when a household lost its case and faced 
forced relocation.
Financial considerations played a major role in persuading households 
to agree to relocate but fight over terms. For most households relocation 
meant a quick improvement in living standards at less cost to themselves. 
This encouraged households to cheat, to get as much financial compensa-
tion as possible. Successful cheating could earn a small fortune for a some 
households but could also reduce the level of trust in and the quality of the 
relationship with government and force government to tighten its regula-
tions, which meant that cheating was against the interests of the majority 
of households.
In a centrally planned system, housing is seen as welfare, as is any im-
provement in the housing situation. Relocation projects started in the 
1980s were actually seen as welfare projects and demanded a substantial 
proportion of the local government budget. Since people were not required 
to pay for their housing, they tended to rely on the government to provide 
rather than looking for housing on the open market. This attitude was dif-
ficult to change, particularly since the dual-market system continued to 
operate in China’s housing market throughout the 1990s.
Households were reluctant to get into debt, especially when household in-
come was low. In general Chinese preferred to have savings, and this did 
not only apply to households subject to relocation. If a relocated house-
hold found its future home on the housing market, it expected to pay the 
whole cost at once. If it then discovered that government compensation 
was not enough to pay for the home it wanted, it was much more likely 
to intensify its efforts to obtain higher compensation than to approach a 
bank for a loan.
Relocation of farmers was even more complicated. The most serious prob-
lem concerned the future of farmers who lost their land. This applied 
particularly to those aged between 35 and 45, who had little education or 
ability to acquire new skills and were unable to tolerate the kind of labour-
intensive jobs that local government was able to provide.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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 3.1.5 Factors speeding up the development process
Land institution is the key factor in determining the pace of urban develop-
ment. It defines the right to use the land, investment choice and income. At 
the same time it brings together the various parties involved in the different 
phases of the process, including those who will benefit most and those who 
may well suffer from changes in occupancy and land-use rights. A number of 
things help to speed up the development process. 
First, the legal framework for land policy reform and land development in 
China was not the end result of a process of historical development but was 
developed and modified to suit the market mechanism. Since this framework 
was based on experiences borrowed by China from countries which work with 
a system of leasehold tenure, in particular from developmental states like 
Singapore and Hong Kong, it provided sufficient flexibility for local practition-
ers to explore the new concepts and practices those countries use for land de-
velopment. Further, the choices provided by the new land policy (sale or lease 
of land-use rights on developed land or raw land) made it easier to respond 
to different investor preferences. The Pudong development zones, with their 
autonomous administrations, provided a perfect laboratory for Shanghai’s ex-
periments with innovations such as involving the private sector, financial or-
ganisations and international and foreign investors. Successful experiments 
could quickly be put into large-scale operation, failures could be analysed to 
avoid any chance of recurrence.
Second, the organisation structures and management strategies used by the 
development companies combined the features of process management and 
project management. The traditional rigid hierarchical structure of the Chinese 
company was replaced by or modified into a matrix structure. Parent compa-
nies (development companies) led the field in controlling the various tasked 
involved in land development, coordinating the division of tasks between their 
various subsidiaries, arranging time schedules and devising marketing strate-
gies for their projects and products. Meanwhile their subsidiaries were able to 
concentrate on the particular phases or tasks for which they had been made 
responsible, coordinating their activities with one another directly or through 
the parent company. Each subsidiary, a business entity in its own right, had a 
measure of autonomy: it could make its own decisions, was responsible and 
accountable for its own financial results and could negotiate with other sub-
sidiaries on a fully commercial basis. Because the parent company was better 
able to organise the way its subsidiaries handled specific phases of the project, 
it could reduce the cost and time involved in transactions between subsidi-
aries, even though the subsidiaries were fully independent of one other. Nor 
would the parent company exclude external companies from its business. The 
strategy of involving the private sector actually encouraged development com-
panies to cooperate with external developers and even to set up joint ventures 
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(again as subsidiaries) to carry on parts of their business. This combination of 
centralisation and decentralisation helped the development companies to cre-
ate a more efficient structure for land development.
Third, the involvement of private organisations and the flow of capital 
from domestic and foreign sources brought about further changes in the busi-
ness environment. New global-local financial links added a new dimension to 
traditional financial mechanisms. The combination of the public sector’s aim 
to achieve economic growth and the private sector’s aim to achieve business 
growth and expansion encouraged the two sides, traditionally separate, to 
work together with a new enthusiasm for creating partnerships. The experi-
mental involvement of the private sector in the decision-making process in 
Pudong and the provision of increased investment opportunities in what was 
traditionally the public domain stimulated a continuing dialogue with the pri-
vate sector. Collaboration between the public sector and the private sector in 
land development, urban renewal and the development of infrastructure led 
to the development of a level of trust traditionally lacking between the two 
sides. The combination of increasing numbers of public-private ventures and 
the introduction of shareholders encouraged the adoption by the public sec-
tor of ‘pro-business local state corporatism’. Such partnerships had the effect 
of blurring the separation between government and the market.
Fourth, although relocation is an important part of urban redevelopment 
it has often been controversial. The appalling housing conditions in Shanghai 
and Pudong before the start of the Pudong development meant that reloca-
tion, originally intended to improve living standards, gained a good deal of 
support from those affected, allowing earlier relocations to be implemented 
smoothly and rapidly. Land acquisition and resettlement regulations contin-
ued to cause trouble and face opposition because of the primitive nature of 
attempts to adapt to the market mechanism. As urban development becomes 
increasingly rapid, its negative consequences become increasingly significant, 
especially to members of the poorly educated lower classes, both urban and 
rural, who find it difficult to deal with violent economic change and try either 
to develop survival strategies or to take advantage of the system (Wu, 2004), 
or take the kind of violent revenge which can result in delaying or slowing 
down the redevelopment process.
 3.2 Infrastructure
The city which can achieve speed will achieve success.  
(Le Corbusier, 1925)
The next logical phase was the completion of a draft urban development 
strategy, transport plan and plans for other related infrastructural improve-
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ments. Inadequate infrastructure was the biggest barrier to the development 
of Pudong, the most serious challenge being the lack of any proper link be-
tween Pudong and Puxi. Traditionally, water transport had been the main 
method, though most piers along the east bank of the Huangpu were used 
mainly for the transport of industrial goods. The passenger transport system 
between Pudong and Puxi consisted of 16 ferries, 4 car ferries and an old two-
lane tunnel, which together had to handle more than 1.1 million people and 
17,000 cars a day, so that overcrowded public transport and traffic jams were 
a common experience (Wan and Yuan, 2001). Not only was the connection be-
tween Pudong and Puxi problematic but the urban road system within Pudong 
also turned out to totally inadequate. For example, until 1990 there were only 
285 km of roads (including 65 km of urban roads) to serve an area of more 
than 500 km2, and the standard of most of those roads was far below that of 
normal urban roads. Nor was there any airport or railway to link Pudong with 
other regions. Equally problematic were Pudong’s inadequate public utilities 
for providing water, electricity and gas. Pudong even lacked a mains drain-
age system to handle rainwater. Clearly Pudong’s infrastructure was unable 
to cope with the existing situation, let alone serve a modern urban district 
intended as a flagship 21st-century Chinese city.
Updating the existing infrastructure was seen as the top priority task to 
make possible the development of Pudong. In fact the priority the imple-
mentation strategy gave to planning, infrastructure and environmental con-
siderations clearly indicated the importance of infrastructure to Pudong’s 
development. Local planners saw three issues as high on their agenda: first, 
improvement to Pudong’s infrastructure, not only to serve the different de-
velopment zones but also to support the development of a modern district. 
This would involve the construction of efficient links not only between indi-
vidual development zones but also between those zones and newly developed 
transport hubs in the Pudong area. These links were seen by local officials as 
a necessary precondition for Pudong’s economic development and the attrac-
tion of investment. Second, the need to combine improvements to Pudong’s 
infrastructure with improvements in Shanghai as a whole. An attempt was 
made to obtain a complete overview of Shanghai’s infrastructure and to link 
improvements in Pudong with similar improvements in Puxi, possibly includ-
ing connections to a new national road network. The most urgent task was 
to lower the barriers between Pudong and Puxi. Third, because of the impor-
tance of the Pudong development to the restructuring of Shanghai’s urban 
and economic structure, infrastructural improvements could not be limited to 
simply satisfying the objectives of individual industries, but had to be in line 
with Shanghai’s general policy, which was to relocate industry and population 
from Puxi to Pudong, restructure Shanghai’s economic system to focus on the 
city’s service industry and financial function, open up its financial market to 
attract foreign investment and make use of foreign technology, management 
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techniques and development skills. For the Shanghai government, infrastruc-
tural improvement involved not only ambitious plans for the city’s future but 
also a number of reforms leading to an implementation strategy radically dif-
ferent from that traditionally used for infrastructural development.
 3.2.1 Infrastructure system
The sophisticated infrastructure system designed for Pudong included a core 
of ‘three ports’ (a deep water port, an airport and an ‘information port’), ‘three 
networks’ (a rail network and metro system, an urban highway network and 
a cross-river transport network) and ‘three systems’ (to supply power, natural 
gas and district heating), as illustrated in Figure 2.12 (Chapter 2) and Figure 
3.11. The ‘three ports’ were important to allow Pudong to establish links with 
the outside world and help Shanghai to become an international transport 
hub. The idea of the ‘three networks’ was to embed Pudong’s infrastructure in 
the infrastructural framework of the Shanghai metropolitan area18 as a whole. 
The key aim of the metropolitan transport system was to provide a rapid 
transport system allowing journeys in Shanghai’s central area, inner suburbs 
and outer suburbs to take no longer than 15 minutes, half an hour or one hour, 
respectively. This meant Pudong would need close links not only with the 
west bank of the Huangpu but also between different parts of the district. The 
plan included a combination of two ring roads, designed to link Pudong and 
Puxi, and various bridges, tunnels, metro lines (see Figure 3.12), light railways 
and ferries19, providing the main transport framework for Shanghai. To speed 
up the transport system in Pudong, a proper road network was designed to 
connect the various development zones and small towns with the newly de-
signed transport hubs, Shanghai Pudong international airport, Waigaoqiao 
deep water port and the Pudong railway system. The three systems referred 
to above would need to satisfy the requirements of residents, industry and 
commerce. Water plant and new water resources, a district drainage system 
and a sewage treatment plant were included to serve the Pudong area as a 
whole. Apart from traditional infrastructural services, Pudong would need a 
proper telecommunication system if Shanghai was to succeed in becoming 
a global city. Telecommunication development has in fact become the key 
to the development of a global urban system, lowering the barriers to inter-
national interaction imposed by space and time (Rimmer, 1996; Gu and Tang, 
2002, pp. 283-284). The city’s telecommunication system as eventually devel-
  The short-term package of infrastructure was designed to cover 15 years (1990-2005) and the long term pack-
age 30 years (1990-2020).
  The plan for cross-river infrastructure linking Pudong and Puxi included 12 bridges, 12 tunnels, various metro 
lines and light railways, one tunnel for cyclists and several for pedestrians, 16 passenger ferries and 5 car ferries.
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oped was connected to a new national fibre-optic network. China’s first city-
wide digital cellular network is currently in operation in Shanghai. (Olds, 2001, 
p. 181) In fact Pudong was designed as a telecommunications hub.
Despite their ambitious plans for developing Pudong’s infrastructure and 
Figure 3.11 Infrastructural plan for Shanghai Metropolitan
Source: Ye, 2003
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ensuring quality, Shanghai authorities were still being repeatedly told by 
foreign and international institutions that their urban planning system was 
outmoded and not suited to dealing with private-sector investors. They were 
advised to maintain only the bare essentials of development control and let 
the market determine how different districts would develop (McLemore, 1995). 
Even though the Shanghai authorities still believed in the value of the con-
tribution made by traditional planning to directing a long-term vision and 
ensuring the final quality of the development product (here an area devel-
opment), they also realised that the traditional ‘master plan’ approach was 
unlikely to do the job. In consequence old ways underwent massive change, 
becoming receptive to new ideas with the assistance of many new strategic-
level advisory and decision-making bodies. Thus, although the old mecha-
nisms (e.g. top-down planning) were still in active use, there was more will-
ingness to listen to the state, experts and investors from China and abroad. 
There was also more willingness to discuss and adjust, allowing existing 
plans to be altered to suit changes in the economic or social situation.
One example was the five-year plan, one of the most important mecha-
nisms used by national, provincial and major city governments, and still in 
active use in Shanghai. This was not a control document, functioning in the 
traditional way, but rather a prescription for action to be taken in the com-
ing five-year period. The plan set out all the major initiatives the government 
intended to take during the period, taking into account both government and 
private interests. The five-year plan for Shanghai and Pudong also included 
key infrastructure projects, providing an assured level of financial support 
from the public purse. The projects included were almost certain to be im-
plemented. However, if the Shanghai authorities found it necessary to amend 
Figure 3.12 Shanghai’s Metro system
Source: Wang, 2003
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such projects, they were allowed to put their amendments into practice, rath-
er than being forced to follow the plan. They could also include changes or 
new ideas in the list of projects in the action plan for the coming year, as pub-
lished at the end of each year. Key projects would receive special funds from 
the municipal budget to ensure the implementation went ahead smoothly 
and without delay. The local district government employed a similar strategy, 
listing key projects to be implemented each year at district level. In this way, 
not only were government projects open to scrutiny by the market and soci-
ety at large, but also the list key projects and the timetable for implementing 
those projects gave investors sufficient confidence to supply capital even be-
fore the site had been prepared.
Box 3.7 provides a general overview of the 15-year (short-term) infrastruc-
ture improvement scheme prepared by local planners. However, close ex-
amination of the detailed description of each step to be followed by Pudong 
shows that the scheme actually listed the detailed projects included in each 
five-year plan. The same projects were also listed in each year’s action plan, 
but divided into different phases of construction within the five-year period. 
In this way, traditional urban planning schemes, mainly dealing with long-
term visions (30-50 years), and short-term plans dovetailed with five-year 
plans defining initiatives, projects to be implemented and the related public 
budget strategy and annual action plans. The various plans were in fact com-
plementary to and refined one another.
A number of new strategic-level advisory and decision-making bodies in 
Shanghai often played a key role in helping local authorities to adjust their 
plans: these bodies succeeded in making several adjustment to the transport 
system, such as the construction of metro line 2 and the provision of an im-
proved bus service. In particular, the construction of the extremely expensive 
metro line was largely a response to the demand by domestic investors, the 
principal investors in Pudong between 1990-1995. Domestic investors often 
made the existence of an efficient public transportation system a precondi-
tion for investment. In this case they set an underground metro system and 
improved bus capacity within Pudong and between Pudong and Puxi as a first 
priority for the Shanghai authorities. In response to the demand of domes-
tic investors and Shanghai’s aim to stimulate the development of Zhangjiang 
high-tech park, the Shanghai authorities decided to change the plan for the 
old metro line 2 so that instead of running to the Wujiaochang area in the 
northeast of Shanghai, it would run to Zhangjiang high-tech park and the 
country park in Pudong. At the same time more public transport lines were 
laid out to satisfy the need for transport and allow a certain number of people 
to both live and work in Pudong. Between 1990 and 2001 as many as 1,000 km 
of roads were a built to improve the road system in Pudong. These measures 
helped to a considerable extent to improve the investment environment and 
were welcomed by both investors and local residents.
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 3.2.2 Implementation strategies
Finance and organisational ability are probably the two main factors deter-
mining whether infrastructural projects on such an enormous scale can be 
Box 3.7 Pudong infrastructure improvement plan
Key steps in the short-term Shanghai Pudong infrastructure plan:
n First five years (1990-1995): building Pudong’s basic strategic structure. 
Two bridges (Nampa Bridge and Yangpu Bridge) and one tunnel (Yan’an 
Dong road tunnel) were to be built to link Pudong and Puxi. Two main 
roads (the Yanggao Road extension project and the inner ring road) were 
to be constructed to provide the backbone for Pudong’s road system and 
connect the three development zones Lujiazui, Jinqiao and Waigaoqiao. 
A series of public utilities, the Waigaoqiao power plant, the Lingqiao 
water works, the Pudong gas works, a sewage treatment project and a 
telecommunications project, were to be completed to provide Pudong 
with services that had previously been inadequate or totally lacking. It was 
decided to build the landmark Oriental Pearl TV tower during the same 
period, not only for its function but also for its symbolic value to Pudong. 
n Second five years (1996-2000): improving the strategic structure 
and functional development aimed at building up Shanghai as an 
international transport hub. The most significant projects to be completed 
in this period were three hubs - Pudong international airport, Pudong 
international deep water harbour (phase I - Waigaoqiao deep water port) 
and Pudong Info-port, two lines - Metro line 2 and the Pudong section of 
the outer ring road, the Pudong light railway transit system, a number of 
river-crossing projects and two avenues (Riverfront Avenue and Century 
Avenue). Other civil engineering projects, including water supply and 
drainage projects, the Waigaoqiao power station (phase II) and the East 
China Sea natural gas project were also to be completed. Investment in 
this period would be six times greater than that in the first five-year period.
n Third five years (2001-2005): infrastructural development aiming to bring 
Pudong's system of infrastructure to a new level of sophistication. A 
number of projects would be focused on creating fast connections within 
Pudong, between Pudong and Puxi and between Shanghai and the outside 
world. These projects were to include Pudong international airport (phase 
II), Waigaoqiao deep water harbour (phase IV), the Pudong section of 
the outer ring road, a light railway transit system (L4), the Pearl Line light 
railway (phase II) and several projects to improve the connection between 
Pudong and Puxi, including the Lupu Bridge, the Fuxing road tunnel, the 
Wusong road tunnel, the Dalian road tunnel and the Huangpu pedestrian 
tunnel. Other projects would herald a significant stage in Pudong’s 
development. For example, the world’s first commercial high-tech maglev 
trains would be constructed and tested in Pudong. Finally, a water supply 
and disposal project would also be implemented in the same period. No 
less than Yuan 100 billion (US$ 12 billion) would be invested in major 
infrastructural projects.
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implemented efficiently and effectively. However, unsuccessful examples of 
traditional infrastructural development could have led one to wonder whether 
such failures might recur in the infrastructural development of Pudong. Tra-
ditionally Shanghai’s infrastructure projects were handled under the central 
planning system by the relevant public departments. The results often turned 
out to be less than satisfactory, because of a continuous budget shortfall, lack 
of coordination between different departments and poor management before 
and after the development (maintenance was often weak). The question facing 
the local authority and many investors was how the implementation of infra-
structural projects should be handled in Pudong, and whether it would be pos-
sible to avoid the kind of bad experiences which had occurred in the past.
Organisation
Originally infrastructure projects in Shanghai were handled piecemeal by con-
struction and investment offices in different departments of the local author-
ity. These offices were generally burdened with budget deficits20 and lacked 
knowledge of modern management techniques. They were often blamed for 
the level of service being totally inadequate to satisfy the need. Apart from 
the national and local economic and institutional reform required to adapt 
to a market system, the infrastructure and public utility industry was being 
required to perform more efficiently and find alternative sources of finance to 
replace the public purse. In 1987 the Shanghai Planning Committee (Shanghai 
Jiwei) set up Shanghai Jiushi Ltd. (Shanghai Jiushi Gongsi) to be responsible for 
a special fund of US$ 3.2 billion to be used exclusively for improving Shang-
hai’s infrastructure, technological innovation, increasing export capacity and 
developing the service sector. In this, the first experiment ever in Shanghai 
to allow a commercial organisation to take charge of government funds, the 
Shanghai authorities attempted to take a more market-oriented approach to 
public investment and the attraction of finance from non-government sourc-
es. One year later, ten Shanghai Construction Committee investment offices 
were reorganised to create the Shanghai Urban Construction Foundation 
(Shanghai Chengshi Jianshe Jinjinhui), whose main function was to raise invest-
ment for the development of urban infrastructure in Shanghai. In 1992 the 
foundation was renamed Shanghai Urban Construction Company (also known 
as Shanghai Chengtou), to mark its increased ability to become involved in a 
wide range of commercial activities. This reorganisation marked the begin-
0   In the old central planning regime, infrastructure was free of charge and public utilities charged fees far 
below cost. The difference between the fees collected and the original cost of construction and maintenance was 
paid from public funds, which at that time were hardly substantial, since Shanghai was required to pass on the 
greater part of its revenue to central government. Thus the old fee system made it difficult to make good a budget 
deficit. Further, the offices responsible for budgets and finance were not involved in the actual construction and 
maintenance, while those who were actually doing the work had no say in how the money was used.
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ning of a series of reforms in the administrative organisation and financing 
of the urban infrastructure industry. Chengtou, Jiushi and later Tongsheng, a 
subsidiary of the Shanghai Port Authority (Shanghai Gangwuju) and their sub-
sidiaries became the main participants in a variety of infrastructural develop-
ments (highways, bridges, tunnels and harbours) and public utility projects 
(water, energy and waste disposal) in Shanghai, including the key infrastruc-
tural projects in Pudong referred to above.
The achievement of these highly ambitious plans was no easy task. Re-
search into the work of the public companies involved showed that the strat-
egy adopted was generally project-oriented, more particularly for key projects 
included in the five-year or annual action plans. Once a project had been au-
thorised, the company involved would appoint a number of staff members 
to form a project management team to take charge of the whole project. In 
some cases the team might even be set up as a new subsidiary, which would 
operate using a budget allocated by its parent company. Frequently the par-
ent company would invite other public or private investment companies 
to participate by taking shares in the new undertaking. In other cases, the 
project management team would share its investment responsibilities with 
the daughter branches at district level.
One significant way in which these reorganised public companies differed 
was that they combined responsibility for finance and operations in a single 
commercial body. They therefore know how much they could expect from 
public funds and how much they would have to find from alternative chan-
nels. Between 1992 and 2002 Chengtou brought in 124 billion yuan (US$ 14.98 
billion) of public finance and non-government investment for urban infra-
structure in Shanghai. The money was invested in more than 40 key infra-
structure projects (Liu, personal interview, 2002; Wang and Liu, 2004). However, 
between 1992 and 1997, Chengtou only received 600 million yuan of public 
finance, much less than it needed (and in fact spent) during the period. Some 
of the shortfall could be made good from fees and local taxation21, but the 
remainder had to be made good from other sources, including loans from do-
mestic banks and international banks in countries like Germany and France, 
low-interest-rate loans from multinational organisations like the ADB and the 
World Bank, private investment, money raised from bonds issued22 by Shang-
   The Shanghai authorities allowed Chengtou to collect no fewer than 24 kinds of local taxes and fees e.g. sew-
age fees.
   The bond policy is also mentioned in the section on finance. In China the issue of bonds is highly con-
strained and tightly controlled by central government. Only bodies that have succeeded in obtaining approval 
from central government are allowed to issue bonds. In the light of the Pudong project, central government 
granted Shanghai the privilege of issuing bonds to raise money from the public for the development of Shanghai. 
In issuing bonds to raise funds for Shanghai's key infrastructural projects Chengtou was acting on behalf of local 
government. 
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hai and the stock market. Statistics for Chengtou show that out of the 124 bil-
lion yuan (US$ 14.98 billion) raised by Chengtou, 50% came from bank loans, 
25% from public funds, 10% from private sources for the sale or transfer of 
land-use rights to its own property, 8% from bonds and 3% from the capital 
market (Ji and Lu, 2004).
Financial mechanism
Pudong’s ambitious infrastructure plans required strong financial support. In 
the 15 years since 1990 (1990-2004), a total of 180 billion yuan was injected in-
to Pudong’s infrastructure. In fact between 1990 and 2001 more than 93 billion 
yuan (US$ 11.23 billion) was invested, a dramatic average annual growth rate 
of 27.1%. Another statistic shows that between 1990 and 1999 a total of 77.4 
billion yuan (US$ 9.35 billion) was invested, 40% on civil engineering projects, 
35% on transport and telecommunication, 13% on power and 12% on public 
utilities. These figures show the comprehensive nature of the upgrading of 
Pudong’s infrastructure and public utilities, the speed at which the upgrading 
took place and the vast amount of money involved. These figures also reflect 
the dramatic 365 billion yuan (US$ 44.08 billion) investment in infrastructure 
in Shanghai in 11 years (1990-2001), representing about 90% of the total in-
vestment in infrastructure in Shanghai in the 50-year period between 1950 
and 2000 (SPNASB, 2005).
Public finance made a major contribution to the development of infrastruc-
ture in Pudong, especially in regard to a number of key projects. Since many 
of Pudong’s key projects were also key projects for Shanghai (e.g. the ‘three 
ports’, ‘three networks’ and ‘three systems’), Pudong received relatively more 
local government finance than other Shanghai districts. For example, 11% of 
the 200 billion yuan (US$ 24.15 billion) invested in Shanghai’s fixed assets in 
1997 went to Pudong. In that year half the investment in key projects city-
wide went to Pudong. The Shanghai Municipal Government allocated Pudong 
25 billion yuan (US$ 3.02 billion) in the eighth five-year period (1990-1994) and 
96.9 billion yuan (US$ 11.7 billion) in the ninth five-year period (Chen, 2003, p. 
108). Another point to be noted is the special effort made by central govern-
ment, which considered the success of Pudong a matter of national impor-
tance. Central government agreed to allocate Pudong an annual 300 million 
yuan (US$ 36.23 million) in the eighth and ninth five-year periods (1990-1999), 
either directly or through Shanghai Municipal Government. In the ninth five-
year period, the amount of public finance actually reached 10 billion yuan 
(US$ 1.21 billion), vastly more than the expected 1.5 billion yuan (US$ 18.16 
million). This increase was in line with the increase in the local budget to Pu-
dong in the same period, which seems to have been an attempt to reduce the 
impact of the Asian economic crisis. Most of the money went to improving 
infrastructure in Pudong. Even though finance provided by central and local 
government advanced the development of infrastructure in Pudong, there was 
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still a big gap between total investment and the amount of public finance over 
the period, especially at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, 
when Shanghai’s total annual budget for investment in infrastructure was no 
more than 1.9 billion yuan, much less than the amount actually required. The 
shortfall was generally made good from other sources.
The need to find alternative sources of finance for infrastructural projects 
was not only the main motive for pressing ahead with institutional reform 
within the infrastructure industry but also a major concern for the Shang-
hai authorities and the new public companies. The financial resources avail-
able for the development of infrastructure in Pudong could not be considered 
separately from the strategy for searching for sources of finance at city level. 
Three main phases can be distinguished, each characterised by a different 
emphasis on the source of finance for investment in infrastructure for Shang-
hai and Pudong as a whole.
The first phase was defined in the early stage of the Pudong development, 
when loans were one of the main sources of funds, second only to public fi-
nance. Each year from 1990 to 2000 Pudong borrowed US$ 200 million in low-
interest loans from the Bank of China. Other state-owned banks also entered 
into long-term contracts with Pudong to provide low-interest loans for a 
certain period. Other loans came from institutions such as the World Bank, 
the Asian Development Bank, foreign governments and foreign commercial 
banks. In total, US$ 3.2 billion were raised through such channels (Wang and 
Liu, 2004). For example, Nanpu Bridge and Yangpu Bridge were both financed 
by low-interest loans granted by the Asian Development Bank. The inner ring 
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road was financed by a loan from the World Bank. Metro line 2 was financed 
by loans from Germany (US$ 488 million), France (US$ 57 million) and the 
United States (not available). Pudong International airport was partly funded 
by a Japanese loan (US$ 3.3 billion). A World Bank loan funded the Waigaoqiao 
thermal power project (US$ 0.61 million) and the restructuring of Shanghai’s 
port facility (US$ 196 million) (Olds, 2001, p. 180; Liu, 2002; Ji and Lu Xinhuanet, 
July 4, 2004; World Bank; Shanghai WTO Research Centre; Window on China). 
The world’s first commercial maglev elevated railway, which was completed 
and began its trial runs in December 2002, was supported by a German loan. 
One exceptional project that used private finance rather than international 
loans was the upgrading of existing terminals in Shanghai’s Waigaoqiao port, 
for which Li Ka-shing’s Hutchison International Terminals (HIT), an arm of 
Hutchison Whampoa, formed a fifty-fifty joint venture with the Shanghai Port 
Authority.
The second phase took place during the mid-1990s, by which time land had 
become a major source of government income and a major source of funds 
for infrastructural investment. The newly regulated land market in Pudong 
and in Shanghai generated more than 100 billion yuan (US$ 12.08 billion) for 
Shanghai and for Pudong from the transfer of land-use rights.
The third phase took place in the late 1990s, during which various innova-
tive methods were tested for obtaining non-government finance. The sharp 
decrease in the number of developers and land transfer deals during the 
Asian economic crisis meant that land market revenue decreased dramati-
cally, forcing Shanghai and Pudong to be more open to any possible sources 
of financial support. FDI, domestic private finance, bonds, the stock market, 
investment funds, the new real estate investment trusts and other types of 
funds from the real estate or financial sector were all welcomed and quickly 
tried out in practice. For example, 10 billion yuan (US$ 1.21 billion) was raised 
by listing existing infrastructure on the stock market. Another 10 billion yuan 
(US$ 1.21 billion) in private finance was raised for the construction of high-
way projects. Bonds issued between 1995 and 2005 raised more than 12 billion 
yuan (US$ 1.45 billion) for infrastructural development (Lingdao Juece Xinxi 
editorial board, 2002).
Foreign investment made a significant contribution to the development 
Box 3.8 ADB and the Nanpu and Yangpu bridges
The development of the Nanpu and Yangpu bridges was one of the earliest 
initiatives to connect Pudong with Puxi. The proposal to construct these 
bridges was sent to central government in 1986, long before the authorisation 
of the Pudong development. The earliest funding amounted to 760 million 
yuan (US$ 92 million). The actual cost was 820 million yuan which was partly 
financed by a US$ 37.61 million loan from the Asian Development Bank. The 
process required the relocation of 113 businesses and 4,218 households and 
the building of 361,000 m2 of accommodation to house relocated households. 
A further 43 ha of farmland were expropriated, requiring jobs to be found for 
the 1,200 farmers who lost their land 
Source: Murray, Personal interview, 2002
[  ]
of infrastructure and public utilities. In the 12 years from 1990 to 2002, US$ 
10 billion came from foreign investment, including US$ 4.3 billion in FDI and 
US$ 1.2 billion in loans from foreign countries (Shanghai WTO research centre, 
2002). The resulting funds were used for all kinds of infrastructure, and not 
only made a major contribution to Shanghai’s limited infrastructure budget 
but also indirectly influenced the decision-making process for Shanghai’s ur-
ban redevelopment. A further input resulting from the acceptance of foreign 
finance was the transfer of advanced technology and management skills lack-
ing in Shanghai, such as knowledge of tendering systems, capacity training 
programs and relocation policy, as evident in the Nanpu and Yangpu bridge 
Figure 3.14 Infrastructure projects funded by international loans. Top left: Nanpu Bridge; top right: Yangpu 
Bridge; centre: Pudong International Airport; bottom left: Maglev train; bottom right: metro line
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projects. The choice of projects which were considered suitable for alternative 
financing and those which fell mainly within the concern of public finance 
depended on their anticipated profitability of the project. Profitable projects 
were those involved with water, electricity, heating, gas, public transport, the 
metro, sewage treatment, and waste disposal. Unprofitable projects involved 
toll-free roads and bridges, flood protection systems, disaster prevention sys-
tems, sanitation, environmental protection, river purification treatments and 
the protection of water resources. The public purse continued to be used as 
the main source of funds for unprofitable projects. For profitable projects, the 
government was prepared to give up control and allow private sector invest-
ment from inside and outside China by public companies, joint ventures, in-
vestment funds etc. and public investment in bonds or shares. It was also pre-
pared to allow arrangements such as build, BOT, BOO, build and transfer (BT) 
and transfer, operate and transfer (TOT).
Chengtou, like its predecessor Jiushi, was already playing an active role in 
involving private finance. In 1994, a joint venture company set up by Cheng-
tou and Jiushi granted a short-term (15 year) lease on operating rights to the 
Nanpu and Yangpu bridges and the Dapu road tunnel to CITIC Pacific23, a 
Hong Kong company with strong connections with the political world in Bei-
jing. The 2.475 billion yuan (US$ 29.89 million) raised was used to build the 
Xupu bridge over the Huangpu. After this experiment, Chengtou decided to 
involve private finance directly in the construction of infrastructure by a BOT 
arrangement for the Lupu bridge. The construction of the bridge was organ-
ised and financed by six companies, led by China State Shipbuilding Corpora-
tion and Jiangnan Shipyard (Group) Co. Ltd.
With years of experience behind it, Chengtou decided to further reform its 
public utility activities. In 2000 and 2001 Chengtou reorganised its subsidiar-
ies and set up three new companies, Shanghai Civil Work Property Manage-
ment Ltd. (Shanghai Shizheng Zichan Jingying Gongsi), Shanghai Water Property 
Management Ltd. (Shanghai Shuiwu Zichan Jingying Gongsi) and Shanghai Trans-
portation Investment Group, Ltd. (Shanghai Jiaotong Touzi Jituan Youxian Gongsi), 
specialising in investment, management and maintenance of public utilities. 
The link between Chengtou and each of these companies was determined by 
the size of its shareholding, which in turn depended on the size of its invest-
ment. This arrangement created a win-win situation for Chengtou and any 
of its possible future partners. For Chengtou it was a positive way of clarify-
ing its own interest after heavy investment. Previously any profit had gone to 
   CITIC Pacific (Zhongxin Taifu) is a Hong Kong company. Its major shareholder is CITIC Hong Kong (Hold-
ings) Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of CITIC Beijing, Peoples' Republic of China. CITIC was set up by former 
vice premier Rong Yiren, China’s most famous ‘red capitalist’. In 2005 his son Rong Zhijian became president of 
CITIC.
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the individual public utility company, even though the investment had been 
made by Chengtou. Other companies with an interest in this kind of business 
now had the chance to become involved by buying or selling shares in Cheng-
tou. For the three public utility companies, the balance sheet and profit and 
loss account were matters of primary importance, encouraging them to im-
prove their service and management skills by introducing extra investment 
and advanced technology.
Shanghai Water Property Management Ltd. was one of the first companies 
to start such an experiment. In 2002, it tendered for a variety of projects, one 
Box 3.9 Involvement of private finance in key infrastructure projects in Shanghai
The device of transferring operating rights as applied to the Nanpu and 
Yangpu bridges was later repeated to fund other key infrastructure projects 
in Shanghai. One example was the transfer of operating rights to part of the 
Puxi inner ring road, involving the sale of 35% of the operating rights for the 
bridges (Neihuaxian Gaojia) to the inner ring road to Shanghai Industrial 
Investment (Holdings) Co. Ltd. (Shanghai Shiye Jituan) for US$ 600 million, 
which sum was used to finance the Yan’an Bridge (Gaojia).
In March 2002, Chengtou sold 99.35% of its shares in the Huhang 
highway to Fuxi, a Chinese private company, granting Fuxi 30 years operating 
rights to Huhang Highway for a total investment of 3.21 billion yuan 
(US$ 39 million). The deal included tolls, service stations, service areas, 
advertisements and related sources of income along the highway and a 
further expansion project to widen the four-lane highway into six lanes. 
Chengtou planned to invest the substantial sum received in new highways, 
water treatment and waste disposal projects.
The experience gained from directly involving private finance in Lupu 
Bridge was later used for the construction of the Hulu highway, the main 
backbone linking Shanghai to the Yangshan deep water harbour, its newest 
key infrastructure project. In May 2002, Chengtou joined with several other 
private companies to set up a project company to take charge of the Hulu 
highway project. Chengtou held 30% of the shares in this company, the 
remaining 65% being divided between three private companies, Nongkai, 
Huaxin and Longcang. A marginal 5% was held by a state-owned construction 
company.
The transfer of operating rights or direct involvement of private finance in 
the construction of infrastructure allowed Chengtou to lay its hands on extra 
finance to speed up its investment in key infrastructure projects far beyond 
the scope of the available public finance. The private sector also benefited 
from being allowed for the first time to become involved in an industry 
that had previously been fully controlled by the public sector. Further, the 
experiment of mixed ownership in the construction of the Hulu highway and 
similar projects provided an alternative to simple privatisation. The public 
sector, which still partly controlled the process, could be more confident that 
the public interest would be served than if it handed over complete control to 
the private sector, which it still did not completely trust 
Source: Liu, personal interview, 2002; Wang and Liu, 2004
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of which involved setting up a joint venture company by selling 50% of its 
shares in Shanghai Water Property Management Ltd. (Pudong Branch) and 
transferring 50% of its operating rights for 50 years to its partner in Pudong 
Water Plant. In 2002 a deal was finally struck with the French Vivendi Water 
for US$ 92 million, 2.66 times the original tender. On 30 August, Shanghai Viv-
endi Water Ltd. became the first joint-venture company in China to directly 
involve foreign investors in a total package of service and management in 
the water industry. Another project was a BOT arrangement to construct the 
Zhuyuan sewage treatment plant, a plant with sufficient capacity to treat 1.7 
million tons per day. Shanghai Youlian United Ltd, a joint venture company 
involving the three private companies Shanghai Youlian Ltd., Shanghai Jian-
gong, and Bejing Huajin, won the bid for 20 years special operating rights. 
Shanghai Youlian Ltd. owned 85% of the total shares in the company. It is 
believed that this was the first Chinese private company to become involved 
in the water industry. Recent figures show that the management strategies 
and skills brought in by the private sector resulted in reducing its operating 
costs from 0.33 yuan/ton (US$ 0.04/ton) to 0.22 yuan/ton (US$ 0.03/ton). These 
measures enabled Shanghai Water Property Management Ltd. to raise 4.6 bil-
lion yuan (US$ 55.56 million) on the stock exchange for further investment in 
new water and sewage plants for better service at lower cost (Liu, personal 
interview 2002; Ding, China Business News, Dec. 2, 2004; Wang and Liu, 2004).
The private organisations that became involved in infrastructure includ-
ed both state-owned enterprises and private companies from Shanghai and 
other provinces. A number of foreign investors also became involved. In re-
cent years these organisations have invested an enormous amount of money 
in Shanghai and Pudong’s infrastructure and interest continues to increase. 
However, traditionally the level of trust between the private sector and public 
sector has been very low, partly for historical reasons and partly because of 
the existing legal system. What motives persuaded private organisations to 
enter into partnership with the public sector? After all, in most branches of 
industry the domestic private sector receives unfavourable treatment in mat-
ters such as finance, taxation and even permission to participate. It may not 
be possible to provide a complete answer to this question, but some idea was 
obtained from interviews and research.
One main reason was the generally assured economic return. In the case 
of Lupu Bridge, local government guaranteed a return of 9.7%, i.e. an annu-
al return of 240 million yuan (US$ 28.99 million) including cost and mainte-
nance fee. Local government also granted 25 years operating rights, based on 
a calculation that 20 years would be required to recover the original cost, so 
allowing 5 years of profit. The investors were also granted the right to use the 
bridge for other commercial purposes (Liu, personal interview, 2004). In the 
case of Shanghai Vivendi Water Ltd., the French Vivendi Water could expect a 
profit in the medium-term of 12-18%.
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Another reason was the potential market available to the infrastructure 
industry. Private investment, in China and abroad, is constantly looking for 
potential markets. The infrastructure industry offers the private sector a new 
field of activity. The earlier the investment, the better.
Early experience with market reform shows that the earliest entrants to 
the Chinese market could expect a high economic return, though they could 
also face high risk. However, once good relationships had been established 
with local public partners, private investors could reasonably expect to be-
come involved in other profitable projects.
A third reason could have been the mutual benefit arising from collabo-
ration between the public sector and private organisations. The amount of 
attention paid to each collaboration, locally and internationally, constrained 
both parties to keep to the terms of the original agreement. Long-term con-
siderations were important for both sides. Shanghai and Pudong offered the 
Chinese private sector a more level playing field than most other Chinese 
cities, on which to participate and compete in the infrastructure industry by 
public tender, even though the private sector was still generally at a disad-
vantage by comparison with the public sector and foreign investors.
The experiment of involving the private sector helped Shanghai to gain 
more knowledge of the market mechanism and experience in collaborating 
with the private sector. However, the experiment has not been without prob-
lems or controversy. In particular, public sector knowledge of finance, con-
tracts and corporate governance was still inadequate by comparison with that 
of its private counterparts. Consider the most famous example, the transfer of 
the Nanpu and Yangpu bridges. A five-year negotiation between CITIC Pacific 
and its public sector partner was completed in 2003, marking the premature 
termination of the first infrastructure project to involve private finance.
The direct cause of this premature termination was the abandonment of 
the toll system, the project’s main source of profit, because of the traffic prob-
lems it created. The rapid increase in the amount of traffic using the bridges 
and tunnels meant that cars waiting to pay the toll caused enormous traffic 
jams on both sides of the Huangpu, damaging the investment environment 
in Puxi and Pudong. In 2000 therefore local government decided to abandon 
the toll system and use local taxation to pay back CITIC Pacific. However, the 
extra taxation was far from sufficient to satisfy the terms of the contract. The 
200 million yuan shortfall (US$ 24.15 million) had to be made good from the 
public purse, from Chengtou and from an increased car tax, a difficult thing to 
achieve. The enormous financial pressure forced Shanghai authorities to ne-
gotiate with CITIC Pacific to reduce the guaranteed economic return from 15% 
to 8-9%, a proposal which was hardly attractive to CITIC Pacific. Until 2002, 18-
19% of CITIC Pacific’s total profits had come from its Shanghai infrastructure 
projects. Each side therefore hoped to find a more acceptable solution which 
would secure its own interests while not jeopardising the partnership estab-
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lished over the years in this and many other cooperative projects. After five 
years of discussion and negotiation, a deal was finally sealed. CITIC Pacific 
sold back its rights to Shanghai’s infrastructure projects for HK$ 6.16 billion 
(US$ 79 million), leaving it with a profit of HK$ 320 million (US$ 40.93 million) 
(Tong and Shen, 2003).
Perhaps the real reason underlying this problematic contract was the pub-
lic sector’s lack of business sense and financial experience and its awkward-
ness in dealing with contractual obligations. For example, government guar-
anteed a yield of 15% without considering possible changes in the economic 
situation or the financial market, so that the contract took no account of pos-
sible interest rate changes and the effect such changes could have on the fi-
nancial outcome. Thus in 1994 the private partner was guaranteed a risk-free 
yield of 15%. By 2002 this was worth 5-6 times more because of the change in 
the renminbi interest rate (from 21.8% in 1994 to 15% in 2003, 10.98% in 1995 
and 1.58% in 2003). Only when the contract became impossible to fulfil, did lo-
cal government realise that it was faced with an impossible financial burden.
It appears that the collaboration between Shanghai and CITIC Pacific was 
not the only case when this kind of trouble was experienced. Local authori-
ties in Fuzhou, Changcun and Chongqing also became involved in lawsuits 
with private partners because of similar situations arising from infrastruc-
tural projects. These cases raised substantial doubts about the public sector’s 
ability to deal with the private sector in infrastructural projects. Thus it was 
not surprising when in September 2002 the state council issued document no. 
43 - Circular of the General Office of the State Council on Issues Related to the 
Proper Disposal of Existing Projects with Guaranteed Fixed Returns for For-
eign Investors (Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu tuoshan chuli xianyou baozhang 
waifang touzi guding huibao xiangmu youguan wenti de tongzhi) to prevent local 
government promising foreign investors a fixed economic return on infra-
structural projects. Chinese researchers also warned of problems that could 
be created by inequitable BOT contracts in the Chinese infrastructure indus-
try.
The realisation of such a large number of key projects in the short period 
since 1990 had much to do with external and internal forces operating at na-
tional, local and district level, such as economic factors, preferential policies 
and financial input from national and local government. However, it could not 
have been possible without the key role played by public companies after the 
institutional reorganisation. The way these public companies approached the 
market not only created more efficiency in their own organisations but also 
attracted large sums of investment though innovative financial devices. Col-
laboration with international institutions like the ADB and the World Bank 
provided SMG with valuable knowledge and expertise on working with non-
governmental organisations and the private sector generally. This experience 
was enlarged by further collaboration with the private sector in China and 
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abroad. The advanced technology, management skills, financial ability and 
cost-benefit analysis techniques learned from the private sector increased 
efficiency, reduced costs and ultimately gave individual citizens the benefit 
of better public services. The recognition of these advantages by the public 
sector led Shanghai to further collaboration with the private sector on public 
service projects. Indeed certain tasks were handed over to the private sector 
in their entirety.
Thus as trust increased between government and the private sector there 
was a shift in the financing of infrastructure development from public finance 
to private investment. The strict distinction between public and private be-
came blurred. The experimental leasing of operating rights and subsequent 
public bond issues helped Shanghai to obtain an amount of money which 
would have been impossible to obtain from the public purse. Various organi-
sations traditionally forbidden to participate in the infrastructure industry 
became actively involved in water management and transport. The substan-
tial amount of investment required came from a combination of public funds 
and private investment, from domestic and foreign sources, moving the infra-
structure industry into the fast track.
The methods adopted by Chengtou and Jiushi have had a major effect on 
the approaches taken by other Chinese cities to their infrastructural devel-
opment. In fact the desire for extra finance for infrastructure is to be found 
throughout China. The very limited public budget available for infrastructure 
means that many cities are desperate for finance from non-governmental 
sources. Statistics show that 700 billion yuan (US$ 84.54 billion) was invested 
in urban infrastructure in China in the ninth five-year period (1996-2000). An-
other 1,000 billion yuan (US$ 120.77 billion) was required in the tenth five-year 
period (2001-2005), but the total budget from central and local government 
amounts to no more than 200-300 million yuan (US$ 24-36 million), which 
meant that the remaining 700 million yuan (US$ 84.54 billion) had to come 
from loans, FDI or private finance (Ding, China Business News, Dec. 2, 2004). 
The method of operation adopted by Chengtou and other public companies 
in Shanghai has attracted a good deal of attention from other Chinese cities. 
Cities like Beijing, Tianjin, Chongqing, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Nanjing, Chengdu, 
Kunmin, Yinchuan and Huhhot have followed what has become known as the 
Shanghai model by setting up their own Chengtous to encourage investment 
in infrastructure (Guo, China Economic Herald, Aug. 3, 2004).
 3.2.3 Infrastructure and the Pudong development
The dramatic change in the system used to provide infrastructure for Pudong 
were brought about by a number of different factors.
The first factor was the active approach to financing adopted by the infra-
structure industry which meant that capital could be attracted from various 
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sources. The sources used were a mixture of domestic and foreign, ranging 
through international and domestic loans, bonds, investment funds, and the 
stock market to private finance. It is interesting to note that a large number 
of key infrastructural projects were funded, directly or indirectly, by glo-
bal capital, as in the case of the construction of the metro lines and the first 
two bridges between Pudong and Puxi. Preferential treatment was the main 
strategy employed by Shanghai to attract overseas investment and to create 
Figure 3.15 Infrastructure development in Pudong: new highways link new 
neighbourhoods in Pudong with downtown Shanghai, 2006
Source: CNAP
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a more attractive investment climate. And capital flows are always accompa-
nied by the transfer of information, technology and the kind of mindset that 
led to the reform and reorganisation of the traditional institutional system 
and the appearance of public companies like Jiushi and Chengtou.
The second factor was the public companies and the operational strategies 
they applied to their infrastructural projects. These companies replaced the 
traditional government organisations to become leading participants in the 
infrastructure industry and the development of Pudong’s infrastructure. By 
comparison with bureaucratic government departments, they tended to focus 
more on cost-benefit analysis and therefore were more businesslike, more 
efficient, more open to new ideas and more willing to collaborate with the 
private sector. Earlier collaboration with multi-national organisations brought 
them advanced technology and improved their management skills. Chengtou 
and other public companies generally established project companies to im-
plement their projects and concentrated on finding finance or partners will-
ing to form a joint venture or buy shares in the project company. This was 
one method used to raise private finance for infrastructure projects. Another 
method was to list project companies on the stock exchange and so give them 
access to the capital market. Finally, the ability to adapt to changing econom-
ic circumstances was clearly evident in the financial strategies applied.
The third factor was that the construction of infrastructure was based on 
a long-term vision and a number of short-term action plans, a strategy not 
unlike that used by the central planning system but more sensitive to change 
and market reaction. This complex planning system to some extent helped 
the public sector to set its budget to ensure the realisation of key infrastruc-
tural projects; it has also helped the private sector to decide where invest-
ments should be made. In this sense, infrastructure plans, long-term and 
short-term, undoubtedly played a role in directing public and private finance 
to the area to which the public sector hoped to give priority, adding to the 
speed of development.
 3.3 Real estate market
Land and real estate are inseparable components of a real estate market 
(Syms, 2002; Carn et al., 1988). As an urban redevelopment project, real estate 
development played a significant role in determining and accelerating Pu-
dong’s development. The reintroduction of Shanghai’s real estate market was 
designed to address two needs, the need for China’s economy to involve the 
private sector in land, plant, warehouses and residential property in a way 
that would have been impossible under the old system, and the nationwide 
need for improved housing, particularly severe in Shanghai. The limited pub-
lic budget made it impossible for the housing allocation system to satisfy the 
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enormous demand for new housing.
Land and housing reform were introduced in Shanghai to encourage the 
transfer of land and property for value and so support the growth of a real 
estate market. Such transfers had been standard in Pudong since the early 
1990s. As a late starter, Pudong, unlike downtown Shanghai, had the advan-
tage of being able to introduce a series of reforms to the marketing of land 
and real estate development without coming up against entrenched interests. 
Thus Pudong became a laboratory for Shanghai’s experiments in reform. The 
success of the Pudong operation would provide a basis for Shanghai local gov-
ernment to decide whether their reforms should be applied to the metropoli-
tan area as a whole. Pudong’s real estate market grew dramatically, taking an 
increasing share of Shanghai’s office space, housing and industrial building. 
In due course the Pudong property market became a more and more essential 
part of the real estate market in Shanghai as a whole.
 3.3.1 The Shanghai real estate market
Land and housing reform
China’s reformists recognised the importance of reintroducing the markets in 
land and real estate that existed in the 1980s. The main aim of land reform 
was to move from administrative allocation of state-owned land (xingzhen 
huabo) to free transfer (wuchang) for an unlimited period (wuxianqi) and final-
Figure 3.16 A real estate market on the rise, 2006. The boom in real estate in Shanghai 
extended beyond downtown Puxi into an emergent Pudong
Source: CNAP
[  ]
ly to a new market system (shichang jingji shouduan) in which land-use rights 
would be transferred for an agreed period (youxianqi shiyong) against payment 
(youchang) (Lu, 1999, p. 238). The move involved legislation and administrative 
change but also affected various economic interests. The central aim of hous-
ing reform was to use the emerging real estate market to commoditise and 
commercialise housing. Housing reform was another key factor in encourag-
ing the growth of China’s real estate market. In fact, Zhang and Wang (2000, p. 
223) went so far as to suggest that ‘the re-establishment of a real estate mar-
ket in China actually began with the breakthrough of housing reform’.
At the end of the 1970s housing reform began to tackle the problems of 
housing shortage and poor housing quality prevalent in Chinese cities (see 
Figure 3.17, Figure 3.18 and Box 3.10). The basic approach to the reform of ur-
ban housing reform was set out in a speech made by Deng Xiaoping in 1980. 
Deng’s ideas can be summarised as follows:
Figure 3.17 Old Linong houses in Pudong before 1990
Source: Wang and Xia, 2001
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Urban housing should be treated as a commodity, capable of being sold to 
and owned by its occupiers, rather than welfare or a public benefit provid-
ed by government or society.
The low level of rent charged under the existing controlled rent system 
should be raised to market level to encourage people to buy rather than 
renting.
Investment in urban housing should come through many different chan-
nels and the approach to construction should be flexible, so that the bur-
den of providing accommodation for urban residents would be shared be-
tween individuals and government.
Shanghai was one of the few Chinese cities to conduct a series of pilot hous-
ing reforms to attempt to reduce its housing problems. Reforms introduced 
since 1980 involved the introduction of new housing construction systems, 
the establishment of housing corporations, the sale of houses to overseas 
Chinese, the sale of houses to local residents at subsidised prices, rent re-
form, the establishment of a housing provident fund and the privatisation of 
public housing. In 1991, after more than 10 years of experiment, citywide sur-
veys, consultation and feedback, the Shanghai Housing Reform Implementa-
tion scheme (Shanghaishi zhufang zhidu gaige shishi fang’an) became law. The 
central aims of the scheme were to commercialise housing with the help of 
housing finance support (the housing provident fund), to discourage the al-
location system by subsidising households while steadily increasing the rent 
for public housing, paying construction bonds for receiving allocated housing, 
privatising public housing and encouraging the commoditisation of housing 
by providing incentives such as tax relief for housing purchased on the mar-
1.
2.
3.
Figure 3.18 Housing shortage and low housing quality as the driving force behind urban 
redevelopment in downtown Shanghai
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ket (Lu, 1999; Zhou, 2003). The establishment of a housing market became in-
creasingly important to Shanghai’s housing reforms. The first housing market 
in Shanghai was established in 1979 (Zhao, personal interview, 2002). Luxury 
houses were sold on a commercial basis to overseas Chinese and their rela-
tives and later to Shanghainese with sufficient purchasing power. Other hous-
es were also made available to Shanghainese on a commercial basis, though 
preference was given to those with a serious housing problem. These two sec-
tions formed the entire internal housing market, a market which was only 
open to Chinese clients, though there was also an external housing market 
providing houses for foreign buyers. The difference between the two markets 
was that land used by the external market was transferred against payment 
of a fee for land-use rights, whereas land used by the internal housing mar-
ket was either allocated free of charge or for a fee below the commercial rate. 
The two housing markets were finally integrated in 2001, when the same land 
transfer fee was charged to both Chinese and foreign investors, regardless of 
origin, so encouraging the development of a more healthy and mature real 
estate market.
Evolution
The reintroduction of the market in land and housing satisfied the basic con-
ditions for the emergence of a real estate market in Shanghai. The develop-
ment of this market went through three critical phases (Zhang and Wang, 
2000):
In the preparation phase (1978-1987), a breakthrough in housing reform 
was achieved by the recognition of the commodity market, with housing 
as one of the most significant commodities. The experimental sale of pub-
lic housing as an alternative to renting began in 1982. the State Council is-
1.
Box 3.10 Shanghai’s housing problem before reform
In the 1970s and 1980s Shanghai was notorious for its housing shortage. A 
report published in 1979 gave figures for households experiencing the worst 
housing in Shanghai: 29,200 married couples had no home of their own, 
16,600 households had less than 2 m2 of net floor area per capita, 13,000 
households were made up of several couples sharing the same space, 1,200 
households which had migrated to Shanghai had nowhere to live and a 
further 45,000 households were demanding the return of homes illegally 
occupied during the Cultural Revolution. In total, 3.3 million m2 of housing 
were needed. Another survey conducted in 1981 reported on the general 
nature of the housing shortage in Shanghai. 602,000 households, i.e. 37.6%, 
were suffering a serious housing shortage. 445,000 of these households had 
a net floor area per capita of less than 4 m2 and a further 157,000 households 
were made up of two or three generations sharing the same space. 400,000 
young couples were waiting to be housed. Estimates of the amount of 
housing needed to make good the shortage and satisfy the increase in 
housing requirements forecast for the period 1982-1990 ranged between 13 
and 22 million m2.
Source: Lu, 1999
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sued its Administrative Method for Individual Urban Citizens to Construct 
Housing (Chengzhen geren jianzao zhuzhai guanli banfa) in May 1983. Tenta-
tive Methods for Urban and County Construction Development Companies 
(Chengxiang jianshe zonghe kaifa gongsi zhanxing banfa) was issued in Octo-
ber 1984 to regulate the earliest form of publicly owned real estate compa-
nies involved in the provision of urban housing. The first national survey 
of the housing situation was conducted in 1985 to provide more informa-
tion for the coming reforms. These four steps helped to provide a basis for 
the series of housing reforms to be implemented in China in general and 
Shanghai in particular. Land reform was also under scrutiny, particularly 
Shanghai’s 1986 experiment of charging foreign enterprises a fee for land-
use rights. These experiments provided experience and a legal foundation 
for the further development of Shanghai’s real estate market.
In the growth phase (1988-1991) the land market experienced an increas-
ing number of land transfer deals, followed by increasing investment in 
urban development and improvement of infrastructure. The beginning of 
this phase was marked by the constitutional definition of property bound-
aries in state-owned land, required to make possible the transfer of urban 
land-use rights. A series of land reform measures were initiated to accom-
pany the People’s Republic of China Land Administration Act. Hongqiao’s 
land bid led to the rapid expansion of the land market in Shanghai. In 
three years, twelve plots of land were leased with a total area of 953.36 ha, 
though only 1.74% was leased specifically for real estate use, the remainder 
being leased to development companies for further land development. Ta-
ble 3.4 shows that land transfer deals in Shanghai went through two peak 
periods in 1993 and 2002 and two downturns in 1995 and 1999. The chang-
es were greatly influenced by the economic situation at the time and coun-
termeasures taken by national government. In 1995, after the rapid growth 
at the beginning of the 1990s, national government tried to curb symptoms 
of overheating by severely restricting the bank loans which had powered 
the first wave of land transfers. The later relaxation of this policy contrib-
uted to a new wave of activity in real estate, but this was followed in 1997-
1999 by the downturn brought about by the Asian economic crisis. The 
third wave started at the end of that crisis and continue to gain strength, 
though it was feared that more problems would arise in 2005, following 
warnings about real estate bubbles and the possibility of strict national fi-
nancial policies to restrict bank loans. This fear led local government to 
reduce the total supply of land. Whether this will cause a new downturn 
is yet to be seen. It is interesting to note that as the land market became 
more tightly regulated, more land was granted to real estate developers 
rather than public companies operating in different development zones. In 
the last decade the amount of land transferred between local government 
and public companies dropped steadily. Table 3.4 shows the substantial 
2.
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amount of building land that has been or is to be realised by land transfer. 
The size of the figures suggests a direct connection between the amount 
of land available on the market and the explosive growth in the amount of 
real estate achieved.
In the overall development phase (1991 to date), both land reform and 
housing reform made further advances. Not only did the supply and de-
mand sides of the local real estate market become more competitive, but 
related businesses sprang up to provide real estate finance, property man-
agement, intermediary market and other services. This rapid development 
was encouraged by the continuing housing reform, with the State Council 
issuing a document to encourage urban housing reform in all cities and 
those towns capable of implementing the necessary measures. Shanghai’s 
real estate market was stimulated by an increasing demand for housing 
and of course the development of Pudong. Shanghai, afraid of opposition 
from existing interest groups and possible failure, still hesitated to intro-
duce its reforms in other parts of the city. Accordingly Pudong, relatively 
isolated from Puxi’s location in downtown Shanghai, was used for the ex-
perimental application of a number of bold measures such as a fully op-
erational land market and the abolition of the old allocation system (See 
Chapter 2 and Section 3.2).
In the 25 years during which Shanghai was gradually preparing and setting 
up its real estate market, investment in fixed assets and real estate increased 
3.
Table 3.4 Land transfer in Shanghai, 1988-2004 
Year
Land area  
(ha)
Land area 
of land 
tracts (ha)
Developable 
area 
(10,000 m2)
Types of housing (10,000 m2)
Residential Composite Commercial Industrial Other
1988 -1994 9618.73 7590.07 2788.02 758.26 1178.15 – 780.11 71.50
1995 998.47 757.18 1234.21 444.49 196.45 – 417.99 175.28
1996 878.99 457.89 1365.41 858.29 169.43 – 273.07 64.62
1997 1426.06 886.80 1962.11 1308.19 190.29 – 325.29 138.34
1998 1058.17 771.70 1929.96 1193.88 271.58 – 385.38 79.13
1999 954.53 79.00 1240.98 919.10 69.77 – 138.41 113.70
2000 1729.54 – 1991.42 1352.82 38.19 – 430.50 169.91
2001 2517.10 – 3152.53 1693.63 227.58 – 1127.15 104.17
2002 3817.99 – 4724.88 2524.64 371.23 111.93 1717.08 –
2003 6985.85 – 6991.36 3149.21 701.17 464.61 2561.66 114.71
2004 7135.60 – 8052.05 2888.28 981.96 490.12 3578.06 113.62
Total 37175.02 10542.64 35432.93 17090.79 4395.80 1066.66 11734.7 1144.98
Note: This table excludes land areas and gross floor areas of lots granted for which the contract was terminated and 
acquired by paying land premium.
Source: SMHLRAB and SMSB, 2005, p. 54
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rapidly. Figure 3.19 shows the boom in the real estate sector in the 1990s and 
the further boom in the early 2000s. It also shows the downturn between 1996 
and 1999, the approximate period covered by the Asian economic crisis. In 
general, the growth of the real estate sector was truly spectacular, whether 
in terms of investment volume or area constructed. For example, the annual 
investment in real estate in 2002 was 15 times greater than the total invest-
ment in the 7-year period 1986-1992. In the same year the area of real estate 
construction was equal to four-fifths of the total area of construction in the 
same 7-year period (SMHLRAB and SMSB, 2003; Shanghai Real Estate Market, 
p. 49).
Land and housing reform could only provide the conditions necessary for 
and favourable to the emergence of a real estate market. The growth of the 
real estate market and the real estate sector generally depended on a mul-
titude of factors affecting supply and demand. More important, Pudong’s in-
fant real estate market not only depended on investor interest but also on the 
healthy growth of Shanghai’s real estate market generally. What factors stim-
ulated Shanghai’s real estate boom? Were those factors capable of supporting 
sustained growth? The answers to these questions could help to provide an 
understanding of the status of real estate in Pudong and how it could benefit 
from growth in Shanghai’s real estate market.
Supply and demand
‘All commodity markets, including real estate markets, are composed of 
two distinct groups of participants. First, there is a group of individuals 
who are able and willing to purchase the commodity – the demand side 
of the market – who represent the consumers. Second, there is a group 
that is able and willing to produce and make the product available for 
sale – the supply side of the market. There are distinct and often unique 
demand and supply characteristics for each specific real estate submar-
ket’ (Carn et al., 1988, p. 68).
The real estate sector is not isolated but is closely linked with the local econ-
omy and the resultant demand for space. The increase in employment and 
purchasing power generated by local economic growth increases the demand 
for goods and services, thus creating further employment and new non-basic 
employment. ‘Simply stated, a one-unit change in basic employment caus-
es more than a one-unit change in total employment. This phenomenon is 
called the internal multiplier effect’ (Carn et al., 1988, p. 43). By the same to-
ken, local demand for housing, retail and office space is determined in part by 
the economic growth of the community, but growth in the real estate sector 
stimulates the local economy to further growth. To understand the growth of 
Shanghai’s real estate market it is necessary to examine a range of factors 
capable of contributing to the creation of supply and demand. The following 
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analysis highlights a number of issues including the potential of the local 
economy, the demand for urban development and the demand for real estate 
as a commodity.
Rapid growth in the local economy provided a powerful impetus to an 
emerging real estate market. - The development of Shanghai was directly 
related to national economic reform and the open door policy introduced 
in China at the end of the 1970s. Even though China has experienced its 
downturns, in general those reforms helped it to achieve greater econom-
ic efficiency and stimulated rapid economic growth. Official figures show 
that over the 20 year period 1980-2000 China’s economy grew at an annual 
rate of 9.5%. The vast untapped market of a potential 1.3 billion custom-
ers acted as an enormous magnet attracting investors to seek business op-
portunities in China. The booming economy created extra opportunities 
for Chinese labour and the consumer market. In 2005 China overtook the 
United States to become the biggest consumer market in the world. The 
country’s economic growth and generally successful economic strategy 
enabled the construction industry and the real estate market to attract ex-
tra investment, while increasing purchasing power stimulated the demand 
side. The economy of Shanghai, China’s biggest city and most important 
business centre, increasingly became the symbol and measure of China’s 
economic development. Although Shanghai too experienced a number 
of downturns, it quickly caught up with the boom cities in South China, 
which had been granted autonomy early in the period of economic reform. 
Shanghai’s share in the national GDP before 1988 was almost twice that 
of Beijing, and its average annual growth of 10.2% was the highest for any 
1.
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city in China (Yusuf and Wu, 2001; SMSB, 2006; SPNASB, 2006) (See Figure 
3.20). Between 1990 and 2001 Pudong’s GDP grew at the even more amaz-
ing rate of 26% annually. This enormous economic progress was not lim-
ited to Shanghai: since the start of economic reform the Yangtze valley and 
Shanghai’s hinterland generally also became prosperous. Each city in the 
area devised its own strategy to create the most efficient links with Shang-
hai by improving transport facilities and telecommunications and opening 
branches in Shanghai. Shanghai was still considered the main link with 
the outside world, geographically and economically. This idea also contrib-
uted to a rush of investment in business, trade and real estate in Shanghai 
in the 1980s and in Pudong in the early 1990s.
Inner city redevelopment and expansion into new districts fuelled the 
growth of the real estate market. - As the economy continued to grow, 
Shanghai started to pay more attention to its physical environment, not 
only because the municipality had a bigger budget for improving living 
conditions in the city but also because it saw such improvement as essen-
tial to creating a business environment that would attract investors. At the 
same time steady economic growth brought substantial revenue to local 
government, making it possible to provide strong financial support to a 
number of ambitious urban projects. The 1986 Shanghai master plan pro-
posed a number of measures to deal with problems created by the over-
crowded city centre, poor housing quality, inadequate infrastructure and 
inappropriate land use. These measures included building new urban 
districts to rehouse excess population, readjusting the land use plan and 
moving factories responsible for pollution out of the city centre, redevelop-
ing old residential districts, constructing new residential areas, providing 
adequate infrastructure to link different districts and cleaning up the en-
vironment in the city centre, in other words a complete face-lift for Shang-
hai’s crowded and polluted city centre.
A number of urban development and renewal projects forced Shanghai 
to face a large-scale process of demolition and resettlement, as shown in 
Table 3.5. An enormous amount of residential space was needed for peo-
ple who had lost their old homes. By 1995, 3.2 million m2 of residential 
space had been demolished, and by 2002 the figure had doubled (SMHL-
RAB and SMSB, 2003, p. 47). Relocated households provided the major-
ity of buyers of new homes, especially in the suburbs. In the last twen-
ty years a large number of people living in the city centre moved out to 
new residential areas in the suburbs, partly because of the cost of reset-
tlement. Since local government was responsible for resettling residents 
and businesses displaced by redevelopment, it had to take into account 
the relationship between the cost of resettlement and its potential in-
come from land leasing. The population density in Chinese cities, the 
key principle that resettled households must be given adequate accom-
2.
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modation, and government-imposed minimum standards for quality and 
size (generally much higher than ever before), meant that redevelopment 
could be extremely expensive. Shanghai district government has reported 
that between 60 and 70% of its land lease revenue was needed to pay for 
resettlement. Each hectare of land cleared required the relocation of 800-
1,000 people (Fu et al., 1999). The size of the resettlement effort forced dis-
trict governments to change from on-site resettlement to off-site resettle-
ment, further accelerating the process of urbanisation and the expansion 
of new districts in suburbs like Pudong, Minhang and Jiading. Pudong be-
came the perfect choice for new relocation projects because of its cheap 
land. Several neighbourhoods were constructed in Pudong for households 
displaced by projects in Puxi and Pudong. One such neighbourhood was 
Pudong’s Jinyang New Village, a mega-project designed to accommodate 
100,000 people.
Foreign investment internationalised the local real estate market. - Despite 
its late arrival on the scene, Shanghai saw an inflow of FDI increasing from 
US$ 177 million in 1990 to US$ 5.85 billion in 2003, an increase of 32 times 
(see Figure 3.21). Statistics show that by 2000, 153 Fortune 500 companies 
had invested in 513 projects in Shanghai, with contracted funds amount-
ing to US$ 8.6 billion (People’s Daily, 2000). Shanghai showed every sign of 
becoming an international financial centre, ‘the nexus between that coun-
try’s wealth and the global market and between foreign investors and that 
country’s investment opportunities’ (Sassen, 2000, p. 104).
The importance of foreign investment as a source of capital, ‘raises the 
need to enhance a city’s competitiveness’ (Wu, 2002, p. 160). The increase 
in the number of banks and other organisations involved in trade, finance 
3.
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and insurance24 forced Shanghai not only to provide increasing amounts 
of space for its manufacturing industry but also to give priority to satisfy-
ing the demand for office space, especially the high-quality office space re-
quired by foreign investors. Moreover its ambitious urban strategy created 
enormous opportunities for foreign investors wishing to profit from the lo-
cal real estate market, and for businesses specialising in producing upmar-
ket products for international investors and highly paid professionals.
Housing demand. - Housing demand became one of the main driving forc-
es behind Shanghai’s real estate market, particularly because the city was 
facing the results of decades of neglect and lack of investment. National 
statistics show that in 1998, after years of investment in housing and two 
decades of housing reform, the average net floor area per capita for urban 
residents was 8.8 m2. 40% of homes had no toilet or kitchen. About 3 mil-
lion urban households occupied a net floor area per capita of less than 4 
m2. Almost all housing stock required maintenance. Achieving the aim of 
increasing the net floor area per capita to 13.5 m2 for 370 million perma-
nent urban residents would require the construction of an extra 3.33 billion 
m2 (on the assumption that construction area equals twice net floor area), 
   For example, the number of insurers in Shanghai increased to 55, more than double the number in 2000. The 
number of insurance agents increased from one in 2000 to 92 in 2004.
4.
Table 3.5 Completed demolition and resettlement in Shanghai, 1995-2004
Year
Completed projects approved
Gross floor area of buildings 
completed for demolition and 
resettlement (10,000m2)
Residents Flats (business entities)
No. of households
Gross floor areas 
(10,000 m2) No. of flats
Gross floor areas 
(10,000 m2)
1995 322.77 73,695 253.90 2,682 68.87
1996 342.95 86,481 258.86 2,651 84.09
1997 479.68 77,388 363.16 2,469 116.52
1998 449.68 75,157 343.94 2,282 105.59
1999 342.50 73,709 248.17 1,476 94.32
2000 365.76 68,293 288.35 2,313 77.40
2001 515.65 71,909 386.66 1,819 128.99
2002 644.53 98,714 485.00 2,383 159.54
2003 584.93 79,077 475.47 1,781 109.46
2004 580.11 55,398 445.67 1,357 134.44
Total 4,628.40 759,821 3,549.18 21,213 1,079.22
Note 1.: Figures shown for 2004 include urban districts and rural counties.
Note 2.: The figures shown in Table 3.5 differ from those in Table 3.3. The reason probably lies in the difference in copes 
between the two sets of figures.
Source: SMHLRAB and SMSB, 2005, p. 48
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an increase of 278 million m2 every year until 2010. It was also estimated 
that 2.5% of the 4 billion m2 of existing housing stock had deteriorated suf-
ficiently to require demolition, necessitating replacement by 100 million m2 
of new housing stock, i.e. 12 million m2 of construction area every year for 
12 years. Moreover urbanisation was gathering speed: the expected growth 
of 30 to 45% would increase the size of the urban population by 260 million, 
requiring a further 7 billion m2 of construction area in 12 years. In total, 
about 1 billion m2 of construction area will be required each year for 12 
years. If in addition 25% of the 4 billion m2 of existing housing stock were 
to be improved by the provision of separate toilets and kitchens, the total 
housing demand would become even more enormous (Yan, 2005) Even in 
Pudong, whose 43.5 km2 urban area in 1990 accounted for no more than 8% 
of the total area, the poor quality of most of the housing stock generated a 
high demand for better and more spacious housing. 
Over the last 15 years investment in residential property has shown 
strong growth (see Figure 3.22 and 3.23). Although the trend was disturbed 
between 1997 and 1999 by the Asian economic crisis, investment in resi-
dential building was generally not influenced by the global market situa-
tion, but rather reflected the strong local economy and growing local con-
sumerism. One important thing to note is that investment in residential 
property accounted for 60% of total investment in real estate, increasing to 
76% by 2003 as is shown in Figure 3.23. All these figures confirm the impor-
tance of the housing sector to Shanghai’s real estate market.
Demand for commercial real estate. - Apart from housing, the booming 
economy and growing business sector created increased demand for com-
mercial property for offices, retailing and other functions, for sale or rent. 
5.
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The demand for office space was driven partly by local investors and partly 
by the entry of investors from other parts of China and abroad. The origin 
of the investors affected the nature of their demands for office space in 
terms of quality, rent and preferred location. Foreign investors tended to 
choose high quality office space (grade A or A+), whereas domestic inves-
tors would choose any of a wide variety of quality levels, ranging from A or 
A+ (especially for the financial sector) all the way down. As the number of 
links with the rest of the world increased, an increasing number of foreign 
businesses and banks started to look for high quality office space in Shang-
hai. Little such space was available. In 1994, Shanghai had only 194,000 
m2 of grade A office space, compared with five times more in Bangkok, 15 
times more in Singapore and 23 times more in Hong Kong (Olds, 2001, p. 
185). Many foreign companies had to operate out of four- or five-star hotels 
while waiting for the construction of new offices. As shown in Figure 3.23, 
investment in office building doubled in just one year, from 1995 to 1996. 
There are several possible reasons for such an increase. The shortage of of-
fice space, not to mention the high profit to be made from a short-term 
investment, might have sparked off investors’ enthusiasm; another reason 
may have been the liberalisation of financial policy in 1995.
In the 1990s the real estate sector as a whole showed a strong and 
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steady increase in both investment and completed volume, as shown in 
Table 3.6. Investment almost doubled in the ten years from 1993 to 2002. 
However, this growth was not without its dangers. Unlike the continuing 
strong demand for housing and the boom in the housing market, the mar-
ket in office space was more influenced by the state of the local and global 
economy, which directly impacted investors’ decisions on capital allocation. 
Table 3.6 and 3.7 show that even though investment in office building grew 
sharply between 1995 and 1997, from 1997 onwards the local office market 
was deeply disturbed by the Asian economic crisis. Figure 3.24 shows the 
low occupancy of office space immediately before, during and after the cri-
sis. Investment subsequently fell away sharply, from 15,083 million yuan 
(US$ 1,821.62 million) in 1996 to 2,622 million yuan (US$ 316.67) in 2001. 
Residential
Office
Commercial
Other
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Table 3.6 Investment in development and construction of commodity building in Shanghai, 1986-2004
Year
Annual investment amount
(100 million yuan)
Construction area 
(10,000 m2)
Completed area 
(10,000 m2)
Sub-total Central Local Sub-total
Including new 
construction Sub-total
Including 
residential 
development
1988 -1994 250.63 12.63 238.00 11075.15 1959.67 1180.02 1097.41
1995 286.45 67.59 218.86 5074.80 1749.55 700.39 529.77
1996 454.79 17.62 437.17 6005.46 1469.08 1207.86 992.30
1997 515.78 52.03 463.75 5341.79 1431.88 1464.96 1207.86
1998 440.47 31.82 408.65 5416.10 1361.80 1565.34 1242.00
1999 401.44 27.44 374.00 5083.18 1308.60 1468.62 1229.23
2000 566.17 27.80 538.37 5523.23 1992.31 1643.62 1388.01
2001 630.73 24.78 605.95 5986.18 2426.75 1791.36 1524.21
2002 748.89 25.14 723.75 6856.96 2612.74 1984.68 1708.11
2003 901.24 20.85 880.39 8267.51 3134.53 2491.84 2139.99
2004 1175.46 23.02 1152.44 9481.61 3196.20 3443.02 3076.19
Total 6372.05 330.72 6041.33 74111.97 22643.11 18941.71 16103.36
Source: SMHLRAB and SMSB, 2005, p. 52
Table 3.7 Leasing of office complexes, 1995-2004 (in m2) 
Year
supply of the 
end of the year
Newly-added 
supply  
during the year
Supply 
available 
during the year
Occupied area 
during the year
Occupied area 
of the end 
of the year
Volume of 
vacancy  
during the year
Vacancy 
rate (%)
A B C D E F G
1995 251,597 101574 102065 89534 239066 12531 5.0
1996 258,225 6658 19189 8188 247254 11001 4.3
1997 235,472 -22783 -11782 -47574 199680 35792 15.2
1998 283,611 48139 83931 10259 209939 73672 26.0
1999 286,097 2486 76158 20221 230160 55937 19.60
2000 292,559 6462 62399 22215 252375 40184 13.7
2001 1,446,775 1154216 1194400 922567 1174942 271832 18.8
2002 1,556,504 109729 381561 123373 1298315 258188 16.6
2003 2,807,394 1250890 1509079 1132264 2430579 376815 13.4
2004 3,056,463 249069 625884 284897 2715476 340987 11.2
Note: In the Table, A= A0+B, C=B+ F0, D=C-F, E= E0+D, F=A-E, G=F÷A(%);A0, E0, F0 represent the figures for the previous 
year, B (newly added leasing area in the market during the year), includes newly added area for lease of projects completed 
earlier.
Source: SMHLRAB and SMSB, 2005, p. 89
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Only in 2002 did the office market start its long slow recovery, albeit from 
very low level. The crisis in Shanghai’s office market reflected the precari-
ous nature of that market, causing many investors to question its future.
As already mentioned, many commercial buildings in the city centre 
were converted to provide space for manufacturing, so reducing commer-
cial space to a minimum. Nor was sufficient attention paid to the provi-
sion of commercial space in the new districts. The general shortage of 
commercial space and the growing local demand for such space may well 
have been one of the main reasons for increasing investment in commer-
cial real estate. Moreover the fact that the economic return on commercial 
commodities to both rents and taxation are profitable and the profitability 
of the service sector could be another reason for preferring this form of 
investment.
Empowering local purchasing power. - Even though privatisation of pub-
lic housing was the driving force behind increasing house ownership, in-
creases in purchasing power and the demand for improved living condi-
tions also encouraged the rapid growth of the real estate sector and the 
sale of commercial houses25. Economic growth brought prosperity to the 
city’s residents. Figure 3.25 gives a vivid picture of the increase in savings 
and disposable income. Statistics show that between 1978 and 2004 aver-
age wages of white-collar and blue-collar workers in Shanghai increased 
from 672 yuan (US$ 448) [change in conversion rate in the same year] to 
24,398 yuan (US$ 2946.62). Besides, average disposable income per capita in 
Shanghai increased 40 times and 15.4% annually from 406 yuan (US$ 271) 
to 16,683 yuan (US$ 2014.86). Meanwhile, total savings by urban and rural 
households increased from 1.82 billion yuan (US$ 1.2 billion) to 696.10 bil-
lion yuan (US$ 84.07 billion). Naturally the increase in household income 
stimulated consumption. Annual consumption expenditures of urban 
households increased 34 times (14.7% per year) from 357 yuan (US$ 238) to 
12,631 yuan (US$ 1525.48). As living standards and quality of life continued 
to rise, the Engel coefficient (the proportion of total expenditure that goes 
on food) continued to fall, from 56.2% in 1980 to 36.4% in 2003. Expenditure 
on accommodation, education, medical services, transport and communi-
cations also continued to rise, as did expenditure on cultural and leisure 
activities, each roughly fourfold in 23 years. These figures for expenditure 
were in line with the intensification of economic reform and the promotion 
of privatisation in these sectors. ‘In only ten years of experimental housing 
reform, Shanghai has gone from having next to no private home owner-
ship – all but outlawed after the communist revolution – to a market where 
   Commercial houses refer to the houses in the housing market with the aim of earning market profit. The 
ownership of the houses can be transferred and is decided by the market supply and demand.
6.
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more than 90 per cent of homes are privately owned’ (McGregor, 2002).
The stagnation of supply in the first three decades under Mao, the de-
mand created by the ambitious plans to put Shanghai back on the world 
stage, continuous economic growth and a significant inflow of foreign 
investment combined to produce a dramatic increase in the demand for 
commodity building for residential, commercial and manufacturing pur-
poses. Long-term expectations for increased housing quality and property 
ownership also helped to stimulate investment in a once stagnant con-
struction industry. As a result, in the last several decades Shanghai experi-
enced an unprecedented level of urban development and urbanisation.
 3.3.2 Pudong - sustainable growth or bubble?
The strong demand in Shanghai’s real estate market resulted not only from 
powerful economic support and business demand since the start of economic 
reform in China and Shanghai but, more important, from explosive growth in 
demand after decades of stagnation and neglect. Economic growth and the 
development of the real estate market, nationally and locally, provide a help-
ful framework for understanding the Pudong development. But questions still 
remain about the factors responsible for this growth. What is the real situa-
tion in Pudong’s real estate market? What is the relationship between the real 
estate markets in Pudong and Puxi? If Pudong’s real estate market continues 
to grow, will the growth be sustainable? All these questions have a bearing on 
Pudong’s economic and urban development and the future of its real estate 
market.
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Growth and driving forces
Before 1990 the real estate market in Pudong 
was very much underdeveloped. The decision 
to go ahead with the Pudong development 
encouraged investors to think about Pudong’s 
stock of land, a vast untapped resource. Fur-
ther, the application of the principle of land transfer for value adopted by 
Pudong since 1990 gave private developers from China and abroad a better 
chance of entering the Shanghai market. By 1992, two years after the start of 
the Pudong development, Pudong had leased 1335.1 ha of land, about twice as 
much as in Puxi (Zhang and Wang, 2000, p. 225). The difference between land 
transfer in Pudong and in Puxi was that in Pudong land leasing and urban 
development were closely tied to the goal of building up Pudong’s special eco-
nomic functions – finance, manufacture, import and export and high-tech – in 
four development zones. More than 60% of the first land transferred in Pu-
dong was for manufacturing and more than 20% for housing (see Table 3.8), 
though in Lujiazui the emphasis was on office space.
As development continued, the amount of office space became a key in-
dicator of the health of the local real estate market. Most office space was 
located in the Lujiazui financial and trade zone. As Shanghai’s new central 
business district and China’s first financial and trade development zone, Lu-
jiazui benefited from a series of preferential policies (see Box 2.3, Chapter 2) 
designed to attract international financial and trading organisations. Since 
1990 Lujiazui has became a development zone specialising in office buildings 
at different quality levels. One-third of Shanghai’s office space is presently lo-
cated in Pudong, unlike the situation in 1990, when office space in Pudong 
amounted to a negligible fraction of the total stock. 
Housing has always been a crucial part of the real estate market in Pudong, 
which needed to house its own increasing population (forecast at 2.5 million 
as against 1.3 million in 1990) and to implement higher housing standards, in-
creasing living space per capita to 26 m2 as against 12 m2 in 1950. It therefore 
needed to mass-produce housing. In the 1980s and 1990s Pudong was used 
by local government for experiments in implementing national housing pol-
icy (see Box 3.11). As housing reform proceeded, welfare houses were either 
privatised or became residential commodities and were put on sale on the 
housing market. According to district government reports, between 60 and 
70% of the revenue from land leasing was used to finace resettlement. The 
magnitude of the resettlement effort forced district governments to resettle 
displaced residents off-site rather than on-site, and Pudong became a loca-
tion for off-site resettlement. Researcher Li Zhanjun (2002) comments:
‘Pudong currently accounts for 20-25% of total residential building con-
struction in Shanghai, even though Pudong has an area of only 500 
km2, amount to 8% of Shanghai’s total area (6,000 km2). This is why we 
Table 3.8 Use of land leased in Pudong before 1993 
Land use Projects Area (m2) %
Industrial 61 1,562,202 70.22
Residential 17 562,729 25.29
Commercial 40 35,991 1.62
Financial 6 21,047 0.95
Technology 6 42,811 1.92
Total 130 2,224,780 100.0
Source: Zhang and Wang, 2000, p. 226
[ 0 ]
describe the volume of residential building construction in Pudong as 
massive. Pudong’s special role in Shanghai’s economic and urban devel-
opment has been one of the main factors determining the development 
of Pudong.’
The rate of development of Pudong’s real estate market since 1990 (See Figure 
3.26) was also affected by the general economic growth at national and local 
level, the increase of investment in fixed assets and commodity buildings in 
Shanghai, the preferential policies adopted by national and local government 
and the continuous injection of public finance to improve its infrastructure. 
The progress made by the Pudong real estate market stimulated the real es-
tate market in Shanghai as a whole, increasing the volume of land transfers 
and the commodity development of offices, housing and other functional 
space. Apart from its economic importance, Pudong also possessed a number 
of local advantages which probably increased the success of its real estate 
market.
Its primary advantage was its location. While it is true that when Lujiazui 
had been linked to downtown Puxi by tunnels, bridges, metros and buses, it 
became one of the best locations from which to enter Shanghai’s downtown, 
Pudong was already connected to most Shanghai districts. Researcher Li 
Zhanjun (personal interview, 2002) comments on the way Pudong’s strategic 
location has benefited the development of its real estate market: 
‘No district in Shanghai borders as many other districts as Pudong. Pu-
dong is linked to Chongmin Island by the Yangtze, and with Baoshan 
through Wusong kou. This advantage can help Pudong attract residents 
of other districts to move to Pudong.....’
Compared with districts in Puxi, Pudong is spacious, with a lower population 
density and a high percentage of green space. It was designed to provide a 
much more favourable residential environment than the Puxi area generally. 
Pudong does however have a number of disadvantages which will need to be 
overcome if the growth of the real estate market is to be sustained:
To compete with other old districts, Pudong will need to overcome its tradi-n
Box 3.11 Pudong’s first housing estate
According to Li Jianneng, former senior planner at the Pudong planning 
bureau, the first (experimental) real estate project was actually a housing 
project, originally intended to provide what under the old central planning 
system were known as allocation houses (tongpei zhuzhai). These houses 
were designed as welfare houses for Shanghainese who had no homes or 
were forced to relocate to allow inner city redevelopment. The Shanghai 
Municipal Construction Committee, which was in charge of the project, 
expropriated about 200 ha of farm land for the construction site, but this 
land was still unused in the 1990s, at the start of the Pudong development. 
When Pudong introduced new regulations enforcing full implementation of 
the principle of land transfer for value, this piece of land became one of the 
first to be made available to the market through the process of land leasing. 
Houses built on this land could be sold as residential commodities
Source: Li, personal interview, 2002.
[  ]
tional unfavourable image as a poor, low-quality, residential area, outdated 
and unfashionable. This stereotype is not so much a problem for newcom-
ers from other parts of China, but remains a major concern to Shang-
hainese who have spent all their lives in Shanghai.
Pudong still needs to upgrade its social infrastructure, including its edu-
cational, retail and entertainment facilities, to compete with the more 
sophisticated social environment that the inner city inherited from dec-
ades of development. This is the most common complaint made by Shang-
hainese about the residential environment in Pudong as compared to that 
of their former homes in Puxi.
Pudong needs to continue its infrastructural development and provide 
fast connections to Shanghai’s city centre. Traffic jams between Pudong 
and Puxi could easily raise doubts in the minds of potential investors and 
home buyers and cause them to reject Pudong as their new location.
Both advantages and disadvantages have had their effect on the growth of 
the Pudong real estate market and on the thinking of investors considering 
locating in Pudong. If Pudong is to keep up with the growing real estate mar-
ket, it will need to overcome its disadvantages and strengthen the advantages 
it already possesses. Investors judge a location on many factors, according to 
their own interests and expectations, and investors help to shape the real es-
tate market. The next section will attempt to look at the real estate market 
through the eyes of an investor, with particular attention to the long-term 
and short-term vision of investors in Pudong and the origins of the real estate 
developers and their strategic investment behaviour.
n
n
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Origins and strategies
Behaviour in the real estate sector is affected by both long-term and short 
term considerations. It appears that the origin of the developer plays a sig-
nificant part in determining his business interests, investment strategy and 
investment behaviour. A substantial number of developers in Pudong came 
from abroad (Hong Kong, Taiwan, East and South East Asia, the US and Eu-
rope). Some, like Nokai, came from Shanghai. Others came from neighbour-
ing provinces like Zhejiang and Jiangsu, where the private sector found the 
environment more friendly. It is interesting to note that analysis showed that 
although different private sector groups participated in the development of 
Pudong at different times, the main aim has always been the same – to make 
a profit. The strategies used to determine when and where to invest have re-
flected the interests, capability and limitations of the private sector.
Before the development of Pudong, locally based state-owned real estate 
companies performed a hybrid function in the real estate market, performing 
as commercial entities while at the same time acting in the public interest 
under public sector supervision. Private companies have participated in the 
Pudong development since 1990. It was explained in Section 3.1 that the de-
velopment of Pudong has been partly characterised by investment by Chinese 
public companies. In fact, Chinese public companies were a distinctive fea-
ture of the development scene in Pudong. These companies handled invest-
ment by various government organisations at national, provincial, city and 
district level. The famous product of these public companies was the shengbu 
lou, buildings financed by investments made by Chinese public companies 
with a ministerial or provincial background. At the beginning of the 1990s the 
Figure 3.27 Green space along Century Avenue, Pudong’s main street
[  ]
investment environment was still in a very critical condition. Nanpu Bridge 
had just been built to link the two sides of the Huangpu. There was only one 
main road serving the various neighbourhoods and factories in Pudong, which 
still bore no resemblance to the image presented in the Pudong master plan. 
Pudong was still too much of a gamble for most private investors. At that time 
government intervention was designed to encourage companies supported by 
ministries or provincial governments to invest in the Pudong real estate mar-
ket. Central government ‘recommended’ that ministries and provinces should 
assist Pudong’s development. However, even though central government had 
a powerful influence on government at lower levels, the process of decentral-
ising the economy had already reduced the effect of any pressure exerted on 
companies, generally state-owned, most of which were operating commer-
cially. Accordingly a series of preferential policies were adopted to lower the 
barriers to investment and increase investment flexibility. These policies in-
cluded reduced taxation and the leasing of land at below market price. These 
practical measures, known as shenbu lou policies, had a positive impact on 
the decision of ministries and provincial governments to support their com-
panies’ investment in Shanghai. In fact these preferential policies also ap-
plied to government-related bureaus, national energy companies spun off 
from government ministries, banks and national insurance companies. A to-
tal of 67 buildings in Pudong benefited from these policies. However, shengbu 
lou were not only the results of this government intervention. Most provinces 
preferred Shanghai to the cities in South China as ‘China’s window to con-
nect the outside world’. Shanghai’s traditionally close links with neighbouring 
provinces, provinces further inland and the outside world, meant that it was 
able to bring increased trade and economic benefits to other cities. Moreover, 
investment in real estate – for example in Pudong – was considered by many 
Chinese to be high-risk even if it did offer the chance of high return. If things 
went well, a company could make a fortune; if things went badly, a compa-
ny could be bankrupted. For this reason many Chinese provinces decided not 
to participate at this stage. Since most companies were responsible for their 
own profit and loss, they had to stand the risk of loss if the investment went 
wrong. Most of them carried out some sort of feasibility study, and wherever 
possible took steps to reduce the level of risk. Investors appear to have had a 
number of characteristics in common:
Investment in most shengbu lou projects was not provided by a single com-
pany but by a corporation made up of a dozen or more companies support-
ed by a ministry or province. For example, investment in the Jinmao Tower 
came from 19 different companies headed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
and Economic Development (see Box 3.12). Investment in the Jinshui Tower 
came from 28 companies headed by China Agricultural Bank, and invest-
ment in the China Petroleum Tower came from more than 20 companies all 
connected in some way with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC).
a)
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Most of the companies that combined to form an investment corporation 
had considerable business experience and financial support. As companies 
with a strong government background, they also enjoyed support at region-
al and central level, so that in the event of trouble in the real estate mar-
ket the ministries or provinces concerned would be in a position to adopt 
some kind of strategy to allow the companies to bear a possible short-term 
loss without going bankrupt and so wait for the market to recover.
Several projects financed by ministries or banks used their local branches 
b)
c)
Box 3.12 Jinmao Tower as an example of shengbu lou
The Jinmao Tower development was in many ways a typical example 
of shengbu lou. The project was initiated by the overseas branches of 
19 companies headed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation (MOFTEC), which wanted to construct a landmark building in 
Pudong. The decision to invest was influenced by central government’s call 
for support for the Pudong development and the potential benefits offered 
by Pudong's real estate market. The aim was to build the kind of skyscraper 
that would be visible from all parts of Shanghai. The chosen location had 
two main advantages, easy access to good transport links to both sides of 
the river, including a tunnel (opened in 1988) and the metro (opened in 
2001), and the easy availability of the necessary land (a subsidiary of one 
of the shareholders had a factory situated on one of the three pieces of 
land designated by the Pudong master plan for the building of landmark 
skyscrapers). Compensation was quickly arranged for the factory and its 
employees (who lived in a workers’ village) and a new piece of land was 
found to relocate the factory. Internal relocation was easier and cheaper 
for the developers since no protracted legal procedures were required. As 
each of the companies involved in the Jinmao Tower had a strong financial 
background and considerable experience in operating in accordance with 
international standards, it was decided to hand over the cost-benefit analysis 
to an international consultancy firm. However, even Price Waterhouse 
Coopers’ market analysis failed to predict the Asian economic crisis (1997-
1999). Even worse, most of the office buildings built in Pudong in 1996 and 
1997 came on the market in 1997 and 1998, so increasing supply at a time 
of greatly reduced demand. Occupancy dropped steadily. By 1999 occupancy 
of the Jinmao Tower had fallen sharply. To increase occupancy, each investor 
was required to set up its own sales team to help to promote the building. 
Outside agencies were called in and attempts were made to make use of 
employees’ connections in the search for potential tenants. The situation only 
started to ease after 2000, by which time economic conditions had improved 
and the market was beginning to demand more office space. The rent asked 
for space in the Jinmao Tower increased steadily, from US$ 0.7-1.1 per m2 in 
1999 to US$ 0.8-1.3 per m2 in 2000 and US$ 0.9-1.5 per m2 in 2002. By 2002 
the occupancy rate had attained a steady 85%. The investors anticipated that 
it would take at least 15 years from the completion of the building to recover 
their original investment.
Source: Chen, personal interview, 2002
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as their representatives, to allow the project to get on track quickly in the 
local environment.
Most shengbu lou projects in Pudong managed to lease land from local de-
velopment companies at below market price.
Target groups for the projects operated on a variety of different levels; 
some were interested in space for high quality offices and hotels, though 
most were more interested in medium or medium to low quality office 
space. The Jinmao Tower in the Lujiazui financial district, for example, was 
designed for top-class offices and hotels and so mainly targeted large for-
eign companies and state-owned Chinese companies, whereas Huaneng 
Lianhe Tower and Qilu Tower were aimed more at domestic companies re-
quiring lower standards.
Analysis showed that not all companies carried out a proper cost-benefit 
analysis. Companies with more knowledge of business or more aware of the 
rules governing global economics, and which applied their knowledge in prac-
tice, tended to have stronger profiles in their investment projects in Pudong. 
However, most shengbu lou projects went through a number of difficult years, 
particularly during the Asian economic crisis, partly because of a lack of per-
spectives and target (blind investment), absence of a proper feasibility study, 
a lack of knowledge of architecture and urban planning, absence of a good 
project management team and bad property management and service. In par-
ticular a number of buildings financed by investments from energy compa-
nies, banks or local public offices had problems with design, construction and 
general building quality. Interviews with a manager of Shanghai Chengtou 
revealed that these kinds of problems were experienced during the construc-
tion of its 80,000 m2 New Construction Tower (Liu, personal interview, 2002). 
The original goal was to accommodate a number of public organisations. The 
design and even the function of the building were changed several times after 
1993, when the project started. The project was not finally completed until Oc-
tober 2000, eight years later, compared with the 4-5 years usual for a similar 
high-rise in Shanghai or Pudong. The main reason was almost certainly lack 
of market experience. Even though a feasibility study had been carried out, 
the research was not sufficiently detailed. Even worse, at that time a feasibil-
ity study was little more than one of the documents required by local govern-
ment as part of the procedure for applying for a construction permit. There 
were also problems with the design, which was not precise enough for the 
contractor. The shareholders had been unable to agree on what kind of lifts 
should be installed and what kind of glass wall should be used for the exte-
rior cladding. However, the ability of most shengbu lou to negotiate a cheaper 
land price in return for their ‘efforts in support of Pudong’ limited the dam-
age to the final economic outcome. For example, when Shanghai Chengtou 
invested in the New Construction Tower project, it managed to negotiate a 
d)
e)
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land price of 980 yuan (US$ 118.36) per m2, far below the ruling market price 
of US$ 200 per m2. By 2002 the price of land had risen to US$ 500 per m2. Even 
after so much delay and so many problems caused by design changes it was 
still possible to generate an economic return sufficient to cover the cost. In a 
properly functioning market the company would probably have been much 
less fortunate. It should also be noted that the increase in the value of the 
land represented a loss to local government.
Another characteristic shared by developers in the Pudong real estate mar-
ket was that most foreign investors had a Chinese or Asian background or 
connections (see also Section 3.4). Investors based in Hong Kong and Taiwan 
played a crucial role in the development of Pudong, providing almost half the 
FDI. The role they played in the real estate market was even more significant. 
Investors from those areas were amongst the first to enter the Chinese mar-
ket after the introduction of the open door policy in 1978. All of them had ex-
perience with operating in a market economy and a real estate market and 
shared a basic cultural and racial background with the mainland Chinese, 
which made it easier for them to understand the market and the change26 
(see Box 3.13). Chinese based in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao who became 
participants in the Pudong real estate market were soon joined by develop-
ers from other Asian countries who shared the same familiarity with Chinese 
culture. In fact most of the real estate companies which became involved had 
some kind of link with China. Perhaps the owner or founder of the compa-
ny was Chinese, or the current boss had a Chinese background, as in the case 
of the Thailand-based Chiatai Group, or perhaps the investor’s home country 
had close links with Chinese culture, as in the case of Singapore. By 1999, 205 
real estate projects had been financed by foreign investment, for a total invest-
ment amounting to US$ 2.97 billion. In fact the majority of such projects were 
financed by Asian investors, mainly based in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, 
Thailand, Malaysia, Japan or Korea. Their geographic advantage encouraged 
Asian investors to enter the Chinese market in the 1980s, almost a decade be-
fore the arrival of the first Americans or Europeans. Some of these investors 
were overseas Chinese, others came from countries with the same kinds of 
traditions and cultural background as China and others again had established 
contacts with local or national politicians. Thus most of them seemed to find 
their way in China more easily than their European or American counterparts. 
   Another reason, perhaps less significant but not unimportant, was that they found it relatively easy to fit into 
China in the first years after the adoption of the open door policy, thanks in part to the positive image some ty-
coons created for themselves as good-hearted people rather than blood suckers, for example by charitable activi-
ties in fields such as education, medicine and response to natural disasters. An understanding of the importance 
of the local political culture led most Hong Kong businesses to maintain close relationships with politicians at 
local and national level. Most investors in this group concentrated their investments on medium to high quality 
offices, hotels and apartments, all much in demand at the time
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While all these companies had investment in Pudong in common, the 
strategies they adopted to deal with market uncertainty and investment risk 
could differ substantially. For example, a medium- to small-sized Hong Kong 
development company might be prepared to gamble on the prospect of high 
Box 3.13 The Kerry Group and the Shangri-la Hotel
The five-star Shangri-la Hotel is a good example of a project undertaken by 
Hong Kong-based investors. The Kerry Group was a Hong Kong company 
specialising in real estate development, particularly the development of its 
chain of five-star Shangri-la hotels. The group was the first developer to 
invest in the waterfront on the east bank of the Huangpu, Lujiazui FTZ’s 
‘golden location’. The group was generally positive about the development 
of the Shanghai real estate market and the potential for growth in tourism in 
Pudong in connection with business visits and exhibitions. Discussions with 
local politicians and SLDC did much to increase their confidence. According 
to the group, the enthusiasm of the private sector tended to encourage the 
public sector to achieve the promised completion of the key infrastructure 
required by Pudong. Both the annual infrastructure priority list and the 
timetable for the implementation of the necessary infrastructure projects 
confirmed this enthusiasm. In 1994 the group bought the land-use rights on 
a piece of land on the Pudong waterfront, one of the first pieces of land to be 
sold by the Fudu World Land Development Company. The group hoped that 
its hotel on the Huangpu would in due course become a significant feature 
of Pudong’s skyline. On their first visit to the site in 1993, the group found 
the site still occupied by factories and warehouses. Fortunately by the time 
of their second visit the task of relocation was almost complete. The group 
invited KKS, a Japanese firm of architects, to prepare a design for the project. 
The preparatory work took till 1995 to complete; only then could work start on 
constructing the 55,000 m2 hotel. Construction took four years, which meant 
that the Shangri-la Hotel was able to open in 1998, when the Asian economic 
crisis was at its worst, severely affecting the real estate market in Shanghai 
and Pudong. Several projects in the Fudu World block and Lujiazui had to 
be suspended because of lack of finance. Completed offices also suffered 
enormous decreases in the number of clients. Occupancy of the Shenmao 
Tower, a Japanese investment, was still promising, but some of the shengbu 
lou, including the Huaneng Tower, were completely unable to let office space. 
In such circumstance the Shangri-la Hotel felt itself lucky to be able to start 
at its lowest occupancy ever (70%) and achieve more than 80% in each 
subsequent year. By 2002 occupancy had achieved a steady 94-100%. The 
group attributed this stability and satisfactory economic return to a proper 
feasibility study and careful market research, good timing, a good location, 
a correct assessment of the market and effective targeting of clients. Their 
estimated payback time for the project was 10-12 years, though the booming 
market should reduce the time required. In fact the increase in business 
encouraged the group to make a second investment, to extend the Shangri-la 
Hotel. The construction of the 50,000 m2 second phase started in 2000.
Source: Yu and Xiong, personal interview, 2002
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return, whereas a Singaporean or Japanese developer would probably take a 
more conservative approach. The first thing the Japanese did to get a proper 
picture of the investment situation in Pudong, was to go to see for themselves 
what was actually happening on the spot. In November 1990, a Japanese del-
egation made up of architects, planners, and legal experts, went to Pudong to 
attend a consultative conference on the Pudong development. The conference 
discussed architecture, town planning, infrastructure and land leasing proce-
dures. A month earlier, delegates from Japanese banks and Japanese insur-
ance experts had been to Pudong to assess the chance of Pudong becoming 
a financial centre. In December, a group of businessmen from Osaka organ-
ised a visit to Pudong and subsequently decided to invest in one of Pudong’s 
industrial areas. January 1991 saw the opening of the Shanghai Sino-Japa-
nese Trade Centre in a building financed by the Japanese real estate company 
KOWA, the Japanese Industrial Bank, the Shanghai Foreign Trade Company 
and the Shanghai International Trade Exhibition Company. The first collabora-
tion between Japanese and Chinese may have been a painful experience, but 
Figure 3.28 Shangri-la Hotel. The front section was built during the first 
phase, the rear section, still under construction, is the second phase 
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it did succeed in opening the door to further cooperation between the two 
countries and gave more Japanese investors the confidence needed to invest 
in Pudong. It also encouraged more Japanese delegations to visit Pudong.
Singapore may have had more in common with the Chinese, culturally 
and linguistically, than Japan, but its real estate developers were just as risk-
averse as those from Japan. A number of Singaporean developers became 
involved in Pudong in the mid-1990s. Capitaland (China), for example, was 
set up in Shanghai in 1994 by the Singapore-based Capitaland, one of Asia’s 
largest listed property companies. Most of their product in Pudong consisted 
of medium- to high-standard apartments. Chrysanthemum Park (see Figure 
3.32), for which construction began on 3 April 1997, comprised 1,109 accom-
modation units and 30,000 m2 of green space, and was completed in June 2001. 
The project was financed by a 2 billion yuan investment by Capitaland (Singa-
pore) and the Pudong Real Estate Group.
One subject worthy of note is the role played by various governments in 
promoting investment in Pudong by their nationals. The Japanese govern-
ment set up the Japanese Business Centre to help Japanese investors get a 
better understanding of the Chinese market and in 2001 the Singapore gov-
Box 3.14 The Japanese Mori Group in Pudong
In 1993 SLDC invited domestic, Asian, European and American investors to 
tender for the development of three landmark skyscrapers, each some 400 
m high, along the east bank of the Huangpu. As one of the earliest foreign 
investor in China, the Mori Group had foreseen Pudong’s growth potential. 
The group’s managing director, who maintained good personal relationships 
with Chinese politicians at local and national level and had a special interest 
in Pudong, decided to invest in one of these super high-rise building. Even in 
1995 the real estate market in Shanghai and Pudong seemed to be growing. 
When a feasibility study reported positively on the investment, the group 
decided to waste no more time and selected two sites for investment. Both 
were located in Lujiazui. One was to be used for a landmark skyscraper 
- the Shanghai World Financial Centre - the other for the Shenmao Tower, a 
standard high-rise office building. The investment in the Shenmao Tower was 
made in 1995 and the building was completed in 1998. The tower provided 
A+ quality office space and was aimed at potential tenants from Japanese, 
European and American companies. The group’s careful market research and 
high quality product meant that the tower was fortunate enough to keep its 
occupancy above 80% despite opening in the middle of the Asian economic 
crisis. In 2002, when demand recovered, occupancy rose to 97%. But the 
investment in the Shanghai World Financial Centre was a source of concern 
right from the start of construction in 1997. First the investment - and so 
construction - was suspended during the Asian economic crisis. The project 
was restarted in 2002, but by that time the design had become outdated 
and improvements to the original design were needed to satisfy changed 
requirements. The project is planned to be completed in 2007 or 2008, but 
little progress seems to have been made. 
Source: Ouyang, personal interview, 2002
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Figure 3.29 Shenmao Tower (far left) was the first investment made by the Mori Group 
in Pudong; it occupies a key location in Lujiazui Financial Centre
Figure 3.30 Shanghai World Trade Centre (under construction)
Source: CNAP
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ernment set up the Singapore Centre to help Singaporean companies to oper-
ate in Shanghai and Pudong. Its public housing company was active in real 
estate development in Pudong. There was also increasing collaboration be-
tween governments.
The variety of investors meant that the participants in Pudong’s real es-
tate market formed quite a mixed bag. They included not only private sector 
developers, but public companies operating commercially, something unique 
to China. However, the public sector background of these companies raised 
doubts in the minds of outsiders about how ‘private’ and business-like they 
would be in matters such as cost-benefit analysis and the management of 
market risk. The constantly changing mix of participants, particularly the in-
creasing involvement of the private sector, domestic and foreign, suggested 
a steadily growing market applying more market-oriented rules to its local 
institutions and trying to become more mature.
Figure 3.31 Chrysanthemum Park - a Capitaland development in 
Pudong
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Short-term versus long-term
As explained in Chapter 2, the Pudong development was not intended pri-
marily for property development but rather for economic development, sec-
tor development and the expansion of the area’s economic function. Thus the 
growth of the real estate market in Pudong depended on developers’ efforts 
to satisfy not only the local demand for housing and office space but also 
the demands of the majority of investors who came to Pudong to become in-
volved in manufacturing, logistics, port operation and other activities. In fact, 
the sustainability of the real estate market depended on the combined efforts 
of long-term and short-term investors, some interested in the supply side, 
others potential customers for office space or housing.
Short-term investors in the real estate market included real estate devel-
opers and speculators. The number of real estate companies increased rap-
idly, from 43 in 1991 to 64 in 1992, 543 in 1993 and 700 in 1994, which was 
one third of the total number of real estate companies active in Shanghai that 
year. 522 of these companies, one for every 1,000 m2 in Pudong, even survived 
the introduction of a certification process. This number had increased slightly 
by 2001, but only 9 were certified for grade 1 enterprises, 61 for grade 2 and 
95 for grade 3, while 474 were ungraded. Many real estate developers started 
up in Pudong with short term plans based on a strategy of quick investment, 
high return, though even they tried to maintain a profitable situation in the 
Pudong market for as long as possible. This applied to most of the compa-
nies from the ministries and other provinces which invested in Pudong. Large 
developers, often foreign, tended to be cautious about entering the new real 
estate market, but once they decided to go in, they usually adopted longer-
term strategies aimed at creating bridgeheads in the local market, even when 
times were difficult. Capitaland (Singapore) was one example of a company 
whose strategy included localisation and brand marketing. Pudong, Shanghai 
and indeed much of China, had countless small real estate companies which 
derived most of their profit from speculation in land and real estate. These 
companies lacked capital; many had connections which enabled them to ob-
tain land from local land offices but were vulnerable to any deterioration in 
the economic situation, which explains why a downturn in the real estate 
market, as during the Asian economic crisis, bankrupted so many Chinese 
real estate companies. In many cases the combination of bureaucratic man-
agement style and traditional management structure also played a role in the 
rush. DTZ Shanghai’s Gao Yongyan (2002) described this phenomenon as fol-
lows:
‘I heard about the approval of some new office projects in the afternoon. 
Once a decision has been made, money is invested, even when the state 
of the market is uncertain, because in China decisions are made at the 
top. As soon as the top man has made up his mind, his employees do 
their best to put his decisions into practice. The top man is not interest-
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ed in cost-benefit analysis. I was often told, “Don’t do a feasibility study 
for us. The decision is already made. It is no longer a question of wheth-
er to do it or not, but how best to do it”. This attitude is quite common. 
Some companies, for example state-owned enterprises, behave like this 
because they still work under the old system. But some are privately 
owned. Some enterprises from Hong Kong and Taiwan face similar prob-
lems, with a very bureaucratic structure and strictly defined layers of 
management. Even when I was in trouble, the top man would ask for a 
photograph to prove that the trouble was real. This kind of thing really 
has an enormous effect on investment profit.’
Short-term investors also became involved in other kinds of speculation. For 
example, during the Asian economic crisis hot money was speculating on a 
change in the yuan (renminbi)/US dollar exchange rate. In 2004 a new wave of 
hot money poured into the real estate market in Shanghai and Pudong, bet-
ting on a quick profit if pressure from Europe and the US succeeded in forcing 
China to increase the pegged exchange rate against the US dollar. There was 
also speculation in real estate in Shanghai and Pudong fuelled by the hope of 
short-term gain. Because the rate of interest paid on savings in Chinese banks 
was being maintained at a historic low, there was little to be earned from sav-
ings, and the Chinese stock market too was in deep trouble. People saw hardly 
any alternative to investing their money in the property market, where prices 
were rising rapidly. Speculators included rich investors from Wenzhou, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, overseas Chinese and foreigners.
Long-term investors in the Pudong real estate market were interested in 
a wide variety of activities, including manufacture, finance, trade, the high-
tech industry and real estate. Statistics for 2001 show that in twelve years of 
development, Pudong attracted 7,700 projects from 70 different countries or 
regions. By 2002 some 123 financial organisations, 650 investment companies 
and 1,400 trading companies, domestic and foreign, had located their main 
or local headquarters in Pudong. Pudong also attracted a variety of domestic 
investors because of its function as China’s window on the outside world. A 
total of 30 Chinese provinces, autonomous regions and state-controlled cities 
and 17 ministries invested in 6,368 projects in Pudong. 32 large enterprises, 
companies with a registered capital of more than 100 million yuan, moved 
their headquarters to Pudong. During the same period 200 trust companies 
and consultancies were set up in Pudong. Different industries tended to con-
centrate in different development zones. For example, 601 logistics compa-
nies and 70 international companies, with 5,000 projects financed by invest-
ments from 60 countries and areas, chose to locate in Waigaoqiao tax-free 
zone. 60 international companies set up in Jinqiao export-processing zone, 
with 400 projects. 20 R&D organisations and 700 software companies set up in 
Zhangjiang High-tech Park. These investors were not involved as developers 
in the Pudong real estate market but played a significant role in determining 
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the supply of and demand for space for manufacture and warehousing, hous-
ing, offices, business and entertainment. Their interest in the market was 
mainly long-term; they lacked the flexibility required for short-term moves 
to other locations, so their success (or failure) had a significant impact on the 
prospects of the local real estate market.
High risk, high return?
Profit has always been one of investors’ major concerns. In the Pudong and 
Shanghai real estate markets, high profits and a sharp increase in housing 
prices encouraged real estate developers to rush into the market without 
much in the way of a feasibility study (see Figure 3.32). Haila (1999, p. 584) 
commented on what she saw in the Shanghai property market in 1999: ‘The 
willingness to invest in China, shared by overseas Chinese and Western com-
panies, is fuelled by expectations of huge profits. Such expectations are to 
some extent justified, as illustrated by a story told by a Singaporean investor 
who in the early days made a profit as high as 450%; his profit later reduced to 
45%, still a high figure in a mature real estate market’. Such prospects helped 
to give all kinds of investors the confidence to invest in Shanghai. Gao Yongy-
an (personal interview, 2002), from DTZ’s Shanghai branch, described what he 
saw in Shanghai’s real estate market during and after the Asian economic cri-
sis:
“The office market experienced a downturn, bottoming in 1999. Rents 
reached a very low level. Even high-quality office space could be rented 
for US$ 0.20 per m2 per day. In general owners still asked a high price 
but offered special terms, for example a 50% discount for a three-year 
contract. The market began to recover in 2000, so that today the rent 
asked can be as high as US$ 1 per m2 per day. The current occupancy 
for office space is 87%, which is pretty high by international standards. 
I foresee large amounts of office space coming on the market between 
2003 and 2006. The housing market is characterised by an enormous 
amount of speculation. The whole country has gained confidence in 
Shanghai, especially since China joined the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Shanghai has 
become a world city representing China’s economy. That is why so many 
Taiwanese and people from Wenzhou invest in Shanghai…… They in-
vest in housing, buying 8-10 house at a time. In 1999 the price of hous-
ing was not particularly high. Some good housing projects could be sold 
immediately, but many had to wait a while to find a buyer. The market 
began to improve in 2000. In 2002 the price of housing has increased by 
30%. Housing projects that used to sell for 4,000 yuan per m2 now cost 
as much as 6,000-7,000 yuan per m2. Some projects whose remoteness 
made them difficult to sell also experienced a rapid increase in price, 
thanks to the completion of the metro system.”
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Property prices, inflation, interest rates and exchange rates
Real estate developers and international financial organisations were not the 
only ones to see the chance of high profits; small investors and domestic and 
foreign house buyers were all drawn into the property market at one time or 
another. During the Asian economic crisis, smaller buyers were not consid-
ered to be particularly important, but by 2004-2005 they had begun to exert a 
major influence on the property market, particularly at the top end. The main 
attraction was the increased price of housing in Shanghai (see Figure 3.32). 
Reports suggested that in popular locations prices could increase eight or 
nine times. Moreover the sharp increase in prices on the housing market had 
for some while been accompanied by a policy of keeping interest rates low to 
stimulate consumption. Not until 2004 did China’s central bank raise interest 
rates, the first increase in nine years, which explains why people turned to 
the property market to achieve higher profits or simply to maintain the value 
of their savings.
It has already been mentioned that small investors speculated in real es-
tate in Shanghai and Pudong as a way of making short-term gains. Specula-
tors included rich investors from Wenzhou, Hong Kong and Taiwan, overseas 
Chinese and foreigners. Investors from Wenzhou became well-known players 
in China’s real estate market. It has been estimated that 100,000 Wenzhou 
investors together invested 100-160 billion yuan (US$ 12.08-19.32 billion) in 
speculative deals on the Chinese property market, including 3 million yuan in 
Shanghai (Kang, 2003; Li and Chen, 2003) Another significant group of inves-
tors was drawn from the 400,000 or so Taiwanese living in Shanghai or the 
Yangtze delta. Like the Wenzhou investors, the Taiwanese were disappointed 
with the low interest rates (less than 2%) available in Taiwan and the unstable 
[  ]
performance of the local stock market, so investment in Shanghai’s relatively 
cheap real estate market became a popular alternative (Chen, Lianhe Zaobau, 
August 23, 2002).
Hot money has been another factor causing uncertainty in China’s prop-
erty market since China became more and more closely integrated in the glo-
bal economy. The 1997-1999 economic crisis, which affected most countries in 
East and Southeast Asia, was sparked off by an inflow of hot money and en-
couraged by the poor functioning of the local banking system. The same kind 
of thing began to happen again in 2004 and 2005, though this time hot money 
was betting on pressure from the US and Europe eventually forcing the yuan 
to revalue against the dollar (see Figure 3.33).
Uncertainty of legal reforms
A legal system does not determine the nature of market forces, but it is dif-
ficult to see how a mature market can develop without proper legislation to 
support its operations and its participants. The importance to an emerging 
property market of a legal framework defining the rights and obligations asso-
ciated with the new markets in land and housing has already been discussed. 
Although much has been done, many matters still need to be clarified to 
avoid confusion between the different participants. For example, a ruling by 
the supreme court in China denied banks the right to take possession of the 
deposit (mortgaged property) if the borrower was a first-time buyer and failed 
to make payment, forcing members of the bank association to reduce their 
risk by raising the threshold to would-be borrowers. This measure had the 
immediate effect of making it more difficult for people to afford new houses 
in a red-hot property market. This was just one of many examples of the mis-
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match between the legal system and the reality of the property market.
Balancing supply and demand
China’s real estate market is still developing. As already explained, there 
are many reasons to believe that the explosive growth in this sector has 
been fuelled by strong market demand. But since the market is still devel-
oping, many factors may still be able to disturb the balance between supply 
and demand, as illustrated by the Shanghai and Pudong real estate markets. 
The Asian economic crisis provided first-hand evidence of how the market 
could be disturbed. A current subject of debate is whether the market is ex-
periencing a bubble or sustainable growth, since by 2004 China’s real estate 
market seemed to have entered an unstoppable price spiral. The national 
bureau of statistics recently reported that in 2004 average property prices in 
China’s main cities rose 12.5%. This surprising double-digit growth delighted 
developers but made experts fear another market bubble. The price for resi-
dential and commercial property averaged 2,759 yuan (US$ 333.21) per m2, 
and between January and November 2004 the average price of housing alone 
rose to 2,580 yuan per m2, an increase of 11.6%. Meanwhile the amount of 
vacant housing continued to drop, falling 12.9% year-on-year to 58.26 million 
m2 (Asia Times, March 29, 2005). Once again the question arose whether the 
public sector should take the initiative in curbing the undesirable effects of a 
bursting bubble.
It seems that the public sector has taken measures at both national and lo-
cal level. Central government experimented with a series of policies, such as 
limiting the supply of land, tightening bank lending policies and raising inter-
est rates. According to government figures, in the fourth quarter of 2004 prop-
erty prices in Shanghai were 10.4% higher than in the corresponding quarter 
of 2003, and in 2004 three-quarters of all bank loans in Shanghai were for real 
estate transactions. The first strategy available to central government was 
to attempt to reduce the level of supply by curtailing the amount of finance 
available to developers and to tighten mortgage lending rules to raise the cost 
of home loans. The strategy chosen by local government to avoid the collapse 
of the property market was to limit the supply of land. But the effectiveness 
of measures taken by the public sector was relatively limited. The market still 
seems to have the upper hand.
 3.3.3 Real estate and urban development
Even though the main aim of the Pudong development was economic devel-
opment and each development zone concentrated on developing its own ac-
tivities, property development and the growth of the real estate market in-
evitably played a key role in facilitating that development. Pudong’s robust 
economic growth contributed to the sustained demand for office space, hous-
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ing, factories, warehouses and public services. Demand brought a reaction 
from the real estate market and so stimulated property development. The de-
velopment of the real estate market in turn contributed to economic growth 
and encouraged the development of related activities, such as construction, 
retailing, transport and services, further stimulating Pudong’s economic 
growth and creating extra employment. The interaction between real estate 
and economic development has had a significant effect on the speed of the 
Pudong development.
The real estate boom in Pudong, formerly a backward economic area, re-
flects the current level of economic growth and the booming real estate mar-
ket at national, regional and local level. Decades of stagnation in Shanghai’s 
construction industry created a demand for additional space which the emerg-
ing real estate sector was called on to satisfy. The strong demand for office 
space, housing, retail space and manufacturing property since the 1990s has 
made the real estate sector one of the pillars of Shanghai’s economy. Pudong 
is not exceptional in this respect, though it does play a special part in Shang-
hai’s economic revival. Pudong’s economy has grown at an annual rate of 20%, 
attracting investors from all over the world; these investors require an accept-
able residential environment, and this demand has created a vast real estate 
market. Further, the majority of households displaced by urban redevelopment 
in the Puxi area have been or will be relocated to the Pudong area, creating an 
enormous demand for proper housing and public services. And the improve-
ment in Pudong’s image led to a change in the attitude of the Shanghainese 
towards housing in Pudong. Although the change was not particularly dramat-
ic, it led to increased interest in buying housing in Pudong, especially housing 
located on the waterfront on the east bank of the Huangpu.
Another factor contributing to the encouragement of real estate develop-
ment was the way that expectation of high profits increased the number of 
developers pouring investment into the market. The kind of profit reported 
by Singaporean developers was immeasurably higher than that available in a 
mature real estate market. Investors understand the level of risk inherent in 
an immature market yet cannot resist the attraction of a potential profit un-
imaginably higher than available anywhere else. The possibility of high profit 
also appealed to the gambling mentality common to many real estate devel-
opers, especially foreign investors with a Chinese background. Large numbers 
of Chinese real estate developers (public and private) with little understand-
ing of the operation of the market nonetheless rushed to invest in Pudong 
simply as a gamble, hoping to profit from getting in early on an immature 
market. This speculative approach to land and real estate development on 
both the supply side and the demand sides seems likely to persist in Shang-
hai as long as prices continue to rise, increasing the risk in the market and 
uncertainty about its future. The rush to speculate and a high risk, high re-
turn mentality also contributed to the speed of Pudong’s urban development.
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The fact that China’s legal framework for real estate transactions is still un-
der development, helped to ease the entrance of organisations previously ex-
cluded from the construction industry, for example because land reform now 
allows land-use rights to be transferred to the private sector. Housing reform 
has given further encouragement to private sector participation in the real es-
tate market. Relocation regulations have defined the basic procedures for the 
relocation necessitated by urban redevelopment. These legal developments, 
as implemented in Pudong, have provided a legal framework for the market 
and for private sector participation and have created the kind of environment 
which encouraged the emergence of a lively real estate market, which in turn 
contributed to the rapid growth of interest in the Pudong development.
 3.4 Finance
 3.4.1 Pudong’s financial structure
Shanghai needed large amounts of investment to start up and continue the 
Pudong development. A number of studies into how Shanghai acquired such 
a vast amount of capital for urban development have credited the heavy 
hand of the state, speculating that financial support from government was 
mainly responsible for the speed achieved in this huge urban project, a speed 
achieved by hardly any Western city (Wu, 2003a; Yatsko, 2001) Other studies 
credited foreign direct investment with being the major stimulus for Shang-
hai’s rapid urban growth in a period of increasing globalisation (Olds, 2001; 
Wei et al., 2006; Wei and Leung, 2005). A more accurate picture of the financial 
structure which underpinned the Pudong development, based on empirical 
data on financial flows and public-private cooperation, is given below.
Sources of finance
At least five different sources of finance supported the Pudong development:
Domestic loans, i.e. various funds borrowed during the reference period 
from banks and other financial institutions for investment in fixed assets, 
including loans made by banks from their own funds and deposits, loans 
granted by higher authorities, special government loans (including loans 
for replacing petroleum by coal and for participating coal mines), loans 
arranged by local government from special funds, domestic reserve loans, 
working loans, etc.
Foreign Investment, i.e. foreign funds received during the reference period 
for investment in fixed assets, including foreign funds borrowed and man-
aged by government or individual units, foreign funds provided in connec-
tion with joint ventures, and debt bonds and shares listed on international 
financial markets. ‘Foreign funds borrowed and managed by government’ 
1.
2.
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here means loans made to the government by foreign governments, or-
ganisations or financial institutions, subject to official agreements, signed 
by both sides, making government responsible for the repayment of both 
principal and interest.
Directly acquired funds, i.e. funds raised for investment in fixed assets by 
construction companies themselves during the reference period e.g. from 
higher authorities or local government.
Other, i.e. funds received during the reference period which was not de-
rived from any of the sources mentioned above27.
Two logical approaches can be used to explain how the structuring of invest-
ment in Pudong came about and how each source of finance came to have the 
significance it has today. The horizontal approach compares the early stages of 
investment in the development of Pudong with those in the development of 
Shenzhen, the first special economic zone. Both Pudong and Shenzhen were 
set up as SEZs as part of China’s national strategy and both were oriented to-
wards the outside world. The vertical approach compares Pudong as it was in 
the early stages of its development with Pudong as it is today, as way of show-
ing how each source evolved to meet changes in the economic context, global 
and local; it also considers the reasons for those changes.
Pudong and Shenzhen
The first comparison examines the financial mechanisms in place in the third 
year of the establishment of the two SEZs, Pudong in 1993 and Shenzhen28 in 
1983. As shown in Table 3.9, more than half of the total finance for the Pudong 
development came from directly acquired funds, compared with only a quar-
ter in Shenzhen. Domestic loans to Pudong provided a further quarter, mak-
ing it the second most important source, though still representing a smaller 
fraction than the one-third in Shenzhen. Foreign investment played an im-
portant part in stimulating the development of Shenzhen (25%), compared 
with its marginal (10%) contribution to the Pudong development in the first 
year. The state gave little in the way of subsidy to either SEZ; state support to 
Pudong amounted to less than 1%.
A number of explanations can be given for the noticeably different extents 
to which the two SEZs relied on different sources of finance in their early years.
First, even though both SEZs were expected to make use of foreign invest-
   Ge (1999) treats debt bonds and shares as other sources; Zhang (2003) treats them as directly acquired 
funds. The present paper treats debt bonds and shares listed in China as other sources. 
   Shenzhen is a sub-provincial city in Guangdong province in southern China, located at the border with the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Shenzhen is a center of foreign investment and since the late 1970s 
has been one of the fastest growing cities in the world. It is also the busiest port in China. In the past two dec-
ades, outsiders have invested more than $30 billion in building factories and forming joint ventures in Shenzhen.
3.
4.
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ment and technology in their development, 
Shenzhen had a better chance of attracting 
FDI than Shanghai. Shenzhen benefited di-
rectly from its strategic location next door to 
Hong Kong, an established international fi-
nancial centre for foreign investment. Shen-
zhen was also similar to Hong Kong culturally 
and linguistically, making it easier to attract investors from Hong Kong and, 
for similar reasons, from Taiwan. Shanghai lacked these advantages, which 
makes it is easy to understand the limited foreign investment in Pudong com-
pared with the relatively high percentage of foreign investment in Shenzhen. 
Further, by 1993 competition between municipalities for foreign investment 
had already become severe. In 1983 foreign investors wishing to invest in Chi-
na had little alternative to investing in SEZs; by 1993 the choice had become 
much wider. Investment in Shenzhen focused on labour-intensive, low-tech, 
small-scale production, whereas investment in Pudong focused on large-scale, 
high-tech production and the service sector (finance and trade). This strategy 
was in the long-term interest of Pudong and Shanghai, but made it difficult 
for investors to see a profit in the short-term or immediately after start-up. 
Moreover high-end investment requires good investment conditions, physi-
cal and institutional29, which were hardly achievable in the early stages. Only 
gradually could Pudong take the steps required to build up or transform its 
physical environment and to establish the efficient administrative structure 
and workable legal framework required to attract foreign investment30. Be-
cause Pudong found it more difficult than Shenzhen to attract foreign invest-
ment, especially investment from Hong Kong and Taiwan, the state chose to 
use its limited budget to give priority to key infrastructure projects in Pu-
dong, such as the new Waigaoqiao deep-water port and various power sta-
tions. Thus the difficult situation at the beginning of the Pudong development 
forced Pudong to search for all possible means to channel capital from the 
domestic and international market.
Second, although state subsidy was minimal in both cases, the significant 
size of bank loans indirectly indicates significant support from central and 
local government. The relatively small amount of state subsidy did not mean 
   Much of the concern felt by multi-national corporations about investing in China had to do with the protec-
tion of intellectual property rights and copyright on technological innovations. See research done by Liu (2005), 
McGaughey et al. (2000).
0   This also explains why for 10 years Zhangjiang High-tech Park found it difficult to attract investment and new 
projects. To assist the park’s development, since 2000 the SMG has not only identified Zhangjiang as a priority 
project, but has also taken drastic measures to improve its accessibility, changing the city’s original transport 
plan to ensure that the No. 2 metro, instead of connecting the east of Puxi to the centre of Puxi, now links Puxi to 
Pudong and then runs on to the park. 
Table 3.9 Comparison of investment resources 
between Pudong and Shenzhen (%)
Pudong
(1990)
Pudong
(1993)
Pudong
(2004)
Shenzhen
(1983)
State budgetary funds 3.9 0.8 0.4 5.2
Domestic loans 28.1 26.5 25.4 37.3
Foreign investment 10.6 9.9 8.7 26.6
Directly acquired funds 46.4 55.6 28.3 26.6
Other 11.0 7.3 37.2 4.4
Source: Ge, 2002, pp.22-23; SMSB, various years
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that central government was not supporting SEZs, but rather that its sup-
port was provided by subsidies to enable banks to make the necessary loans. 
As domestic loans were generally acquired from state-owned banks, and ar-
ranged or supported by central government, this was more a political gesture 
than a matter of commercial calculation. In fact, central government support 
enabled the four main state-owned banks to reserve special loans for the 
Pudong development. Central government also directed the flow of foreign 
investment to satisfy its priorities, allowing and assisting Pudong to access 
loans from international sources such as the World Bank and the Asian De-
velopment Bank in the early stages of its development. So, for example, an 
Asian Development Bank loan helped Pudong to build the Nanpu Bridge and 
the Yangpu Bridge, a German government loan to build the No. 2 metro line, 
a Japanese loan to build the Pudong International Airport, a World Bank loan 
to build a power station, and so on. Furthermore, the fact that at least 48 for-
eign banks and 8 insurance companies31 were given permission to operate in 
Pudong provides one more example of the way the state used its influence 
to help Pudong attract investment without itself having to make any direct 
financial contribution. The result was that finance from a variety of sources 
round the world became involved in Pudong and became linked with the lo-
cal market through the intermediary of central government.
Third, the fact that a large proportion of the earliest investment in Pudong 
came from fund-raising all over China demonstrates Shanghai’s success with 
its active land policy. Zhang (2003) pointed out that the transfer of land use 
rights had become the main instrument for Shanghai’s fund-raising. By 2000 
the revenue earned from land transfers is estimated to have reached more 
than 100 billion yuan (US$ 12 billion). Between 1988 and 1998, 4,337 parcels 
of land were transferred, a total area of 14,436 hectares. Between 1995 and 
2000, 30% of all such transactions involved foreign developers. In value terms 
the proportion contributed by the foreign developers was even higher, be-
cause they had to pay a much higher price for land than their Chinese coun-
terparts. The significance of directly acquired funds suggests that the active 
land-transfer policy followed in Pudong actually created the link between Pu-
dong and a network of Chinese and international investors. Thus land trans-
fer played a dominant role in bringing together local and global capital.
Fourth, another reason Pudong attracted so much investment from inside 
China is the strong traditional links between Shanghai, its hinterland and 
China’s inland provinces. Its ability to attract investment demonstrates that 
Shanghai not only enjoyed historical, geographical and cultural connections 
with its neighbouring cities and had for centuries been the traditional leader 
   Since its foundation, at least 56 foreign financial organizations, 43 foreign banks, including Citibank, ABN 
AMRO, HSBC and Sanwa Bank, and 11 insurance companies have set up in Pudong.
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of the Yangtze river delta (a point that was considered in more detail in Chap-
ter 2), but also enjoyed a much stronger relationship with inland governments 
and businesses through collaboration resulting from the socialist allocation 
system in use prior to economic reform32. By comparison, Shenzhen was es-
tablished almost from scratch; in the early stage its links with inland China 
were very weak. Unlike Shanghai’s unchallengeable role as leader of the Yang-
tze river delta and its agglomeration effect, a number of centres – Hong Kong, 
Guangzhou and later Shenzhen – had to compete for resources and market 
share and for the leading position in the Pearl delta region33. Another differ-
ence was the weaker economic connection between the Pearl delta region 
and inland China caused by differences in history, culture and even language. 
Castells (2000a, p. 436) described this kind of discontinuity as a ‘distinctive 
feature of being globally connected and locally disconnected, physically and 
socially’. While the Yangtze river Economic Belt (consists by provinces locaed 
in the Yangtze river valley) was already a fact, the Pan-Pearl River Delta (PPRD) 
only began to become a reality in 2004, as a way of encouraging economic 
collaboration between Guangdong and its neighbouring provinces. Shang-
hai’s traditional strength in industrial development, business and trade also 
attracted investors from inland China to invest and speculate in the new op-
portunities offered by Pudong. Pudong therefore took advantage of Shanghai’s 
regional network to raise funds from inland China during the early stages of 
its development. Between 1990 and 1993 alone, Pudong set up 3,100 joint ven-
tures with inland enterprises and raised 22 billion yuan from inland China 
(Ge, 1999). Its strong regional network, based on cultural and social homoge-
neity, created the atmosphere of trust required to encourage organisations in 
the hinterland to become involved in Pudong.
Finally, the increase in finance from other sources, including finance raised 
from shares and debt bonds in Shanghai, reflects the increasing flexibility of 
Chinese financial mechanisms. As host to the larger of China’s two stock ex-
changes, Shanghai raised over 100 billion yuan (US$ 12.08 billion) on the stock 
market, one-sixth of the total equity capital raised on that market. Pudong, 
   The strong relationship between Shanghai and the Chinese provinces was strengthened by the allocation sys-
tem used by the central planning mechanism between 1949 and 1978. China used Shanghai as its most important 
production centre. Under the direction of central government and its various arms, Shanghai allocated the raw 
materials it needed from all over China and sent back its products to the provinces. The same allocation system 
made Shanghai the biggest source of revenue for China’s central government, which redistributed that revenue 
to poorer regions. The allocation system also led to co-operation between Shanghai and under-developed regions, 
resulting in Shanghai sending large numbers of talented people to inland provinces and cities to help in the 
building of local enterprises in fields like textiles and electronics. 
   If we compare the network structures formed by the cities in the two regions, the relationship between the 
Yangtze delta and its surrounding regions is more like the relation between London or Paris and their surround-
ings, whereas the Pearl delta is more like the Randstad in the Netherlands (see Castells, 2000a, pp. 434-440).
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the site of the stock exchange, has always tried to mobilise public capital for 
the further development of its development zones and related infrastructure. 
For example, four development zones were listed on the stock exchange. Debt 
bonds were rarely issued. Shanghai and Pudong were given permission to is-
sue bonds for various construction projects. However, as the Chinese stock 
market34 was immature and risky and the bond market was strictly controlled 
by central government (which only gave permission for single projects), it is 
understandable that the bond and stock markets provided no more than 4.2% 
of the finance raised in 1993 (Ge, 1999). It can be concluded that the increasing 
marketisation of China’s economy made it impossible for the state to inter-
vene financially in its traditional way. Thus Shanghai was forced to search for 
all possible ways of making good the shortage of capital required to develop 
Pudong. Apart from its active land policy, various market tools, including the 
stock and bond markets, were used to channel the flow of capital to Pudong.
Evolution and the global economy
In an interview with Chinese internet users, Hu Wei, executive director of 
Shanghai Pudong New Area management committee, gave details of the mas-
sive investment channelled into Pudong.
“Pudong’s development is a marketisation process. 300 billion yuan (US$ 
36.23 billion) was invested in the ten-year development. [The invest-
ment was] in fact raised through a number of different channels, includ-
ing 32% from foreign investment, 30% from Chinese enterprises, 30% 
from bank loans and 8% from the central state, Shanghai and Pudong 
New Area. Government investment made up a very small proportion, 
since more investment was raised by opening the market [to outsiders] 
and attracting investors to our market. Thus Pudong’s development was 
made possible by opening up the market and support from the whole 
country” (Zhang Gianggio Luntah, March 10, 2002).
In fact, Hu’s account gives a clear picture of how Pudong raised its finance 
during the last decade. Figure 3.34 shows the sharp rise in total investment in 
Pudong in the 15 years between 1990 and 2004. Total investment in fixed as-
sets in Pudong increased 62.5 times from the level at the start of the project. 
Almost all sources provided a greater amount of investment. For almost a 
decade, directly acquired funds had been the most important of Pudong’s five 
sources of finance, only reducing in importance after 2000. Three sources of 
investment showed a tendency to decline as a proportion of the total amount 
invested: domestic loans continued to provide a quarter of total investment 
   China’s stock exchanges were officially established in 1990. Access was tightly controlled by the state by 
means of a quota system, which strongly favoured larger state-owned enterprises and aimed to raise funds to aid 
state-sponsored projects (Zhang, 2003).
[ 0 ]
and foreign investment was also a relatively stable source, providing 10% of 
the total investment. Both sources showed a very slight proportional decrease. 
Funds from the state budget, consistently the least productive source, showed 
a sharp proportional decline. Other sources, insignificant in the early stages 
of development, began to peak sharply in 2001, becoming Pudong’s most im-
portant source of investment in 2004 (SMSB, 1990-2005)
Figure 3.34 shows that the most dramatic disruption of investment oc-
curred around 1997-1999, the period of the Asian economic crisis. Total in-
vestment began to drop sharply in 1997, reaching a low point in 2000. During 
this period Pudong had great difficulty in acquiring finance. The amount of 
investment raised through domestic loans, foreign investment and fund-rais-
ing all experienced the same drop at the same time. Only contributions from 
the state budgetary fund increased slightly during the crisis period.
 These fluctuations in the performance of Pudong’s sources of investment 
arose because the evolution of Shanghai’s financial mechanisms was directly 
affected by changes in the international financial market. These mechanisms 
relied mainly on an active land policy. Pudong was even more dependent 
on revenue from land, since this was the only source of revenue on which it 
could rely at the time. Thus the operation of the land market and the trans-
fer of rights to use state-owned land was the most important way of raising 
investment capital. Pudong unquestionably achieved the goal of China’s land 
reform and the commercialisation of state-owned land, at the same time 
giving all investors an equal opportunity to participate in the market. (This 
point was discussed in more detail in Section 3.1). Involvement in land linked 
State budgetary fund
Domestic loans
Foreign investment
Fund-raising
Other sources
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the local business network (Chinese developers and investors) and the glo-
bal business network (foreign developers and investors) to Pudong, but also 
to Shanghai, the owner of the land. However, during the Asian economic cri-
sis Shanghai’s main generator of revenue lost much of its appeal to investors. 
The international economic crisis had direct consequences for international 
investors, domestic financial organisations and the performance of the local 
economy. International investors, especially those based in South East Asia, 
faced severe financial deficits or even bankruptcy, and were incapable of fur-
ther expansion. Consider the issue of debt bonds as an example. Even though 
the decision to issue such bonds was looked on by the Chinese government 
as a way to mobilise public money and was strictly regulated by central gov-
ernment, the international bond market still largely reflected the ebb and flow 
in the international financial market, especially in the period 1997-1999 (see 
Figure 3.35). The second reason that may have contributed to the decline in 
revenue from land transfers is the mismanagement of land transfers by the 
local authority. Zhang (2003) claimed that a severe lack of transparency in the 
operation of the land leasing market was to blame. The heavy involvement 
of state-owned development companies and a serious oversupply of indus-
trial land brought about by competition between district and county govern-
ments appeared to contribute to that lack of transparency. The third reason 
may have been that land had become scarce after ten years of intensive land 
transfer; the reduced supply generated a rapid increase in price. (This point 
was also discussed in Section 3.3)
Interestingly, contributions from state budgetary funds did not follow the 
general financial trend but rather the reverse. For example, between 1992 and 
1994 those contributions rose to support the construction of a number of key 
infrastructure projects in Pudong, and increased again between 1997-2000 to 
support Pudong’s infrastructure development during the most difficult part of 
the Asian economic crisis. An interview in October 2002 with Liu Rongming, 
director of Pudong New Area Administration Committee’s investment bureau, 
revealed in more detail the strategic considerations underlying government 
investment in Pudong:
“Direct investment by local and central government amounted to 35-38 
billion yuan (US$ 4.23-4.59 billion), including 10 billion yuan from cen-
tral government, i.e. one-tenth of the total investment in Pudong. The 
lack of sufficient finance led government to [establish] development pri-
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orities and investment priorities. In the last two years the priority ar-
eas have been Lujiazui, Huamu, Century Avenue, Century Park and their 
road systems”.
This shows that central government not only played a significant part in 
guiding and supporting the Pudong development when times were hard, but 
also had the good sense to relax control and assistance to allow Pudong to 
progress on its own. The relatively limited amount of state capital in China 
made it necessary to set priorities. The strategy of selective penetration as 
reflected in the Chinese government’s social, political and economic poli-
cies was described by Xia as an important key to success for a developmental 
state (2000, p. 220). The state also needs to have the ability and flexibility to 
‘move in and out of sectors, to promote this or that industry’ (Cumings, 1987, 
p. 74 and 81).
Analysis of the evolution of Pudong’s financial mechanisms shows that their 
ups and downs were closely related to changes in the international financial 
market. However, despite the challenge presented by the Asian economic cri-
sis, Pudong proved that it had the capacity to attract investment both inside 
and outside China. Its success can be largely explained by the business op-
portunities offered, its strategic location and Shanghai’s industrial tradition. It 
is fair to say that instead of specifically focusing on private investment from 
abroad, like SEZs such as Shenzhen, Pudong tended to look beyond foreign 
investment and make efforts to attract all possible investment both inside 
and outside China. In fact, contributions from inland organisations supported 
much of the development of Pudong. As the scale of the Pudong development 
continued to increase, the amount of FDI continued to grow, as foreign inves-
tors generally saw more opportunities to be gained from participating. The 
same applied to investment from other sources. The proportional growth in 
investment from those sources resulted from the efforts of local government, 
which did all it could to find extra investment to make good the shortfall from 
domestic and international financial organisations.
The following section examines in more detail how the two kind of invest-
ment flowed to Pudong and the effect they had during the different phases 
of development. On the one hand, the relatively stable injection of domestic 
loans, self-funded investment from local enterprises and neighbouring prov-
inces and ministry-backed enterprises still dominated Pudong’s financial 
mechanisms. On the other hand, foreign investment began to become more 
significant than in the first three years.
FDI and the global Chinese business network
‘Private finance and credit is increasingly available on a global scale, beyond 
the range of national control’ (World Bank, 1991; Sassen, 2000). The state 
council’s proposal to use foreign investment to develop Pudong took account 
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of the globalised financial market. Its calculations were also based on ten 
years experience of attracting FDI to facilitate development in the four south-
ern SEZs - Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen and Shantou. This was also in line with 
China’s emphasis on continuing economic reform, which attached great im-
portance to the utilisation of foreign capital (Khan, 1991; Huang, 1995, p. 217; 
Olds, 2001, p. 163). Since 1979, China has constantly developed new policies 
and regulations to attract FDI, in the confident expectation that FDI would 
strongly ‘facilitate economic development, maximize foreign exchange earn-
ings, relieve domestic capital supply bottlenecks, transfer technology and 
skills to Chinese enterprises and workers, promote employment and increase 
interaction between the domestic economy and the outside world’ (Olds, 2001, 
p. 163; Kueh, 1992, p. 637; World Bank, 1997; Li and Li, 1999). The scale of capi-
tal flows into China since the introduction of the open-door policy has been 
enormous, particularly during the 1980s, the first half of the 1990s and after 
the Asian economic crisis (see Figure 3.36).
FDI flows were primarily directed towards the special economic zones, the 
open coastal cities (e.g. Shanghai) and the open economic zones (e.g. Pudong 
New Area). Shanghai experienced unprecedented levels of FDI, as shown in 
Figure 3.21. In fact the amount of FDI received by Shanghai in the 1990s was 
US$ 45 billion, 15 times the amount received in the 1980s. It has often been 
suggested that the sharp increase in the 1990s was due to the development 
of Pudong. Pudong was a ‘preferential area’ for FDI and a wide range of incen-
tives were offered to encourage ‘foreign’ investors, including subsidised land 
prices and tax deductions or exemptions, flexibility in method of investment 
method and area of investment (see Box 3.15). These policies were kept under 
strict scrutiny by special research teams in Shanghai, which conducted ex-
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tensive research into how Pudong might best attract FDI (Mao, 1997; Wan and 
Yan, 2000). In fact policies changed to match changes in the economic situa-
tion inside and outside Pudong, Shanghai and China generally. For example 
in 2000, after a long period of poor performance in the high-tech sector, new 
preferential policies were introduced to attract FDI to the Zhangjiang high-
tech park. Preferential taxation treatment gradually reduced when China en-
tered the World Trade Organisation (WTO) since the rules of that organisation 
require that all enterprises, foreign and domestic, receive equal treatment. 
Between 1981 and 1990 a total of US$ 274 million was invested in 17 projects, 
whereas between 1990 and 1999, US$ 592.5 billion of foreign investment came 
to Pudong. The growth of FDI between 1990 and 2003 is seen as a positive re-
sult of preferential policies. By the end of 2001 the total number of contracted 
projects involving FDI amounted to 7,515, with a total contracted FDI of US$ 
164.54 billion.
About half of the total FDI in Pudong went into industry, though a relative-
ly large amount was invested in infrastructure and real estate development, 
as shown in Figure 3.37. Other investment was channelled into real estate 
projects, either directly, through involvement in the development of real es-
tate projects, or indirectly, through purchases on the property market. A third 
source of finance was international loans and debts involving foreign govern-
ments or multinational organisations with members from most of the impor-
tant developed countries, which acted as principal donors to developing coun-
tries. For example, the ADB, with donors from developed countries including 
the US, Japan and Germany, specialised in developments in Asia. The ADB in-
vested in several key infrastructure projects in Shanghai, including the Nanpu 
and Yangpu bridges. The German government provided low-interest loans for 
the construction of Shanghai’s metro lines. Privileged investments made by 
the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the United Nations Devel-
opment Programme, and the special treatment given by the WTO show that 
Box 3.15 Tax advantages enjoyed by foreign investors in Pudong
1. Manufacturing enterprises were granted a 15% reduction in income tax.
2. Any enterprise scheduled to operate for more than 10 years was exempted 
from income tax for the first two years and granted a 50% reduction for the 
following three years. If the enterprise was considered ‘high-tech’, income 
tax was charged at a reduced rate of 10% for the next three years.
3. Export enterprises for which the value of annual export sales amounted 
to more than 70% of the total value of annual sales paid income tax at a 
reduced rate of 10%.
4. Enterprises involved in ports, energy or transportation, paid income 
tax at a rate of 15%. If they were scheduled to operate for 15 years they 
were exempted from income tax for the first 5 years and granted a 50% 
reduction for the following 5 years.
5. Foreign investors buying or building houses were exempt from property tax 
on those houses for 5 years.
6. Banks and joint-venture banks with a capital of US$ 10 million or more 
paid income tax at a reduced rate of 15%.
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these institutions were keen that Shanghai should rapidly integrate into the 
global economic and financial system. This process was assisted by the Chi-
nese government, which relocated the Shanghai branches of the People’s 
Bank of China (China’s central bank) and the four largest banks from Beijing 
to Shanghai-Pudong to establish Shanghai as a national centre (Yulong and 
Hamnett, 2001, p. 133).
An interesting characteristic of FDI in China is that capital flows were 
mainly sourced from the Asian-Pacific region. Figure 3.38 gives a good picture 
of the dominant influence on FDI in China exerted by the global Chinese busi-
ness network, especially businesses in the Asian-Pacific area, after the intro-
duction of economic reform and the open door policy. Hong Kong, for exam-
ple, provided more than half the total FDI in China, although the part played 
by Hong Kong is declining (from 60% in 1995-1996 to 41% in 1998-1999), while 
the part played by Singapore and Korea has increased from 8% to 11%. Olds 
(2001, pp. 164-165) suggested several reasons for this:
‘...first: China’s development is linked to the global shift of capital flows 
to the Asian Pacific region since the early 1980s which aim to take ad-
vantage of the availability of skilled and unskilled labour, low wages, 
natural resources and the bourgeoning domestic and regional markets. 
The restructuring of the Chinese economy both contributed to and 
was impacted by this broad structural shift. Second, China was explic-
itly capitalising on the Greater China concept. In keeping with the prag-
matic nature of Dengism, links with ethnic Chinese living in East and 
Southeast Asia have been encouraged. Cultural, linguistic, and family 
ties have been extremely helpful in guiding capital flows to China from 
Hong Kong and Taiwan (the two largest ‘foreign’ investors). In contem-
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porary China, population flow is tightly interwoven with the flows of 
capital that propel the restructuring of cities such as Shanghai.’
Olds was correct in pointing out the part played by the Greater China concept 
in foreign investment in China. In fact, the majority of foreign private sector 
investors were related in one way or another to the global Chinese business 
network. Research shows that more than 60% of all FDI in China came from 
overseas Chinese (Guha and Ray, 2000). Overseas Chinese have a stronger 
connection with China than, for example, overseas Indians to India. This is 
perhaps the crucial reason why even though other Asian countries may have 
adopted similar policies to attract FDI, they have not been nearly as effective 
as those adopted by China. Despite the risk, businesses making up the glo-
bal Chinese business network were prepared to invest in the immature Chi-
nese market because of their better understanding of Chinese culture and 
because they were more willing than other international investors to accept 
risk. When they encountered problems, Overseas Chinese could turn to their 
networks or guanxi for informal help. Global Chinese business networks have 
played a key role in initiating and stimulating the growing of the Chinese 
market, generating the kind of success and high yields required to stimulate 
interest in FDI.
By comparison, in the early days only a handful of international compa-
nies from the US or the EU were bold enough to enter China’s market or give 
strong financial support. Their first steps were to start up ‘pilot projects’ to 
investigate the potential and risks of the Chinese market; even if they failed 
there they would still have other profitable markets outside China. The situa-
tion was very different for enterprises in the global Chinese business network, 
many of which were medium-sized or small. Operating in the Chinese market 
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enabled some of them to expand and gain recognition.
Things were much the same in Pudong. Investments from the global Chi-
nese business network, especially from Hong Kong and Overseas Chinese in 
the Asian-Pacific region, played a definite role in supporting the Pudong de-
velopment. Figure 3.39 shows that Hong Kong took top place both in number 
of projects (2,766) and amount invested (US$ 3.5 billion or 21% of the total 
FDI), followed by the US, Japan and Singapore. Other Asian investors also con-
tributed a great deal to the Pudong development. Countries outside Asia, such 
as the US, Germany and the UK, increased their investment in the mid-1990s, 
especially during the Asian economic crisis, helping Pudong to sustain the 
growth in FDI. Each country had its own preferred area of investment: Hong 
Kong and Taiwan concentrated on traditional manufacturing industry and re-
al estate, while Japan, the US and countries in Europe were more interested in 
technologically advanced industries, such as car manufacture and medicine. 
The number of projects and the amount invested by Hong Kong and Taiwan 
shown in Figure 3.39 suggest that the projects concerned tended to be me-
dium-sized or small.
Investors from Hong Kong and Taiwan played a crucial role in the develop-
ment of Pudong, accounting for half of its FDI. Their influence on the real es-
tate market was even more dominant. Investors from Hong Kong and Taiwan 
were the first to enter the Chinese market after the introduction of the open 
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door policy in 1978. They shared cultural and ethnic roots with mainland Chi-
nese, which made it easier for them to understand the market. They were 
generally familiar with the operation of a market economy and had a good 
deal of experience in the real estate market. Most of them had a strong fi-
nancial background. Another factor, possibly less significant but not unimpor-
tant, was that they were quickly able to fit in to China in the early days after 
the introduction of the open door policy, and appreciated the importance of 
establishing a positive image35. Most investors from this group concentrated 
their investments in medium and high-quality offices, hotels and apartments. 
The share in FDI from Hong Kong declined in the second half of 1990s, while 
the share from Singapore and Korea increased. Investors from Singapore and 
Korea began to invest in Pudong much later than those from Hong Kong, but 
their special political and cultural links with China helped them to build up 
their networks and localise their businesses.
The input of FDI into the real estate sector grew steadily, matching the pat-
tern of FDI development described above. By 1999 foreign investors had be-
come involved in 205 real estate projects, investing a total of US$ 2.97 billion. 
Asian investors have always been important players in this sector, perhaps 
because the real estate market is a local affair. Asian investors, with the same 
kind of traditions and cultural background as the Chinese, find it easier to 
find their way in China than developers from other regions. One particular 
cultural difference is the willingness to accept risk. For example, a Hong Kong 
developer tends to be prepared to take more risk, gambling on a possible high 
return, while a European company prefers to make sure that the investment 
is feasible before taking on the risk. Further, the geographical advantage en-
joyed by Asian investors encouraged them to enter the Chinese market as far 
back as the 1980s, almost a decade earlier than their American and European 
counterparts.
Analysis of the sources of funds invested in fixed assets in Pudong sug-
gests that both the public and the private sector played a part in building up 
the complex financial mechanism. Instead of controlling and intervening 
in its traditional fashion, the state largely left things to the market. Howev-
er, this withdrawal by the state did not mean that the private sector domi-
nated the direction of Pudong’s development. Rather, the local public sector 
brought a new entrepreneurship to urban development with its business-ori-
ented behaviour and active land policy. In many cases, increasing collabora-
tion between public and private led to a blurring of the boundary between 
the two sectors. On the other hand, Pudong’s financial mechanism was based 
on cooperation between global and local participants. Land transfer and other 
   Most Hong Kong businessmen understood the importance of local politics and maintained close relation-
ships with politicians at all levels.
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international financial devices (e.g. loans and bonds) enabled global players 
to penetrate the local real estate and financial markets. Although the role of 
global participants was relatively marginal compared to that of local partic-
ipants, its importance in connecting Pudong with global economic systems 
and financial markets should not be underestimated. It is also necessary to 
emphasise the role played by global Chinese business networks, especially 
those located in South East Asia, and their significance in mobilising global 
capital flows into Pudong.
 3.4.2 Corporate finance
Pudong’s financial mechanism presents an active market in which the public 
and private sector, local, regional, national and global, work together to stim-
ulate financial flow. But how do real estate companies raise their funds? Is 
the visible hand still as visible in promoting Pudong’s real estate market as 
it was in urban development? This section considers individual firms which 
were actively involved in real estate development in Pudong, to explain how 
corporate finance was structured in the real estate sector and how it contrib-
uted to the present state of Pudong’s financial mechanism.
Sources of finance
The raising of capital by Pudong’s real estate enterprises relies heavily on 
other funds (33%), domestic loans (30%), directly acquired funds (29%) and a 
small amount of foreign investment (8%). Though much in line with the fi-
nancial mechanism employed to finance the construction of fixed assets, this 
breakdown highlights several interesting ways in which real estate business-
es differ from Pudong firms in general.
First, the state has completely withdrawn from any direct financial in-
volvement in Pudong’s real estate market. The figures for 2001 (see Figure 
3.40) show the state budgetary fund actually disappearing from the scene, in-
dicating that in Pudong’s real estate market the decoupling of state and mar-
ket has become a reality. This is in line with the findings of Allen et al. (2005: 
p. 80) on the subject of financial channels used by Chinese firms generally, to 
the effect that the part played by the state budget is very limited (10%). Thus 
Pudong’s real estate businesses were likely to operate in a more business-ori-
ented environment.
Second, foreign investment in real estate business is still not as common 
as in sectors like manufacture, though the growth is steady. A recent estimate 
suggested that foreign investment made up 20% of the total investment in 
China’s real estate sector. Three channels were involved, direct investment in 
the real estate sector, investment in property, and international debt bonds 
or loans. The high risk may have been one of the main factors discourag-
ing international investors from participating in the operation of real estate 
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projects. The alternative was to invest in local Chinese real estate companies 
and thus participate indirectly in the Pudong real estate market. Interviews 
with local real estate companies in 2002 and 2004 showed that the raising of 
capital was considered almost as important as developing a real estate project 
on site.
Third, the surprising reliance on other funds has been a distinct feature 
of the finance mechanism in Pudong, which leads to the speculation that en-
terprises in Pudong were more active than most Chinese firms in searching 
for alternative sources of capital, such as bond issues or the stock market. 
This strategy, which was only allowed when China evolved from a centrally 
planned, closed economy into an open market economy, could well have been 
appropriate in the increasingly competitive real estate market.
Fourth, although there was no direct state intervention, many of the real 
estate enterprises active in Pudong’s real estate market still had connections 
of one kind or another with the state. In 2001 only about 40% of the capital in-
vested in Pudong real estate was totally unrelated to the state; the remaining 
60% being connected in some way with central or local government. Allen et 
al. divided Chinese firms in Pudong into three categories:
The state sector, i.e. all companies over which the government has ulti-
mate control (State-owned Enterprises [SOEs] and others, i.e. public enter-
prises).
The listed sector, i.e. all companies whose shares are listed on an exchange 
and publicly traded.
The private sector, i.e. all other companies which are privately owned or 
owned by local government.
1.
2.
3.
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Figure 3.41 shows that the part played by the truly private sector in Pudong’s 
real estate market was significant but not really dominant; traditional SOEs, 
on the other hand, were being transformed into various types of modern en-
terprise. The figure clearly shows the various new forms adopted by tradition-
al SOEs, including shareholding, jointly-operated, limited liability and compa-
nies limited by shareholding. These changes were to a large extent related to 
the ongoing reform of China’s unprofitable SOEs, which aimed to introduce 
modern corporate governance into formerly uncompetitive SOEs. One of the 
ways in which China’s economic reform attempted to introduce market insti-
tutions involved the introduction of modern business systems to reinvent in-
efficient and incompetent public enterprises or SOEs with modern corporate 
governance. The Chinese state adopted a gradual strategy to introduce com-
petition and vigour, without divesting itself of public enterprises, by a process 
of corporatisation and diversification of ownership designed to reform inter-
nal structure, governance and operations and so achieve efficiency, effective-
ness, accountability and responsibility, combined with more transparency and 
openness (Tenev et al., 2002; Khan, M. et al., 2005). This approach increased the 
number of different ways in which firms could raise funds for their opera-
tions through new ownership structures but preserved a somewhat ambigu-
ous connection between the state and traditional SOEs. Fieldwork led to the 
discovery that companies in different categories tend to target different end-
users. For example, state-related enterprises are more likely to target users at 
the lower end of the market, while the private sector is more likely to target 
uses at the higher end, making state-related enterprises even more necessary 
to the housing market. The role of these enterprises can be compared to that 
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of private housing corporations in Europe.
Fifth, interviews led to the discovery that a large number of businesses, 
mostly state-related, were not themselves real estate developers. They were 
never very interested in becoming deeply involved in Pudong’s real estate 
market but hoped to make a substantial profit by entering the market at an 
early stage. This behaviour by firms searching for stability and attempting 
to reduce the economic uncertainty characteristic of China’s emerging mar-
ket can be seen as a strategy of diversification. Guthrie’s study of Shanghai’s 
firms (1999) argued that this strategy of diversification was ‘not about profit-
maximisation but, rather … about economic uncertainty, and firms adopting 
this strategy are seeking stability by investing in the fast-return markets of 
China’s rapidly expanding service-sector economy’. Pudong provided those 
companies with a market in which to carry on high-risk, high-return business. 
This may explain how the shengbu lou could exist in Pudong’s emerging real 
estate market.
Corporate finance in Pudong – the Lujiazui Group
To give a picture of the organisation of corporate finance in the context of 
Pudong - Shanghai, the present section considers the case of the Lujiazui De-
velopment (Group) Company Limited, also known as the Lujiazui Group. One 
interesting feature of this group is that it appears to have several different 
kinds of ownerships co-existing under one roof. Shanghai Lujiazui Develop-
ment (Group) Company Limited is one of five companies established by SMG 
in August 1990 to develop large tracts of land, to run a comprehensive range 
of businesses and to coordinate activities in the Lujiazui Finance and Trade 
zone. Until it became a limited company, in 1997, the group was known as the 
Shanghai Finance & Trade Zone Development Company. It has a registered 
capital of 2.7 billion yuan (US$ 0.33 billion) and the total assets of the compa-
ny are valued at 14.1 billion yuan (US$ 1.7 billion), including 6.2 billion yuan 
worth of net assets.
The Lujiazui Group’s ambition was not only to be involved in land develop-
ment in Lujiazui but to become an international finance, trade and service in-
dustries group with the characteristics of the Lujiazui Central Business Cen-
tre by the end of the tenth five year period. The adoption of modern business 
systems as a way of improving commercial efficiency appears to have been 
the main technique used to improve its competitiveness.
The SLDC has taken a number of different steps to reach its goal.
First, it has tried to nurture a more business-oriented and client-oriented 
culture than that typical of other public enterprises. Although control ulti-
mately lies with the local government, the internal structure of the group has 
attempted to adopt a model business system. Three main divisions within 
the corporation follow the development process through planning, marketing, 
research and coordination. The development planning division is responsible 
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for urban planning and the negotiation of land leasing with interested inves-
tors, the marketing division carries out market research and devises market-
ing strategies and the City Infrastructure Construction Management Company 
provides a complete after-sale service after land has been leased, providing 
solutions to any problems faced by investors during the construction process.
Second, it has followed the same kind of diversification strategies found 
in many other Chinese firms. The Lujiazui Group holds shares in 54 other 
companies active in real estate, finance, insurance, the stock market and high-
tech industries (see Box 3.16). Some of its companies specialise in different 
aspects of the construction industry, so that although independent they are 
capable of collaborating with each other through the group’s close network 
structure; others have moved away from the construction industry to special-
ise in fields such as finance or retailing. Many of its subsidiaries were set up 
as joint-ventures with other public or private companies, Chinese or foreign. 
Joint ventures, joint-operations and co-financing arrangements have given 
the group substantial additional capital and enabled strong teams to be as-
sembled to take on further developments.
Third, to enable the group to acquire the capital it need to develop Lujiazui 
but failed to receive from local government, it listed part of its assets on the 
stock exchange. The group’s parent company is the Shanghai Lujiazui Finance 
& Trade Development Co. Ltd., which ranks 18th among the top 50 companies 
Box 3.16 Main subsidiaries of the Shanghai Lujiazui Development (Group) Company 
Limited (SLDC)
Shanghai Lujiazui Finance & Trade Zone Development Co. Ltd.
Shanghai Lujiazui Finance & Trade Zone United Development Co. Ltd.
Shanghai Fortune World Development Co. Ltd.
Shanghai Lujiazui Real Estate Development Co. Ltd.
Shanghai Lujiazui Engineering Materials Equipment Supply Co.
Shanghai Lujiazui International Co.
Shanghai Lujiazui Import & Export Co. Ltd.
Shanghai Lujiazui Property Management Co. Ltd.
Shanghai Lujiazui Hongan Industry & Commerce General Co.
Shanghai Lujiazui Urban Construction Development Co. Ltd.
Shanghai Lujiazui Planning K Architecture Design Co. Ltd.
Shanghai Lujiazui Investment Co. Ltd.
Shanghai Lujiazui -Itochu Development Building Co. Ltd.
Shanghai Nancheng Economy United Development Co. Ltd.
Shanghai Zhang Yang Construction & Commerce United Development Co.
Shanghai Lu Yang Economic United Development Co. Ltd.
Shanghai Oriental Forwarding Co. Ltd.
Shanghai Pudong Art & Advertising Co.
Shanghai Grand Construction & Decoration Co. Ltd.
Shanghai Oriental Pearl Amusement Co. Ltd.
Shanghai Lujiazui Green Garden Development Co. Ltd.
Source: Official website of Shanghai Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone Development 
Ltd.: http://www.ljz.com.cn
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listed on the Shanghai stock exchange. On 28 August 1992, Lujiazui Develop-
ment (Group) Company Limited and Shanghai International Trust set up the 
Shanghai Lujiazui Finance & Trade Zone Development Co., Ltd. which was 
listed on the stock exchange on 31 December 1994. Government remained 
the main shareholder, though foreign investment became an important new 
source of capital. Table 3.10 shows that about 57% of the shares were still held 
by government36, and those shares were not for sale. Meanwhile, there were 
signs of increasing influence from outside suppliers of finance (shareholders) 
on the company’s commercial behaviour. The table also shows that a signifi-
cant amount of foreign investment was achieved through Domestic B Shares; 
the attempt to raise finance from the domestic market was less successful.
Table 3.10 gives an equally detailed picture of the shareholders behind the 
scenes. Among the top ten shareholders, only the local government (the main 
shareholder) and two Shanghai investors (companies associated with the Lu-
jiazui Group) came from mainland China. The other seven were foreign in-
vestors. The same phenomenon can be observed in other development com-
panies. These so-called public enterprises were in fact financed by capital 
injections from the global and local capital markets and the local government. 
Both the second and third strategies adopted by the Lujiazui Group affected 
its style of corporate governance and financial structure. In particular an in-
creasing number of shareholders came from non-Chinese backgrounds.
This seemingly modern structure does go some way towards making Lujia-
zui Group’s equity accountable, either through joint ventures with private en-
terprises or by the listing of the parent company on the stock exchange. The 
structure is not without flaws however, especially the unclear nature of the 
state’s involvement in the group’s operations. In one interview, an employ-
   The government’s share showed a slight decline over a 10 year period, dropping 3% between 1998 and 2007.
Table 3.10 Shareholders in Shanghai Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone Development Ltd. 
(2007) (unit: Share)
Nature of shareholders Name of shareholders
Number of shares 
held (millions) Percentage (%)
State-owned shares  
(lock-up period: 3 years)
Shanghai Lujiazui (Group) Co. Ltd. 
(Authorised Operation)
1067.74 57.17
A shares held by 
corporations (Lock-up 
Period: 1 Year)
Shanghai International Trust  
& Investment Co. Ltd. 56.00
3.00
Shanghai Lujiazui (Group) Co. Ltd. 8.82 0.47
Shenyin & Wanguo Securities Co. Ltd. 8.82 0.47
A shares held by 
individuals
Individuals 216.70 11.61
Domestic B shares Individuals 509.60 27.28
Total 1334.06 1867.68 100.00
Source: Official website of Shanghai Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone Development Ltd.: 
http://www.ljz.com.cn
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ee (Gong, 2002) made the following comments on the complex relationship 
between the state and the market and the huge debts faced by the Lujiazui 
Group:
“Our relationship with government is a sort of binding relationship [kun 
bang guan xi]. Originally the development companies in Pudong had 
close connections with the government (which more or less means that 
we were directly controlled by the government). But at the same time 
we helped the government to operate; we operated much like compa-
nies in a market economy, with shareholders. There was no distinction 
between government and private shareholders [zheng qi bu fen]. A listed 
company should be accountable to the entire body of shareholders. No 
distinction should be allowed. So the Lujiazui Group was one of the last 
development companies to set up a company with shareholders sepa-
rate from the parent group. This took place in the second half of 2002. 
To ensure that the shareholder company had a good balance sheet, the 
group included much of the good equity to the shareholders and left the 
bad equity in the group”.
Accountability arrangements need to be amended to meet stock exchange re-
quirements when a public enterprise has its shares listed on the stock ex-
change. However, separation of ownership and control, a common feature 
of large modern corporations, does not apply to public enterprises in China. 
Government can exert control over management appointments and rewards, 
and so over the company’s behaviour (Qiang, 2003, p. 777). Although the Lu-
jiazui Group wanted to continue to improve its ‘modern business system’, it 
constantly had to face the difficult task of maintaining a balance between the 
government and the market place. It had to abide by modern market princi-
ples while being unable to deal with its main shareholder on a normal con-
tractual basis. The group had to invest its own money in key infrastructure 
projects, which had formerly been the responsibility of local government 
(SMG). In the short term the group could use the profits from its real estate 
activities to cross-subsidise these projects, but in the long-term the group ran 
into debt. Wan and Yuan (2001, p. 102) pointed out that the increasing cost of 
land development in Pudong also contributed to the group’s worsening finan-
cial position. Furthermore, intensified competition from neighbouring areas 
and the restrictive nature of financial policy after 1996 also reduced the in-
terest of investors. The group’s financial deficit could only be made good by 
loans granted by state-owned banks and guaranteed by SMG, its main share-
holder. The same interviewee from the Lujiazui Group also complained about 
the debt now facing the group:
“The reason we have so much debt is that the group did too many things 
which the government would normally have done. Now we just let eve-
rything go to pot [lan diao le]. The group is in trouble anyway. The group 
has huge debts but the shareholder company shows a profit. The share-
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holding is so big that the shareholder company needs to earn 100 mil-
lion yuan to be able to show a ten cent profit per share in the annual 
report”.
The problem faced by the Lujiazui group’s corporate finance reflects the po-
tential risk faced by most Chinese public enterprises: a huge deficit37 and poor 
financial performance, resulting in the imposition of a severe burden on the 
banking system, and constituting a threat to the country’s financial stabil-
ity. The way this challenge is tackled will have direct consequences for the 
healthy growth of Pudong and Shanghai’s financial market.
 3.4.3 Public-private financing
When the Pudong project was first set up, the region lacked the advantage of 
closeness to Hong Kong or Taiwan, areas containing the most important con-
tributors to FDI in Shenzhen. On the other hand, Shanghai not only possessed 
traditional advantages in fields like manufacture, business and trade with the 
outside world, but also enjoyed traditional connections with its vast hinter-
land, the Yangtze delta and the Yangtze valley, a vast market which at the end 
of the 1980s still remained untapped. These factors played a significant role in 
determining the financial resources on which Shanghai could rely to develop 
Pudong.
Research showed that Shanghai took a more integrated approach to set-
ting up its financial mechanism: all possible channels for attracting finance 
were important, not only private sector FDI. An examination of Pudong’s fixed 
assets showed that the public and private sector both played a part in con-
structing its complex financial mechanism. Although local governments and 
officials in China form part of the administrative apparatus – are part of ‘the 
state’ – they are also distinct entities, separate from central government, with 
their own agendas, and increasingly with their own resources. Negotiations 
between public and private organisations at district level, affecting concrete 
urban projects, infrastructure and building, take place without the involve-
ment of central government and are not subject to detailed regulations im-
posed by central government. The local public sector began to display a new 
entrepreneurship in urban development and its business-oriented behaviour 
was very much in line with private sector behaviour when looking for new 
capital resources.
On the other hand, Pudong’s financial mechanism was based on global-lo-
cal collaboration. Shanghai made heavy use of land leasing to attract FDI, and 
   According to a recent survey by the People’s Bank of China, China’s central bank, by the end of 2000 51.2% of 
the 62,656 enterprises were failing to repay their bank debts. The proportion of non-performing loans in the state-
owned banking system has been estimated at between 25 and 30% (Qiang, 2003, p. 781).
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Pudong played its part. Pudong’s financial mechanism to a large extent de-
pended on an active land policy to generate revenue for further investment 
in urban development. Most of the money raised by land leasing was used to 
invest in infrastructure – new roads, bridges, metro links, etc. – to stimulate 
private investment in real estate. In this ‘experimental land policy’, treating 
land as a commodity, the Chinese public sector became closely involved with 
the private sector. Deepening globalisation led to the development companies 
becoming privileged mediators between the local public sector and the pri-
vate sector, operating on a global scale, directing global capital flows to local 
urban development.
As a result, urban development has become sensitive to fluctuations in the 
global market, as demonstrated by the Asian economic crisis. Land transfers 
and international sources of finance such as loans and bonds have enabled 
global players to penetrate the local real estate and financial markets. Al-
though the role of global players is marginal compare with that of local play-
ers, their importance in contributing capital flow, creating economic growth 
and employment and connecting Pudong with the global economic system 
and financial markets should not be underestimated. What also needs to be 
highlighted is the significant role played by global Chinese business networks, 
especially those located in South East Asia, in directing global capital flows 
into Pudong.
‘The decisions managers make regarding their firms’ strategies are tied to 
the institutional environments in which they are embedded, the economic 
constraints they are experiencing, and the networks of firms in which they 
are situated’. This is especially true of the newly established development 
companies, which form the front line of the entrepreneurial Chinese govern-
ment and those state-related enterprises which became involved in Pudong’s 
real estate development. They operate relatively autonomously, in a way far 
removed from any top-down central planning doctrine. Spreading over the 
city and operating at district level, these companies work from the bottom 
up, occupying themselves simultaneously with a variety of building projects 
involving participation by private developers and investors from all over the 
world. In many cases, the borders between public and private are blurred, as 
in the case of the Lujiazui Group.
In this process, local development companies enter into contractual rela-
tions with footloose international private companies. As these companies are 
involved with urban development projects, the price of land is a dominant 
factor in any negotiation. The collaboration is equal and horizontal, with no 
substantial direct involvement or hierarchical relationship with government. 
These entrepreneurs are quite different from the ‘bureaucratic entrepreneurs’, 
Castells’ name for China’s new capitalist class comprising individuals, more 
often than not members of the Communist Party, whose access to resourc-
es stems from their control of government institutions and finance (Castells, 
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1998, p. 319). Research revealed a trend towards a new kind of organisation 
characterised by complex and differentiated forms of public and private part-
nership (De Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof, 2000; Frissen, 1999). These international 
partnerships combine new types of financial cooperation with competitive re-
lationships and are constantly shifting the foundations of future urban devel-
opment in Shanghai further outside the reach of central government.
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 4 Networking strategies: 
managing area 
development in the 
developmental state
Introduction
Shanghai’s rebirth is the direct consequence of China’s need to survive in a 
situation of pervasive globalisation. Because China chose to follow the East 
Asian model of the developmental state in its economic reforms, it substan-
tially adopted a number of the institutional characteristics that helped the 
five recognised examples of the developmental state (Japan, South Korea, Tai-
wan, Singapore, and Hong Kong) to create high economic growth, including 
an active role for the state, a collaborative relationship between the state and 
the economy, a planned approach to the development, guidance and supervi-
sion of industry, a development-oriented dictatorship, an attempt to achieve 
social equity in the process of development and the executive control of legal 
institutions (White, 1988; Johnson, 1995; Huff, 1995; Chan, 1998; Xia, 2000; Cas-
tells, 2000a and 2000b; Low, 2004). Xia (2000) pointed out a number of substan-
tial modifications made to deal with China’s vast size and the legacy of state 
socialism. One important characteristic he identified as indicating the special 
character of the Chinese ‘developmental state’ was its duality, leading to ten-
sion and cooperation between national and local development and between 
an active legal system and strong government. This institutional arrangement 
had immediate consequences for urban government and for the area man-
agement strategies used in the implementation of the Pudong development.
There is much evidence for the evolutionary nature of the policies applied 
in Pudong to manage the changing environment and the different challenges 
faced during the development. The different policies and the way they were 
implemented display a number of distinct characteristics defining the ap-
proach to the steering of the Pudong development. The development strategy 
was shaped by the aim to achieve economic development and its relevance 
to restructuring the local and regional economy. Local government played an 
active role right from the start of the project, all the way from decision-mak-
ing to implementation, influencing the development process both ‘overtly’ 
and ‘covertly’, stepping in or out according to circumstances and the needs of 
the moment. The application of the SEZ concept to such a huge urban devel-
opment project and the variety of experimental policies followed in Pudong 
recall the similar tactics used by China to stimulate economic growth and for-
eign investment. In many ways the area management strategies that Shang-
hai adopted for the Pudong development remind one of the ways in which 
China followed the model of the developmental state in pursuing its develop-
mental strategies. Urban development is a complex process, dynamic and di-
verse, involving interaction between the state and the market in parallel with 
increasingly dynamic global-local interaction. Policy making, consequently, 
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is not pre-planned but rather emerges from the interaction between private 
companies and bureaucratic agencies, with mediatory organisations playing 
an essential role. As Mintzberg has said, policy-making is ‘emergent’, not de-
signed (Mintzberg, 1990 and 1994; Mintzberg et al., 1998).
Compared with the traditional way of managing area development in Chi-
na – closed, top-down, opaque, bureaucratic and government-controlled – the 
development of Pudong showed an evolutionary trend, more open and inter-
active, governed by a hybrid form of control characteristic of the specifically 
Chinese development model. A networking strategy was essential to facili-
tate the development. ‘Developmental states can be treated as mechanisms 
to control the political economy characterised by a series of networks’ (Xia, 
2000, p. 37). Here ‘network’ means a system of links between societal forces, 
or informal players, and institutionalised, formal authority. Networks are not 
only affected by the traditional Chinese culture of guanxi, but also required 
as political and economic control in the information age. Networking allows 
government and the market to begin to find ways of approaching and un-
derstanding one another. Cooperation between government and the market 
is generally achieved by institutional adaptation on the part of government 
leading to the creation of new rules to accommodate the admission of market 
forces and give them space to operate. The changing strategies used in the 
Pudong development also reflect how emerging situations led to strategies 
being redefined.
The following analysis attempts to explain the stunning speed achieved 
by Shanghai in the Pudong development by comparing the area management 
strategies used with the model of the developmental state that drives Chi-
nese development. The analysis examines two essential relationships struc-
tures, between state and market and between local and global, with particular 
attention to those relationships that directly affected the speed achieved by 
the 15-year Pudong development.
 4.1 State-market
 4.1.1 Developmental goal
Economic reform and the open-door policy were designed as part of a sur-
vival strategy to ‘ensure China’s entry into the capitalist global economy and 
into the informational age, using lessons learned from the Asian “tigers”’ (Xia, 
2000). According to Deng, ‘Development is the only hard truth. Without devel-
opment there can be no stability’. In the development state, the state is legiti-
mate ‘when it establishes hegemony or consensus vis-à-vis the civil society’ 
or, in other words, ‘the legitimacy principle may be excised on behalf of so-
ciety (the democratic state) or on behalf of a societal project’. Castells (2000b, 
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p. 284) added: ‘When the societal project respects the broader parameters of social 
order (for example, global capitalism) but aims at fundamental transformations of 
the economic order (regardless of the interest or desire of the civil society), I propose 
the hypothesis that we are in the presence of the developmental state’. (Italisation 
by Castells) Developmental states not only find their survival strategy by af-
firming economic development and economic internationalisation as the only 
legitimacy principle, but also assert their national interests in the world.
The developmental state model has led to the Chinese leadership being 
almost completely preoccupied with efficiency and growth (Xia, 2000, p. 226). 
This obsession with development is well illustrated in the design of the Pu-
dong development. Pudong was seen not as a property development project 
or an area development, but rather as an economic tool to advance Shang-
hai’s development and integration into the global market. In the 1970s and 
1980s this preoccupation with economic growth led Shanghai’s planners to 
adjust the course of Shanghai’s urban development to create new ‘engines’ to 
power the city’s growth. Whereas formal urban plans restricted the economic 
strategies available to local government, Shanghai’s planners looked to west-
ern urban planning for new avenues of development. For example, when they 
discovered the significant impact made by CBDs on American urban econo-
mies, they decided to include this western concept into their master plan, de-
signing the Bund area in Puxi and the Lujiazui area in Pudong as old and new 
CBDs for Shanghai. Similarly, during the design of the Lujiazui Financial Cen-
tre local planners came to accept that land has a market value, and subse-
quently realised that in Shanghai, as in Hong Kong and Singapore, land could 
serve as the main source of local government revenue for infrastructural de-
velopment.
This developmental rationale meant that the strategies used to build up 
Pudong and sustain its prosperity were very much oriented towards econom-
ic growth. By designating Pudong as a separate unit rather than an integral 
expansion of an existing urban area, Shanghai declared its preference to sub-
ject Pudong to regulations different from those applying in Shanghai’s other 
urban districts. In accordance with an agreement reached with central gov-
ernment, Pudong in fact followed China’s economic development strategy by 
becoming one of China’s national SEZs, ‘a bird sanctuary for the market econ-
omy’ and ‘a laboratory for China’s experimental East Asian strategy’ (Xia, 2000, 
p. 51). The powerful drive to integrate into the global economy and the aim to 
build Pudong as a multi-functional district including finance, trade and ex-
port, a tax-free zone and a high-tech zone, reflects China’s constant emphasis 
on economic development. The four main development zones, each designed 
to target a different economic activity, would rely heavily on foreign capital 
and foreign investment, foreign markets and the transfer of foreign technolo-
gy. To earn Shanghai a place on the world stage, Pudong created an economic 
structure oriented towards the outside world.
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The Pudong development enjoyed a number of advantages stemming from 
urban redevelopment oriented towards economic growth, the designation of 
special economic zones and the development of economic functions rather 
than property development.
First, special policies giving extra flexibility were introduced in the SEZ to 
test the operation of a market economy. Economic activities were mainly driv-
en by the market and joint ventures with foreign companies. Both partner-
ships and wholly foreign-owned enterprises were permitted. Adoption of the 
Chinese strategy of selective SEZ development enabled Pudong to enjoy the 
freedom of experimenting with various market-related ideas and methods to 
stimulate its economic growth. Constraints that limited the ability of normal 
urban districts to attract foreign investors and utilise foreign capital were re-
moved, enabling Pudong to concentrate on its goal of establishing an outward 
and export-oriented economy.
Second, since Pudong was treated as an economic project in a defined ur-
ban area, integrated economic policies could be applied in such a way as to 
test their effectiveness. A series of preferential policies affecting such mat-
ters as finance, taxation, industry and construction could easily be set up by 
local government and implemented collectively by its various departments. 
The preferential treatment offered by Pudong on taxation and land transfer 
were the most important factors encouraging foreign investors to invest in 
the start of the Pudong development. A whole set of economic tools were pro-
vided to allow Pudong to react to changes in the market. Different interest 
groups were able to see possibilities for advancing their own economic inter-
ests, so attracting investors with different backgrounds, interests and inten-
tions. As shown in the earlier analysis of financial resources, Shanghai was 
able to ensure that the Pudong development would allow different depart-
ments of local government (involved in economic planning, finance, taxation, 
construction, urban planning and the environment) and investors (property 
developers, manufacturers, bankers, insurance companies etc.) to find ways 
to satisfy their individual requirements.
Third, the emphasis on economic development rather than merely proper-
ty development allowed Pudong to sustain long-term development with con-
tinuous investment from the market, economic output and job supply in vari-
ous sectors, and also prevented the quick boom and bust that so often occurs 
in an area whose economy is powered by a boom in the property market.
Fourth, China’s emphasis on development meant strong government sup-
port for key projects with national and local significance. As Pudong’s profile 
was in line with the national strategy for economic reform, government sup-
port at local and national level continued to support the market in Pudong 
by creating an environment that would encourage the interaction of market 
forces.
As some localities would benefit from more favourable policies and privi-
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leges than others, a selective strategy of area development was assumed to 
result in fragmented area development. Table 4.1 shows how much foreign 
investment was attracted by various development zones in Pudong over ap-
proximately fifteen years. It is clear that preferential policies did in fact play 
a key role in attracting foreign investment. Any increase in the preferential 
treatment given to foreign investors increased the amount of investment the 
development zones were able to attract.
 4.1.2 Local-central synergy
Local-central synergy
The first and most important characteristic of a developmental state is the 
‘state-guided capitalist development system’. White (1988, p. 24) described 
the predominant role of the state in the East Asian developmental state: ‘In 
each case the developmental impact of the state extended far beyond eco-
nomic policy to include ideological mobilisation, pervasive political controls 
and social engineering. Each state has sought to draw a clear line between 
the domestic and international economies and to define and implement eco-
nomic priorities through varying forms of strategic planning.’ As Xia pointed 
out (2000, pp. 180-181, pp. 203-204, p. 208), one important modification to Chi-
na’s dual developmental state concerned the relationship between the centre 
(the state) and individual localities (local government). According to Xia, the 
relationship between the state and individual localities is characterised by 
‘interdependence’ and ‘mutuality’. Each of the two sides possesses resources 
that are essential to central control and local autonomy: the state does not 
possess sufficient resources to exercise complete control and local govern-
ment does not possess sufficient resources for complete independence. Each 
side needs valuable resources that only the other can provide. It follows that 
the state and local government both constrain and supported one another’s 
approach to development. The characteristic interdependence of the state 
and local government creates a framework that is not zero-sum, with the re-
sult that the relationship between the centre and local government has al-
ways been cooperative, a symbiotic partnership based on a complex balance 
of mutual dependence. Without this essentially complementary relationship 
Table 4.1 Development of key state-level development zones in Pudong (at the end of 2004)
State-level development zones Date open
Plan area 
(sq. km)
Developed 
area (sq. 
km)
Invested in 
fixed assets 
(million yuan)
Number  
of projects
Contract investment  
(US$ millions)
Foreign
Non-
Shanghai Shanghai
Lujiazui Finance & Trade Zone 1990 28 14.50 1718.51 106 30.10 21.81 52.51
Jinqiao Export Processing Zone 1990 20 23.72 623.27 620 114.13 7.52 6.87
Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone 1990 10 8.50 263.74 8064 85.75
Zhangjiang High- Tech Park 1992 25 17.00 587.26 938 78.76 8.50 13.98
Total 63.72 3192.78 9728 435.73 37.83 73.36
Source: SPNASB, 2005
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it would be impossible to sustain a developmental approach either centrally 
or locally. This ‘interdependence’ and ‘mutuality’ was clearly reflected in the 
decision-making for the Pudong development.
The Pudong development recognised the active function played by the 
state, but was achieved by a coalition between the state and local government. 
Decisions affecting Pudong, although largely taken at local level, were typi-
cally the synergistic result of local-central collaboration. The time taken to 
prepare the project reflected the constraints that Chinese local governments 
faced in pursuing their developmental agendas. The development was seen as 
a large urban project which would allow Shanghai to re-establish its prestige 
and to regain the position, lost as a result of China’s isolation in the world be-
fore 1978, one step ahead of the southern provinces, which traditionally had 
lagged far behind Shanghai but had benefited from the introduction of the 
open-door policy. It was therefore thought that Pudong, much like the south-
ern provinces, should be treated as a Special Economic Zone. The prestige 
gained by SEZ status would help Shanghai to realise its ambition of rejoining 
the global market and so enhance Shanghai’s performance and competitive-
ness within China and beyond. It was also thought likely that a successful 
Pudong development would affect the judgement of the performance of local 
politicians and so their career prospects. However, the granting of SEZ status 
was in the hands of central government. Moreover, not only were Shanghai’s 
various administrative functions tightly controlled by central government but 
the same was true of access to finance, particularly from outside investors. 
Shanghai desperately wanted to be freed from the restrictive political and fi-
nancial control exercised by central government before the Pudong develop-
ment began. Li Zhanjun, a local researcher, used the term Songbang (untie) to 
express the urgency of Shanghai’s desire for this freedom to allow it develop 
its local economy the way it wanted. Lacking the autonomy required to decide 
on and implement an area development plan, Shanghai was simply unable to 
carry out an urban project of such a size without approval from central gov-
ernment. Moreover, since Shanghai was still handing over more than 80% of 
its revenue to central government, it had few resources left for investment in 
urban projects of the size of the Pudong development.
China’s central government, though not always directly involved in local 
development, simply can not be left out of the essential decision-making 
process. Deng, the architect of China’s economic reform, was not entirely con-
fident about the developmental state’s ability to serve as a model for China as 
a whole. Although the enormous potential created by Shanghai’s traditional 
capacity for economic development, its talented labour force, its businesslike 
approach and its open culture provided a favourable environment for inves-
tors, it did not want to risk ‘killing the goose that lays the golden eggs for 
central government in a state-planned economy’ (Xia, 2000, p. 187). As central 
government relied heavily on revenue from Shanghai (amounting to no less 
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than one-sixth of total national revenue), it feared that any autonomy Shang-
hai might acquire would reduce its tax contribution and so disturb the stabili-
ty of the national economy. Through a continuous consensus building process, 
both sides finally found common ground, a way to advance their common in-
terest – economic development in the interest of national economic reform. 
The Pudong development could help Shanghai to restructure its economy and 
become the new economic engine powering its lagging economic develop-
ment. Central government saw Pudong as a potential shop window for Chi-
na’s second wave of liberalisation and economic reform. With the support 
of Shanghai, Pudong had the potential to become an economic powerhouse 
stimulating its vast hinterland, the Yangtze river delta and the Yangtze river 
valley. The decision to go ahead was encouraged by a powerful Shanghai lob-
by within central government, the government’s own Pudong feasibility study 
and the emerging political crisis brought about by the Tian’anmen Square af-
fair. Pudong was chosen by central government as the ‘emerging remedy’ to 
assure foreign investors that China would not only continue with its econom-
ic reform and open-door policy but would also open up Shanghai, its most 
important economic centre, to the outside world. Shanghai grasped the op-
portunity to consolidate central government support for Pudong and lobbied 
for a full presentation of the Pudong project, asking for full support including 
preferential treatment and financial assistance. Once both sides recognised 
their shared interests and constraints and the need each had for assistance 
from the other, the original conflict between supporters of local development 
and central government were able to reach a consensus, each, for its own rea-
sons, supporting the start-up of the Pudong development. The achievement 
of this consensus between central and local government confirmed Xia’s view 
that a beneficial relationship between a developmental state and supporters 
of local development can be secured by ‘setting up a cooperative, non-zero 
sum, game’.
Understanding the imbalance that might be created by a strategy of selec-
tive development, central government exercised its significant political power 
in the national interest to enforce collaboration between different levels of 
government and ministries. ‘The SEZs used special policies to attract foreign 
direct investment, technology, joint ventures and foreign enterprises. As these 
poured in, the SEZs found they needed more talented people and investment 
from outside their own areas. A large number of inland provinces and cen-
tral ministries, which also wanted to take advantage of the special policies 
granted exclusively to SEZs, brought in large amounts of capital and set up 
offices and factories’. Indeed, many provinces and ministries invested heavily 
in SEZs as a way of setting up ‘shop-window enterprises’ and so gaining ac-
cess to global markets. While central and local government believed that the 
introduction of preferential policies and provision of financial support to de-
velop a particular urban area in Shanghai could provide China with a second 
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economic boom, they could not ignore the jealousy and anxiety of support-
ers of other local developments who were afraid that Pudong would empty 
the national coffers, leaving nothing for anywhere else. This concern led to 
a compromise solution, a non-zero sum game satisfying, at least in the short 
term, the shared interests of other regions. Pudong was designated the ‘head 
of the dragon’, charged with stimulating the economic development of the 
entire region. The consequences of this designation were significant, because 
it re-established the traditional regional network formed by Shanghai and its 
hinterland. In fact the Pudong development led to a series of regional devel-
opments and an inflow of global capital into the region. Zweig (2002) wrote 
that FDI followed the flow of regional openings under segmented deregulation. 
For example, in 1991 the Yangtze river valley received only 4.9% of national 
FDI; its opening and particularly the opening of Pudong in 1992 had the effect 
of redirecting foreign investment so that by 1994 it had become the recipient 
of 29% of all FDI in China. These figures demonstrate the importance of an 
integrated regional environment to attracting global capital. Although cities 
within the region tended to compete with one another for capital, resources 
and business, they also appreciated the importance of mutual collaboration 
and coordination and their shared interest in attracting global finance to the 
region. The traditional links and cultural similarities between Shanghai and 
other cities in the region also helped to enhance economic integration and 
social and cultural unity.
Regional networking, if it worked well, would actually be in the interest of 
the Pudong development, allowing it to become the nexus connecting domes-
tic interests and the international market while at the same time being the 
spearhead for Shanghai’s strategic plan to stimulate the economic develop-
ment of the region comprising the Yangtze river delta and Yangtze river valley. 
As a state-level SEZ, Pudong enjoyed a series of advantages lacked by other 
cities. Like other SEZs, Pudong was not only able to benefit from urban de-
regulation but also found itself in a better position to access foreign trade and 
foreign investment than areas still operating under the central planning sys-
tem. Pudong also enjoyed preferential policies providing lower taxation and 
greater flexibility in dealing with domestic labour, transfer of land to foreign 
investors and the raising of domestic capital from both national and local 
government. Furthermore, as the new focus of China’s second round of lib-
eralisation in the 1990s, Pudong enjoyed crucial support from central govern-
ment and a privileged position in the finance, trade and service sectors (see 
Chapter 3, Section 3.1). Domestic players, restricted by the strict regulations 
imposed by their own cities, hoped to benefit from the low tax rates and the 
ease of doing business with the outside world available in Pudong’s deregu-
lated environment. The analysis given in Chapter 3 shows that Pudong’s fi-
nancial structure and real estate market were to some extent dominated by 
domestic players. Many of the companies that became involved in the Pudong 
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development also speculated in land or became active in the service sector 
rather then sticking to their original businesses. Land speculation and activity 
in the service sector, if done well, gave domestic companies a quick econom-
ic return. This, according to Guthrie (1999), reflected a type of diversification 
strategy followed by Chinese companies to counter the economic uncertainty 
produced by ongoing economic reform.
The difference between Shanghai and developmental states like Singa-
pore is that Shanghai needed to make extraordinary efforts to coordinate 
with central government and other neighbouring provinces and cities to 
ensure the plan was well received and was given the national and regional 
support required to allow it to run smoothly and become reality. The build-
ing of a consensus between different political players in support of the Pu-
dong development actually involved implementing a network strategy for an 
area development project. For this reason, argued Xia (2000, p. 215), China’s 
economy should be characterised as hybrid: ‘It is no longer a planned social-
ist state, nor is it yet fully a pure market economy’. China’s economy and pol-
itics have been marked by a diversification in the Chinese political structure 
and frequent bargaining and consultation between important political play-
ers and institutions. These new features contributed to the emergence in Chi-
na’s economy and politics of a network style of government, characterised by 
embeddedness, connectivity and reciprocity. This meant developing links be-
tween different institutions and the adoption of the mohe strategy, a combina-
tion of cooperation and competition used to guide and manage interaction’. 
This networking strategy achieved the cooperation between local and central 
government needed for the Pudong development. It also helped to build con-
sensus between regional players in support of a project initiated by one of 
their number, with central government playing the leading role. The inclusion 
of central, local and provincial governments in the same network made it 
easier for politicians and institutions to connect and communicate with one 
another (Xia, 2000, p. 205).
Capacity of state intervention
The developmental state is characterised by ‘an active role for the state and 
a collaborative relationship between the state and the economy’. A central 
planning system ignores market rules, but a developmental state needs to be 
‘market-fostering’, ‘market-facilitating’ and committed to nurturing markets 
(Xia, 2000, p. 27). In the Chinese version of the developmental state, the re-
lationship of ‘interdependence’ and ‘mutuality’ between the state and local 
development initiatives allowed central government, Shanghai local govern-
ment, Pudong local government and the hybrid development companies to 
share in decision-making, the design of a development strategy for Pudong, 
and implementation. Local government played its part as initiator of the Pu-
dong development, designing the development concept and strategies, lob-
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bying central government and negotiating the level of support required from 
central government. As one by one the conditions for further development 
were met, the local authority started to present its development ambitions 
to the outside world. Local politicians made promotional trips to Asia, Europe 
and the Americas and meetings were held between the local authority and in-
ternational investors to promote the Pudong development and persuade po-
tential participants. To support the city’s marketing efforts, the local author-
ity introduced a series of measures to reform those elements of the existing 
institutional system that were hostile to private investors. These institutional 
changes and other measures involving matters such as land and infrastruc-
ture development, played a key role in facilitating the increasing influence of 
market forces in Pudong and attracting participants from various sectors from 
round the world. Amongst the most important improvements in institutional 
design were those experimental measures which created new entry rules al-
lowing or enabling stakeholders to work in a transitional environment and 
providing more equal conditions for outsiders to compete in what was a rath-
er closed local market. The role of the state in facilitating the operation of the 
market was reflected in the use of lower-level agents and development com-
panies, aware of changes in the market and responsive to those changes, to 
work closely with people who became involved in the market. Clear evidence 
is provided by the four development companies which represented the inter-
est of the various local authorities on the construction site. The hybrid na-
ture of these companies ensured that they were business-oriented. Although 
they were required to represent the interests of the government, their biggest 
shareholder, they also had to be responsive to public shareholders, to whom 
they were responsible for any profit or loss. This division of functions gave 
the local authority more flexibility to react to major challenges while leaving 
its agents free to find practical solutions. When the development was going 
smoothly the local authority would tend to reduce the amount of interven-
tion and put more reliance on the market to provide capital. However, when 
action was required to deal with a failure in the market, as in the period 1997-
2000 when the local market was in decline because of the Asian economic 
crisis, or in the period 1992-1994 when Pudong needed specific funds to invest 
in infrastructure, the local authority immediately stepped in to provide the 
necessary assistance.
Like the local authority, central government also saw the Pudong develop-
ment as an economically-oriented national project which would help China, 
and not just Shanghai, to achieve its developmental goals. Central govern-
ment’s decision to support Pudong was based on an intensive feasibility study 
and complicated political calculations and consensus-building in the national 
interest. Once agreed on the significance of the Pudong development, central 
government devoted itself to meeting its commitments and helping Shang-
hai to set up Pudong as a new shop window for China’s economic reform. Be-
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cause it was an economic project, central government was able to implement 
a series of economic measures to excite investors’ interest, not only allowing 
Pudong to enjoyed the privileges of an SEZ but also giving it special preferen-
tial policies not yet enjoyed by other SEZs, to strengthen its specifically eco-
nomic functions. For instance, besides the preferential policies to reduce or 
eliminate customs duty and income tax, granted to all economic and techno-
logical development zones and certain SEZs, central government also author-
ised Pudong to allow foreign organisations to open financial institutions and 
become active in the service sector. Central government also gave Shanghai 
permission to open a stock exchange, expand its authority to examine and 
approve investments and allow foreign-funded banks to engage in RMB busi-
ness. Foreign financial organisations wishing to enter the Chinese financial 
market and conduct business in Chinese currency were required to set up in 
Pudong’s Lujiazui Financial and Trade Zone. The local authority even moved 
a number of markets (including the gold and diamond markets) from Puxi to 
Pudong, to enhance Lujiazui’s economic function as financial and trade cen-
tre and Shanghai’s new CBD. By deliberate measures of this kind, government 
(central and local) acted ‘overtly’ to help Pudong establish its financial func-
tion in the shortest possible time. During the decision-making process, cen-
tral government acted more as a consensus-builder, balancing the wishes of 
conservatives and reformers and of different regions. As soon as the imple-
mentation phase began, central government quickly changed to become a fa-
cilitator, using its political influence and budgetary support to help the local 
authority to stimulate the development. At the start of the development, cen-
tral government also acted as coordinator of the efforts to put Shanghai, or 
more particularly Pudong, on the world stage. In a number of instances cen-
tral government acted as intermediary in promoting Pudong to international 
investors, creating links between Pudong and various multinationals to raise 
finance from the global market for Shanghai to use for the development of 
Pudong’s infrastructure. The need for the role played by central government 
also changed as time went by. Once the Pudong development was under way, 
central government was able to reduce its amount of intervention and budg-
etary support, though when the development ran into trouble, as for example 
during the Asian economic crisis, it stepped in to give a helping hand,.
This sharing of tasks between local and central government demonstrat-
ed the flexibility with which a developmental state can carry out a particu-
lar project. Chan et al. (1998) wrote: ‘Indeed, the hallmark of the East Asian 
countries’ economic miracles is precisely their eclecticism. The people and 
officials of these countries have generally avoided a rigid adherence to par-
ticular scholarly conventions or policy orthodoxies, while showing consider-
able awareness and sensitivity to the lessons and injunctions from seemingly 
opposing perspectives (such as neoclassicism and statism, as well as depend-
ency theory). Thus we see in these countries the coexistence of vigorous mar-
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ket competition and active state administration, energetic export promotion 
and deliberate import substitution, and both efforts to recruit foreign capital 
and technology and efforts to control and regulate them.’ Low (2004, p. 5) also 
wrote that the power of a developmental state lies in its capacity and capabil-
ity to anticipate and respond to economic change. This view is well illustrat-
ed by the changing roles of central government, local government and their 
agents at lower levels, and in the way they accepted tasks in areas of strength 
and avoided tasks in areas of weakness.
Analysis of the decision-making process and subsequent developments in 
Pudong clearly shows how in the long term the role of government changed 
from intervention to enabling, and to continuing its efforts to build a strong co-
operation between state and market. This confirms Huff’s claim (1995, p. 1435) 
that a successful interventionist government ‘must know when to stop’.
 4.1.3 Institutional adaptation
As a developmental state China has been forced to concentrate on economic 
issues. The successful adoption of the developmental state model can only be 
achieved with the assistance of institutions modified to facilitate market de-
velopment and help maintain the strength of the state’s capacity to advance 
its development agenda. This means that the traditional institutions used to 
support the formal rigid central planning system needed to be modified to 
support economic development. However, although good institutional design 
can facilitate networking by changing formal or informal rules governing ac-
cessibility to the network, this strategy is in general ‘difficult to implement 
and usually takes a lot of time’ because of a significant level of criticism and 
resistance (Klijn, 2005, p. 334). Extra difficulties and frustrations were encoun-
tered in the course of China’s urban development since the management of 
networks involved a move away from a formal rigid central planning system 
and a society within which market rules and networks had been denied for 
many decades. In fact, for the sake of development, China’s central and lo-
cal authorities were obliged to take a more difficult path to network manage-
ment, engaging in a series of institutional reforms and adaptations to allow 
the existence of a series of networks and the growth of a strategy of network-
ing between state and market. Guthrie (1999, p. 7) said of the use of institu-
tional adaptations in relate to firms and organisations in Shanghai: ‘It is pre-
cisely the institutional environments that define markets and the rational 
bureaucratic systems within firms that are being invented and implemented. 
In case of China, we have the unique opportunity to observe the construc-
tion of new institutions and markets and the adoption of many new practices 
within firms, an interesting window onto what one scholar has referred to 
as the “state-building” project of market construction and transformation.’ In 
the development of Pudong, institutional design, or more precisely institu-
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tional adaptation, was essential if the market was to become involved in lo-
cal development. To achieve such adaptation, Shanghai concentrated on two 
things, a market-oriented administrative structure with sufficient calibre to 
advance the development strategy effectively and a market-friendly legal sys-
tem to ensure the achievement of synergy between state and market.
Administrative restructuring
Any institutional designer who has to design new institutions or reshape old 
ones will always need to consider the general efficiency of the proposed in-
stitution (Xia, 2000, p. 214). For Pudong that meant that any new body would 
have to be capable, efficient and fully committed to Pudong’s overall econom-
ic development. Shanghai used Pudong as a laboratory in which to test the ef-
fectiveness of its plans for institutional reform. To increase transparency and 
provide an efficient and effective service, the institutional design adopted by 
Pudong combined ‘small government’, employing as few personnel and of-
fices as possible, ‘big service’, putting the emphasis on bureaucratic efficiency, 
and ‘big society’, transferring functions other than supervision and regulation 
to associations and NGOs.
Shanghai chose a two-layer administrative structure to create a capable 
and efficient administrative body to govern Pudong. At the upper level was 
the Pudong New Area Administration Committee (Later the Pudong New Area 
People’s Government), the political administrative body responsible for gov-
erning Pudong; at the lower level were various publicly supported develop-
ment companies responsible for the development in each zone. The main task 
of the Pudong New Area Administration Committee was to pass on develop-
ment recommendations made by Shanghai to district level and to set up ef-
ficient administrative services to satisfy the needs of investors. To strengthen 
the relationship between state and market while not becoming directly in-
volved in the operation of the market, the local authority set up development 
companies to carry out implementation on site, turn government strategy in-
to reality, negotiate land transfers with private investors, and communicate 
investors’ wishes back to district government and the Shanghai local author-
ity. These companies enabled the local authority to put its ideas on urban de-
velopment into practice, acting on site to ensure that the development strat-
egy laid down by the local authority was followed in a way acceptable to the 
market.
In its creation of an effective Pudong New Area Administration Commit-
tee, Shanghai put a good deal of effort into emphasising the autonomy of 
that committee. The Singapore model had identified governmental autono-
my excluding particular interest groups (in this case the local Chinese com-
munity) as one of the most important factors in creating all-out systematic 
commitment to economic development. In the case of Pudong, governmental 
autonomy could only be created by unifying support from segmented local 
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districts or county bodies for the development as a whole rather their own 
individual development agenda. Recognising that the land to be used for Pu-
dong was still controlled by three districts and two counties, Shanghai did not 
immediately dismantle the various local authorities involved. Instead, a co-
ordination team, the Pudong Development Office, was set up to examine the 
existing situation and the problems faced by Pudong, coordinate the public 
institutions involved and prepare for institutional transition. The process of 
institutional adaptation was not begun until Shanghai was certain that it had 
a thorough understanding of the situation in Pudong. The Pudong New Area 
Administration Committee was established as a unified administrative body 
replacing both the old coordinating team and the original five-division struc-
ture. Personnel were appointed by Shanghai from outside Pudong to avoid a 
power struggle and any attempt by existing players to modify reforms to suit 
their own interests. Meanwhile, the land that originally belonged to the three 
districts and two counties was put into the name of the Pudong New Area. 
The institution was further strengthened by the exclusive status granted to 
Pudong by central government, above that of urban district and SEZ, allow-
ing Pudong to approve certain large-scale investment projects in a way that 
would not be allowed to an ordinary urban district.
Apart from administrative restructuring, institutional adaptation also in-
volved the revision of approval procedures. A ‘one-stop’ system was intro-
duced to facilitate the obtaining of administrative approvals, to avoid the usu-
al bureaucratic delays and ensure that investors found the business of getting 
approval for investment projects fast and relatively painless. All the red-tape 
could be sorted out at the Pudong Investment Centre. The efficiency of this 
‘one-stop’ system was achieved thanks to the existence of close institution-
al links and an overlapping of personnel, which meant that information was 
shared efficiently and the cost of transactions involving a number of different 
organisations was reduced.
To increase efficiency, each of the four development companies set up sub-
sidiaries capable of handling different phases of land and infrastructure de-
velopment, making it easier to provide and integrate strategies to deal with 
the different stages of urban redevelopment. Thus, for example, housing to 
accommodate relocated households was provided even before relocation ac-
tually took place. This saved a good deal of time compared with normal pro-
cedures, which required development companies to arrange every stage with 
independent companies. All this helped to speed up the development. By 
combining administrative restructuring and institutional adaptation, the Pu-
dong local authority was able to establish new links between state and mar-
ket and facilitate the entrance of outside investors into the local market.
Adaptation of the legal framework
Restructuring the legal framework to facilitate investors’ entry into and op-
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eration in Pudong’s market was another part of the institutional adaptation 
required to accommodate new players. China’s newly established legal frame-
work made it possible for foreign investors to participate in the Chinese mar-
ket and guaranteed those investors certain protections on Chinese soil. For 
example, Japanese researchers have suggested that the improvements made 
to the Joint Venture Law in 1990 removed the biggest obstacles to Japanese 
investment. These improvements protected joint ventures in the private sec-
tor by ending the right of local government to transfer them to state-owner-
ship, allowing foreigners to become directors of joint ventures and ending a 
number of restrictions applying specifically to joint ventures. Unlike the dras-
tic transitional process in Eastern Europe, institutional adaptation in China 
was gradual, designed to avoid violent social confrontation. The revision of 
national laws and regulations to support market concepts was also gradual. 
New laws were introduced to prepare the ground for the introduction of a 
market economy, but the details were kept vague to allow for later interpreta-
tion and implementation. Some of the new laws even contradicted one an-
other, requiring amendment and adjustment to continue as China’s economic 
reform deepens and the operation of the market becomes better understood. 
During the transitional period the uncertainty and vagueness of the new legal 
system made it possible for local authorities to make changes for their own 
benefit. Xia (2000) once claimed that a network strategy enabled East Asian 
institutions to be flexible and adaptable in their search for change. The insti-
tutional adaptation required to ease the relationship between state and mar-
ket was achieved partly by creating alternative institutions and partly by add-
ing new functions to existing institutions. The changes to the legal system, 
though not without risk, provided scope and flexibility for local authorities to 
carry out further experiments to discover what suited them best.
The making of changes to the legal framework in Shanghai in general and 
Pudong in particular was one such localisation process to implement the new 
regulations. The changes addressed the need for market facilities and permit-
ted the introduction of a market in land, a real estate market and a housing 
market. Shanghai needed to put the new laws into practice in a way would 
suit local conditions. Sometimes it had to innovate and make laws of its own. 
In practice, the Shanghai local authority chose Pudong for a series of ex-
perimental legal reforms which it was not immediately prepared to apply to 
Shanghai as a whole. Pudong’s SEZ status allowed it to implement a number 
of bold regulations that had already been introduced in other SEZs, e.g. Shen-
zhen, covering such matters as market liberalisation, freedom for foreign in-
vestors to enter the protected local market, and freedom for domestic players 
to look for partners and capital in the global market. Some experiments were 
exclusive to Pudong. For example the grant to Pudong of the exclusive right 
to allow foreign banks and financial organisations to operate in its region un-
doubtedly encouraged the global financial sector to become involved in Chi-
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na’s financial market. Since Pudong was the first region in China to take this 
step it had to set up a complete set of regulations and criteria for the newly 
deregulated financial sector. In most cases this work was carried out with the 
assistance of the national financial administration.
To support area development, the local authority made special efforts to 
create land institutions which would facilitate the operation of the market, 
and to dismantle barriers to outsiders looking to enter the real estate market 
and sectors previously barred to private developers. Pudong’s new land institu-
tion required all land development in its administrative area to be conducted 
along commercial lines, with land-use rights transferred by sale or lease. For 
the first time ever, Chinese and foreign developers were required to compete 
on an equal footing. A bold decision was made to regulate the commercialisa-
tion of urban land transferred under the old allocation system. Pudong also 
regulated the expropriation of land from collective farms, using a ‘land bank’ 
system, and prepared regulations governing the establishment of a local real 
estate market. Another big step was the transition from a dual-track real es-
tate market, in which Chinese and foreign developers were kept separate, to a 
unified market giving everyone the same opportunity to bid. Since the public 
sector hoped that more private finance and more private sector organisations 
would be attracted to Pudong and so boost the real estate market, it adopted a 
more relaxed attitude towards private sector involvement in what was former-
ly public sector territory, such as infrastructure development and the urban 
renewal of shanty towns. Appropriate regulations, sometimes even providing 
incentives, were introduced to allow the entry of the private sector into these 
areas. The combination of changes to the rules governing entry to the network 
and the new legal framework created the conditions required for foreign in-
vestors to enter the state’s highly protected area and for Chinese companies to 
use Pudong as a stepping stone to exploring the global market.
Besides adapting its institutions to communicate with the private sector, 
the local authority also created a number of informal channels for interaction 
with market participants, with the aim of keeping Pudong aware of changes 
in the global market and satisfying the need for the private sector and the lo-
cal authority to understand and respond to market requirements. The govern-
ment invited a number of individuals, from China and abroad, to suggest im-
provements to the master plan and the feasibility studies for individual key 
projects. A series of platforms was set up in Shanghai to involve the private 
sector in Shanghai’s decision-making. One of the most important events was 
the Mayor of Shanghai’s annual international consultancy conference, a plat-
form for Shanghai’s mayor and urban managers to sit down with the CEOs 
of multinationals to discuss the development of Shanghai and to exchange 
information and opinions.
The institutional adaptation also attempted to ease the tension between 
different interest groups. Relocation strategies were changed to suit the 
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changing situation and the speed of development was adjusted to satisfy 
popular demand. Relocation regulations changed from requiring compensa-
tion in the form of alternative accommodation to requiring monetary com-
pensation, and then back again, as continued investigation and negotiation 
revealed the changing needs of relocated households. Changing needs meant 
that relocation strategies which worked well at one time could be inappropri-
ate in different economic circumstances. Constant adjustments to its strategy 
helped Pudong to reduce to some extent the danger of opposition from relo-
cated households.
Calibre of leadership and technocrats
The key to successful economic planning in East Asian developmental states 
has always been the calibre and economic competence of the political leader-
ship. Huff (1995, p. 1432) credits the success story of Singapore and Taiwan to 
‘a political leadership and associated economic bureaucracy willing and able 
to think like economists and evaluate choices in hard economic terms. The 
competence of their political leadership was also demonstrated by their ef-
fective utilisation of technical knowledge through appropriate modifications 
to suit different localities and the actual production process’ (Grabowski, 1994, 
p. 416).
The capacity and capability delivered by a developmental state requires a 
combination of strong leadership, capable public servants and talented hu-
man resources to ensure the consistent efficiency of a project’s implemen-
tation. In Shanghai, initiatives affecting Pudong were handled by a series of 
Shanghai mayors with remarkable consistency. Their persistence ensured a 
thorough examination of Pudong’s potential and challenges, leading to devel-
opment goals that were ambitious but correct. The added value provided by 
this strong leadership was market-awareness, open-mindedness and a will-
ingness to accept external knowledge and expertise. More important still, the 
recognition that ‘economic matters require skilled specialists’ (Vogel, 1991, p. 
24) led to special emphasis being put on recruiting highly educated economi-
cally aware civil servants from all over China.
Although in the 1990s the mobility of Chinese citizens was still restricted, 
Pudong’s human resource policies focused more on the knowledge and ca-
pacity of the individuals in question rather than where they came from. To 
recruit highly educated staff, Shanghai and Pudong designed a number of 
financial and social incentives including a measure of flexibility in the time 
and place of work. A service centre was established to target this group of 
Chinese workers; their families were given special assistance with finding 
jobs, schools and housing. SMG also organised annual trips to the US and Eu-
rope to look for talented Chinese with knowledge of advanced technology and 
management skills, who were willing to return to their homeland. As a result 
Pudong became a magnet attracting a quarter of all Chinese who had studied 
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abroad and then returned to China. Most of these people now hold important 
positions in the public sector or the private sector.
A strong regime (strong government) combining capable political leader-
ship with a highly-educated economically aware bureaucracy and support-
ed by technical expertise, ensured that the implementation of the Pudong 
project was conscious of and responsive to developments in the market. The 
competence of the regime also allowed a better presentation of each phase 
of the development, helping to buttress the local authority’s credibility and 
reputation. Its professionalism and commitment to the realisation of the Pu-
dong development undoubtedly helped to convince an uncertain private sec-
tor to commit itself to the venture. It also convinced a large number of people 
that they would benefit from the development. A general desire to improve 
stagnant welfare and living conditions, housing, infrastructure, and the envi-
ronment, led the majority to support the project. Pudong residents generally 
formed a vulnerable group; their economic position was weak and they suf-
fered from location-related cultural discrimination. The level of commitment 
and the subsequent level of performance in the Pudong development im-
pressed everyone involved and won support from government organisations 
and the various bodies and even individuals involved in the project, even 
though national or local interest required a high price to be paid to achieve 
the necessary compromises.
 4.1.4 Selective strategy
Selective intervention
One of the most successful lessons learnt by the developmental states con-
cerned selective intervention. As interpreted in China, selective strategy in-
volves a pragmatic approach to sharing limited resources in a vast land with 
many different local interests. ‘The feature of unevenness or particularism re-
flected in the centre-localities relationship, is a conspicuous character of net-
work governance. A network society is always in favour of particularism in-
stead of universalism. This has made the Chinese state structure appear to be 
less institutionalised, and lacking in legibility. However, this amorphism pro-
vides freedom for the Chinese state to explore new ways to structure or regu-
late the centre-localities relationship’ (Xia, 2000, p. 205). The state was able 
to push through area development in a particular favoured area, in this case 
the Pudong New Area, in the same way as in the 1980s Deng used Guangdong 
and Fujian as laboratories for experimental East Asian strategies. The highly 
selective SEZ strategy was chosen by Shanghai, and later China, to handle the 
development of Pudong, because the state expected Pudong to attract west-
ern capital, technology, management skills and experience, and subsequently 
to help Shanghai to move from a rigid outdated socialist planning system to 
a market oriented economy. Ge (1999, p. 1268) explained the special function 
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fulfilled by SEZs: ‘…through the window [they provide] the rest of the domes-
tic economy can be connected to the outside world, even without leaving the 
door open. Basically, SEZs function as a laboratory where various methods 
aimed at overcoming the drawbacks associated with a central planning sys-
tem can be developed. Fresh concepts and means that originated in a market 
economy outside China ahead could first be introduced into, absorbed by, and 
tested out in the SEZs. Those measures that proved to be effective and suc-
cessful in the SEZs could then be extended, where feasible, to the rest of the 
country. This, in turn, would help the whole economy, step-by-step, to become 
more open and efficient.’
The application of the SEZ strategy offered the state a number of advan-
tages in stimulating the Pudong development.
First, economic function was emphasised throughout, all the way from de-
sign to implementation. This meant that the economic development and sus-
tainability of an area was not to be supported by the prosperity generated by 
a one-time game in the property market, but by a sustainable and fully-devel-
oped economic structure.
Second, the privileged SEZ status enjoyed by Pudong allowed it to avoid 
the administrative constraints faced by officials in other towns and cities in 
their attempts to promote economic development and gave Pudong’s local 
government officials the freedom and flexibility to experiment with a mar-
ket economy. This openness also allowed Pudong to access higher-quality and 
more talented personnel to advance the city’s development (Zweig, 2002, p. 
61). Opportunities to test, learn and adjust are vital to the maintenance of a 
vibrant economy.
Third, the same privileged status allowed Pudong to implement a series of 
economic measures, such as tax concessions, to stimulate economic develop-
ment. In an ordinary urban development, scope for this kind of innovation 
would be greatly reduced.
Fourth, its special status allowed Pudong access to the global capital mar-
ket, which was badly needed for its development.
Fifth, the SEZ strategy helped Pudong to obtain the autonomy needed to 
achieve the aims of the developmental state. SEZs are treated separately in 
national planning (including national financial planning) and have province-
level authority over their economic administration. SEZs’ local councils and 
government have legislative authority.
The selective strategy is also reflected in the limitation of the number of 
parties involved in decision-making. Even though the Pudong development 
hoped to achieve great publicity and wide support, this did not require a large 
number of different parties to be involved in the development process as a 
whole. To achieve its specific targets, the public sector exercised strict control 
over the number of parties involved, especially in the early stages. For exam-
ple, in the early stages international organisations and global architects were 
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welcomed for their investment, innovative concepts and management skills. 
Although limiting the number of parties involved was inconsistent with the 
openness favoured in urban development, it reduced to some extent the time 
required for negotiation and so increased the speed of development.
The strategy employed was further reflected in the sector selection and 
sector development process. The four main development zones, designated to 
target different economic activities – finance and trade, export processing, tax-
free activities and high-tech activities – relied heavily on foreign capital and 
foreign investment, foreign markets and foreign technology transfer. These 
four different economic activities were considered in the light of Shanghai’s 
geographic, economic and social advantages. The designation process led 
Pudong to formulate an outward-oriented economic structure aimed at giv-
ing Shanghai a place on the world stage. Central and local government in-
troduced preferential policies to help to support the four different economic 
activities. For example, to help the Lujiazui Financial and Trade zone, central 
government authorise Pudong to allow foreign organisations to open financial 
institutions there and conduct business in Chinese currency. Central govern-
ment also gave Shanghai permission to set up one of China’s only two stock 
exchanges, another move to strengthen Shanghai’s financial sector. The local 
authority boldly moved several markets (including the stock exchange, the 
gold market and the diamond market) from downtown Puxi to Pudong. By 
such a deliberate measures, government, central and local, overtly assisted 
Pudong to set up its financial activities in the shortest possible time.
The strategy was also reflected in the limited use made of state budget-
ary funds. Central government devoted a large sum from the state budget to 
support the Pudong development, mostly for the development of Pudong’s in-
frastructure. This obsessive strategy is in fact characteristic of most Chinese 
urban development. Infrastructure projects improve communication between 
different locations and so are crucial to enhancing the attractiveness of a par-
ticular project. Before the development began, Pudong suffered from a lack 
of efficient connections with Shanghai’s downtown areas: access to Pudong 
could be very difficult. It followed that the most important way of stimulating 
investors’ interest was to improve connections between Pudong and Puxi and 
access within the Pudong area generally. Important infrastructure projects 
therefore addressed the provision of connections between the two sides of 
the Huangpu (bridges and tunnels) and improved mobility and access within 
the area (ring roads, highways, and a metro). Apart from performing their im-
mediate function, infrastructure projects also helped to promote the develop-
ment goal, convincing the private sector of the genuineness of government’s 
developmental intentions, and so securing more private sector investment 
and greater economic growth.
Because the local authority’s budget was limited, it too adopted a selective 
strategy, concentrating its spending on a selected priority area in each zone. 
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As some localities received more favourable treatment and more privileges 
than others, it was inevitable that in the early stages the development ap-
peared more fragmented than integrated. However, selectiveness had obvious 
advantages: if a particular area is given the full attention of the public sector 
and private investors and sufficient investment, its image can be transformed 
quite quickly. This will give local government a convincing demonstration to 
persuade the private sector to participate in the next phase of development, 
making it a useful piece of city marketing.
This strategy of selective penetration has been crucial to the achievement 
of China’s development goals and has been applied ‘in the social, political 
and economic policies of the Chinese government’ (Xia, 2000, p. 220). The 
state does well to be highly selective in choosing the areas in which it inter-
venes, if it wants to be effective and efficient. ‘If a state wants to follow the 
development model successfully, it has to deal with the dialectical relation-
ships between autonomy and embeddedness, penetration and selectivity, and 
centralisation and decentralisation’ (Xia, 2000, p. 220). Selectivity is important, 
as excessive intervention will weaken a state’s autonomy. Analysis of the Pu-
dong development suggests that the selective strategy was well adapted to 
achieving the developmental goal, since selective strategies aim for the most 
efficient and effective development allowed by the limited resources available.
Experimentation, gradualism and pragmatism
From the very beginning of the Pudong development, local government was 
concerned with the potential economic significance of Pudong to Shanghai’s 
economic revival, internationalisation and entrance to the global economy. 
The Pudong development was selected as the key strategy for China’s widen-
ing economic reform in the 1990s. Deng Xiaoping foresaw that Pudong could 
have even greater regional and national significance than his early experi-
ments in Shenzhen. He was very much in favour of experimenting with dif-
ferent ideas in different places. Like Shenzhen, Pudong was one of the places 
he selected for experimenting with new ideas and providing new experience 
to assist his strategic planning. Instead of applying a universal standard, top-
down, Deng took account of local conditions, winning support by effective 
demonstration rather than crass coercion (Xia, 2000, p. 184) As Xia argued 
(2000, pp. 185-186), Deng ‘subjected his strategy to improvisation, innovation, 
and adjustment by the people, based on their practical knowledge, specific 
environment, and commonsensical judgment. He also left his national strate-
gy open to revision by regional and local forces’. In practice, Deng’s version of 
socialism with a Chinese face meant ‘respecting each locality according to its 
own characteristics’, and ‘bringing the initiative of the centre and the locality 
into full play’.
The same approach was adopted for the Pudong development. Pudong be-
came an experimental field for specially designed pilot projects, a place to try 
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out new strategies and policies, reflecting the nation’s pragmatic and gradu-
alist approach to reform. As previously noted, Pudong was used to test the 
feasibility of a new land policy, a market in land and new methods of land 
development. China’s earliest one-stop service for investment approval was 
introduced experimentally in Pudong before being introduced generally in 
Shanghai and neighbouring provinces. The downsizing of Pudong’s adminis-
tration was another pilot programme that Shanghai hoped to extend to other 
districts if it turned out to be helpful. New mechanisms such as BOT and PPP 
were introduced experimentally in Pudong for infrastructure development, 
water plant management and land development. Even building standards 
could be negotiated and amended, as for example when the new internation-
al high-rise standard was introduced by S.O.M. for the Jinmao Tower. These 
kinds of experiment, coupled with a pragmatic approach, made possible the 
rapid introduction of efficient and effective measures to help Pudong speed 
up its development and attract more investment. A belief in utility rather 
than ideology led to many new ideas being tried out in Pudong. Although the 
old regime erected enormous barriers to hinder the introduction of new ideas 
that it saw as conflicting with the existing structure or existing methods, it 
was still possible to try out innovative ideas in designated test areas. Meas-
ures that proved successful could then be tried out in other areas.
This experimental approach went well with the gradual approach adopt-
ed by China in its twenty years of economic reform. Woo-Cuming observed 
(1999, p. 20) that ‘…in the true developmental state, the bureaucratic rulers 
possess a particular kind of legitimacy that allows them to be much more ex-
perimental and less doctrinaire than in a typical authoritarian regime. This is 
the legitimacy that comes from devotion to a widely believed-in revolutionary 
project’. The experimental approach allowed several types of policy (new and 
old) to coexist, to see which worked best. The gradual approach reduced the 
risk of short term instability and also provided a time scale for different inter-
est groups to realise their expectations and appreciate their limitations. The 
reorganisation of Pudong’s administration was one such example.
Market-oriented planning
The Pudong development showed that the planning approach to development 
was still alive and kicking. This approach owed its rebirth to a growing mar-
ket-awareness, the responsiveness of new-style planning to changes in the 
international economy and an ability to take advantage of market awareness 
through selective government intervention. The sector development in the 
four development zones was an example of this kind of approach. To adapt 
the local economy to the international economy, and to use the Pudong de-
velopment to help Shanghai ‘[achieve] an international scale and breadth of 
economic development, and become a modern city of the first order in world 
terms’ (Gamble, 2003), planning transformed its function to become a demon-
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strative tool, a promotional device to attract the attention of the public and 
investors from the outside world, and a bargaining tool to develop consen-
sus between different organisations and interest groups. The open consulta-
tion and open competition the local authority used to define the development 
goals for Pudong brought in world-famous architects, international corpora-
tions and expertise of all kinds to help formulate outline and detail plans for 
Pudong. The celebrities involved attracted enormous attention from the me-
dia, indirectly helping Shanghai to promote its development ambitions for Pu-
dong, regardless of whether their plans would ever be put into practice. This 
interactive process also helped to build trust, with the relationship between 
state and market being strengthened by the local authority’s enthusiasm, 
commitment and ability to keep its promises. Investors were kept properly 
informed about what to expect and when, making them more likely to invest.
Huff et al. (2001) used game-theory to analyse the role of credibility, repu-
tation and investment coordination in a developmental state. Their research 
suggested that to avoid a deadlock in which neither side invests, ‘the success-
ful developmental state must demonstrate commitment by promoting its “de-
velopmental” credentials through a process of reputation building’. It follows 
that decisive actions are more likely to ‘convince an uncertain private sec-
tor of the government’s developmental credentials than rhetoric, and these 
must be undertaken’. The best demonstration of the commitment of a devel-
opmental state to an urban project is the completion of brand new infrastruc-
ture projects. A blueprint or sand model serves the function of demonstrating 
the ambitious plans the state has for the area. This also explains why Chi-
nese central and local governments are so keen on investing in infrastructure, 
because this is the most tangible evidence a developmental government can 
provide to convince the uncertain investor. It also explains why the planning 
approach, abandoned in the West many years ago, is still accepted in develop-
mental states. Planning in a developmental state differs from traditional plan-
ning in its market-awareness, flexibility and adaptability, and in its role in 
marketing to potential participants. Consider for example the five-year plan, 
one of the most important mechanisms used by national, provincial and ma-
jor city governments, and still in active use in Shanghai. This is not a control 
document, functioning in the traditional way, but rather a prescription for ac-
tion to be taken in the coming five-year period. The plan sets out all the major 
initiatives government intends to take during the period, taking into account 
both government and private interests. For example, the key infrastructure 
projects for Shanghai and Pudong could appear in both the five-year plan and 
the annual plan, so providing an assured level of financial support from the 
public purse to ensure the implementation went ahead smoothly and with-
out delay. Local government employed a similar strategy, listing key projects 
to be implemented each year at district level. In this way, not only were gov-
ernment projects open to scrutiny by the market and society at large, but al-
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so the list of key projects and the timetable for implementing those projects 
gave investors sufficient confidence to supply capital even before site prepa-
ration was complete. If a local authority had sound reasons for amending a 
project included in the plan, it was allowed to do so instead of being forced to 
follow the original plan. Amendments could include changes or additions to 
the list of projects in the action plan for the coming year, as published at the 
end of the year. Such market-oriented plans demonstrated to the private sec-
tor and the public the commitment the developmental state needed to show 
to its development goals and gave some assurance that results would be de-
livered. Comparison of long-term and short-term action plans also helped to 
increase investors’ faith in Pudong. A clear vision of Pudong’s future, concrete 
implementation strategies and practical results all combined to increase in-
vestors’ confidence. ‘In the developmental state, government “planners” have 
to convince the private sector of their commitment to economic growth, and 
thus put themselves in real charge of the economy’ (Huff et al., 2001).
The present section examines how Shanghai made use of the developmen-
tal state model to generate opportunities for the Pudong development. The 
development was mainly achieved through the active part played by Shang-
hai ‘as planner, reformer, and developer/entrepreneur’ (Wei and Leung, 2005). 
Various government interventions were designed to help Pudong realise its 
developmental goal, as for example the use of SEZ status, the declared inten-
tion of creating an outward-directed economy with the help of foreign invest-
ment, institutional design to permit the involvement of the private sector and 
adoption of a selective strategy to stimulate the development of particular 
sectors. Further assistance came from the synergy between developmental 
political systems at central and local level (Xia, 2000, p. 208). To induce market 
players to take part, local and central government created new entry rules to 
accommodate the market. Institutional design was used not only as a tool to 
manage the complex network involved in Pudong’s development, but also as 
a means of introducing efficiency into existing institutions. A series of new 
laws was quickly passed to put into effect reforms to facilitate the operation 
of the market. Institutional development and various new laws and policies 
affecting the transfer of land use rights facilitated land development by mak-
ing it possible to involve a variety of different participants in the process, so 
assisting urban development as a whole.
While most of the strategies adopted by a developmental state were adopt-
ed in the development of the Pudong area, some were adopted in a modified 
or revised form. For example, the much desired FDI played a less decisive role 
than the local authority had hoped. Instead Shanghai adopted a shengbu lou 
policy to raise the necessary funds from other Chinese cities and regions. This 
and other modifications reflected the ‘complexity, dynamics and diversity’ of 
urban development (Dekker and Van Kempen, 2004; Roberts and Sykes, 2000; 
Borja and Castells, 1997). The adoption of the experimental approach and a 
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gradual process of reform had already shown that the Chinese state in gen-
eral and Shanghai in particular were fully aware of the complexity and un-
certainty of urban development and were prepared to adapt their intended 
strategies as circumstances changed.
 4.2 Local-global articulation 
Today’s world is subject to random effects produced by the global flow of cap-
ital, people, information, images, technologies, and products. Hannerz (1990, 
1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1996) wrote of the historical increase in ‘cultural flow, the 
emergence of the global ecumene …a single field of persistent interaction 
and exchange between cultures’ and the enabling role of the world city in the 
formation of such ‘open ramifying networks’. Castells uses the term ‘space 
of flow’ in this context. Although cities ‘increasingly depend on the forms 
of their articulation with the global economy as regards their standards and 
modes of living’, Borja and Castells (1997) challenged the widespread view 
that global moulds local. Olds’ contribution to the discussion, based on the 
results of his empirical research into urban development in Vancouver and 
Shanghai, was the claim that ‘global reach is a formative act, depending on 
a wide range of processes and forces operating at a variety of scales’. As lo-
cal and central government treated Pudong as a cooperative exercise, help-
ing to stimulate Shanghai’s internationalisation by taking advantage of ‘the 
growth of the global financial market, the expansion of the international 
trade in services, and the repatterning of foreign direct investment ‘(Sassen, 
2001, p. 329), research was able to show the significance to the speed of area 
development of Shanghai’s mechanism for mobilising capital and encourag-
ing information flow in a specific locality. While China’s central government 
had expressed a preference for economic reform, in the Pudong development 
Shanghai paid particular attention to the attraction of foreign investment and 
the growth of the property market. China’s selective strategy was once more 
clearly reflected in Shanghai’s interaction with global forces in its treatment 
of the Pudong area development. ‘[Special Economic] Zones were a key inter-
national linkage channel for urban centres and could play a major role in in-
ternationalising the city’ (Zweig, 2002, p. 71). As capital flowed in, Shanghai 
worked on improving its financial mechanisms to make them more sophis-
ticated and more in line with international standards. Besides capital prefer-
ence, Shanghai also took note of advanced experience outside China in fields 
such as architecture, urban planning, project management and urban devel-
opment management skills. The knowledge gained, absorbed and adapted to 
suit the Pudong situation, transformed both the landscape of Pudong and the 
local business environment.
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 4.2.1 Global-local financial flow
Coincidentally, the Pudong development began at a time when global finance 
was looking for new opportunities in the East. Sassen’s work The Global City 
(2001a) presents a vibrant picture of the transformation taking place in glo-
bal financial markets. She wrote of ‘the reorganisation of sources of surplus 
value made possible by massive shifts of capital from one area of the world 
to another’ and named the key components of this process as ‘the outflows of 
capital from old industrial centres’ in combination with ‘the inflow of capital 
into newly industrialising countries’. The ability of capital to penetrate tradi-
tional local markets is achieved ‘not only through foreign direct investment 
but also through mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures’. Sassen consid-
ered FDI an important element in the process of capital relocation ‘because 
much of the geographic dispersion of production and of the reorganisation 
in the financial industry is international rather than domestic’ (Sassen, 2001a, 
p. 37). Sassen also claimed that Southeast Asia had replaced Latin America as 
the main recipient of FDI in manufacturing from highly developed countries. 
Olds suggested a similar trend in capital inflow to the property market in the 
same area: ‘it is clear that in an overall sense, global capital has been flowing 
into Asia-Pacific property markets, linking together cities and engendering 
relationships of uneven interdependencies across space’. Investors were at-
tracted by continuing rapid economic growth, a vast market for cheap labour, 
rising incomes and the increasingly consumerist culture of the Asian-Pacific 
Region and sought to take advantage of that vast untapped market. The inter-
est in exploring such a market became even more apparent from the continu-
ous increase in the amount of FDI injected into the region and the arrival of 
multinational corporations and global pension funds (see Olds, 2001, p. 24).
Over the years China has been one of the biggest recipients of FDI. China 
began to experience a rapid growth in inward FDI in 1980, which became even 
greater in 1992 (see Figure 3.36). In 2005 China even surpassed the United 
States as the country receiving the highest inflow of FDI. This unprecedented 
success was the result of a series of factors, including the size of the poten-
tial market, low labour costs, good infrastructure, preferential policies (e.g. tax 
credits), increasing political openness, geographical factors, political stability 
and even the country’s exchange rate regime (Wei, 2005; Xing, 2005; Branstet-
ter and Feenstra, 2002; Zhang, 2001; Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Henley et al., 1999; 
Chen, 1996; Lardy, 1995). Various studies have confirmed in different ways that 
at the beginning of the 1990s , the time at which the Pudong development 
was first proposed and approved, global sources of finance were increasing 
the rate of expansion in East Asia generally and in China in particular, giving 
Shanghai an opportunity to explore strategies to attract global capital flow to 
Pudong.
Cities have become increasingly dependent on a variety of different forms 
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of association with the global economy and their performance as global com-
petitors, and so have needed to find some way of attracting investors, global 
and local, to invest in local urban development projects. Pudong was present-
ed as a nexus between global players and domestic players. To hook Pudong 
to the global economy and the global financial market, the project’s initiators 
borrowed the concept of the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to free Pudong from 
rigid institutional constraints, so allowing it to bypass the administrative, po-
litical, and economic barriers limiting Shanghai’s economic activity and to 
experiment with the development of an outward-looking, market-oriented 
economic system (Ge, 1999, p. 1268). Pudong was able to offer global players 
its status as state-level SEZ and its strategic location, a combination which 
provided a perfect stepping stone to tapping the market offered by a vast hin-
terland that had for decades been closed to them (Graham, 1994). Pudong’s 
strategic location gave global investors an ideal entrance to the Chinese mar-
ket. Shanghai’s leading role in the Chinese economy generally and the Yang-
tze river delta and the Yangtze river valley in particular gave it not only a vast 
local market but also a way for outside investors to enter China’s highly seg-
mented and protected local market. Moreover China’s impressive economic 
performance not only offered global players enormous economic opportuni-
ties but also encouraged a substantial number of Chinese investors who were 
looking for opportunities to expand in the Chinese market, and possibly also 
in the global market. Shanghai’s traditionally strong links with its vast hinter-
land in the Yangtze river delta and the Yangtze river valley encouraged inves-
tors from those regions to see Shanghai, rather than the southern Chinese 
provinces, as a trustworthy intermediary between them and the global econo-
my and the global market.
Shanghai’s original intention was to push through the Pudong develop-
ment by the use of foreign investment. It therefore conducted a series of re-
search projects to investigate FDI and the experience of other developmental 
states that had been successful in attracting FDI. Both the designation as SEZ 
and the creation of outward-directed development zones were results of this 
learning process. The Waigaoqiao Tax-free Zone, the Jinqiao Export Processing 
Zone and the Zhangjiang High-tech Park, each emphasising a different cat-
egory of manufacture, processing or export activities, were designed to hook 
into the global economy by attracting foreign manufacturers, particularly 
multinationals, to set up industrial sites in Pudong. However, just as strate-
gies adopted by other developmental states were modified to suit conditions 
in China, Pudong’s FDI policies had to be adjusted to suit the Chinese context 
in a way that would allow them to live with and even benefit from the prevail-
ing restrictions and limitations. As a deliberate piece of central government 
strategy, the Lujiazui Financial and Trade Zone, the only such zone in China, 
was designed to attract foreign banks and financial organisations and so give 
China a new international centre for finance and trade. Because the Chinese 
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financial system was closed to the outside world, (for example China not only 
restricts exchange between RMB and other currencies but also controls the 
exchange rate), Lujiazui opened the door to foreign financial organisations 
wishing to enter the Chinese financial market. A deliberate policy of estab-
lishing capital markets (including a stock exchange and a gold market) and 
moving those markets to Pudong, had a cumulative effect on people already 
interested in the market potential of China generally and Shanghai in par-
ticular. Central government applied a deliberate strategy of contextual limita-
tion to create the best possible conditions for Pudong to attract financial sup-
port. The result was a rush of enthusiastic foreign investors, all waiting for 
entry approval. Statistics show that in fifteen years, 42 financial organisations 
set up branches in Pudong.
Analysis shows that much of the foreign investment (55%) went into 
manufacture. While Shanghai continues to attempt to transform itself into a 
global city comparable to London, New York and Tokyo, it seems to have no 
intention of giving up its manufacturing sector. It is interesting to note that 
Sim et al. (2003) also comment on the development of Singapore as a global 
city in which manufacture continues to play an important economic role. The 
same feature can also be observed in other Asian cities. The significance of 
the manufacturing sector for the growth of Shanghai’s GDP coupled with the 
employment it provides and the current contextual and political difficulty of 
creating a new international financial hub, seems to have led Shanghai to be 
reluctant to change its present approach and concentrate exclusively on de-
veloping the financial sector.
Pudong’s preferential policies to attract FDI were not limited to the fi-
nancial and manufacturing sectors, the two sectors which Pudong hoped to 
establish quickly as its main economic supports. It was hoped that inviting 
foreign investors and foreign investment into Pudong’s urban development, 
especially in areas formerly restrict to the Chinese public sector or Chinese 
private investors, would encourage an inflow of foreign investment to make 
good the shortage of capital. Land development projects and infrastructure 
development were thrown open as the local authority showed its willingness 
to involve global players into Pudong’s urban development and real estate 
market. Pudong’s preferential attitude towards foreign investment gave for-
eign investors a number of advantages over their Chinese counterparts, such 
as exemption from taxation in the first three years and other tax concessions 
(see Shanghai Municipal document Decree. No. 35). The Chinese private sector, 
in particular, found it difficult to compete, not only because of the tax advan-
tages enjoyed by foreign investors, but also because of state bias in the finan-
cial sector and other areas relating to property development. To profit from 
such policies, local state-owned organisations attempted to set up joint ven-
tures with foreign investors, and large Chinese corporations (some of which 
were state-owned) preferred to set up a foreign subsidiary rather than invest-
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ing in Pudong directly. Unfortunately this eagerness to integrate into the glo-
bal economy and bring global players into the local market, to some extent 
distorted the local market by encouraging local organisations to develop tac-
tics to reduce or even profit from the resulting inequality.
Although Pudong’s property market brought with it huge uncertainties, the 
opportunities offered – an untapped market and the chance of high return – 
persuaded a significant number of developers to try their luck. The dramatic 
increase in prices and rents for housing and offices in Pudong, coupled with 
the booming property market in Shanghai, has revealed the danger that con-
tinuing integration with the global property market may lead to an uncontrol-
lable separation from the local Chinese market and a loss of state influence. 
Sassen (2000, p. 6) described the impact of the international property market 
on local property markets in global cities in the following terms:
‘It means that the real estate prices in the centre of New York City are 
more connected to prices in London or Frankfurt than to the overall real 
estate market in the city. In the 1980s, powerful institutions from Japan, 
for instance, found it profitable to buy and sell property in Manhattan or 
central London. In the 1990s, this story was repeated many times. Ger-
man, Dutch, French, and U.S. investors bought properties in central Lon-
don and other major cities around the world. The competition forced up 
prices and raised them even further to allow property to be resold at a 
profit. How can a small commercial operation in these cities compete 
with such investors and the prices they can command?’
Although the impact of international investors on Pudong’s property market 
bears no comparison to the situation in London and New York, there is no 
doubt that international investors greatly influenced the real estate markets 
in Pudong and Shanghai, especially after the Southeast Asian economic crisis. 
Not only did investors involved in real estate development rapidly increase 
their investment in local real estate projects (by 65% between 2003 and 2004 
for example), but investors who were reluctant to participate directly in prop-
erty development for fear of risk, participated aggressively in local corporate 
finance. Firms like Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs were unwilling to par-
ticipate directly in development activities, but were happy to play the role of 
shareholder. In fact, as one interviewee said: 
‘Most real estate companies have two divisions: one works on the reali-
sation of real estate projects, the other targets foreign investors to cover 
shortfalls in finance for their real estate projects’. 
Even in land development companies such as the Lujiazui development com-
pany (see Chapter 3, Section 3.1 and 3.4), foreign investment formed a signifi-
cant part of the whole financial structure. For foreign investors, this approach 
was more attractive than direct involvement in real estate development, 
because it was a less risky business than developing real estate on foreign 
soil. The way that Shanghai’s property market is heating up because of the 
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growing economy, the coming 2010 world expo and speculation on changes 
in the yuan/US dollar exchange rate, has encouraged foreign investors to 
see China as an emerging market offering long-term market potential and a 
high economic return. Investors also hope to make a quick profit on changes 
in exchange rates and interest rates. It has been reported that in the first 11 
months of 2004, foreign investors invested US$ 22.2 billion in the real estate 
sector, US$ 15 billion of which was used for real estate development, direct-
ly or indirectly, and US$ 7 billion to purchase property. In fact foreign buyers 
made up one-fifth of all house purchasers in Shanghai. The property market 
in Pudong and Puxi has seen rapid price increases, even between one day and 
the next (Xu and Chen, Southern Metropolitan Daily, May 27, 2005).
Entering into partnership with foreign investors was not so financially ap-
pealing to local developers, because state banks were accustomed to support-
ing activity in the real estate sector. More appealing was the opportunity to 
acquire general and financial management skills from foreign counterparts. 
This situation changed when the state began to try to prevent the real estate 
market from overheating, as happened in 2003 when central government’s 
newly issued Document 121 imposed stricter controls on bank loans for re-
al estate purposes. According to Document 121, housing developers are not 
eligible for bank loans until the project’s buildings have roofs on them. This 
rule could cause real estate developers to run short of capital, even real es-
tate companies that are in good shape. Bank loans were the main source of 
finance for Chinese real estate developers, and bank loans were tightly con-
trolled by the state. If the state thinks the market is overheating and needs to 
be controlled, it simply issues new regulations to restrict lending. This is why 
since 2003 Chinese real estate developers in Shanghai have been desperate to 
raise additional investment.
Speculation by international investors has been said to have set an exam-
ple to local real estate investors, especially those with limited knowledge of 
the real estate sector and modern corporate management. Local investors’ 
participation in local markets tended to involve speculation based more on 
intuition than on professional calculation, with the result that those inves-
tors often suffered the effects of bad market analysis, bad management and a 
lack of vision. (Chapter 3, section 3.1 and 3.3 gave an analysis of the behaviour 
of real estate companies with a ministerial or provincial government back-
ground). Although the size of their losses was limited by profits generated by 
market growth and preferential treatment on land prices and taxation, they 
contributed to the increasingly speculative character of Pudong’s real estate 
market and raised questions about the health of the Pudong market.
However, despite the many preferential policies introduced by central 
government to help Shanghai to shape up as China’s financial centre, lead-
ing many people to believe that Shanghai has the potential to catch up with 
or pass Hong Kong and become a new world-class financial hub, contextual 
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limitations are proving to be a barrier. The main barriers erected by existing 
Chinese financial systems, such as the non-convertible Yuan, the centrally 
controlled exchange rate and the state-controlled banking system, will all 
tend to hinder Shanghai’s long-term development into a world-class financial 
hub. The Chinese legal system and the weak financial system also add to the 
uncertainty. And although central government has made great efforts to give 
Shanghai sufficient autonomy to attract FDI and open up its financial sector, 
it still has not moved the chief decision-making body (the People’s Bank of 
China) to Shanghai. Many investors see this as a significant sign that govern-
ment has still not completely made up its mind to support Shanghai’s ambi-
tion to become a leading financial centre and would rather apply its political 
leverage to maintaining the status of Hong Kong. Given the present state of 
the market in Pudong, foreign investors, though attracted by the potential of 
an emerging real estate market capable of yielding a far higher return than 
any mature market, will still try to minimise uncertainty and risk. Their in-
creasingly speculative activities and the impact of those activities on Shang-
hai’s property market continue to cast doubt on future prospects: how long 
can local and central government continue to guide and control an area de-
velopment in which uncontrollable global players are becoming increasingly 
influential? Can a developmental state maintain the win-win situation creat-
ed by a liberalised market in the long-term? And is there any chance that the 
local authority can continue to benefit from the contribution made by foreign 
investment without suffering the kind of damage caused by speculative FDI 
in the real estate sector? So far it seems the state has not yet found a likely 
solution to this problem.
The global Chinese business network
Overseas Chinese networks and the emerging financial influence of Chinese 
capitalists and firms operating within the international Chinese communi-
ty have played a crucial role in helping Pudong to access global sources of 
capital, formal and informal. This is well demonstrated by Pudong’s financial 
structure and the unusually large proportion of FDI contributed by Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries like Singapore and Malaysia (Chapter 
3, Section 3.3 and 3.4 gave further details), in marked contrast to the fact that 
90% of all global FDI currently comes from ‘the big three’, the European Un-
ion, the US and Japan. However, this finding follows a pattern similar to that 
revealed by studies of FDI into Shanghai and China (Chan, 2000; Olds, 2001; 
Yeung, 2004; Zhang, 2005). Most of these findings point to Greater China38 in 
the Asian-Pacific region and the global Chinese business network as directing 
   Great China generally refers to the areas that include Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao. Some 
research also includes Singapore as part of the Great China. 
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the inflow of FDI into China. For example, between 1978 and the mid-1990s, 
overseas Chinese invested more than US$ 50 billion in mainland China, ac-
counting for more than 80% of total realised FDI and helping mainland China 
to become the largest recipient of FDI of all developing countries throughout 
the 1990s (Yeung, 2004). Yeung (2004) described the ‘adaptable’ Chinese capi-
talist as a hybrid capitalist, more concerned with individuals than institu-
tions, a representative of an open and flexible form of capitalism: ‘Once they 
have established businesses in their host economies, ethnic Chinese and their 
firms begin to extend their operations and networks across borders to form 
increasingly seamless webs of Chinese capitalism on a regional and, some-
times, global scale.’ In fact, the network approach of the developmental state 
has already been followed by global Chinese capitalists, whose operations, 
based on thousands of clan networks, have enabled them to ‘penetrate local 
communities, expand into mainland China, join the global network, and send 
their children to the best schools, all for the purpose of engaging in network-
ing. This “truly global, tribal network” derives its strength from the network’ 
(Naisbitt, 1996; Xia, 2000, p. 37). Though starting up a good deal later than 
Guangdong and other regions in southern China, Shanghai quickly achieved 
the same level of connection with the informal, loosely knitted, global Chi-
nese business network. Shanghai had the advantage that a large number of 
Shanghainese who immigrated to other countries or fled to Hong Kong or Tai-
wan before the Communist party took power, now hope to re-establish con-
nections with their hometown. Most of these people are highly educated and 
many are involved in business and trade, being part of the Overseas Chinese 
network.
 4.2.2 Global-local information flow
Global-local interaction is not restricted to economic production, the prima-
ry activity of almost every industry and R&D undertaking in the Pudong area. 
Pudong also provides an interesting example of the influence exerted by for-
eign expertise, directing and assisting Shanghai’s urban development, partici-
pating in different phases of the planning and architectural design, establish-
ing a land regime and setting up public-private partnerships. One of the most 
interesting characteristics of this knowledge transfer is the degree of local 
pragmatism in adapting advanced knowledge and know-how before applying 
it to the local situation.
Urban planning
Architecture and urban planning were two of the areas most active in adapt-
ing knowledge from the outside world to suit the Pudong situation. Local pro-
fessionals, encouraged by their own professional curiosity and the eagerness 
of local politicians to hear outside opinions, were largely responsible for ini-
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tiating interaction with the outside world, although the earliest initiative was 
more a matter of ‘importing’ than interaction. The result of local planners’ re-
search into American zoning concepts and Hong Kong’s Outline Zoning Plans 
(OZP) led them to apply similar principles to Pudong’s land use plan. Their 
search for new ‘engines’ to power the city’s growth led them to examine the 
impact of the Central Business District (CBD) on the American economy and 
its application to Pudong’s development plan. Interacting and conferring with 
outside experts gave local professionals an insight into how to examine lo-
cal projects in the light of western planning concepts. SMG was determined 
to employ world-class architects who had a clear understanding of what a 
futuristic 21st-century international centre should look like (Olds, 1997, p. 17). 
Olds concluded that the fact that this foreign input had little impact on the 
actual master plan was unimportant, because their role was largely promo-
tional: ‘Lujiazui was simply branded by the world’s design elites, and the SMG 
made full use of their “signatures” to achieve broader goals than the practi-
cal development of the 170 ha area’ (Olds, 2001, p. 234). The resulting images, 
used in brochures and on websites, had the effect of increasing the flow of 
global capital into Pudong. The lack of Chinese experience meant that the lo-
cality could be treated as a tabula rasa. None of the creative references used 
by foreign architects were derived from Chinese cities, nor did they relate in 
any significant way to the current situation or take much account of imple-
mentation problems such as the relocation of existing residents. In fact the 
local context was largely ignored. It seemed that every city was treated the 
same way. In Rogers’ words, ‘Shanghai is a modern city, and modern cities are 
shaped by the same kind of pressures all over the world’ (quoted in Olds, 2001, 
p. 208). This approach underestimates the power of the local situation and 
the complex web of relationships between global and local. In their proposed 
plans, foreign architects drew upon their considerable experience of global 
cities. For example, the Ito proposal drew heavily on a 1992 master plan sub-
mitted for the redevelopment of a large site in Antwerp. The Perrault plan was 
heavily influenced by reference situations in New York, Venice and Paris (Olds, 
2001, p. 215). These examples show that Castells’ ‘space of flows’ is also re-
flected in a tendency towards architectural uniformity (Castells, 1996, p. 417). 
Nevertheless, all this information and knowledge was not without value to 
planning practice. The different proposals were actually used by local Shang-
hainese planners in a more pragmatic and practical way, adapted to suit lo-
cal conditions. This demonstrates that the articulation of global and local is 
dualistic, dynamic and under constant tension. The relationship is contextual 
(Kooijman and Wigmans, 2003, p. 324). The same conflict is even more appar-
ent in architecture. The example of the Jinmao Tower is a perfect example of 
the conflict between modern and traditional and between global and local.
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Land institutions
Pudong’s land regime was largely based on the experience of other develop-
mental states, particularly Singapore and Hong Kong, which established suc-
cessful land institutions to leverage state ownership of land and profited from 
large amounts of revenue from their land. Pudong did not in fact copy what 
had been done in other successful cases, but went to great lengths to adapt 
the various techniques to their own locality and changing economic situation.
Because of its different economic situation, Pudong focused on different types 
of investment to develop land. Sometimes specific policies were adopted to 
stimulate changes in emphasis, as for example the special policy to support 
private investment in the Orchid Garden urban renewal projects. To reduce 
the financial pressure on the city created by land and infrastructure devel-
opment, Shanghai adopted a strategy to ‘rotate land use rights’. The change 
of emphasis from companies with a provincial or ministerial background to 
overseas Chinese and later to international players is another illustration of 
the different strategies adopted by Pudong to adapt to the changing global-lo-
cal market. Of course all aspects of the land market, the land development 
companies and the land bank (set up to expropriate land and prepare it for 
further development) combined to create a land provision system (covering 
the expropriation of land, trade in land, the prioritisation of blocks of land for 
development and the development of strategies for future expansion) were 
subject to public-sector guidance.
The institutionalisation of land development therefore became part of the 
process of China’s transition, facilitating the development of the market by 
sustaining the developmental state model. The adoption of an active land 
policy increased the speed of development by encouraging new players to in-
vest and earn increased revenue from land leasing.
Public-private partnership
The introduction of public-private partnership (PPP) is another interesting 
aspect of Pudong’s pragmatic approach to foreign management techniques. 
Some academic researchers actually doubted the applicability of PPP to Con-
fucian countries in Asia, arguing that the political and social culture in such 
countries is far less amenable than Western cultures to a plural or partner-
ship mode of service delivery (Common, 2000, pp. 135-148; Wettenhall, 2003, 
p. 87). ‘Confucian Asia’ here includes the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), Taiwan, South Korea and Ja-
pan in the east and Singapore in the southeast, all of which share many so-
cio-economic characteristics with the rest of East Asia (Common, 2000, p. 134). 
Confucianism’s hierarchical structure and its influence on a nation’s politi-
cal and societal structure are said to explain the difficulties encountered in 
putting PPP into practice. This claim is based more on a theoretical analysis of 
cultural differences than on an exploration of practical issues. However, many 
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different kinds of player were involved in the development of Pudong. For the 
first time, urban planning and urban development was not just a public task, 
but the collective responsibility of a broad-based group of stakeholders. This 
interactive approach, which became even more common in the implementa-
tion stage because of the need to gain financial and public support, was very 
different from the traditional Chinese approach to urban redevelopment, in 
which the central role was generally played by the public sector and public 
finance. It should be noted that in China the creation of PPPs was based on 
purely financial considerations rather than social concern. The main concern 
was how private sector investment could be involved in Pudong, not just in 
real estate but in the industrial and service sectors generally. The flexibility 
to allow public-private interaction and arrange public-private partnerships 
reflects an important Chinese belief: the end is more important than the 
means (Chen, 2004 and 2006). This pragmatic approach on the part of Chi-
nese reformers and urban managers has helped them to take useful experi-
ences from others and quickly adapt them to their own situation, and to react 
quickly to a changing situation and new difficulties. In its pursuit of market-
oriented reform, Shanghai showed itself to be creative in borrowing and ap-
plying free-market concepts and adapting them to suit existing ideological 
constraints. Many useful experiences and new financial mechanisms were 
‘borrowed’ from the free market and actively used in the Pudong development. 
Several types of capital market were set up in Pudong, including a stock mar-
ket, a futures market, a gold market and a ‘property rights exchange centre’. 
A number of free-market principles were also used to guide the reform of 
the market in urban land. A new feature of the Shanghai land policy was the 
designation of special experimental zones, with specified priorities and facili-
ties, to stimulate private initiatives and to test reactions from the free market. 
These kinds of measures had been found to encourage competition between 
different districts within the same city, e.g. Shanghai, and between different 
Chinese cities, especially the ‘open’ coastal cities.
The first aim was to discover which PPP typologies were applicable to the 
Chinese context, but in the event this approach turned out to be rather point-
less. The applicable typology is directly limited or restricted by contextual 
factors, so the PPP typology Shanghai adopted for Pudong was defined by the 
nature of the locality and the conditions in force at the time. In fact, a more 
interesting question is why and how such a mechanism can be embraced, giv-
en the changing relationship between the public sector, the private sector and 
society at large, in the context of global-local interaction. China has followed 
the developmental state model, and networks and network strategies are es-
sential if such a state is to achieve its development ambitions. ‘Because net-
works provide connectedness and embeddedness among organisations, they 
encourage organisations to learn from each other. They also facilitate coor-
dination and emulation among organisations, increase responsiveness of or-
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ganisations to each other, and also reduce transaction cost for organisations.’ 
Xia further explains, ‘A network strategy encourages reciprocity, guiding the 
pattern of interaction among individuals and organisations and leading to 
self-restraint rather than confrontation’. The use of the network approach to 
understand the developmental state makes it possible to explore the connec-
tion between the state and the market, between individual localities and the 
centre, and between local and global, and the logical basis of the interdepend-
ence of important players and institutions. ‘Under the constraints arising 
from its vastness and Communist legacy, China had to creatively transform 
its institutional arrangements and modify the developmental state model to 
facilitate the development of the market while still maintaining the power of 
central government. The two most important modifications are seen in the re-
lationship between government and the legal system, and between the centre 
and individual localities’ (Xia, 2000, p. 209).These modifications facilitated the 
forging of networks and the construction of public-private partnerships. Xia 
(2000, p. 215) observed that the Chinese political system contained no clear-
cut boundaries between different institutions: ‘instead, they are intertwined 
through institutional links and overlapping personnel’. This mutual embed-
dedness gave China the strength to achieve a gradual transition while still 
maintaining the dual developmental state, ‘because a network strategy pro-
vides flexibility for institutional adaptation without jeopardizing long-term 
stability’.
 4.3 Conclusions
A variety of evidence points to the evolution of policy to deal with changing 
conditions and the different challenges faced during the development of Pu-
dong. The various policies and their implementation all possessed a number 
of significant characteristics which defined the way in which the Pudong de-
velopment was handled. The urban development of Shanghai Pudong was fa-
cilitated by the adoption by a developmental state of an open-door policy. The 
aim underlying the development strategy employed in Pudong was to achieve 
economic development. All the way through from decision-making to imple-
mentation, an active local government influenced the development process, 
both openly and discreetly, according to circumstances and the requirements 
of the moment. The application of the national SEZ concept to a large-scale 
urban development project and the wide range of experimental policies fol-
lowed in Pudong is reminiscent of the tactics used by China to stimulate its 
economic growth and foreign investment. The management strategies adopt-
ed by Shanghai in developing Pudong, reflect China’s use of the developmen-
tal state model. The activities of the development companies show the way 
the developmental state, assisted by local corporatism, set up connections 
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with global networks. The explosive growth of Shanghai over such a short pe-
riod was largely the result of ad hoc decisions made by a great variety of par-
ticipants, with disparate interests, making compromises, resolving conflicts 
and forging alliances, all triggered by policies of economic reform.
Like other SEZs, Pudong serves Shanghai in particular and China in gen-
eral as a ‘shop window’ and a ‘base’, creating opportunities for interaction be-
tween western culture and Chinese culture: foreign investors can gain a better 
understanding of China’s social and economic traditions, while the Chinese 
have greater opportunities to learn about western technology, management 
and expertise (Wong and Tang, 2005, p. 307). Thus Pudong’s SEZ status not 
only gave Shanghai sufficient autonomy to hook into the global capital mar-
ket but also allowed global players to penetrate the local market, providing 
a deregulated zone in which to carry on their activities within a China that 
was still largely regulated. Moreover the significance of the Pudong develop-
ment to Shanghai’s economic restructuring and linkage with global economy, 
meant that locating in Pudong gave investors an important stepping stone to 
the market, both internal and external.
The research showed why Pudong, out of the dozens of urban districts giv-
en similar status and privileges (SEZs and ETDZs [Economic and Technological 
Development Zones]) and the hundreds of urban renewal projects conducted 
during the same period, was able to achieve its development goals in such 
a short time. On the basis of a thorough examination of the way the project 
developed, there can be no doubt that Pudong was a temporary process of ur-
ban transformation executed in an era of increasing globalisation. In a local 
project of this kind, local, global, national and regional forces interact with 
one another; the dynamic process tends to benefit them all. The government 
of a developmental state, assisted by local state corporatism, with local con-
nections to the global network, is invariably exposed to powerful global forces. 
This, in essence, is the logic of globalisation. The process of globalisation and 
the urban and financial outcome of the development process challenge the 
autonomy of the state. Full integration into the market economy makes it in-
creasingly difficult for government to stand aside. A developmental state can-
not remain isolated from and unaffected by the globalisation process (Chen 
and Wigmans, 2005). The nature of urban design and the dominant activities 
within a given city increasingly reflect links to global capital markets. Na-
tional government and the local government of Shanghai treated Pudong as 
a stimulus to Shanghai’s internationalisation by seeking to benefit from ‘the 
growth of the global financial market, the expansion of the international 
trade in services, and the restructuring of foreign direct investment’ (Sassen, 
2001, p. 329). The urban development process in Pudong-Shanghai enabled lo-
cal government to attract FDI at the cost of the loss by central government of 
control of management of the project and the complex financial structures 
and the many international capital transfers generated. The financial mech-
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anisms employed in Pudong demonstrate the difficulties faced by the state. 
When a local financial system is integrated into the global system of capital 
flow, the state faces increasing difficulty in controlling the flow of capital and 
overseeing the different joint ventures, each with its own way of generating 
funding.
The Pudong development demonstrates the dynamics of local-global ar-
ticulation, in which an individual locality takes an active role in responding 
and adapting to global challenges, and in some cases even takes the offensive 
to take advantage of the opportunities presented. Although the state treated 
the impact of knowledge transfer and global capital inflow with caution (for 
fear of negative influence), it was also aware of how significant global capital 
and advanced knowledge could be to a local area development project and to 
the efficiency and effectiveness of urban governance so long desired by local 
authorities. To benefit from external influences rather than being swallowed 
up by them, local authorities (in collaboration with central government) spent 
ample time on study and research before taking ideas accepted international-
ly – particularly in the West – and adapting them to suit their particular local-
ities. This progressive pragmatism was not only applied to global capital flow, 
but also to the transfer of knowledge from the outside world. The designation 
of Pudong as an SEZ created a ‘national enclave’ within which bold experi-
ments could be carried out on various market concepts, helping to accelerate 
a pragmatic adaptation to information inflow and knowledge transfer.
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 5 Conclusions and 
observations
 5.1 Conclusions
The basic focus of this research has been on how China’s urban transforma-
tion dealt with the effect on area development of the dynamic tension be-
tween global and local influences and the speed achieved by Shanghai’s Pu-
dong area development. The study has considered two different aspects of 
this speed: the impact of global influences on area development exerted by 
networks and global capital, and the local response to the formulation, imple-
mentation and adjustment of area development strategies by a local author-
ity working in a developmental state. The study has treated global and local 
influences as both phenomena requiring explanation and explanations for a 
phenomenon.
To explain how global-local tension was managed to achieve speed in the 
Pudong area development, the research first considered the practical effects 
of interaction between global and local influences, from decision-making to 
implementation, from land and infrastructure development to property devel-
opment, from operation to finance. The research discovered how the area de-
velopment strategy for Pudong was formulated by a process of interactive de-
cision-making. The aim of the development was to help revive Shanghai and 
establish its importance to the global economy. Interaction with market play-
ers from China and abroad enabled local government, supported by central 
government, to explore innovative management strategies and maximise the 
possibility of attracting market players and investment. Each aspect of the in-
teraction between local and global influences was examined and highlighted.
Two sets of interrelated variables, local and global, were disentangled to 
see how each contributed to the management of global-local tension. The 
first part of the analysis provided a partial explanation of the driving force 
behind local government's enthusiastic ambition to become part of the glo-
bal economy and presented the rationale which underlaid the formulation of 
its area development strategies. The analysis also considered the modus op-
erandi of the relevant local and national institutions and organisations and 
the means made available to them by the developmental state. The second 
part highlighted the dynamic linkage between global and local influences in 
an area development, achieved by knowledge transfer and capital flow. The 
inflow of information and knowledge helped Pudong to improve its physical 
environment and other aspects of its spatial design to meet market demands 
and expectations. Global financial inflow gave local government the strength 
to carry out its ambitious plans, despite the risks and uncertainties created by 
global influences. The significant role played by the global Chinese business 
network in channelling the flow of capital to Pudong was determined by his-
torical and cultural factors, demonstrating a significant Chinese modification 
to the successful strategies applied by other East Asian developmental states.
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Area development and interaction between global and local influences
Area development has been influenced by the changes imposed on cities by 
a changing world. The strategic turnround in the urban agenda for Pudong 
reflects the kind of shift experienced by many cities, from regulation and dis-
tribution to the promotion of economic growth and competitiveness, making 
revitalisation and competitiveness the central aims of urban intervention. 
Cities around the world tend to use a common language of urban regenera-
tion to brand themselves, using terms such as ‘competitiveness’, ‘flexibility’, 
‘efficiency’, ‘state entrepreneurship’, ‘strategic partnerships’ and ‘collaborative 
advantages’. Emerging urban policies tend to ‘rely on the planning and im-
plementation of large-scale urban development projects to lead economic re-
generation … set against a background of changing urban governance that in-
corporates a critical shift in scale, domains of intervention, actors and agents, 
institutional structures and relations, and policy tools’ (Swyngedouw, 2005), 
as in the case of the Pudong development.
The decision to develop Pudong formed part of the strategy of the local 
authority and central government to assist Shanghai to develop into a sig-
nificant global centre, whether as an emerging global city (Olds, 2001), a world 
city (Yusuf and Wu, 2002; Wei and Leung, 2005), or a globalising city (Li and 
Wu, 2006; Wu, 2003). This meant that Shanghai not only needed to acquire a 
range of economic, geographic and institutional strengths but also to benefit 
from the energy released by openness (Yusuf and Wu, 2002, p. 1215). Given its 
strategic goal of becoming an international centre for finance, trade, transpor-
tation and telecommunications on the Western Pacific Rim, Shanghai was de-
termined to encourage the creation of the conditions required by a global city 
acting as a centre for the exchange of global capital and information and a 
key location for the headquarters of multinationals. The function of Pudong, a 
leading large-scale urban development project, was to enhance the competi-
tiveness and capacity of Shanghai’s ‘hardware’ (its physical environment and 
economic growth) and ‘software’, (its market institutions and economic open-
ness) both of which were essential to the re-positioning of Shanghai on the 
map of globally competitive metropolises.
The Pudong development was used by Shanghai to help it to carry out two 
forms of strategic restructuring, urban and economic. Urban restructuring 
(the restructuring of urban space) created high-quality space to accommodate 
multinationals and global financial institutions just 500 meters from the old 
city centre, and improved telecommunication systems and national and in-
ternational transport links (e.g. by developing Shanghai Pudong International 
airport and the Waigaoqiao deep-water harbour). Economic restructuring es-
tablished a base for an open economy, focused on the service sector, stimulat-
ing the flow of global finance and high-end export-oriented manufacture. In 
some ways the Pudong development followed what Swyngedouw described 
as the developmental logic of large-scale urban investment projects in Euro-
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pean cities, ‘following the rationale of global finance, real estate capital, and 
the real or imagined need for competitive restructuring’ (Swyngedouw, 2005, 
p. 67). But there were important differences. The three global cities New York, 
London and Tokyo gave preference to financial services and the service sector 
generally, with much reduced emphasis on manufacturing. In Pudong howev-
er, Shanghai not only developed the service sector but also encouraged manu-
facturing , though with more emphasis on high-tech industry than on textiles 
and other traditional heavily polluting industries. Even more interesting was 
the role played by the state in leading area development, attracting private 
participants, curbing bureaucracy and creating a business-friendly environ-
ment. These features were closely linked to the logic of the developmental 
state, China’s chosen model.
Although Pudong is a typical example of area development, the use of de-
velopmental logic as a guideline was clearly expressed in the strategy adopt-
ed, which was initiated and mainly shaped by the determination to achieve 
economic development1. A selective strategy, giving preference to specific ur-
ban areas, reflected the fragmentation of government responsibilities and the 
increasing involvement of the private sector in the design and implementa-
tion of urban policy. The application of the national SEZ concept to a large-
scale urban development project and the various experimental policies tried 
out in Pudong were reminiscent of the kind of tactics used by China to stimu-
late economic growth and foreign investment in the country as a whole. An 
active local authority influenced the development process all the way from 
decision-making to implementation, sometimes openly, sometimes discreet-
ly, depending on circumstances and demands at the time. The restructuring 
of state intervention radically transformed traditional urban management to 
create a new style of urban governance designed to produce results, efficiency 
and effectiveness. The activities of the development companies illustrate how 
the developmental state, assisted by local state corporatism, set up local con-
nections with global networks.
As Shanghai’s initiators prepared for the Pudong development, their vision 
of how to bring Pudong and Shanghai as a whole on to the world stage as a 
globally competitive metropolis involved a good deal more than the simple 
improvement of urban space or property-led urban regeneration. Rather their 
vision was comprehensive and integrated, seeking a continuing development 
of the economic, physical, social, environmental and even institutional condi-
tions in Pudong. Urban development as such often requires a strategic frame-
work to address the interrelated problems it creates. This realisation led to 
a series of urban policies, established over a period of time and touching on 
almost every aspect of Pudong’s development. While Pudong maintained its 
vision and a number of basic strategies to guide the daily practice and man-
agement of its urban development and the distribution of resources, in gen-
eral those strategies were flexible, subject to and prepared to accept change. 
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The explosive growth of Shanghai over such a short period was largely the 
result of ad hoc decisions made by a great variety of participants with dispa-
rate interests, making compromises, resolving conflicts and forging alliances, 
all triggered by policies of economic reform. Over the years, these policies 
evolved, improved or were replaced, as required to deal with changing politi-
cal, economic or social circumstances. For example, the environment changed 
in ways that had not been predicted. Thus Hu Wei (2002), director of Pudong 
New Area, described Pudong’s development as a ‘learning process, taking les-
sons learnt in other parts of China and applying them innovatively to the 
situation in Pudong’. It seems more reasonable to say that local government 
used the Pudong development as an aid to learning how best to carry out an 
urban development process in a global context.
This process of learning and evolution, defining and redefining, formu-
lating and reformulating, all aimed to promote Pudong’s progress in a situa-
tion of changing national institutions (for example the evolving land policy 
discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.1) and a rapidly growing economy demon-
strates the impossibility of ignoring emergent elements in such a dynamic 
and complex process. Because of the institutional vacuum left after the 1978 
reform, ‘the exploration of alternative institutional and organizational ap-
proaches to managing cities, society, the economy, and the environment [pro-
ceeded] with a remarkable amount of creativity and invention’ (Albrechts and 
Mandelbaum, 2005, p. 233). Even if there is an awareness of environmental 
change, it does not follow that the right strategies can be formulated immedi-
ately. ‘Strategies may fail, not only by being unsuccessfully implemented, but 
also by being successfully implemented and then proving inadequate’ (Mint-
zberg, 1994, p. 360). The changes to the strategies adopted for Pudong show 
that not all strategies, whether deliberate or emergent, fit successfully into 
the environment. For example, central government took a number of differ-
ent measures to damp down the increasingly overheated real estate market 
in 2004 and 2005, but without much success. Only in 2006, when government 
took drastic measures to limit foreign investment in the property market, in-
cluding the introduction of new forms of taxation , was it possible to see signs 
of a gradual cooling down in the housing market. The Pudong development 
provided a good opportunity to examine the effect of the interaction between 
global and local influences on an evolving area development, to see not mere-
ly how globalisation and the resulting network society affected local life at 
area level, but also how a developmental state can benefit from that interac-
tion to actively transform challenges into opportunities for local development.
Factors affecting the speed of the Pudong development
The present study was prompted by a wish to discover the factors which de-
termined the speed of the Pudong development, a development was remark-
able not only for its extent, with an annual construction area equal to that of 
[  ]
Spain, but also for the accompanying explosive economic growth, which ulti-
mately led to a twelfth of Shanghai’s land area and a tenth of its population 
contributing one fifth of the city’s total GDP and a quarter of its exports. The 
per capita GDP of Pudong rocketed from US$ 1,000 in 1990 to US$ 7,700 in 2001 
and US 11,950 in 2005. The speed achieved by the Pudong development has 
become a symbol of Shanghai’s increasing stature and an image of China’s 
future. Shanghai’s rebirth has given rise to a range of superficial speculations 
on cause and effect. The mass media tend to see the lack of democracy and 
the heavy hand of the communist regime as the explanation for the speed 
of Pudong’s growth. However, such linear explanations hardly show much in-
sight into the complex nature of a city’s growth. Cities are complicated, made 
up of many parts interconnected in intricate ways. In any area development 
interrelated factors evolve and affect one another, producing unexpected con-
sequences and creating dynamic complexity. The usual intuitive judgement 
of cause and effect can do no more than highlight the effect of a single factor 
and cannot provide any worthwhile insight into the operation of a dynami-
cally complex city with non-linear characteristics. The speed of the Pudong 
development was made possible by a number of different factors interrelated 
in such a way as to perform a unique function not achievable by any one of 
those factors in isolation.
The research made use of urban theories of globalisation and the theory of 
the developmental state to explain the nature of a large-scale area develop-
ment in a specifically Chinese context in an era of globalisation. The theory 
of the developmental state39 made it possible to clarify a number of features 
of the Pudong development, especially the powerful motives underlying gov-
ernment intervention in local affairs. Although the study distinguished the 
main features which affected the speed, the fact remains that the complexity 
and dynamics of a city cannot be simplified into just a few elements. Differ-
ent factors interact and reinforce one another. The developmental state, the 
most explicit context of the Pudong development, played a dominant role in 
determining not only the state’s goals and the role played by the state in the 
development but also the network approach exploited by local government to 
deliberately formulate coalitions between state and market, global influences 
and local influences. However, the decision by the state to take an active role 
in this local development project was not taken blindly or subjectively, but fol-
lowed a careful observation and understanding of global economics followed 
by a progressive adaptation to the potential and opportunities offered by the 
global economy. The pragmatic adaptation of advanced know-how derived 
from the outside world to suit conditions in Pudong was a distinctive devel-
   The political survival of Chinese society is the central aim of the developmental state (Castells, 2000b; Xia, 
2000; Huff, 1995; Woo-Cuming, 1999).
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opmental strategy introduced by local government, allowing the developmen-
tal state to use all possible means to achieve its developmental goal. The most 
representative example of pragmatic adaptation in the field of urban develop-
ment was the active land policy, creating an intermediary between state and 
market and attracting global players to a local development. The active land 
policy not only generated substantial income for the further development of 
local infrastructure, but also led to changes in entry rules allowing the private 
sector to become involved in what was traditionally the domain of the pub-
lic sector. The same experiment was carried out with infrastructure develop-
ment. Later, with the development of housing reform and the emergence of 
a real estate industry, the private sector and private finance began to play a 
significant role in the property market, leading public and private finance to 
combine in support of the Pudong development. One strikingly unusual char-
acteristic of Pudong’s financial mechanism was the role played by the global 
Chinese business network as nodes in the global financial network linking a 
local area development and financial market to global capital. This network 
not only played a key role in attracting global capital to the Pudong develop-
ment, but also encouraged speculative investors hoping to earn a quick return 
from Pudong’s booming real estate market.
1. An active public sector and a network strategy
A developmental state is characterised by ‘an active role for the state and a 
collaborative relationship between the state and the economy’ (White and 
Grey, 1988; Johnson, 1995; Huff, 1995; Chan, 1998; Woo-Cumming, 1999; Xia, 
2000; Castells, 2000a and 2000b; Low, 2004). The development of Pudong took 
place in the context of a developmental state, with a developmental mission 
and a determination to explore every last possibility that might lead to eco-
nomic success and integration into the global market. The active role played 
by the state in the Pudong development was achieved by a synergistic coali-
tion between local and central government involving preferential policies and 
financial support. As a matter of developmental logic, local and central gov-
ernment defined the Pudong development not just as an area development 
but as the use of an area development to create an economic powerhouse for 
the region. The designation of particular areas as Special Economic Zones (a 
standard feature of developmental states) is a strategy of active state inter-
vention to create an enclave within which the acceptance of market rules and 
local-global interaction can be accelerated without disturbing society at large. 
The creation of an SEZ allows central and local government to explore vari-
ous economic means to create synergy between state and market, global in-
fluences and local influences. The state can intervene in such an enclave by 
assisting the local authority in its efforts to connect to the global market, pro-
moting economic activity with the outside world, opening up the market in 
trade and financial services and encouraging knowledge transfer. It can also 
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create the greatest possible freedom for outsiders to enter, introduce prefer-
ential policies to encourage foreign investors to accept the inevitable market 
risk and address specific issues to attract FDI.
In an area development process involving a complex network with a mul-
tiplicity of stakeholders, central and local governments achieve their ends 
by creating networks to build up trust and create a coalition between state 
and market, global influences and local influences. In the case of Pudong, lo-
cal government started by involving a number of market players in the mak-
ing of decisions affecting the development. This network strategy led to a 
series of institutional reforms, the creation of alternative institutions, the ad-
dition of new functions to existing institutions, the introduction of permis-
sive legislation to facilitate the achievement of developmental goals and the 
construction of a coalition between the state and the economy. The creation 
of a legal system to facilitate the introduction of market concepts was not a 
precondition for the kind of market reforms achieved in Pudong, but was to 
a large extent the result of daring experiments carried out on the spot. Thus 
the legal system combined acceptance of the market with an awareness of lo-
cal interests. The new legal framework defined a number of key concepts for 
area development, relating to land, property, urban planning, the real estate 
market and the housing market, and included regulations controlling the en-
try of participants from China and abroad. The local authority also replaced 
its existing administrative structure with an efficient two-layer administra-
tion, sensitive to the way the market operated, businesslike, pragmatic and 
result-oriented. The overlapping of leadership and personnel and the calibre 
of the staff further enhanced the feeling of responsibility on the part of those 
involved in accelerating the approval of major decisions. Institutional innova-
tions in Pudong helped the local authority to maintain the integrity of the de-
velopmental state model, creating powerful government with a developmen-
tal orientation and the flexibility required to adjust its strategies to respond 
to global change. To ensure a smooth development, local government did 
not hesitate to ‘make certain interventions in support of its “invisible hand”’ 
when the market was not working properly’ (interview with Hu Wei, director 
of Pudong New Area Government, Shanghai Star, 21 April 2005). In such cases, 
the local authority plays a stabilising role, ensuring investors’ confidence in 
the development, either by acting as mediator to resolve conflicts or by sup-
porting the private sector during crises. Examples of state intervention in-
clude providing a solution to the Super Brand Mall law suit, and the Shanghai 
Municipal Government’s purchase of the stock of the Japanese Yaohan retail 
store (see Chapter 3, Section 3.1 and 3.3). As Fishman (2005) suggested, ‘Be-
cause this is China, and Shanghai in particular, once recommendations are 
made, they are quickly weighed and, if accepted, acted upon’. Undoubtedly 
flexibility and adaptability contributed to the speed of Pudong’s development.
Although the Shanghai local authority was successful in attracting domes-
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tic and foreign investment in Pudong’s urban and economic development, the 
limitations of the developmental state make it necessary to consider the long-
term role of the local authority in the future development of Pudong. First, in 
the long run preferential policies will not by themselves be able to contin-
ue to attract foreign investors and foreign investment (besides being in con-
flict with China’s undertaking to the WTO to give every company the same 
opportunities). Second, although Pudong has benefited hugely from FDI, the 
speculative activities of foreign investors in the real estate market have acted 
against the interests of the local authority, boosting the housing market and 
helping to push up house prices to a level more associated with that in other 
global cities, so leaving the vast majority of households unable to afford de-
cent housing. The resulting housing shortage has become a source of social 
unrest and resentment. Government, both central and local, is finding it in-
creasingly difficult to protect the market from global players, casting further 
doubt on whether local government can continue to play an active role in the 
long-term.
2. Market potential
The design of the Pudong development was a progressive response to the on-
going process of globalisation and an opportunity to attract global capital into 
China through Shanghai in its role as China’s formal business centre. When 
the Pudong project started, at the beginning of the 1990s, global players (mul-
tinationals, financial organisations, and others) were already accelerating 
their pervasive expansion into the Asian Pacific Rim generally and China in 
particular. Investors were attracted by the advantages offered by the Chinese 
market, including a continuing stable high rate of economic growth, a vast 
supply of cheap labour, rising incomes, growing consumerism and a vast un-
tapped market for manufacture, production, real estate and property. Huge 
investments were made in the manufacturing and real estate sectors. The at-
traction of investment in Shanghai was guaranteed by a number of key ad-
vantages: a strategic location, roughly in the middle of China, providing easy 
access to a vast hinterland, good economic conditions, manufacturing and 
management capacity, a well-educated labour force and traditional links with 
the big three providers of FDI (Western Europe, America and Japan). In the real 
estate sector, market potential and high profit margins provided the greatest 
incentives for global players.
Shanghai needed vast amounts of FDI and advanced know-how if it was 
to transform the urban and economic status of Pudong. Global investors were 
able to provide both capital and knowledge transfer. What Pudong could of-
fer in return was its prestigious status as a national SEZ, its special openness 
and freedom to establish links with the global capital market and its role as 
intermediary between global investors and the domestic market. Pudong had 
the potential to serve as a gateway through which the rest of China’s econo-
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my could become linked with the outside world, even if that gateway was not 
thrown wide open. A closer linkage with the global economy also meant local 
economic and financial systems becoming increasing vulnerable to world eco-
nomic crises, as in the case of the Southeast Asian economic crisis between 
1997 and 1999.
3. Pragmatism
The involvement of global players brought in not only the vast amount of 
capital Pudong needed for investment in land and infrastructure, but also for-
eign technology, management skills and new development strategies. West-
ern know-how had a major influence on architectural design, urban planning, 
construction and project management and on the transformation of the lo-
cal institutional framework and legal system. It is however interesting to note 
that the successful utilisation by Pudong of know-how from other countries 
was not achieved by simply copying the original, regardless of local conditions, 
but by respecting local conditions and carrying out experiments to discover 
which variations would be most appropriate. This pragmatic approach was 
similar to the experimental approach used by China in the design of SEZs. Ba-
sically, SEZs function as laboratories for developing various methods aimed at 
overcoming the drawbacks associated with a central planning system. Fresh 
concepts and methods originating in market economies outside China can 
first be introduced into, absorbed by, and tested out in the SEZs. Those meas-
ures that prove to be effective and successful in the SEZs can then, wherever 
feasible, be extended to the rest of the country. This, in turn, will help the en-
tire economy to gradually become more open and efficient. The pragmatic ap-
proach taken by Chinese reformers and urban managers helped them to take 
useful experiences from others and quickly adapt them to their own situation. 
The same approach has also enabled them to react quickly to changing situ-
ations and new problems. In its pursuit of market-oriented reform, Shanghai 
has shown itself to be creative in borrowing and applying free market con-
cepts and adapting them to suit existing ideological constraints. Many useful 
free market experiences and financial mechanisms were ‘borrowed’ and ac-
tively employed in the Pudong development.
In fact many examples of a pragmatic approach can be observed in the Pu-
dong development. The proposals made by global architects for the Lujiazui 
Centre, Pudong’s CBD, were adapted pragmatically in a way that recognised 
the limitations of and the restrictions imposed by the site. The design of the 
Jinmao Tower skyscraper required local urban managers to work to construc-
tion standards unlike any they had previously encountered. In this example 
those involved were not afraid to learn from their American counterparts, 
and used American experience to fill the gaps in existing regulations, so giv-
ing rise to a new set of standards for Chinese skyscrapers. Different types of 
capital market were established in Pudong’s financial sector, including a stock 
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exchange, a futures market, a gold market and a ‘property rights exchange 
centre’. A bidding system and a fresh approach to project management were 
both introduced and improved during the construction of the Nanpu and 
Yangpu bridges, a collaborative effort between the Shanghai local authority 
and the ADB. Pragmatism also came into play in the adoption of a series of 
institutional reforms, for example land reform, housing reform and the estab-
lishment of a real estate market, designed to introduce market principles into 
the development. A series of new policies and regulations was introduced, but 
only after intensive examination of and research into experience with simi-
lar regulations in other countries. Later reforms were only given concrete 
form and put into practice with extreme caution and were always preceded 
by small-scale experiment. Shanghai was fully prepared to revise any policy 
which proved unable to deal with changing economic conditions, as shown 
by its active land policy and the financial mechanism employed for infra-
structure development. Pragmatism allowed Shanghai to make full use of the 
knowledge needed for the Pudong development. The respect paid to local con-
ditions also resulted in the creation of less opposition and the production of 
better results, so further contributing to the speed of development.
4. Legal reform
The distinctive features of the Chinese legal system had direct consequences 
for the speed of the Pudong area development. Ever since the beginning of 
the period of reform, legal reform played a key part in addressing the legality 
of the market, accommodating market concepts and market participants and 
re-establishing and redefining the former markets. However, since the Chi-
nese legal framework was developed from an old system which legitimised 
the allocation system, the framework, although greatly improved by the in-
troduction of new laws and regulations, had still not been developed into a 
fully fledged body of legislation capable of supporting a capitalist system and 
the kinds of property rights enjoyed by businesses and individuals in most 
Western (capitalist) societies. In many cases new laws had to be introduced to 
catch up with the needs of the market, rather than to set guidelines for new 
kinds of economic activity. Pudong, as one of the biggest special economic 
zones, took the lead in carrying out a series of economic reforms, including 
innovative reforms affecting the finance and trading sectors. However, not all 
the necessary laws have yet been introduced: more laws are still required to 
regulate, support and protect ongoing economic experiments. The immaturity 
of the new legal system may well create much uncertainty and risk for new-
comers, but it also provides flexibility and scope for interpretation and some-
times for innovation in areas not yet falling within the existing legal frame-
work.
Interestingly, the lack of maturity of the existing legal system gives lo-
cal government the flexibility to experiment with innovations, the ability to 
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take an experimental approach to the process of lawmaking and scope for 
adjusting laws to suit a changing economic situation. Since the future of the 
reforms was not clear and the potential for conflict with those parts of the 
population whose interests were affected was high, central government actu-
ally introduced draft laws on an experimental basis. This approach of trying 
out something in a pilot project or in a specific area was important to ensur-
ing that a new law was properly understood and its consequences predicted. 
Thus the new legal system was actually based on practical experience. Many 
laws introduced in the last two decades were based on the results of pilot 
projects, advice from internal and external experts and references to similar 
legislation in force abroad. Comparison of different legal systems and a study 
of the effects of experimental legislation in pilot projects helped China to 
take account of changing economic conditions and the effect of the new legal 
system. Western democracies provide many examples of legal systems which 
were developed to suit conditions as they were decades or even centuries ago, 
and so tend to slow down development because any change required the pro-
tracted following of rigid formal procedures.
Local implementation of the legal system and regulations also provided 
extra scope for local government. Since the legal framework has major effects 
on the interests and welfare of different groups, attempts were made to avoid 
social unrest by subjecting all measures of reform to close scrutiny. Some-
times new legislation was deliberately couched in vague terms to reduce the 
level of opposition; vagueness also left room for localisation. The practical ap-
plication of the Land Law to allow the commercialisation of land use rights 
was worked out in detail by the local authorities in Shanghai and the Pudong 
New Area (see Chapter 3). Pudong, a pioneering location in the field of urban 
and economic development, was a perfect place for experiments. Any report-
ed dissatisfaction was investigated to see whether adjustments were required. 
The relocation regulations, for example, underwent a good deal of adjustment 
over the years. This subtle approach had the effect of damping down poten-
tial conflicts between those who could profit from the new legal system and 
those who might lose from any changes.
In Pudong the legal framework was adapted not only to regulate the opera-
tion of the market but also, more importantly, to facilitate the entry of new 
participants and guarantee their status and rights. Although the immaturity 
of the legal system created risks and uncertainty, it also provided scope for 
innovations in the operation of the market and scope for the local authority 
to operate in the way it found most advantageous. Dynamic interaction be-
tween the public sector and the private sector was to some extent stimulated 
by the lack of institutional constraints. However risks created by the lack of 
transparency came into conflict with the rules of the global economic system 
into which China hoped to integrate. The increasingly developed legal frame-
work, national and local, and the desire to adjust the Chinese legal system to 
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meet the requirements for entry into the World Trade Organisation will un-
doubtedly reduce the size of the grey area, though this may take some time to 
achieve.
5. An active land policy
A novel feature of Shanghai’s land policy was the designation of specific ex-
perimental zones, with identified priorities and facilities, as a way of stim-
ulating private initiatives and testing reactions from the free market. This 
measure encouraged competition between districts within the city, as it al-
ready had between different Chinese cities, especially the ‘open’ coastal cities. 
Land policy played a central role in the strategy to encourage development in 
those zones and in Pudong as a whole. The design of this policy was based on 
experience with the Western leasehold tenure system. Land policy in Pudong 
in particular was based on experience in Hong Kong and Singapore, two de-
velopmental states which treated land as a generator of income to support 
major infrastructure projects. In practice, Shanghai did not follow the prin-
ciples adopted by Hong Kong and Singapore rigidly, but constantly took ac-
count of changes in market conditions and boldly created new solutions to 
meet new challenges from the market. For example, during the Southeast 
Asian economic crisis Shanghai allowed investors to lease land use rights for 
short periods, even by the year, to help developers to overcome the shortage 
of capital during that difficult period.
As the economic situation changed, Pudong looked to different types of in-
vestment for land development. Sometimes special policies were introduced 
to stimulate the change in emphasis. For example, a special policy was in-
troduced to support private investment in the Orchid Garden urban renewal 
project. To reduce the financial pressure on Shanghai created by the develop-
ment of land and infrastructure, the city introduced a ‘land rotation system’ 
to rotate land use rights from local government to the development compa-
nies. The change of emphasis from companies with a provincial or ministerial 
background to overseas Chinese and later to international players is another 
example of the different strategies used to adapt to changes in the market, 
global and local. The land market, the land development companies and the 
land bank (set up to expropriate land and prepare it for development) com-
bined to form part of a land provision system guided by the public sector. A 
market-conscious land policy increased the speed of development by involv-
ing new investors and leasing land to generate additional revenue.
6. Relocation strategy
Relocation is always the most difficult issue in any redevelopment, because of 
the way it directly involves a multitude of different interests and affects the 
lives of the people involved. Although some aspects were controversial and 
conflicts did arise, Pudong managed to carry out the necessary relocation rel-
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atively smoothly and efficiently. A number of factors contributed to the speed 
of relocation:
First, Pudong was originally an underdeveloped area of shanty houses, 
low-grade industry and farmland, located close to Shanghai’s prosperous 
downtown area. The area was economically disadvantaged and historically 
discriminated against, geographically and culturally. Local residents desper-
ately needed the improved living standards and increased job opportunities 
that relocation could help to provide. For this reason, proposals for relocation 
received a reasonable amount of public support and were generally well re-
ceived.
Second, relocation had something to offer rural households in exchange 
for their agreement, for example the promise of better living condition, an in-
creased amount of space in a new apartment with modern facilities (kitchen 
and lavatory, mains water and gas), house ownership at a subsidised price, 
and an urban standard of welfare generally. But urban households usually 
lived as tenants in public housing, paid subsidised rent for their accommoda-
tion to their state-owned work units, and had limited bargaining strength. Ru-
ral households on the other hand were used to owning their land collectively, 
and so were sometimes reluctant to accept the offer of an urban identity and 
an improved level of welfare. Businesses that needed to be relocated were of-
fered monetary compensation and often space for expansion in more remote 
areas, as appropriate to their business strategies. Local government’s reloca-
tion policies were adjusted to provide monetary compensation or alternative 
accommodation in response to the changing needs of relocated households 
created by changes in the market. Originally the expectations of relocated 
households were reasonably low and so relatively easy to satisfy. Conflicts 
were also limited through the mediation of employers, in most cases state-
owned work units.
Third, relocation was handled collaboratively by subsidiary companies co-
ordinated by their parent company, the development company for the partic-
ular zone. Task sharing allowed housing estates for relocated households to 
be planned and built even before relocation actually began. Furthermore, the 
requirement that any organisation involved in relocation activities had to be 
licensed reduced the chance of companies with no knowledge of relocation 
laws and regulations trying to abuse their position.
Although the speed of relocation greatly benefited the development pro-
cess as a whole, problems tended to increase. As the Pudong development 
gathered speed, improvements in the urban environment created a booming 
real estate market and dramatic increases in the price of land and the rent 
demanded for housing and offices. A growing number of relocated house-
holds were dissatisfied with the quality of their new apartments, the incon-
venience created by their remoteness from the downtown area, the limited 
transparency of the relocation procedures and, in particular, the amount of 
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compensation. The conflict between relocated households, local development 
companies (acting as agents of local government) and real estate developers 
has the potential to escalate. Local government has still not found a way to 
balance the interests of all concerned; sometimes it even finds itself deriving 
little if any financial benefit from the boom. (The political benefits enjoyed by 
local officials is another matter entirely.) Unlike the situation in most Western 
countries, dissatisfaction with the Pudong project was generated more by the 
lack of fair treatment and proper compensation than by the objective of the 
project as a whole (see Chapter 3, Section 3.1; a more general picture of the 
level of satisfaction with relocation is given by Wu (2003) in his account of his 
research into relocation in Shanghai).
7. Public-private finance
The great strength of the financial mechanism employed for Pudong was that 
it was founded on collaboration between the public sector and the private 
sector and between global investors and local players, so that the active role 
played by local (and sometimes central) government did not imply the domi-
nance of public finance. Although state capital directly or indirectly funded 
the construction of a large proportion of the development, the state was more 
concerned with introducing policies and regulations to attract private finance 
to develop the four development zones and Pudong’s economy generally. Pu-
dong was successful in assisting Shanghai’s efforts to use land leasing to at-
tract FDI. Shanghai was not however totally committed to a feverish hunt for 
FDI but took a more pragmatic approach to possible sources of finance. In fact 
although the contribution made by the global private sector was quite essen-
tial, many local and regional investors also took advantage of the opportunity 
to explore Pudong’s real estate market and economic potential. The dominant 
role played by self-raised funds emphasised how important local players can 
be to the raising of finance.
The financial mechanism employed for Pudong depended to a large extent 
on an active land policy to attract private investors. The revenue generated 
by land was a major source of finance for Pudong’s infrastructure projects, its 
roads, bridges, metro lines, parks and green space. The mechanism involved 
local development companies entering into contracts with ‘footloose’ interna-
tional private companies. Since the business of these companies was becom-
ing involved in urban development projects, the price of land was the main 
subject for negotiation. The collaboration was equal and horizontal, with no 
substantial direct involvement of or multiple hierarchical relationships with 
government. The ‘land policy experiment’ (treating land as a commodity) re-
sulted in the Chinese public sector becoming closely involved with the private 
sector. The development companies became privileged mediators between 
the two, operating on a global scale, directing global capital to local urban de-
velopments. This close relationship was evident in a number of infrastructure 
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projects, in which private finance served to supplement the limited amount 
of public finance. The penetration of private finance into public organisations 
and corporations led to the creation of a new kind of mixed entrepreneur, 
sensitive to the requirements of both government and the market. As in the 
case of Lujiazui (Development Group) Company Limited, strategic decisions 
made by managers were affected by the institutional environment in which 
they found themselves, the economic constraints to which they were subject 
and the networks and partnerships to which they belonged.
8. The global Chinese business network
Central government and Shanghai local government treated Pudong as an aid 
to stimulating Shanghai’s internationalisation in the expectation that such in-
ternationalisation would enable them to benefit from ‘the growth of the global 
financial market, the expansion of the international trade in services, and the 
restructuring of foreign direct investment’ (Sassen, 2001, p. 329). But the task 
could not have been completed without the help of a powerful global Chinese 
business network. The world-wide Chinese business network, as represented 
by wealthy ethnic Chinese in the Asia-Pacific region, played a key role in the 
mobilisation of global capital for the Pudong area development and Pudong’s 
emerging real estate market. Versatile Chinese capitalists have established a 
complex worldwide network capable of involving ethnic Chinese in different 
parts of the world in business and commercial ventures and using cultural 
networks for business development. The traditional interest has been in prop-
erty and deal making. Despite the fact that 90% of global FDI actually comes 
from ‘the big three’ (the EU, the US and Japan), an unusually large proportion 
of FDI in Pudong actually came from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Southeast Asian 
countries like Singapore and Malaysia. The contribution from overseas Chi-
nese was badly needed in the early stages of the Pudong development, since 
at that time the big three were discouraged from participating by the level of 
market risk and political uncertainty. Overseas Chinese investors had the ad-
vantage of knowing the local culture and were more inclined to take the risk 
of betting on an immature market in the hope of large profits. In practice the 
network of ethnic Chinese served as nodes, channelling the flow of capital 
from the global capital market to the local area development and the emerg-
ing real estate market.
9. Real estate market and speculation
Even though the Pudong development was designed to encourage economic 
development, it was inevitable that a key role would be played by property 
development and the growth of the real estate market. Pudong’s robust eco-
nomic growth contributed to a sustained demand for office space, housing, 
factories, warehouses and public services. Demand provoked a reaction from 
the real estate market and so stimulated property development. In turn the 
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development of the real estate market contributed to economic growth and 
encouraged the development of related activities such as construction, retail-
ing, transport and services, further stimulating Pudong’s economic growth 
and creating extra employment. This interaction between real estate and eco-
nomic development had a significant effect on the speed of the Pudong devel-
opment.
The demand for housing generated by housing reform and the ongoing re-
location from the city centre to Pudong encouraged the private sector to grasp 
the opportunity to participate in Pudong’s real estate sector. But another rea-
son for the feverish investment in the Pudong real estate market was the ex-
pectation of high profits and quick returns. The kind of profit reported by Sin-
gaporean developers, for example, was immeasurably higher than anything 
available in a mature real estate market. Although investors understood the 
level of risk inherent in an immature market, they were quite unable to resist 
the attraction of a potential profit so much higher than available anywhere 
else. The possibility of high profits also appealed to the gambling mentality 
common to many real estate developers, especially foreign investors with a 
Chinese background. Nonetheless large numbers of Chinese real estate de-
velopers, public and private, with little understanding of the operation of the 
market, rushed to invest in Pudong simply as a gamble, hoping to profit from 
getting in early on an immature market. This speculative approach to land 
and real estate development on both the supply side and the demand side 
seems likely to persist in Shanghai as long as prices continue to rise, increas-
ing market risk and uncertainty about the market’s future. The inflow of US$ 
20 billion of foreign capital into Shanghai’s real estate market in 2005 alone 
reveals the level of speculative activity by international players. This rush to 
speculate combined with a high risk, high return mentality also contributed 
to the speed of the Pudong development.
Limitations of the developmental state
China’s interpretation of the developmental state model in a Chinese con-
text involved the creative modification of power relationships between the 
centre and local government, and between the executive and the legislature 
(Xia, 2000). A number of important institutional innovations helped China to 
‘maintain the integrity of the developmental state model, namely, a strong 
state with a developmental orientation. Although China has adjusted the 
developmental state strategy and produced a new type of practice to suit its 
own peculiarities, it still is definitely within the general parameters of the de-
velopmental state model’. China therefore demonstrated ‘the true nature of 
the developmental state, only if our analysis moves one level higher to see 
the development state approach as a kind of network strategy and as a way to 
maintain state capacity’. One important strategy in the Pudong development 
was networking, a strategy successfully used by developmental states in East 
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Asia enabling them to be flexible and adaptable in their search for change. 
These states improved their position by combining the advantages of global 
openness with the flexibility and efficiency with which the developmental 
state adapts global change to suit the local context. However, if a system does 
not allow a proper level of independent control and supervision, there will al-
ways be a risk that certain individuals will grasp the opportunity to use their 
power and their political, business and social networks to take advantage of 
the system. Although networking plays an important role in promoting Chi-
nese capitalism within and outside China, the exploitation of networks must 
be realistic, i.e. the network and networking strategy needs to conform to 
the well–defined rules of the global economic system, otherwise networking 
can easily result in the creation of a pervasive crony capitalism (Safire, 1998). 
The recent scandal concerning the Shanghai pension fund led to the fall of 
Shanghai’s party chef Chen Liangyu, a major political figure in Shanghai with 
close ties to business and investors. Chen was the most senior of a group of 
at least six politicians and businessmen implicated in the misappropriation 
of about a third of Shanghai’s 10 billion yuan (US$ 700million) social security 
fund. Chen was accused of illegal business activity, covering up crimes and 
abusing his position to secure benefits for his family (Guardian Unlimited, 26 
September 2006). Although views differ on the true nature of this scandal, the 
investigation can be seen as a sign of measures to curb the pervasive growth 
of crony capitalism40. To find a solution, China needs to re-examine its models, 
Singapore and Hong Kong. Both those city-states took advantage of the global 
Chinese business network while at the same time exploring the application 
of a network strategy in accordance with the well-defined rules of the glo-
bal economic system. It will take a long time for the Chinese legal system to 
catch up with the progress made by Singapore and Hong Kong in the last 50 
years, but the need to catch up is unavoidable, and China’s legal reforms show 
a clear recognition that this is so.
Confidence in the developmental state model was shaken by the South-
east Asian financial crisis, which led believers to recognise its limitations and 
the possibility of change (especially by democratisation). The crisis exposed 
weaknesses in the financial systems of the developmental states such as over-
borrowing and excessive risk-taking, and the inadequate regulatory response 
which made them vulnerable to adverse macroeconomic shocks (Crafts, 1999, 
p. 128). Although the quick recovery of the countries affected and the excel-
lent performance of the Chinese economy thereafter restored people’s belief 
0   Chen Liangyu, who was also a member of the policy-making Politburo, is the highest ranking official brought 
down by allegations of corruption in more than a decade. Chen is alleged to be involved in the misuse of more 
than 3 billion yuan (US$ 380 million) from the 10 billion yuan (US$ 1.2 billion) Shanghai social security fund. The 
investigation was made public on 27 September 2006.
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in the adaptability of the model, the difficulties involved illustrated the long 
and painful process of transplanting two foreign systems, capitalism and de-
mocracy, on to Asian soil, the difficulty of reconstruction and adjustment (Xia, 
2000, p. 216) and the limitations faced by the state in its efforts to combat glo-
bal forces (Chen and Wigmans, 2005).
The most noticeable effects of the pitfalls encountered by the developmen-
tal state depend largely on the situation in the particular locality. Although 
the theory of the developmental state provides ample proof that local govern-
ment can become sufficiently efficient, effective, entrepreneurial and flexible 
to cope with urban change and even become the driving force behind rapid 
area development, obsession with development may lead to spatial fragmen-
tation, disturbing the ideal of maintaining a balance between social, econom-
ic and environmental factors. Putting Pudong on the world stage required the 
state to employ a selective strategy, allowing a defined area privileged access 
to capital, information and flexibility, all limited resources. This preferential 
treatment, discussed in Chapter 4, created contrasts not only between Pudong 
and other districts of Shanghai, but also between different areas within Pu-
dong itself. Although the Pudong development turned out to be one of the few 
examples of Chinese urban development that took some account of issues of 
sustainability and attempted to balance environmental, social and economic 
factors, the selective strategy employed reinforced the highly uneven effect 
of globalisation (Graham and Marvin, 2001) by creating segregated urban ar-
eas, rather than aligning and coordinating their various spatial functions and 
creating coherence between them. Fragmentation is evident in areas in which 
pieces of farmland and dilapidated village houses stand alongside modern 
buildings built with the most advanced techniques. This kind of fragmenta-
tion also casts doubt in how sustainable an urban area should be. Lujiazui, 
the area which became Shanghai’s new CBD, erected hundreds of high stan-
dard, high-rise office towers, surrounded by parks and green space, proving a 
strong profile for office property. But Lujiazui’s housing market and to some 
extent its office market were affected by complaints from local residents that 
Lujiazui lacked renqi, a Chinese word for the liveliness and range of social 
functions that are an absolute necessity for any residential environment. Peo-
ple were unlikely to find a supermarket or snack bar within walking distance. 
Responsibility for this lack of convenience lay in part with the concentration 
of function and the segregation of different areas. The same explanation can 
be given for why a piece of land that had not yet been leased and was tem-
porarily used for restaurants and entertainment suddenly became so popular 
with people living or working in the area, or why so many office buildings 
turned their ground floors into restaurants and supermarket to meet the de-
mands of their occupiers. It remains a critical question whether the Pudong 
development can strike a balance between integration and fragmentation; a 
task that the speed of the development makes even more difficult.
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Current research findings are quite worrying. Yang and Ding (2004) actually 
suggested a correlation between social polarisation and economic polarisa-
tion (concentration of economic function). Their findings suggested that the 
size of the gap between rich and poor was increasing sharply and reaching 
an alarming level. The explosive development of Pudong needs to be further 
sustained by a recognition of the human side of a development project. This 
is particularly true of an area development, since every phase of the develop-
ment affects not only organisations, land, resources and individuals, but more 
important, people’s attachment to the area, quality of life and residential en-
vironment.
Another pitfall involved the inability of the financial system to deal with 
the uncertainty brought about by global integration and the inability of the 
related legal framework to control and minimise potential damage. Although 
local government has done all it can to grasp the opportunities presented by 
globalisation, it seems to be increasingly difficult for it to combat malicious 
attacks on its real estate market by professional speculators from around the 
world. The red-hot real estate market of 2004 and 2005 raised questions about 
the maturity of Chinese legal and financial systems. Speculation only started 
to reduce when central government used administrative measures to define 
the boundaries within which foreign investors could operate and increased 
taxation to discourage investors. In fact however the measures only enjoyed 
limited success and hurt genuine house buyers. The development of a finan-
cial system that is more compatible with the rules and operation of the global 
financial market will require a combination of a strong financial sector, na-
tional regulatory efforts and the state’s willingness to accept change.
Applicability
An attempt has been made to give an account of the current dynamics of a 
network society and the repositioning of cities and the way in which this re-
positioning is, or could be, managed. Preference has been given to looking for 
a concrete interpretation of the tension developing at urban district level and 
an example capable of representing its complexity and dynamics, rather than 
searching for similar examples of global-local interaction in case studies on 
other area developments. A case study depends not on ‘statistical generali-
sation’, but on ‘analytical generalisation’. A single case study, if the selection 
is ‘critical’, or ‘extreme or unique’, can ‘represent a significant contribution to 
knowledge and theory-building’ (Yin, 1989, 1984). The results of the present 
research, though not yet reproduced by other case studies, not only provide 
an insight into area development in Shanghai, but also help to increase the 
understanding of the current dynamic interaction between global and local 
factors in urban development generally. The choice was therefore made to 
use a single case, the Shanghai Pudong development, which seemed to be ca-
pable of achieving this goal. The Pudong case presents an extreme situation 
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in which interaction between global and local factors took place in a location 
whose boundaries had been closed to the outside world for almost forty years 
and in a period when doors and windows were beginning to open. Thus the 
Pudong development presented a unique example, involving tension and con-
frontation and, even more important, speed. Furthermore, the involved na-
ture of the Pudong development provided a unique opportunity not only to 
test the application of the theory of the developmental state at local level, but 
also to link two different domains, political economics and urban study, in an 
examination of the complexity of the impact of context on urban manage-
ment and area development.
Generalisation and applicability are major topics in any discussion on ur-
ban studies. During the research the question of whether the outcome of the 
present study would be applicable to other cases was discussed at length. 
Since Pudong was promoted by central government as a show case for Chi-
na’s second round of reform, Pudong’s transformation aroused enormous cu-
riosity from other special economic zones and the coastal cities, eager to find 
out whether there were any lessons to be learnt. The opportunities created 
by the new preferential policies introduced by central government to stimu-
late economic development in poorer areas encouraged more and more in-
terest from regions in central and western China, whose stagnant cities were 
in serious need of revival. These regions seemed to be interested in a variety 
of different strategies, such as a network strategy to create a market-friend-
ly environment for investors, bold measures of institutional adaptation to 
make the public sector effective and efficient and strong input from develop-
ment companies into land development and infrastructure. Some strategies, 
like the use of development companies for infrastructure development, were 
subsequently adopted by other cities. Even so, some reservations are in or-
der about the general applicability of the findings. Shanghai found itself in a 
unique configuration of context-dependent processes. Autonomous direction 
to suit the will of a local authority is no longer possible in the open society 
of which China now forms part. Any new situation creates the need to dis-
cover what measures will be effective. After all, when a particular approach 
is transplanted from one situation or time to another, the context is different 
and an emerging process is expected. Recommendations to other cities, Chi-
nese or Western, would therefore be inappropriate.
By the same token, Shanghai’s experience needs to be evaluated more 
realistically. Cities differ from one another in many ways: each city has its 
own unique history and culture and has gone through its own development 
process. Different strategies for urban development and redevelopment may 
have a common basis but each evolves and is adjusted to fit the particular 
situation. Essentially every strategy has to be designed to address the same 
kinds of problem. Most of the world’s cities have to deal with similar patterns 
of challenges: how to take advantage of urban change to increase their com-
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petitiveness and enhance their position in the global urban system, and how 
to deal with the place-related characteristics of a specific locality and its geo-
graphical, political and economic context, all of which play a significant role 
in determining the problems and the strategies required to deal with them. 
Each city faces its own unique problems. A success in one city cannot simply 
be repeated in another city where geo-political and economic circumstances 
are different. The most that can be said is that the patterns cities formulate 
for their development strategies, especially in large-scale urban development 
projects, can be borrowed and adapted, pragmatically, to suit a specific local-
ity in which circumstances are different.
The question about how applicable the lessons learned in Pudong are to 
cities in general is quite challenging. In fact the question needs reframing: the 
real issue is the extent to which the local, regional or organisational context 
can be changed to benefit from the lessons learned from the Pudong develop-
ment. For example, the legal system may be one of the most difficult things 
to change, but it is easy to adopt a pragmatic approach which makes use of 
pilot studies. The introduction of an active land policy, a driving force behind 
the development of Pudong, had already proved its effectiveness in Singapore 
and Hong Kong. Policies like this can be tried out in a restricted area or as a 
pilot project to judge how effective they might be.
A few studies, for example the research into the redevelopment of Tokyo 
(Saito, 2003), have examined the role played by the local authority in urban 
development and the position occupied by urban change in a developmental 
state. But there has as yet been no systematic study linking the experience of 
these cities in the developmental state context. Further research is required 
to compare these cases to see whether the same kind of logic is present in 
each case. This comparison should encourage the next step, a comparison 
between those cases in which the context was provided by a developmental 
state and the rest, to examine how context influences the management of 
large-scale urban development projects.
 5.2 Observations
In an area development project, the strength of the developmental state lies 
in its application of the network approach in a way that explores every pos-
sibility for making the project a success. Network logic seems to go well with 
traditional Chinese culture and the structure of Chinese society. When the 
traditional merits of the network were introduced into the network logic of 
the developmental state, ‘Chinese political life and economy were revital-
ised’ (Xia, 2000). Castells (2000b) has even claimed that the new competitive-
ness of China came not from its inefficient state enterprises nor, for the most 
part, from its still infant private business sector, but was organised around 
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investment, know-how and world market expertise from overseas Chinese 
investors. These investors, in cooperation with a special kind of institutional 
partner (guanxi or relationship network, particularly tongxiang, people coming 
from the same place, their relatives and friends and acquaintances from the 
same dialect group), constituted the fundamental link between China and the 
global economy in the 1980s and 1990s.
Networking and Chinese culture
Before the start of the Pudong development Shanghai was an unattractive 
place to invest, notorious for its rigidity, bureaucracy and red tape. But within 
15 years all this had changed. The city used the Pudong development, a huge 
urban pilot project, to embrace globalisation for its own benefit, for invest-
ment, knowledge, and information and to transform itself into a city which 
would attract investors from all over the world. It is surprising how quickly lo-
cal urban managers learned to establish relationships with significant players 
generally, and global players in particular. Networking played a central part in 
the Pudong development, particularly in the way it combined global, central 
and local strengths and created synergy between the state and the market. 
It seems that China has a cultural advantage when it comes to adapting to a 
network society, because of its traditional emphasis on and age-old obsession 
with networks and relationships. Indeed, the first step towards being Chinese 
is socialisation into a network society. Chinese are taught how to create net-
works, cultivate good relationships, care about and respond to other people’s 
feelings, save face for themselves and others, behave with propriety, and an-
ticipate reciprocity (Xia, 2000, p. 216). Economic and political institutions are 
always affected by cultural factors and ideologies (Moon and Prasad, 1998). 
Once the traditional merits of the culture had been implanted in the develop-
mental state model and the difficulties of reconstruction and adjustment to a 
modern context had been overcome, it became possible to reinvent networks 
to provide new strategies to facilitate China’s economic development. Manuel 
Castells (1996, p. 173) even argued ‘if the informational/global economy is bet-
ter suited to the network form of business organisation, then East Asian so-
cieties, and the organisational forms of their economic activity, would have 
a distinctive advantage in global competition, because such an organisation 
model is embedded in their culture and institutions’.
Apart from the advantage that networking was already an integral part of 
Chinese culture, China’s network strategy to integrate with the global econ-
omy (in the present case, Pudong’s global connections) was achieved by ex-
ploiting the global Chinese business network (Wedenbaum and Hughes, 1996; 
Chan, 2000; Castells, 2000b; Olds, 2001; Yeung, 2004). The overseas Chinese 
business network, especially in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Southeast Asia, has 
been a major source of foreign investment in China. Between 1978, when 
China opened its doors, and the mid-1990s, ethnic Chinese located abroad 
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had invested more than US$ 50 billion in China, accounting for 80% of all FDI. 
Between 1979 and 1995 they had set up more than 100,000 joint ventures in 
China (Wedenbaum and Hughes, 1996, p. 27; Chan, 2000; Yeung, 2004, p. 15). 
Networks of overseas Chinese, Chinese capitalists and firms belonging to the 
international Chinese community, all of which had become increasingly in-
fluential, played a crucial role in helping Pudong to access global sources of 
capital, formal and informal, and to bring in advanced technology and man-
agement skills, as shown by Pudong’s financial structure and the unusually 
large proportion of FDI contributed by Hong Kong, Taiwan and Southeast 
Asian countries like Singapore and Malaysia (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3 and 
3.4). Castells (2000b, p. 317) used the term ‘guanxi [network] capitalism’ to 
draw attention to the importance of networking and the network of overseas 
Chinese to China’s efforts to become part of the global economy:
‘… overseas Chinese business networks are indeed the main interme-
diaries between global capital, including overseas Chinese capital, and 
China’s markets and producing/exporting sites. But the reason is not 
that they both like steamed cod. It is because China’s multiple links to 
the global economy are local, that is, are created by connections between over-
seas Chinese business and local and provincial governments in China, the sui 
generis capitalist class …’
The complex worldwide social and financial network created by the Chinese 
diaspora41 tends to involve ethnic Chinese in different part of the world in 
business and commercial ventures and in using cultural networks for busi-
ness development (Chan, 2000), with ‘a historically close relationship to prop-
erty and a preference for ‘deal-making’ (Olds, 2001). Tanzer used the term 
‘bamboo network’ to suggest that this kind of informal business network has 
become a powerful and enduring driving force behind the economic develop-
ment of the region adjoining the South China Sea (1994, pp. 138-145). Yeung 
(2004) described the versatile Chinese capitalist as a hybrid, capitalist42, a per-
son whose social organisation centres on the family firm, guanxi relationships 
and business networks. Chinese capitalism is an open and flexible form of 
capitalism, not tied to particular nation-states. ‘Once they have established 
their businesses in the host economy, ethnic Chinese begin to extend their 
operations and networks across borders, forming increasingly seamless webs 
   ‘Chinese diaspora’ refers to ethnic Chinese living outside mainland China. Li (2000) wrote: ‘The Chinese 
diaspora has no political or national boundary, and its Chinese membership can only be loosely defined based 
on a lax interpretation of descent, origin or other imprecise cultural features. However, the Chinese diaspora is 
intimately connected to China, possessing or at least claiming ancestral roots and a common cultural heritage. 
Taken together, the population of China and the Chinese diaspora account for 22% of the world’s population.’
   The definition by See Yeung (2004, pp. 5-6) of the key attributes of Chinese capitalism. He emphasised that 
Chinese capitalism is an institutionalised mode of economic organisation not tied to specific national or state 
boundaries. It is versatile, rooted in, but not limited by, the institutional context.
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of Chinese capitalism on a regional and sometimes global scale’. In fact, the 
developmental state’s network approach has already been adopted by global 
Chinese capitalists, working through thousands of clan networks, penetrating 
local communities, expanding to mainland China, joining the global network 
and sending a their children to the best schools, all for the sake of engag-
ing in networking. The strength of this ‘truly global, tribal network’ lies in the 
network (Naisbitt, 1996; Xia, 2000, p. 37). In the global age, ‘the course followed 
by the Chinese will almost certainly be blessed with a hybrid mixture of fami-
lies, networks, hierarchies and markets as the core foundations of econom-
ic organisations among ethnic Chinese within and outside mainland China’ 
(Yeung, 2004, p. 255).
Looking ahead
Although a wide range of problems arose during the period of reform, China 
has successfully and creatively transformed its institutional arrangements 
to facilitate the operation of the market. ‘China has adjusted the strategy of 
the developmental state and produced a new type of practice to suit its own 
peculiarities’ (Xia, 2001). A network strategy is helping China to create syner-
getic relationships between state and market and combine global and local 
influences into a single development process. Nonetheless the uncertainty of 
China’s development path has made people wonder how far China can cope 
with global change (Saich, 2004, p. xv) ‘China is changing so fast that is it dif-
ficult to keep up with what is significant and enduring and to ignore what 
is irrelevant and ephemeral. China is a country full of intricacies, complexi-
ties and contradictions’. However, ‘If China succeeds in managing globalisa-
tion and marshalling society in its transition to the information age’, Castells 
(2000b, p. 337) claimed, ‘it means that the developmental state is alive and 
well for at least one fifth of humankind. And if nations and states around the 
world feel increasingly powerless vis-à-vis global financial markets, they may 
look for alternatives and find inspiration in the Chinese experience. But…it 
may well happen, instead, that China loses control of its economy, and a 
rapid sequence of alternating deflation and inflation wrecks the country, trig-
gers social explosions and induces political conflicts. If so, the developmental 
state will have run its historic course, and the global flow of capital and infor-
mation may reign uncontested…’.
Shanghai is making every effort to use the Pudong development as a flag-
ship project to earn itself a significant role in the global urban hierarchy. How-
ever only time will tell what kind of status Shanghai may achieve and to what 
extent the role of Shanghai in the global urban network will become recog-
nised as comparable to those global cities, like London, New York and Tokyo, 
which serve as switching centres for information, knowledge, images and 
symbols (not to mention capital flows), and where, as researchers have sug-
gested, global flows are mediated by networked institutions (Friedmann, 1986; 
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Knox and Taylor, 1995; Clark, 1996; Sassen, 2000 and 2001; Castells, 2000b). 
Meanwhile, the social, cultural, economic and political conditions that ena-
ble the production of flow and the growth of a global city have raised critical 
issues to which Shanghai will need to react. Can Shanghai, like Hong Kong, 
burst out from China’s national boundaries and overcome problems like a 
non-convertible currency, a controlled exchange rate and a converted West-
ernised legal system, all of which tend to act as barriers to global integration? 
There hardly seems to be a choice. Shanghai’s strength lies in the network 
and networking it shares with regional and provincial authorities and various 
public-private coalitions, local and regional. Nonetheless it seems that the 
city is likely for many years to remain remote from the global urban hierarchy 
and operate in its own individual way as an Asian version of a global city.
The explosive development of Pudong also emphasises the importance of 
recognising the human side of a development project. This is particularly true 
of an area development, since every phase of the development not only af-
fects different parties, resources and individuals, but more important, their 
feelings, quality of life and residential environment. Although the Pudong 
development can be seen as one of the few examples of China’s urban de-
velopment to have concerned itself with issues of sustainability and to have 
attempted to balance environmental, social and economic factors, the selec-
tive strategy employed reinforced the highly uneven effect of globalisation 
(Graham and Marvin, 2001). Putting Pudong on the world stage involved the 
creation of segregated urban areas. It remains a critical question whether 
the Pudong development can strike a balance between integration and frag-
Figure 5.1 Booming Shanghai in 2006
Source: CNAP
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mentation. The issue of fragmentation is not limited to the unevenness of 
geographic boundaries, but is also involves social imbalance. For example, a 
smooth start to the Pudong development was achieved simply because eve-
ryone involved, including those households which were subjected to compul-
sory relocation, shared the belief that the project would result in increased 
prosperity for all. Whether that belief was justified will depend largely on the 
division of economic and social benefits between the parties involved and will 
definitely affect any further development. Finding a solution will call for all 
the local authority’s concern and creativity.
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 Appendix A Notes on methodology
The nature of this research was qualitative. A case study approach was used 
as the research strategy to examine the explosive development of Shanghai 
in general and the area development in Pudong in particular in the context 
of globalisation. As mentioned in Chapter 1, a case study is an empirical in-
quiry that ‘investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life con-
text when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident and in which multiple sources of evidence are used’ (Yin, 1984, p. 23). 
This appendix reviews the research methodology adopted for collecting data.
Social network and the obtaining of data
The analysis in this dissertation draws on two main stages of research. The 
first stage was made up of pre-PhD experience as a student at Tongji Univer-
sity in Shanghai from 1988 to 1992, seven years experience as an urban plan-
ner in Beijing from 1992 to 1999, and two years of education in Europe, at the 
Institute of Housing and Urban Development Studies in Rotterdam, the Neth-
erlands, and Lund University in Lund, Sweden. The second stage was made 
up of PhD research at Delft University of Technology from 2001 to 2007 and 
participation in research, education and consultancy. The two stages were in-
terrelated and interdependent, with knowledge gained from different phases 
within the two stages assisting the construction of this dissertation. The earli-
est phase, in particular experience in Shanghai, was crucial in that it enabled 
reliable social networks to be formed made up of Shanghai-based individuals 
who could be used during the second phase. It also provided a unique op-
portunity to observe the city of Shanghai from close to, before and during the 
early phases of Shanghai’s rocky rise, allowing comparisons to be made with 
the results of fieldwork carried out in Shanghai and Pudong ten years later.
The author was involved in Shanghai, directly and indirectly, in a number 
of different ways:
First, Tongji University’s school of architecture and urban planning is Chi-
na’s oldest and most respected university department in its field. Its gradu-
ates have become senior officials in Pudong New Area government and 
Shanghai Municipal Government and occupy leading positions in the field of 
urban planning, urban management and urban development in Shanghai. Ex-
perience as student in the department made it possible to form links with 
members of the alumni network and to take advantage of those connections. 
The four year of study in Shanghai gave opportunities to form contacts with 
people who were later interviewed, provided further contacts or helped with 
the arrangement of interviews during later research. Employment at Delft 
University of Technology gave opportunities to meet visiting scholars from 
Shanghai who were involved in similar urban studies of Shanghai, and to ex-
tend the social network beyond the group of alumni.
Second, the assignments carried out during the period of study in Shang-
hai gave opportunities to observe how Shanghai’s urban development was 
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carried on in practice. Assignment to the preparation of preservation plans 
for Nanjing Road, Shanghai’s busiest shopping street, made it possible to par-
ticipate in extensive discussions and interact closely with local and district 
decision-makers, professionals and academics from various companies and 
institutions. Knowledge and understanding of urban development practice 
and the extent of local influence on that practice was further strengthened 
during a period as urban planner in Beijing.
Third, a period as consultant and interpreter for the Dutch company Teun 
Koolhaas Association (TKA) between 2001 and 2003 gave opportunities to par-
ticipate in Shanghai’s urban development as a private sector observer from 
abroad. Continuous participation in the bidding and design process for the 
design of Gaoqiao Town (the Dutch Town in Pudong) led to the establishment 
of close contacts with government officials, professionals and local governors 
working in Shanghai and Pudong New Area. A study trip to the Netherlands 
made by Pudong’s local government officials and professionals strengthened 
the network allowed close relationships to be built with members of the 
group during the trip. A number of interviews were arranged during the visit.
Fieldwork
The majority of the data required for this dissertation - first-hand information 
about the large-scale urban development project in Pudong New area - was 
collected during the period of fieldwork. Thanks to the social network created 
in Shanghai during the four-year period of study in Shanghai and member-
ship of the powerful alumni network of Shanghai’s Tongji University, assisted 
by proficiency in Mandarin Chinese (as a native speaker), ability to under-
stand the local dialect (Shanghainese) and knowledge of English and Dutch 
made it unnecessary to be completely dependent on local hosts to arrange 
the fieldwork. A substantial number of interviews were arranged through the 
author’s own network or reliable intermediaries.
The trip to Shanghai in June 2002 as a representative of the Dutch design 
company TKA was an opportunity to warm up for reconnecting with the local 
network in Shanghai and in Pudong. The most concentrated stretch of field 
work took place in October and November 2002, during which period more 
than 30 interviews were held. While many of those interviews were arranged 
with contacts made back in Holland during the visit to TKA by Pudong local 
government officials and professionals, some of the new appointments were 
arranged by interviewees who suggested other individuals, companies and 
projects with experience that could be relevant to the case study. Being ’one 
of them’ plays a crucial role in building the level of trust required when ques-
tions are to be raised that have not previously been asked by others. Ability to 
understand the language and the local dialect made it easier to get the inter-
viewees to describe a particular phenomenon in detail and in depth.
While Shanghai was striving to walk the path to economic development 
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as a global city, urban transformation and cultural and societal change did 
not always go hand-in-hand. Although openness had to a certain extent been 
achieved, by a wide range of different reforms and the increasing influence of 
foreign capital and knowledge, the local institutional system continued to play 
a crucial part in shaping the local mentality and culture. Although Shanghai is 
one of the most open Chinese city in terms of information flow, it remains dif-
ficult for outside researchers to access important information and arrange inter-
views with people from private companies or local government, many of whom 
tend to consider giving interviews to researchers a waste of time rather than 
appreciating the added value researchers and their researches can bring to their 
Table C.1 Fieldwork details
City Dates Main host Research objectives
Shanghai 21-26 June 2002 n/a To attend the public bidding for the commission to design 
Gaoqiao Town (with the concept of a Dutch town) in Pudong 
(as consultant to TKA), to visit Pudong and to set up a base for 
fieldwork in the October of the same year.
Beijing 13-19 Sep 2002 n/a To conduct research into issues related to real estate 
development and land policy in China at Tsinghua University and 
to interview various ADB staff members about ADB’s initiatives 
in Shanghai.
Shanghai 9 Oct -15 Nov 2002 n/a To conduct research into aspects of the development of Pudong, 
such as the involvement of the public and private sector, project 
initiatives, the decision-making process, the roles played by the 
various parties involved, and academic comments; to collect 
documentary, archival and related information from public 
libraries and private (company) libraries.
Shanghai 23 June-10 July 2004 Jiaotong  
University
To update research into the development of Pudong and its 
development zones, market participants and issues  related to 
urban development, to lead a Dutch study trip1 and organise 
an international symposium to discuss urban development, 
urban management, real estate, finance and housing reform 
in Shanghai with local academics, market participants and 
government officials.
Beijing 11 July-16 July 2004 n/a To conduct interviews with staff from the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency China Office.
Shanghai 10-22 July 2006 Tongji University, 
Shanghai Normal 
University
To discover the latest developments in Pudong and its 
development zones, to collect the latest information on the 
results of the development and market changes and to lead a 
Dutch study trip.2 
1. The Dutch group consisted of students from the ‘Master City Developer’, a post-master program given by Delft 
University of Technology and Erasmus University, Rotterdam for professionals who had worked in urban development 
for more than five years in the Netherlands, and postgraduate students from the Department of Applied Economy, 
Erasmus University. The aim of the study trip was to learn about Shanghai’s urban development in general and the 
large-scale urban development in Pudong in particular.
2. The Dutch group consisted of 25 postgraduate students from Delft University of Technology’s Department of Real 
Estate and Housing, and the study trip was organized by BOSS, the Department of Real Estate and Housing’s 
student society. The aim of the study trip was to learn about Shanghai’s growth as a global city and Shanghai’s urban 
development. The author was one of the two academic supervisors and took responsibility for the study programme.
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work. In such circumstance, trust between the interviewer and his or her social 
network is essential to reduce the chance of rejection a potential interviewee.
The difficulty of arranging interviews for the fieldwork was reduced be-
cause a network characterised by mutual trust was already in place. Asking 
an interviewee to help to arrange interviews with his or her colleagues, em-
ployees, lower rank officials, business partners and clients proved to be quite 
effective. Only in one case did the level of trust fail to overcome political sen-
sitivity or personal reluctance. When a company or individual was not linked 
to any part of the network, extensive research was carried out into the back-
ground of the potential interviewee by reference to the Internet and the mass 
media. Letters, faxes, phone calls and e-mails were all used to make contact 
with potential interviewees until the required result was achieved. In cases 
where it appeared impossible to get into a local company, attempts were 
made to make contact through those companies’ international partners. Ex-
perience of living in Europe has taught that European companies are more 
open and willing to receive researchers than Chinese companies. Fortunately, 
in the end most attempts were successful.
The second and third field trip to Shanghai was made as member of a 
study group of Dutch professionals and graduates studying for a masters’ de-
gree. In these two field trips the local host and partner university played a key 
role in arranging meetings with high-ranking officials in Pudong and Shang-
hai, visits to prestige projects not normally open to the public, and adminis-
trative support, including arranging for the assistance of local students.
The ability to establish and manoeuvre through social networks, tight and 
loose, is important to building relationships of trust with a wide range of dif-
ferent people (Olds, 2001). Trust enables the researcher to obtain confiden-
tial information, discuss sensitive topics, widen and deepen his or her social 
network and find more people willing to supply reliable contacts. The main 
methods used to build trust and to interest potential interviewees included:
using powerful contacts to extend the network;
reciprocating by providing information, short term and long term, e.g. 
Dutch books on urban issues, academic articles and research material from 
Europe;
offering the possibility of collaborative research;
presenting oneself in a professional manner, emphasising one’s Chinese 
education, practical experience in China and education in Europe;
convincing contacts of familiarity with and understanding of the issues 
and so interesting them in discussion.
A case-study protocol was written before the fieldwork started. The protocol 
included questionnaires, the background to the project and company infor-
mation. Case study reports were prepared after the fieldwork and all inter-
views were documented. All material collected was archived.
n
n
n
n
n
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Research methods and data sources
This dissertation is mainly based on qualitative data, using quantitative date 
to supplement or address incomplete information or provide a macroeco-
nomic background. ‘Quantitative evidence can indicate relationships which 
may not be salient to the researcher. It also can keep researchers from being 
carried away by vivid, but false, impressions in qualitative data, and it can 
bolster findings when it corroborates those findings from qualitative evidence. 
The qualitative data are useful for understanding the rationale or the theo-
ry underlying relationships revealed in the quantitative data or may suggest 
directly theory which can then be strengthened by quantitative support’ (Ei-
senhardt, 1989, p. 538). Qualitative data focus on ‘naturally occurring, ordinary 
events in natural setting’ and therefore can provide ‘a strong handle on what 
“real life” is like’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 10). The ‘richness and holism’ 
of qualitative data and the vivid data collected during a ‘sustained period’ 
provided comprehensive information to reveal the complexity of the Pudong 
development and the dynamic interplay between local and global influences.
The research methods used consisted of literature review, internet search-
es, formal open-ended interviews, group discussions, workshops, symposi-
ums and conferences. Use was of course made of the experience and knowl-
edge derived during earlier observation in Shanghai. Data was collected from 
archives, interviews, questionnaires, and observation. Evidence could be qual-
itative (verbal), quantitative (numerical), or both. The following were the main 
sources of qualitative and quantitative data:
Formal open-ended interviews with 52 people in the periods Oct-Nov, 2002 
and June-July, 2004. The vast majority of the interviews were conducted in 
person, and the interviewees included senior and junior representatives 
of a variety of different interests. They included politicians, local officials, 
market participants, academic researchers, journalists and community 
representatives. Interviews were recorded unless the interviewee objected, 
and were subsequently documented
Personal observation, first by on-site fieldwork in Oct-Nov 2002 to get per-
sonal experience and make independent judgments. These early observa-
tions were updated in June-July 2004 and July 2006 during an organised 
study trip. The information received was extended by attendance at pres-
entations, lectures and exhibitions organised by public and private partici-
pants in Shanghai’s development in general and the Pudong development 
in particular.
Group discussions involving both public and private individuals and organ-
isations involved in the Pudong development, and academic discussions 
in workshops, lectures, symposiums, conferences and PhD colloquiums. 
Group discussions generally occurred during the organised study trips. 
Sometimes a group discussion developed when an interview involved 
more than one interviewee and the interviewees were interested in learn-
n
n
n
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ing about the results of the research. Group discussions at conferences, 
symposiums and workshops were more likely to involve academics and be 
concerned with the choice of methodology than the results of the research, 
and so were more relevant to the design and analysis of the research.
Written material in English, Chinese and Dutch, including academic books 
and articles, conference proceedings, national and local laws and regula-
tions, policy documents, statistical yearbooks, local almanacs, official an-
nual investment and market reports, official company reports, analyses of 
listed company active in Shanghai, brochures, company websites, company 
reports (published and unpublished), internal evaluation reports on project 
performance and management strategies, confidential market analyses, 
archival records including maps and charts of Shanghai and Pudong, news 
clippings and articles in the mass media.
A wide variety of methods was used to triangulate the research findings to 
overcome any possible weaknesses or intrinsic bias and the problems that 
can be generated by relying on a single method, a single observer, and a sin-
gle theory. The reliability of the data was ensured by the use of the following 
techniques:
The data was collected over a continuous period of almost six years, with 
four on-site visits, more than forty one-to-one personal interviews and 
nine group discussions. The majority of the interviewees were profession-
als.
Interviews were held with as many people as possible who might have dif-
ferent views on the same topic. Within each topic comparisons were made 
between the responses of the government officials and private companies 
that were involved in the same project. Answers were checked with local 
academic researchers and, where possible, multinational organisations. As 
the number of interviews increased, certain patterns began to appear in 
the responses, which helped to confirm or cast doubt on certain answers.
Information and data obtained from interviews was cross-checked against 
written material, results of academic research and official statistics, espe-
cially when the data was questioned in western media or by western re-
searchers.
In a few cases it was impossible to cross-check the information obtained 
from an interview. Three different techniques were used. First, the mass 
media were examined and different resources used to identify the most 
relevant information. Second, contact was made with different local aca-
demic researchers to check the information. Third, reference was made to 
local archives and libraries.
Conferences, symposiums and workshops in China and Europe (e.g. in the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom) were used as forums for discussing the 
findings of the research with academic researchers with expertise in China.
n
n
n
n
n
n
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 Appendix B Interviewees and 
discussion partners
  Shanghai and Beijing
Anonymous lady Relocated rural inhabitants, relocating in Jinqiao because 
of Lujiazui redevelopment
Bao Ziyuan Sales Manager, Division of Sales & Marketing, First China 
Property Group
Bruce Murray Resident Representative, Asian Development Bank 
Resident Mission in the People’s Republic of China,
Chang Cun Manager Director, International Business, Shanghai Forte 
Land Co., Ltd.
(Ms.) Chen Relocated rural inhabitants living in Huamu because of 
Jianhua Tower
Chen Bangguo Property Manager, Jinmao Leasing & Sales Department, 
China Jinmao Group Co., Ltd., presently deputy general 
manager, Shanghai JM Imtech Facility Co. Ltd.
Cheng Yijun Assistant managing Director, Assets Management Division
Chen Min Shanghai Lujiazhui development (Group) Company Ltd.
Cong Cheng Senior Economist, Department of Policies & Regulations 
Shanghai provident Fund Management Center
Ding Li Tenent Coordination Officer for Super Brand Mall, 
Property Management Shanghai Kinghill Ltd.
Ding Yongyue Deputy General Manager, Shanghai (Z.J.) High-tech Park 
Development Co., Ltd.
Dong Haiwei General Manager and Chief Representative- Shanghai, ING 
Real Estate Investment Manager (Shanghai) Co., Ltd.
Fan Xingliang General manager, Investment & Development Department, 
Shanghai Industrial Development Co. Ltd.; SIIC Shanghai 
Development & Investment Consultant Co; Ltd.
Gao Junjie Senior Project Manager, Industry Property Development 
Department, Shanghai Waigaoqiao Free Trade Zone 
Development Co., Ltd.
Gao Yongyan Project Officer, Commercial Department, Debenham Tie 
Leung International Property Advisers (DTZ)
Ge Zhenming Faculty of Construction & Real Estate, Tongji University
Gong Qiuxia Vice Manager, Development Planning Division, Shanghai 
Lujiazhui Development (Group) Company Ltd.
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Huang Fuxiang Senior Planner, Shanghai Urban Planning & Design 
Research Institute
Huang Jimin Vice Director, Shanghai Urban Planning & Design Research 
Institute
Ji Dehong & 
neighbours
Relocated urban inhabitants living in Jinyang Village 
because of Jinmao Tower
Jin Song Vice General Manager SIIC Shanghai Haiyun Real Estate 
Co., Ltd.
Li Jianeng Consultation Committee, former director of City 
Construction Bureau, Pudong Area
Li Zhanjun Director, Pudong Real Estate research Centre, Pudong 
Reform and Development Research Institute, under 
Shanghai Social Science Academy
Li Zhengjie Manager Corporate Communications, Capitaland China 
Holding Group
Liu Hongyu Professor, Director, Department of Construction 
Management and institute of Real Estate Studies, 
Tsinghua University
Liu Rongming Division of Investment Management, Development and 
Planning Bureau of Pudong New Area
Liu Shen Land management Department, Shanghai Urban 
Construction Investment & Development General 
Corporation (Chengtou Corporation), presently general 
manager, Shanghai Chengtou Yongye Development Co. 
Ltd.
Liu Yu Comprehensive Development Division, Development and 
Planning Bureau, Pudong New Area
Ni Yucheng General Manager, Integrated Communication Dept., 
Shanghai Forte Land Co., Ltd.
Ouyang Yaopeng Project manager, shanghai World Finacial Co., Ltd.
Peng Xi Project Officer, Occupier Services, Debenham Tie Leung 
International Property Advisers (DTZ)
Shangguan Ling Plan and Finance Department, Lujiazhui Construction 
Company under Lujiazhui development Corporation
 Shi Tao Administration & Personnel Dept., Shanghai New 
International Expo Centre Co., Ltd.
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Tang Yichun Division of Real estate Management, Real Estate and Land 
Management Bureau, City Construction Bureau, Pudong 
New Area
Wang Project manager Shenmao Tower
Wang Baofa Press & Information Office, Shanghai Pudong New Area 
People’s Government
Wang Fen Wenhui-Xinmin United Press Group
Wang Yong Comprehensive Development Division, Development and 
Planning Bureau, Pudong New Area
Wu Qingdong Deputy Director Shanghai Pudong New Area Planning & 
Design Research Institute
Xiong Guolong Former project manager Shangri-la Hotel
Yan Jun Vice General Manager, Shanghai Lujiazhui Development 
(Group) Company Ltd.
Yao Jianliang Shanghai Lujiazhui Development (Group) Company Ltd.
Yu Mei Shanghai Lujiazhui Development (Group) Company Ltd.
Yu Yongwei Public Affair Manager, Pudong Shangri-la Hotel, Pudong, 
Shanghai
Yuan Liqiang General Manager, Shanghai Zhangjiang Creative Industry
Zhao Bo Project Officer, Investment & Consultancy Department, 
Debenham Tie Leung International Property Advisers 
(DTZ)
Zhao Dehe Management Division, Shanghai Municipal Construction 
& Management Commission, City
Zhao Jieping Shanghai Lujiazhui development (Group) Company Ltd.
Zhao Yongsheng Manager, Investment & Development Department, SHLG
Zheng Shiling Professor, Director, Institute of Architecture & Urban 
Space, Tongji University
Zhou Jing Office for Program & Evaluation, Japan International 
Cooperation Agency China Office
Zhu Jiaying Vice president, Shanghai Lujiazhui development 
(Group) Company Ltd., City Infrastructure Construction 
management Company
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  The Netherlands
Edwin van den 
Heuvel
Projectmanager, Vakgroep Projectmanagement, OBR 
Gemeente Rotterdam
Peter Oussoren Coördinator Gebiedsontwikkeling, Kennis Centrum PPS, 
Ministerie van Financiën
Richard Price Former general manager, ING Real Estate Asset 
Management - Asia
Rudolf p. Mulder Unit directeur, infra development & management, DHV 
Milieu en infrastructuur BV
Teun Koolhaas Former director, Teun Koolhaas Association
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 Appendix C Questionnaire
Interviews were partly structured by using a concise questionnaire as a guide-
line. Unstructured interviews were used when appropriate to the specific cir-
cumstance and the knowledge of the particular interviewee. Questions were 
selected in such a way as to keep the interview running smoothly. All inter-
views were conducted in Chinese unless the interviewee requested otherwise. 
Quotations used in the dissertation from interviews conducted in Chinese 
have been translated into English.
I Public sector
Background
It has been said that the idea for the Pudong development was proposed at 
the end of the 1970s. Is this true? How many times was the plan officially 
proposed before the final approval in 1990? Which people or decision-mak-
ers were important to the project?
When designing the project did you consult anybody outside the munici-
pality, for example developers, academics or local residents? What proce-
dure was followed and what were the results?
Some researchers have said that the support of the central government 
acted as the direct trigger for the Pudong development. Some have argued 
that if politicians in central government with a Shanghai background had 
not taken decisive action, the Pudong project would never have been ap-
proved, no matter how correct that approval has now proved to be. Do you 
agree?
Approach and stakeholder involvement
How would you describe your approach to the implementation of this gi-
ant plan? Did the Shanghai Municipality use any innovative strategies for 
the development?
A huge amount of investment and a good real estate market were neces-
sary to develop such a huge plan. How would you describe the situation in 
Shanghai?
Where did the money come from? How was so much money channelled 
into investment in infrastructure?
n
n
n
n
n
n
[  ]
Apart from government, what developers or organisations can you name 
that came in at an early stage in the Pudong development? (Name, address, 
contact information)
How did you supply information to these developers or organisations? Why 
were they interested in the Pudong project?
How was it possible to get them interested in Pudong in the early stages, 
when there were plans but no infrastructure? What strategy did you use to 
encourage the private sector to invest in the Pudong development?
How did the project begin? What was the first project? Who financed it? 
What impact did it have?
Did any stakeholders join or leave a project in the middle? When did they 
leave? Why did they leave?
How were stakeholders involved in the various projects?
Did both the public sector and the private sector share the risks and ben-
efits? What were their respective concerns?
How successful do you think the policy was that you used to attract the 
private sector?
Did your approach evolve over time? In what way did it change? Why were 
these changes made? Were the new policies successful? Do you think they 
were effective, or not? Why? Did you apply any measurement to ensure 
that your strategy was effective?
Were there any ways in which Pudong New Area’s urban management dif-
fered from the style of public administration?
How is the cost-benefit management in this project?
Would you say that the introduction of land banking was important ? Why?
How would you describe the relocation situation in the Pudong area? How 
big an area was required for relocation? How was relocation handled? 
What policies were adopted on relocation?
How well do you think relocation went in practice? Were there any prob-
lems?
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
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Did the local community or private land owners have any influence on ne-
gotiations affecting the project?
How much investment did the project attract from the public sector? From 
the private sector? How difficult was it to get contributions from the public 
sector? Was it easy to negotiate investment issues with the private sector?
Would you say that public sector investment acted as the driving force 
behind the whole project? How great an influence was exerted by money 
from the private sector?
How did local communities view the project? Did they have any impact on 
the design and implementation of the project?
How successful was cooperation between the local community, govern-
ment and private participants?
What did local residents think of the Pudong project?
Result and impacts
After 12 years of development, what changes can be seen in the Pudong 
area?
Did the implementation of this project have any social impact, for example 
a higher employment rate or an improved social environment? Was the so-
cial aspect considered to be important for the project? How much employ-
ment did the project generate?
What do you consider to be the achievements or failures? What lessons 
were learnt? Did you apply any performance measurement to the project? 
To what extent did the project achieve its goals?
Are you satisfied with the strategy used? Was it successful? If you had to 
do it all again, would you do everything the same way? If not, what things 
would you want to improve?
How do you see the role of different stakeholders in the project? What do 
you think were the results of their co-operation?
Did you have any criteria to measure the effectiveness of cooperation be-
tween the different stakeholders? Have you ever done any research into 
this?
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
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Public-private partnership
How would you define public-private partnership? What are the main char-
acteristics of a PPP?
Did you have any prior experience of PPP? Do you know of any other kinds 
of PPP arrangement? When and why was the particular kind of PPP ar-
rangement chosen? What was the motivation for this decision?
Was the urban redevelopment of the Rotterdam area the first project in 
which PPP was used? In the light of 12 years of implementation, how well 
do you think PPP approach was applied in this project?
What factors contributed to the decision to make use of public-private 
partnership? The strength of interest from the public sector or the public 
at large? The favourable economic situation? The booming real estate mar-
ket? Urban strategy or policy? The strength of the private sector in Rotter-
dam? Local culture? Support from the local community? The international 
trend towards globalisation? Encouragement to adopt a PPP approach by 
the European Union?
Do you think that particular politicians contributed to setting up the 
project?
If you could choose now, what arrangement[out of what possibilities?] 
would be the best choice for the Pudong project?
What do you think of the way Pudong was developed? Which aspects were 
successful and which not? Were there any failures which could have been 
avoided if the style of management had been improved?
What do you think of the use of PPP in a Chinese context? Do you think 
there are any advantages or disadvantages in using PPP? What particu-
lar added value can PPP give to an urban development or redevelopment 
project or programme?
Is there any legislation to support PPP?
In China, government plays an important role in PPP. Do you think this 
was important to the success of the Pudong project? Do you think that the 
combination of an urban policy which promotes PPP and public interven-
tion can play an important role in accelerating decision making?
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
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Public participation is not a common feature of Chinese society. Did this 
have any influence on the Pudong project? In what way might the develop-
ment of PPP be shaped by aspects of national character such as historical 
background, political influence, public intervention, decision making re-
lating to urban redevelopment, public policy on PPP and urban redevelop-
ment, the state of the economy and the market, social and cultural factors, 
the legal framework and concern with social issues.
II Private Sector
Background of the company
Had your company any prior experience of urban development or real es-
tate projects in Shanghai? For example?
Based on your experience or your general impression, how would you de-
scribe the investment environment in the Shanghai real estate market? 
What do you think is good and what not so good?
The Pudong development
When did you first hear of the Pudong development? When and why did 
your company first become interested in the Pudong New Area develop-
ment?
Why did you choose the ------ project? What was your expectation at the 
time? Had you been interested in development projects in Pudong for some 
considerable time?
Did you contact local officials to find out more about Pudong? Or did the 
local authority contact you for advice or suggestions for the design of this 
project? Or did they invite you to make an investment?
Do you think it would have been a good idea for your company to be in-
vited to help designing the project or to make suggestions as a consultancy 
group acting on behalf of real estate companies?
Was your company interested in part of the project, a single project, part of 
a single project, or in becoming involved in the project as a whole? Why?
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
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Project briefing
When do you start this project? Had you already signed the contract? Did 
you start by leasing land? Did you negotiate a lease or go to the land mar-
ket? If you negotiated a lease, what was it like to negotiate with the mu-
nicipality? Were there any standard terms or conditions for leasing land?
When did you finally decide to take on the project? How?
Did your project involve relocating the original residents? If so, what did 
you do about it?
Did you ever look into the results of the relocation? What do you think of 
the relocation policy?
Do you think you got a good deal? Have you ever done any cost-benefit 
analysis on the project?
Were you satisfied with the infrastructure and public space provided by the 
government? If not, why not?
Did you have any discussions with the original residents or neighbouring 
communities?
Were there any problems with your project and its implementation?
Real estate market and investment environment
How would you describe the real estate market and the investment envi-
ronment here in Shanghai and in Pudong?
Did government keep the promises it made to you before you invested in 
the project?
How would you describe the local authority’s public administration? Was 
it effective? Did you have to wait a long time or cut through a mass of red 
tape before getting approval?
If there was any dispute about the implementation of the contract, what 
did you do? Go to a lawyer? Or negotiate with government?
Do you think the law was properly enforced in Shanghai? Did your view on 
this question influence your investment decision?
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
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Was it easy to get the information you needed about the real estate mar-
ket? Was there any information that you needed but could not get?
Did you have a voice in the Pudong development as a whole, rather than 
just in the project in which you invested, on such matters as infrastructure, 
facilities and the function of adjoining buildings?
If you wanted to complain or give an opinion, could you find a channel that 
would allow you to communicate with local government?
Did you have problems in accessing finance, e.g. getting a loan from a 
bank? Did your company achieve what it had planned?
Public-private partnership
Have you heard of public-private partnership?
Did you have any prior experience of PPP? Do you know of any other kinds 
of PPP arrangements? What do you think of co-operation between the pub-
lic sector and the private sector? How would you define PPP?
In what circumstances would PPP be appropriate? Do you think PPP can 
usefully be used in a Chinese context? What problems could there be and 
how might those problems be overcome?
Was any PPP involved in any project undertaken by your company in Pu-
dong? If so, how successful was it? What differences would there have 
been if government had been involved in the project in the traditional 
way? If no PPP was involved, do you think the result would have been dif-
ferent if the government had made use of PPP?
Government played an important role in the Pudong development. Do you 
think this was important to the success of the project? Did the extent of 
government involvement encourage or discourage investment?
In what way can the development of PPP be shaped by aspects of the na-
tional context such as history, political influence, public intervention, the 
decision making process relating to urban redevelopment, public policy on 
PPP and urban redevelopment, the state of the economy and the market, 
social and cultural factors, the legal framework and concern with social is-
sues?
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
n
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 Appendix D Facts and figures of 
Pudong (2004)
# among which
n.a. means not available
1 yuan = 0.12 US$
Table D1.1 General indicators
Indicators 1993 2004
Land Area (sq. km.) 533.44 569.57
Population (million) 1.44 1.8
Total households (year end) (households) 486,325  667,265
Employed persons (million) 1.05 1.3
Gross output value of Pudong New Area (billion yuan) 16.4 178.98
Financial revenues (billion yuan) 1.12 40.22
Total investment in fixed assets (billion yuan) 16.46 65.19
# Investment in real estate development (billion yuan) – 27.95
# Investment in infrastructure (billion yuan) 5.47 12.12
Floor space per urban residence (sq. m./person) n.a. 22.15
Total resettlement in unit n.a. 16,647
Total resettlement in floor area (million sq. m.) n.a. 4.87
Total area of parks, gardens and green space (million sq. m.) n.a. 82.46
Public green space per capita (sq. m.) n.a. 25.44
Passenger capacity in Pudong International Airport 
(million person-times)
– 21.04
Volume of cargo handled at Pudong International Airport (million tons) – 1.88
Volume of cargo handled at port (million tons) 90.17 130.9
Container handling capacity (million TEU) – 9.43
Number of FDI contracts (unit) 924 1,688
Amount of FDI (billion US$) 1.76 3.22
Operation earning of main tourist attractions (million yuan) – 567
Total number of tourists (million person-times) 15.51
Number of exhibitions Hosted (time) – 108
Number of international conferences hosted (time) – 177
Average wages of staff and workers (yuan) 5,999 29,512
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Table D1.2 Floor space of housing and buildings in fixed assets 
investment
Indicators 2004 (10,000 sq.m)
1990-2004 
(10,000 sq.m)
Residential housing 453.83 4493.79
Factory buildings and warehouses 44.79 963.52
Commerce 26.76 338.69
Office 13.89 479.39
Education 3.14 163.32
Healthcare 11.98 46.21
Others 78.37 558.02
Total 632.76 7042.94
Table D1.3 Functional zones in Pudong New Area
Name Land area (sq. km.) Population (person)
Density of population 
(person/sq. km.)
Lujiazui Functional Zone 42.77 457,616 10,699
Jinqiao Functional Zone 74.86 83,311 1,113
Zhangjiang Functional Zone 115.31 145,564 1,262
Waigaoqiao Functional Zone 97.13 154,199 1,588
Table D1.4 Number of outlets of Chinese and 
foreign financial institutes
Indicators 1990 2004
Banking system 84 406
# Foreign investment 0 52
Credit cooperation 32 46
Securities companies 0 65
Insurance companies 1 74
# Foreign investment 0 32
Postal savings offices 13 52
Others 1 32
Total 131 675
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Table D1.5 Development of key development zones (total by the end of 2004)
Indicators Unit Total Lujiazui FTZ Jinqiao EPZ
Waigao-
qiao FTZ
Zhang-jiang 
HTP
Land development sq. km. 63.72 14.5 23.72 8.5 17
Area of land leased/sold million sq. m. 22.03 2.7 9.1 4.28 5.95
Investment value in fixed 
assets
billion yuan 319.28 171.85 62.33 26.37 58.73
Number of approved and 
contracted projects
unit 9,728 106 620 8,064 938
# Foreign directly-invested unit 7,013 18 419 6,232 344
# Domestic invested unit 2,715 88 201 1,832 594
Projects in operation unit 9,051 70 472 8,064 445
# Industry unit 1,155 362 ,692 101
# Commerce unit 6,145 9 6,114 22
# Other tertiary industry unit 1,751 70 101 1,258 322
Amount of approved and 
contracted projects
billion US$ 43.57 10.44 12.85 10.16 10.12
# Value of overseas 
Investment
billion US$ 30.88 3.01 11.41 8.58 7.88
# Domestic investment 
absorption
billion US$ 12.7 7.43 1.44 1.58 2.25
Projects under construction unit 184 34 34 33 83
Length of completed Roads km 275.31 89.57 68.18 55.06 62.5
Floor area of completed 
buildings
million sq.m. 25.6 11.73 6.04 6.34 1.49
# Commercial and office 
buildings
million sq.m. 10.4 6.83 1.05 2.16 0.36
# Factory buildings million sq.m. 6.7 2.82 3.19 0.69
# Residential housings million sq.m. 6.75 4.9 1.57 0.28
Table D1.6 Investment in fixed assets in key development zones
Name
1993
(billion yuan)
2004
(billion yuan)
Accumulated  
(billion yuan)
Total 14.48 39.84 319.28
Lujiazui FTZ 8.58 15.9 171.85
Jinqiao EPZ 3.09 4.34 62.33
Zhangjiang HTP 0.2 2.27 26.37
Waigaoqiao FTZ 2.61 17.33 58.73
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Table D1.7 Floor space of buildings in Lujiazui Finance and Trade Zone
Indicators
Floor space of buildings 
(million sq. m.)
Floor space of 
buildings completed 
(million sq. m.)
Total 20.84 15.53
Residential housing 11.1 8.39
Commercial buildings 2.32 1.84
Office buildings 5.35 3.62
Others 2.07 1.68
Table D1.8 Trained personnel resources in 
Zhangjiang High-Tech Park
Indicators Number Percentage 
Total number of employed 
persons (year end)
59,437 100
# Doctor degree 1,476 2.48
# Master degree 7,205 12.12
# Bachelor degree 26,710 44.94
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  Summary 
Shanghai Pudong.  
Urban development in an era  
of global-local interaction
Yawei Chen
Introduction and research approach
This research was concerned with large-scale urban area development in 
general, and in particular with gaining an understanding of the role played 
by global-local interaction in shaping the area development strategies in one 
particularly explosive urban project, the development of Shanghai’s Pudong 
New Area. The Pudong development provides an extreme example of a situa-
tion in which interaction between global and local forces took place in a loca-
tion whose boundaries had been closed to the outside world for almost forty 
years and in a period when doors and windows were beginning to open. The 
research led to a concrete interpretation of the tensions developing at district 
level and provided an example capable of representing the complexity and 
dynamics of current area developments. The practical question addressed by 
the research was: What were the main factors responsible for the speed achieved by 
the Pudong development? The associated theoretical question was To what extent 
did the development of the Pudong New Area reflect the characteristics of a develop-
mental state?
The starting point of the research was a theoretical analysis of global-lo-
cal interaction and its impact on the creation of urban space. Urban theories, 
theories related to the network society and the global city, were used to ex-
plain the significant changes taking place in the creation of urban space. A 
number of significant influences were observed. One such influence was the 
rise of the network society, transforming the relationship between tradition-
al organisations operating within cities into a more intertwined and inter-
dependent relationship and leading to a new style of urban governance. An-
other was the formation of a global urban network resulting from economic 
globalisation and global financial flow. The paradigm of the world city, as de-
veloped in pioneering research into global cities (Sassen, 1991, 1994) and the 
world city hierarchy (Friedmann, 1986, 1995), recognises that cities have be-
come the driving forces behind economic globalisation and at the same time 
have become increasingly dependent for their survival on their articulation 
with the global economy. The essential finding of these urban studies was the 
key role played by global capital flow and knowledge transfer in interlinking 
global and local economic systems and creating urban space.
Even when the impact on cities of global forces has been recognised, it is 
still necessary to recognise the global-local dualism expressed in an area de-
velopment process.  The formulation of area development strategies is rooted 
in the local political and economic situation but is increasingly influenced by 
the uncertainty imposed by global forces. The success with which area devel-
opment strategies are formulated to deal with the complexity, dynamics and 
uncertainty of the development process is directly affected by the way the lo-
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cality views itself and the outside world and the way political and economic 
institutions function, adjust and adapt. Thus formulating an area develop-
ment strategy is more a learning process, in which emerging situations need 
to be addressed and adjustments need to be made to suit changing require-
ments. As China chose to base its economic reforms on the model of the East 
Asian developmental state, it naturally introduced many of the same institu-
tional structures that had helped other countries and regions to generate eco-
nomic growth. This same strategy was adopted by Shanghai and played a role 
in shaping Shanghai’s institutional system. Although each East Asian develop-
mental state has its own individual system, the central concern is always to 
achieve a steady high rate of economic growth. In general the state plays an 
active role, laying down industrial policy and promoting economic develop-
ment. Ensuring a high rate of economic growth requires the state to create a 
significant degree of trust from and a close relationship with the market. The 
complex character of the Pudong development provided a unique opportunity 
not only to test the application of the theory of the developmental state at 
local level, but also to link two different domains, political economics and ur-
ban study, in an examination of the complexity of the impact of context on 
urban management and area development.
Case study
To explain how global-local tension was controlled to achieve speed in the 
Pudong area development, the research focused on the two sets of interrelat-
ed variables, local and global. The case study analysed in depth the practical 
measures which affected the speed of the development, including the deci-
sion-making process, management strategies affecting land development, in-
frastructural development and the closely related local real estate market and 
the way in which investment and finance was mobilised. To provide a com-
prehensive picture, the research made use of a variety of different methods, 
including literature review, internet searches, formal open-ended interviews, 
group discussions, workshops, symposiums and conferences. Data was col-
lected from archives, interviews, questionnaires, and fieldwork observations. 
The case study revealed ample evidence for the evolutionary nature of the 
policies applied in Pudong to manage a changing environment and the dif-
ferent challenges faced during the course of the development. The different 
policies and the ways in which they were implemented displayed a number of 
distinct characteristics defining the approach taken to steering the develop-
ment.
Findings
The theory of the developmental state was applied to explain the relationship 
between the speed of the development and the interaction between state and 
market. The analysis considered the motives which underlay the different re-
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sponses to global-local tension, especially the response of local government 
and its effect on the strategies formulated by local government. The analysis 
examined two key relationships, the relationship between state and market 
and the relationship between local and global forces, paying particular atten-
tion to those aspects that directly affected the speed achieved by the 15-year 
development.
State-market networking
As compared with the traditional way of managing area development in Chi-
na - closed, top-down, opaque, bureaucratic and government-controlled - the 
development of Pudong showed an evolutionary trend, more open and inter-
active, governed by a hybrid form of control characteristic of a specifically 
Chinese development model. Use of a networking strategy was essential to 
facilitate the development, allowing government and the market to begin to 
find ways of approaching and understanding one another. Cooperation be-
tween government and the market was generally achieved by institutional 
adaptation on the part of government, leading to the creation of new rules to 
accommodate the admission of market forces and allow them to operate. Four 
aspects of the networking strategy were found to be particularly significant:
Developmental goal - The urban development of Shanghai Pudong was fa-
cilitated by the adoption by a developmental state of an open-door policy. 
The aim of the development strategy employed for Pudong was to achieve 
economic development. All the way through from decision-making to im-
plementation, local government actively influenced the development proc-
ess, sometimes openly, sometimes discreetly, according to circumstanc-
es and the requirements of the moment. The application of the national 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) concept to a large-scale urban development 
project and the wide range of experimental policies followed in Pudong 
was reminiscent of the tactics used by China to stimulate its economic 
growth and foreign investment, following the developmental state model. 
Like other SEZs, Pudong serves Shanghai in particular and China in gen-
eral as a ‘shop window’ and a ‘base’, creating opportunities for interaction 
between western culture and Chinese culture, giving foreign investors the 
opportunity to gain a better understanding of China’s social and economic 
traditions and the Chinese greater opportunities to learn about western 
technology, management and expertise. Thus Pudong’s SEZ status not only 
gave Shanghai sufficient autonomy to hook into the global capital market 
but also allowed global players to penetrate the local market, providing a 
deregulated zone in which to carry on their activities within a China that 
was still largely regulated. Moreover the significance of the Pudong de-
velopment to Shanghai’s economic restructuring and linkage with global 
economy, meant that locating in Pudong gave investors an important step-
ping stone to the market, both internal and external.
1.
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Local-central synergy - The active function played by the state in the Pu-
dong development, was achieved by a coalition between state and local 
government, each supported the other’s approach to development and 
each needing valuable resources that only the other could provide. Once 
the two sides had recognised their shared interest in economic develop-
ment and the need each had for assistance from the other, the initial con-
flict between supporters of local development and central government 
could be  resolved, and the two parties were  able to reach a consensus, 
each, for its own reasons, supporting the start-up of the development. It 
is interesting to consider the efforts made by central government to bal-
ance the conflicting interests of Shanghai and other provinces. In fact 
central government helped to create an enabling environment that local 
government could never have created alone. In the Chinese version of the 
developmental state, the relationship of ‘interdependence’ and ‘mutuality’ 
between the state and local development initiatives allowed central gov-
ernment, Shanghai, Pudong and the hybrid development companies to 
share in decision-making, the design of a development strategy for Pudong 
and implementation. Local government played its part as initiator of the 
Pudong development, designing the development concept and strategies, 
lobbying central government, negotiating the level of support required 
from central government and marketing its development ambitions to the 
outside world. The role of the state in facilitating the operation of the mar-
ket was reflected in the use of lower-level agents and development compa-
nies, sensitive to changes in the market and responsive to those changes, 
to work closely with those individuals and organisations which became in-
volved in the market. The need for the role played by central government 
also changed as time went by. Once the Pudong development was under 
way, central government was able to reduce its intervention and budgetary 
support, though when the development ran into trouble, as for example 
during the Asian economic crisis, central government stepped in to give 
a helping hand. Analysis of the decision-making process and subsequent 
developments in Pudong clearly showed how in the long term the role of 
government changed from intervention to enabling, and to continued ef-
forts to build a strong cooperation between state and market. This shar-
ing of tasks between local and central government demonstrated the flex-
ibility with which a developmental state was able to carry out a particular 
project.
Institutional adaptation - The development of Pudong demanded urgent 
institutional redesign, or more precisely institutional adaptation, if the 
market was to become involved in local development. To achieve such 
adaptation, Shanghai concentrated on two things, a market-oriented ad-
ministrative structure with sufficient calibre to advance the development 
strategy effectively and a market-friendly legal system to ensure the 
2.
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achievement of synergy between state and market. To increase transpar-
ency and provide an efficient and effective service, the institutional design 
adopted by Pudong combined ‘small government’, employing as few per-
sonnel and offices as possible, ‘big service’, putting the emphasis on bu-
reaucratic efficiency, and ‘big society’, transferring functions other than 
supervision and regulation to associations and Non-Government-Organi-
sations (NGOs). In its creation of an effective Pudong New Area Adminis-
tration Committee, Shanghai put a good deal of effort into emphasising 
the autonomy of that committee. A ‘one-stop’ system was introduced to 
facilitate the obtaining of administrative approvals, to avoid the usual bu-
reaucratic delays and ensure that investors found the business of getting 
approval for investment projects fast and relatively painless. To facilitate 
investors’ entry into and operation in Pudong’s market, new laws were in-
troduced to prepare the ground for the introduction of a market economy, 
but the details were kept vague to allow for later interpretation and imple-
mentation. Some of the new laws even contradicted one another, requiring 
continued amendment and adjustment as China’s economic reform deep-
ened and the operation of the market became better understood. To sup-
port area development, the local authority made special efforts to create 
land institutions which would facilitate the operation of the market, and 
to dismantle barriers to outsiders looking to enter the real estate market 
and sectors previously barred to private developers. The changes to the le-
gal system, though not without risk, provided scope and flexibility for local 
authorities to carry out further experiments to discover what suited them 
best. Furthermore, a strong regime (strong government) combining capable 
political leadership with a highly-educated economically aware bureaucra-
cy and supported by technical expertise, ensured that the implementation 
of the Pudong project was conscious of and responsive to developments in 
the market.
Selective strategy - One of the most successful lessons learnt by the devel-
opmental states concerned selective intervention. As interpreted in China, 
a selective strategy involved a pragmatic approach to sharing limited re-
sources in a vast land with many different local interests. The state was 
able to push through area development in a particular favoured area, in 
this case the Pudong New Area, by exploring the highly selective SEZ strat-
egy to attract western capital, technology, management skills and expe-
rience. A selective strategy also involves the limitation of the number of 
parties involved in decision-making, in the selection of sectors to form an 
outward-oriented economic structure and the limited use of state budget-
ary funds. Because the local authority’s budget was limited, it too adopted 
a selective strategy, concentrating its spending on a selected priority area 
in each zone. Pudong could be used as a laboratory for specially designed 
pilot projects, a place to try out new strategies and policies, reflecting the 
4.
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nation’s pragmatic and gradualist approach to reform. These kinds of ex-
periment, involving administrative restructuring or new mechanisms such 
as Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and Public-Private Partnership (PPP), cou-
pled with a pragmatic approach, made possible the rapid introduction of 
efficient and effective measures to help Pudong speed up its development 
and attract more investment. A belief in utility rather than ideology led to 
many new ideas being tried out in Pudong. Although the old regime erected 
enormous barriers to the introduction of new ideas that it saw as being in 
conflict with the existing structure or existing methods, it was still possi-
ble to try out new ideas in designated test areas. Measures that proved suc-
cessful could then be tried out in other places. The Pudong development 
showed that the planning approach to development was still alive and 
kicking. This approach owed its rebirth to a growing market-awareness, 
the responsiveness of new-style planning to changes in the international 
economy and an ability to take advantage of market awareness through 
selective government intervention. Planning transformed its function to 
become a demonstrative tool, a promotional device to attract the attention 
of the public and investors from the outside world, and a bargaining tool to 
develop consensus between different organisations and interest groups.
Local-global articulation
A thorough examination of the way the project developed left no doubt that 
Pudong was an example of a temporary process of urban transformation ex-
ecuted in an era of increasing globalisation. National government and Shang-
hai’s local government treated Pudong as a stimulus to Shanghai’s interna-
tionalisation by seeking to benefit from the growth of the global financial 
market, the expansion of the international trade in services, and the restruc-
turing of foreign direct investment. In a local project of this kind, local, glo-
bal, national and regional forces interact with one another. The Pudong devel-
opment demonstrated the dynamics of local-global articulation, in which an 
individual locality takes an active role in responding and adapting to global 
challenges, and in some cases even takes the offensive to take advantage of 
the opportunities presented. Although the state treated the impact of knowl-
edge transfer and global capital inflow with caution (for fear of negative in-
fluences), it was also aware of how significant global capital and advanced 
knowledge could be to a local area development project and to the efficiency 
and effectiveness of urban governance so long desired by local authorities. To 
benefit from external influences rather than being swallowed up by them, lo-
cal authorities (in collaboration with central government) spent a substantial 
amount of time on study and research before taking ideas accepted interna-
tionally - particularly in the West - and adapting them to suit their particular 
localities. This progressive pragmatism was not only applied to global capital 
flow, but also to the transfer of knowledge from the outside world. The desig-
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nation of Pudong as an SEZ created a ‘national enclave’ within which bold ex-
periments could be carried out on various market concepts, helping to accel-
erate a pragmatic adaptation to information inflow and knowledge transfer.
Global-local financial flow - Pudong was presented as a nexus between glo-
bal players and domestic players. To hook Pudong into the global economy 
and the global financial market, the project’s initiators borrowed the con-
cept of the SEZ to free Pudong from rigid institutional constraints and so 
allow it to bypass the administrative, political, and economic barriers limit-
ing Shanghai’s economic activity and to experiment with the development 
of an outward-looking, market-oriented economic system. Pudong’s pref-
erential policies to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) were not limited 
to the financial and manufacturing sectors, the two sectors which Pudong 
hoped to establish quickly as its main economic supports. It was hoped 
that inviting foreign investors and foreign investment into Pudong’s urban 
development, especially in areas formerly restricted to the Chinese pub-
lic sector or Chinese private investors, would encourage sufficient inflow 
of foreign investment to make good the shortage of capital. Land develop-
ment projects and infrastructure development were thrown open as the lo-
cal authority showed its willingness to involve global players into Pudong’s 
urban development and real estate market. Although Pudong’s property 
market brought with it huge uncertainties, the opportunities offered – an 
untapped market and the chance of high return – persuaded a significant 
number of developers to try their luck. The dramatic increase in prices and 
rents for housing and offices in Pudong, coupled with the booming prop-
erty market in Shanghai, revealed the danger that continuing integration 
with the global property market could lead to an uncontrollable separation 
from the local Chinese market and a loss of state influence. It is notewor-
thy that in Pudong’s financial structure, the unusually large proportion of 
FDI contributed by Hong Kong, Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries dem-
onstrates the importance of the global Chinese business network to direct-
ing the inflow of FDI into China generally and Pudong in particular.
Global-local information flow - Pudong also provided an interesting ex-
ample of the influence exerted by foreign expertise, directing and assist-
ing Shanghai’s urban development, participating in different phases of the 
planning and architectural design, establishing a land regime and setting 
up public-private partnerships. Architecture and urban planning were two 
of the areas most active in adapting knowledge from the outside world to 
suit the Pudong situation. Local professionals, encouraged by their own 
professional curiosity and the eagerness of local politicians to hear outside 
opinions, were largely responsible for initiating interaction with the out-
side world, although the earliest initiatives were more a matter of ‘import-
ing’ than interaction. Interacting and conferring with outside experts gave 
local professionals an insight into how to examine local projects in the 
1.
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light of western planning concepts. The lack of Chinese experience meant 
that the locality could be treated as a tabula rasa. Hardly any of the creative 
references used by foreign architects were derived from Chinese cities, nor 
did they relate in any significant way to the existing situation or take much 
account of implementation problems such as the relocation of existing res-
idents. In fact the local context was largely ignored. Nevertheless, all this 
information and knowledge was not without value to planning practice. 
The different proposals were actually used by local Shanghainese planners 
in a more pragmatic and practical way, adapted to suit local conditions.
Pudong’s land regime was largely based on the experience of other devel-
opmental states, particularly Singapore and Hong Kong, which had estab-
lished successful land institutions to leverage state ownership of land and 
had profited from large amounts of revenue from their land. Pudong did 
not in fact copy what had been done in other successful cases, but went to 
great lengths to adapt the various techniques to suit its own locality and 
different economic situation. The institutionalisation of land development 
therefore became part of the process of China’s transition, facilitating the 
development of the market while maintaining the developmental state 
model. The adoption of an active land policy increased the speed of devel-
opment by encouraging new players to invest and earn increased revenue 
from land leasing.
The introduction of public-private partnership was another interesting as-
pect of Pudong’s pragmatic approach to foreign management techniques. 
For the first time, urban planning and urban development was not just a 
public task, but the collective responsibility of a broadly based group of 
stakeholders. This interactive approach, which became even more com-
mon in the implementation stage because of the need to gain financial and 
public support, was very different from the traditional Chinese approach to 
urban redevelopment, in which the central role was generally played by the 
public sector and public finance. The main concern was how private sector 
investment could be involved in Pudong, not just in real estate but in the 
industrial and service sectors generally.
The Pudong example demonstrated that urban development is a complex 
process, dynamic and diverse, involving interaction between the state and the 
market in parallel with increasingly dynamic global-local interaction. Policy 
making, consequently, was not pre-planned but rather emerged from the in-
teraction between private companies and bureaucratic agencies, with medi-
atory organisations playing an essential role. As Mintzberg has said, policy-
making is ‘emergent’, not designed (Mintzberg, 1994). 
Conclusions and practical implications
The research applied urban theories and the theory of the developmental 
state to understanding the nature of a large-scale area development in a spe-
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cifically Chinese context in an era of globalisation. The speed of the Pudong 
development was made possible by a number of different factors interrelated 
in such a way as to perform a unique function not achievable by any one of 
those factors in isolation. The theory of the developmental state made it pos-
sible to clarify a number of features of the Pudong development, especially 
the powerful motives underlying government intervention in local affairs and 
the network approach exploited by local government to deliberately construct 
a coalition between state and market, global and local.  However, the decision 
by the state to take an active role in this local development project was not 
taken blindly or subjectively, but resulted from a careful observation and un-
derstanding of global economics followed by a progressive adaptation to the 
potential and opportunities offered by the global economy. The pragmatic ad-
aptation of advanced know-how derived from the outside world to suit condi-
tions in Pudong was a distinctive developmental strategy introduced by local 
government, allowing the developmental state to use all possible means to 
achieve its developmental goal. The most representative example of pragmat-
ic adaptation in the field of urban development was the active land policy, cre-
ating an intermediary between state and market and attracting global players 
to a local development. The active land policy not only generated substantial 
income for the further development of local infrastructure, but also led to 
changes in entry rules allowing the private sector to become involved in what 
was traditionally the domain of the public sector. The same experiment was 
carried out with infrastructure development. Later, with the development of 
housing reform and the emergence of a real estate industry, the private sec-
tor and private finance began to play a significant role in the property market, 
leading public and private finance to combine in support of the Pudong devel-
opment. One striking characteristic of Pudong’s financial mechanism was the 
role played by the global Chinese business network as nodes in the global fi-
nancial network linking a local area development and financial market to glo-
bal capital. This network not only played a key role in attracting global capital 
to the Pudong development, but also encouraged speculative investors hoping 
to earn a quick return from Pudong’s booming real estate market.
Although the Pudong development demonstrated the strength with which 
a developmental state could combine the advantages of global openness with 
flexibility and efficiency in adapting global changes to suit the local context, 
there are a number of limitations that need to be recognised. First it is neces-
sary to be realistic about the exploitation of networks and network strategies 
and to take account of the need to conform to the well-defined rules of the 
global economic system. Second, while the use of a selective strategy is effec-
tive, it needs to be applied in such a way as to avoid the escalation of spatial 
segregation and economic polarisation. Third, it has to be appreciated that the 
local financial system will be increasingly unable to deal with the uncertainty 
imposed by global economic integration.
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Research into the Pudong development has given some understanding of 
the complexity and dynamics that feature in today’s area developments and 
the nature of the interaction between global and local influences. The Pudong 
development was found to be a unique configuration of context-dependent 
processes. While different strategies for urban development and redevelop-
ment can be expected to have much in common, each strategy evolves and 
is adjusted to fit the particular situation. Each individual approach, as in the 
case of the approach taken for the Pudong development, needs to be realis-
tically evaluated to determine its suitability for transplanting from one situ-
ation to another. Generally the patterns on which cities base their develop-
ment strategies for large–scale urban development projects can be borrowed 
and adapted, pragmatically, to suit other locations where circumstances are 
different. The question of applicability can therefore better be reframed in 
terms of the extent to which the particular local, regional or organisational 
context can be changed to benefit from the lessons learned from the Pudong 
development.
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  Samenvatting 
Inleiding en onderzoeksaanpak
Dit onderzoek was gericht op grootschalige stedelijke ontwikkeling in het al-
gemeen en in het bijzonder op het verkrijgen van een inzicht in de rol van de 
mondiaal-lokale interactie bij het vormen van strategieën voor de ontwikke-
ling van gebieden in een uiterst controversieel stedelijk project, de ontwik-
keling van Sjanghai’s Pudong ‘New Area’. Het Pudong-project is een extreem 
voorbeeld van een situatie waarin de interactie tussen mondiale en lokale 
krachten plaatsvond op een locatie waarvan de grenzen bijna veertig jaar 
voor de buitenwereld gesloten waren geweest en tevens in een periode waarin 
de deuren en ramen van China begonnen open te gaan. Het onderzoek heeft 
geleid tot een concrete interpretatie van de spanningen die zich op districts-
niveau ontwikkelden en leverde een voorbeeld waarmee de complexiteit en 
dynamiek van de huidige ontwikkelingen in het gebied konden worden weer-
gegeven. De praktische vraag die in het onderzoek werd gesteld was: Wat wa-
ren de belangrijkste factoren die hebben geleid tot de snelheid die werd be-
reikt in het Pudong-project? De daaraan verbonden theoretische vraag was: In 
hoeverre kon uit de ontwikkeling van Nieuw Pudong de kenmerken van een 
ontwikkelingsstaat worden opgemaakt?
Het uitgangspunt van het onderzoek was een theoretische analyse van de 
mondiaal-lokale interactie en de gevolgen daarvan voor de vorming van ste-
delijke ruimte. Stedelijke theorieën, theorieën met betrekking tot de netwerk-
samenleving en de mondiale stad, zijn toegepast ter verklaring van de signi-
ficante veranderingen die optreden bij de vorming van stedelijke ruimte. Er 
zijn een aantal significante invloeden waargenomen. Een van die invloeden 
was de opkomst van de netwerksamenleving, waarbij de relaties tussen tra-
ditionele organisaties binnen steden werden getransformeerd tot meer ver-
weven en onderling afhankelijke relaties, wat een nieuwe stijl van stedelijk 
bestuur tot gevolg had. Een andere invloed was de vorming van een mondiaal 
stedelijk netwerk als gevolg van de economische globalisering en mondiale 
geldstromen. Het paradigma van de wereldstad zoals ontwikkeld in pioniers-
onderzoek naar mondiale steden (Sassen, 1991, 1994) en de hiërarchie van 
de wereldstad (Friedmann, 1986, 1995), erkent dat steden de drijvende kracht 
achter de economische globalisering zijn geworden en tegelijkertijd in toene-
mende mate voor hun voortbestaan afhankelijk zijn geworden van hun gele-
ding binnen de mondiale economie. De essentiële conclusie van deze stede-
lijke studies was de sleutelrol die door mondiale geldstromen wordt gespeeld 
en de overdracht van kennis bij het koppelen van mondiale en economische 
systemen met het vormen van stedelijke ruimte. 
Zelfs als we de effecten van mondiale krachten op steden erkennen, is 
het nog steeds nodig om het mondiaal-lokaal dualisme te erkennen dat tot 
uitdrukking komt in een gebiedsontwikkelingsproces. Het formuleren van 
strategieën voor gebiedsontwikkeling komt voort uit de lokale politieke en 
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economische situatie, maar wordt in toenemende mate beïnvloed door de on-
zekerheid veroorzaakt door mondiale krachten. Het succes waarmee strate-
gieën voor gebiedsontwikkeling worden geformuleerd om te kunnen omgaan 
met de complexiteit, dynamiek en onzekerheid van het ontwikkelingsproces 
wordt rechtstreeks beïnvloed door de manier waarop de lokale gemeenschap 
zichzelf en de buitenwereld ziet en de manier waarop politieke en economi-
sche instituten functioneren en zich aanpassen. Dit betekent dat het formu-
leren van een strategie voor gebiedsontwikkeling eerder een leerproces is 
waarin de situaties die zich voordoen moeten worden aangepakt en aanpas-
singen nodig zijn in verband met veranderende eisen. Aangezien China be-
sloten heeft haar economische hervormingen te baseren op het model van 
de Oost-Aziatische ontwikkelingsstaat, heeft het uiteraard veel van dezelfde 
institutionele structuren geïntroduceerd die andere landen en regio’s gehol-
pen hebben economische groei te realiseren. Dezelfde strategie is gevolgd 
door Sjanghai, wat tot uiting komt in de vormgeving van diens institutionele 
systeem. Hoewel elke Oost-Aziatische ontwikkelingsstaat zijn eigen individu-
ele systeem heeft, draait het steeds om het bereiken van een constante, hoge 
economische groei. In het algemeen speelt de staat een belangrijke rol door 
het vastleggen van het industrieel beleid en het bevorderen van economische 
ontwikkeling. Een hoge economische groei vereist dat de staat een aanzien-
lijke mate van vertrouwen van, en nauwe relaties met, de markt creëert. Het 
complexe karakter van het Pudong-project bood een unieke kans om niet al-
leen de toepassing te testen van de theorie van de ontwikkelingsstaat op lo-
kaal niveau, maar ook om twee verschillende domeinen, de politieke econo-
mie en het stedelijk onderzoek, aan elkaar te koppelen in een analyse van de 
complexiteit van de gevolgen in de context van stedelijk beheer en gebieds-
ontwikkeling. 
Case studie
Om te kunnen verklaren hoe de spanning tussen mondiaal en lokaal werd 
gehanteerd om snelheid te bereiken in het Pudong-project, heeft het onder-
zoek zich met name gericht op de twee sets gerelateerde variabelen, lokale en 
mondiale. De casestudy omvatte een diepgaande analyse van de praktische 
maatregelen die invloed hadden op de snelheid van de ontwikkeling, zoals 
het besluitvormingsproces, managementstrategieën die invloed hebben op 
de grondontwikkeling, ontwikkeling van de infrastructuur en de nauw daar-
mee verbonden lokale onroerendgoedmarkt, en de manier waarop investerin-
gen en financiering werden gemobiliseerd. Om een duidelijk beeld te krijgen 
is in het onderzoek gebruikgemaakt van een verscheidenheid aan metho-
den, waaronder literatuuronderzoek, internetonderzoek, formele interviews, 
groepsdiscussies, workshops, symposiums en conferenties. Gegevens zijn ver-
zameld uit archieven, interviews, enquêtes en veldonderzoek. De casestudy 
leverde uitgebreide aanwijzingen op voor de evolutionaire aard van de stra-
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tegieën die in Pudong zijn toegepast. Deze betreffen het omgaan met een ver-
anderende omgeving en de verschillende uitdagingen die in de loop van de 
ontwikkeling het hoofd geboden moesten worden. De verschillende strategie-
en en de manier waarop deze werden geïmplementeerd toonden een aantal 
kenmerkende eigenschappen van de aanpak die werd gevolgd om de ontwik-
kelingen te sturen. 
Bevindingen
De theorie van de ontwikkelingsstaat is toegepast voor het verklaren van de 
relaties tussen de snelheid van de ontwikkeling en de interactie tussen staat 
en markt. De analyse richtte zich op de motieven achter de verschillende res-
ponsen op de spanning tussen mondiaal en lokaal, vooral de respons van de 
lokale overheid en het effect daarvan op de strategieën die door de lokale 
overheid zijn geformuleerd. In de analyse zijn twee sleutelrelaties onderzocht, 
de verhouding tussen staat en markt en die tussen lokale en mondiale krach-
ten, waarbij in het bijzonder aandacht werd geschonken aan die aspecten die 
rechtstreeks invloed hadden op de snelheid die werd bereikt tijdens de 15 jaar 
durende ontwikkeling.
Staat-markt netwerken
Vergeleken met de traditionele manier van omgaan met gebiedsontwikke-
ling in China – gesloten, hiërarchisch, ondoorzichtig, bureaucratisch en be-
heerst door de overheid – toonde de ontwikkeling van Pudong een evolutio-
naire trend, meer open en interactief, bestuurd door een hybride vorm van 
regelkenmerken van een specifiek Chinees ontwikkelingsmodel. Toepassing 
van een netwerkstrategie was van wezenlijk belang om de ontwikkeling mo-
gelijk te maken, waarbij de overheid en de markt manieren beginnen te vin-
den waarop ze elkaar kunnen benaderen en begrijpen. Samenwerking tussen 
overheid en markt werd in het algemeen bereikt door institutionele aanpas-
singen aan de kant van de overheid die resulteerden in het opstellen van 
nieuwe regels om het toelaten van marktkrachten mogelijk te maken en deze 
te laten werken. Vier aspecten van de netwerkstrategie werden bijzonder sig-
nificant geacht. 
Ontwikkelingsdoelstelling. - De stedelijke ontwikkeling van Sjanghai Pu-
dong werd mogelijk gemaakt door het ‘open-deur’ beleid waartoe de ontwik-
kelingsstaat was overgegaan. Het doel van de voor Pudong gevolgde ontwik-
kelingsstrategie was het bereiken van economische ontwikkeling. Gedurende 
het hele proces van besluitvorming tot implementatie heeft de lokale over-
heid het ontwikkelingsproces actief beïnvloed, soms openlijk, soms discreet, 
volgens de omstandigheden en de vereisten van het moment. De toepassing 
van het nationale Speciale Economische Zone (SEZ) concept op een grootscha-
lig stedelijk ontwikkelingsproces en de grote verscheidenheid aan experimen-
tele strategieën die in Pudong werden gevolgd, deden denken aan de tactiek 
[ 0 ]
die China gebruikte om economische groei en buitenlandse investeringen te 
stimuleren volgens het model van de ontwikkelingsstaat. Net als andere SEZ’s 
doet Pudong dienst voor Sjanghai in het bijzonder en China in het algemeen 
als ‘etalage’ en ‘basis’ voor het creëren van kansen voor interactie tussen de 
westerse cultuur en de Chinese cultuur, wat buitenlandse investeerders de 
kans geeft om China’s sociale en economische tradities beter te begrijpen en 
de Chinezen meer kans geeft te leren van westerse technologie, management 
en deskundigheid. Op die manier gaf de SEZ-status van Pudong niet alleen 
Sjanghai voldoende autonomie om aan te haken bij de mondiale kapitaal-
markt, maar gaf ook mondiale spelers de mogelijkheid de lokale markt bin-
nen te dringen door een gedereguleerde zone te bieden waarin zij hun acti-
viteiten konden uitvoeren in een China dat nog steeds voor een groot deel 
gereguleerd was. Bovendien betekende het belang van het Pudong-project 
voor Shanghai’s economische herstructurering en aansluiting bij de mondiale 
economie dat investeerders, door zich in Pudong te vestigen, een belangrijke 
springplank verkregen naar de markt, zowel intern als extern.
Synergie lokaal-centraal. - De actieve rol van de staat in het Pudong-project 
werd bereikt door een coalitie tussen de staat en de lokale overheid, die elk 
elkaars aanpak van de ontwikkeling ondersteunden en die elk waardevolle 
middelen nodig hadden die alleen de ander kon bieden. Toen beide partijen 
eenmaal hadden erkend dat ze een gezamenlijk belang hadden in de econo-
mische ontwikkeling van Pudong en dat ze van elkaars hulp afhankelijk wa-
ren, kon het oorspronkelijke conflict tussen de aanhangers van lokale ontwik-
keling en de centrale overheid worden opgelost. De twee partijen konden zo 
een consensus bereiken waarbij ze, elk vanuit hun eigen standpunten, het in 
beweging zetten van de ontwikkeling ondersteunden. Het is interessant om 
te kijken naar de inspanningen die de centrale overheid zich heeft getroost 
om een balans te vinden tussen de botsende belangen van Sjanghai en an-
dere provincies. In feite heeft de centrale overheid geholpen een omgeving te 
creëren en mogelijk te maken die de lokale overheid alleen nooit zou kun-
nen hebben bereikt. In de Chinese versie van de ontwikkelingsstaat maakte 
de verhouding tussen ‘onderlinge afhankelijkheid’ en ‘wederkerigheid’ tus-
sen de staat en de lokale ontwikkelingsinitiatieven het de centrale overheid, 
Sjanghai, Pudong en de hybride ontwikkelingsmaatschappijen mogelijk te 
delen in de besluitvorming, het ontwerp van een ontwikkelingsstrategie voor 
Pudong en de implementatie ervan. De lokale overheid heeft een rol gespeeld 
als initiator van het Pudong-project: deze heeft het ontwikkelingsconcept en 
strategieën ontworpen, bij de centrale overheid gelobbyd, over het niveau van 
steun dat van de centrale overheid vereist was onderhandeld, en haar ontwik-
kelingsambities aan de buitenwereld kenbaar gemaakt. De rol van de staat bij 
het faciliteren van de marktwerking bleek uit het gebruik van vertegenwoor-
digers en ontwikkelingsmaatschappijen op een lager niveau die gevoelig zijn 
voor veranderingen in de markt en snel op die veranderingen kunnen reage-
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ren, om zo nauwer samen te werken met die individuen en organisaties die bij 
de markt betrokken raakten. De behoefte aan de rol van de centrale overheid 
veranderde ook in de loop der tijd. Toen het Pudong-project eenmaal draaide, 
kon de centrale overheid haar interventie en budgettaire ondersteuning ver-
minderen, hoewel toen het project in de problemen kwam, zoals bijvoorbeeld 
tijdens de Aziatische economische crisis, de centrale overheid te hulp schoot. 
Analyse van het besluitvormingsproces en de daaropvolgende ontwikkelin-
gen in Pudong laat duidelijk zien hoe op de lange duur de rol van de overheid 
veranderde van interventie naar ondersteuning en vervolgens naar blijvende 
inspanningen om tot een vruchtbare samenwerking tussen staat en markt te 
komen. Deze verdeling van taken tussen lokale en centrale overheid liet de 
flexibiliteit zien waarmee een ontwikkelingsstaat een bepaald kon project uit-
voeren.
Institutionele aanpassingen. - De ontwikkeling van Pudong vereiste drin-
gende institutionele herstructureringen, of nauwkeuriger gezegd institutio-
nele aanpassingen als de markt betrokken moest raken bij lokale ontwikke-
ling. Om een dergelijke aanpassing te bereiken concentreerde Sjanghai zich 
op twee dingen: een marktgericht bestuursstructuur van voldoende kaliber 
om de ontwikkelingsstrategie effectief te bevorderen en een marktvriende-
lijke wet- en regelgeving om een goede synergie tussen staat en markt verze-
keren. Ter verhoging van de transparantie en voor een efficiënte en effectieve 
dienstverlening, streefde het door Pudong ingevoerde institutioneel ontwerp 
naar een combinatie van een ‘kleine overheid’ met zo min mogelijk ambte-
naren en kantoren. Men wilde een ‘hoogwaardige dienstverlening’ met na-
druk op bureaucratische efficiëntie en een ‘betrokken samenleving’, waarbij 
andere functies dan toezicht en deregulering werden overgelaten aan vereni-
gingen en NGO’s. Bij het opzetten van een effectief bestuurscomité voor het 
nieuwe Pudong, heeft Sjanghai zich erg ingespannen voor het benadrukken 
van de autonomie van dat comité. Een ‘één-loket’-systeem werd geïntrodu-
ceerd voor het eenvoudiger verkrijgen van overheidsgoedkeuringen, om de 
gebruikelijke bureaucratische vertragingen te vermijden en ervoor te zorgen 
dat investeerders snel en zonder al teveel obstakels goedkeuring konden krij-
gen voor investeringsprojecten. Om toegang tot en activiteiten op de markt 
van Pudong makkelijker te maken voor investeerders, zijn nieuwe wetten 
geïntroduceerd ter voorbereiding op de introductie van een markteconomie, 
maar de bijzonderheden zijn vaag gehouden om latere interpretatie en im-
plementatie mogelijk te maken. Sommige nieuwe wetten waren zelfs met el-
kaar in tegenspraak, zodat voordurende wijzigingen en aanpassingen nodig 
waren naarmate de economische hervorming van China zich voortzette en 
de werking van de markt beter werd begrepen. Om de ontwikkeling van het 
gebied te ondersteunen, heeft de lokale overheid zich speciaal ingespannen 
om grondinstituten op te zetten die de marktwerking moeten vergemakkelij-
ken en de barrières te slechten voor buitenstaanders die zich willen begeven 
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op de onroerendgoedmarkt en in sectoren die vroeger niet toegankelijk wa-
ren voor private ondernemers. De veranderingen in de wetgeving, hoewel niet 
zonder risico, leverden mogelijkheden en flexibiliteit voor de lokale overheden 
om verdere experimenten uit te voeren om te ontdekken wat hen het beste 
beviel. Bovendien zorgde een sterk regime (sterke overheid) waarin capabel 
politiek leiderschap werd gecombineerd met een hoogopgeleide, economisch 
bewuste bureaucratie en werd ondersteund door technische deskundigheid, 
dat de implementatie van het Pudong-project plaatsvond met aandacht voor 
en adequate reacties op marktontwikkelingen.
Selectieve strategie. - Een van de belangrijkste lessen die ontwikkelingssta-
ten hebben geleerd heeft betrekking op selectieve interventie. In China is een 
selectieve strategie geïnterpreteerd als pragmatische aanpak voor het delen 
van beperkte hulpmiddelen in een uitgestrekt land met veel verschillende lo-
kale belangen. De staat kon gebiedsontwikkeling in een bepaald voorkeursge-
bied doorzetten, in dit geval Pudong New Area, door met behulp van de uiterst 
selectieve SEZ-strategie kapitaal, technologie, managementdeskundigheid en 
ervaring uit het Westen aan te trekken. Een selectieve strategie betekent ook 
het beperken van het aantal partijen dat betrokken is bij de besluitvorming, 
in de keuze van sectoren voor het vormen van een naar buiten gerichte eco-
nomische structuur en het beperkte gebruik van overheidsgelden. Omdat het 
budget van de lokale overheid beperkt was, ging die ook over op een selectie-
ve strategie en richtte haar uitgaven op een bepaald prioriteitsgebied in elke 
zone. Pudong wordt gebruikt als laboratorium voor speciaal ontworpen proef-
projecten, een plaats om nieuwe strategieën en vormen van beleid uit te pro-
beren in het kader van de nationale pragmatische en gradualistische aanpak 
van hervormingen. Dit soort experimenten, waarvoor bestuurlijke herstruc-
turering of nieuwe mechanismen zoals Build Operate Transfer (BOT) contrac-
ten en Publiek Private Samenwerking (PPS) nodig zijn en gepaard zijn gegaan 
met een pragmatische aanpak, maakte de snelle invoering van efficiënte en 
effectieve maatregelen mogelijk om Pudong te helpen haar ontwikkeling te 
versnellen en meer investeringen aan te trekken. Doordat doelmatigheid bo-
ven ideologie werd gesteld, konden vele nieuwe ideeën worden uitgeprobeerd 
in Pudong. Hoewel het oude regime enorme barrières opwierp tegen de in-
voering van nieuwe ideeën die men in strijd vond met de bestaande struc-
tuur of bestaande methodes, was het toch mogelijk om nieuwe ideeën uit te 
proberen in daartoe aangewezen proefgebieden. Maatregelen die succesvol 
bleken konden vervolgens op andere plaatsen worden uitgeprobeerd. Het Pu-
dong-project liet zien dat de planmatige aanpak van ontwikkeling nog steeds 
uiterst succesvol was. Deze aanpak dankte zijn wedergeboorte aan een groei-
end marktbewustzijn, de ontvankelijkheid van een nieuwe stijl van planning 
voor veranderingen in de internationale economie en de mogelijkheid om te 
profiteren van het marktbewustzijn door selectieve overheidsinterventie. De 
functie van de planning veranderde in een demonstratiehulpmiddel; een pro-
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motiemiddel om de aandacht te trekken van het publiek en van investeerders 
uit de buitenwereld, en een onderhandelingshulpmiddel om consensus te be-
reiken tussen verschillende organisaties en belangengroepen.
Lokaal-mondiale geleding
Bij een grondige beschouwing van de manier waarop het project zich ont-
wikkelde liet het geen twijfel dat Pudong een voorbeeld was van een tijde-
lijk proces van stedelijke transformatie dat werd uitgevoerd in een tijdperk 
van toenemende globalisering. De nationale overheid en de lokale overheid 
van Sjanghai behandelden Pudong als een middel voor het stimuleren van de 
internationalisering van Sjanghai door te proberen te profiteren van de groei 
van de mondiale financiële markt, de uitbreiding van de internationale han-
del in diensten, en de herstructurering van buitenlandse directe investerin-
gen. In een dergelijk lokaal project vindt interactie plaats tussen lokale, mon-
diale, nationale en regionale krachten. Het Pudong-project liet een beeld zien 
van de dynamiek van de lokaal-mondiale geleding, waarbij een individueel 
district een actieve rol speelt bij het reageren op en aanpassen aan mondiale 
uitdagingen, en in sommige gevallen zelfs het voortouw neemt om te profite-
ren van de geboden mogelijkheden. Hoewel de staat voorzichtig omging met 
de gevolgen van de overdracht van kennis en de instroom van mondiaal ka-
pitaal (uit angst voor negatieve invloeden), was men zich ook bewust van het 
feit dat een behoorlijk mondiaal kapitaal en geavanceerde kennis van groot 
belang konden zijn voor een lokale gebiedsontwikkeling en voor de efficiën-
tie en effectiviteit van het stedelijk bestuur waar de lokale overheden al zo 
lang naar streefden. Om te kunnen profiteren van externe invloeden in plaats 
van door ze te worden opgeslokt, hebben lokale overheden (in samenwerking 
met de centrale regering) veel tijd besteed aan studies en onderzoek voordat 
ze internationaal -vooral in het Westen- geaccepteerde ideeën overnamen en 
ze aanpasten aan hun eigen lokale behoeften. Dit progressieve pragmatisme 
werd niet alleen toegepast op de mondiale kapitaalstroom, maar ook op de 
overdracht van kennis vanuit de buitenwereld. Door de aanwijzing van Pu-
dong als SEZ ontstond een ‘nationale enclave’ waar gedurfde experimenten 
konden worden uitgevoerd voor diverse marktconcepten, wat bijdroeg tot een 
versnelde pragmatische aanpassing aan instroom van informatie en over-
dracht van kennis.
Mondiaal-lokale geldstromen. - Pudong werd gepresenteerd als schakel 
tussen mondiale spelers en binnenlandse spelers. Om Pudong te kunnen la-
ten aanhaken aan de mondiale economie en de mondiale financiële markt, 
leenden de initiatiefnemers van het project het idee van de SEZ om Pudong 
te bevrijden van de bestaande institutionele beperkingen en het mogelijk te 
maken de bestuurlijke, politieke en economische barrières te omzeilen die de 
economische activiteit van Sjanghai beperkten en om te experimenteren met 
de ontwikkeling van een naar buiten gericht, marktgeoriënteerd economisch 
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systeem. Pudong’s voorkeursbeleid om Directe Buitenlandse Investeringen 
(DBI) aan te trekken bleef niet beperkt tot de financiële en industriële sector, 
de twee sectoren waarvan Pudong snel de twee belangrijkste economische 
pijlers hoopte te maken. Men hoopte dat door het uitnodigen van buitenland-
se investeerders en investeringen in de stedelijke ontwikkeling van Pudong, 
vooral in gebieden die vroeger beperkt waren tot de Chinese publieke sector 
of Chinese particuliere investeerders, voldoende instroom van buitenlandse 
investeringen zou aanmoedigen om het tekort aan kapitaal te compenseren. 
Grondontwikkelingsprojecten en ontwikkeling van infrastructuur werden 
opengegooid toen de lokale overheid bereid bleek te zijn mondiale spelers te 
betrekken bij de stedelijke ontwikkeling en de onroerendgoedmarkt van Pu-
dong. Hoewel de onroerendgoedmarkt van Pudong gekenmerkt werd door 
enorme onzekerheden, brachten de geboden kansen - een onaangeroerde 
markt en de kans op hoge opbrengsten - een flink aantal ontwikkelaars ertoe 
een gok te wagen. De enorme stijging van prijzen en huren voor huisvesting 
en kantoren in Pudong, in combinatie met de opbloeiende onroerendgoed-
markt in Sjanghai, onthulde het gevaar dat steeds verdere integratie met de 
mondiale onroerendgoedmarkt zou kunnen leiden tot een onbedwingbare 
scheiding van de lokale Chinese markt en verlies van staatsinvloed. Het is 
vermeldenswaardig dat in de financiële structuur van Pudong het ongewoon 
grote aandeel van DBI uit Hong Kong, Taiwan en Zuidoost-Azië het belang de-
monstreert van het mondiale Chinese zakelijke netwerk voor het sturen van 
de instroom van DBI in China in het algemeen en in Pudong in het bijzonder.
Mondiaal-lokale informatiestromen. - Pudong was ook een interessant 
voorbeeld van de invloed die werd uitgeoefend door buitenlandse deskun-
digheid, waardoor de stedelijke ontwikkeling van Sjanghai werd gestuurd en 
geholpen, alsmede deelname aan de verschillende fases van het plannen en 
het architectonisch ontwerp, het opzetten van een grondregime en het orga-
niseren van publiek-private samenwerking. Architectuur en stedelijke plan-
ning waren twee van de gebieden waar kennis actief uit de buitenwereld het 
meest werd aangepast aan de situatie in Pudong. Lokale deskundigen, aan-
gemoedigd door hun eigen professionele nieuwsgierigheid en het enthou-
siasme waarmee lokale politici meningen van buiten willen horen, waren 
grotendeels verantwoordelijk voor het opzetten van interactie met de buiten-
wereld, hoewel het bij de eerste initiatieven meer ging om ‘importeren’ dan 
om interactie. Interactie en overleg met deskundigen van buitenaf boden lo-
kale deskundigen inzicht in de manier waarop lokale projecten moesten wor-
den onderzocht in het licht van westerse planningsconcepten. Het gebrek aan 
ervaring in China betekende dat het district kon worden beschouwd als een 
tabula rasa. De creatieve referenties gebruikt door buitenlandse architecten 
werden niet of nauwelijks afgeleid van Chinese steden en evenmin hadden 
ze op enige significante manier een relatie met de bestaande situatie of hiel-
den ze veel rekening met implementatieproblemen zoals het verplaatsen van 
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de oorspronkelijke inwoners. In feite werd de lokale context grotendeels ge-
negeerd. Toch was al deze informatie en kennis niet zonder waarde voor de 
praktijk van de planning. De verschillende voorstellen werden in feite door de 
lokale planners in Sjanghai op een meer pragmatische en praktische manier 
gebruikt, aangepast aan de lokale omstandigheden.
Het grondregime van Pudong werd voornamelijk gebaseerd op de ervarin-
gen van andere ontwikkelingsstaten, vooral Singapore en Hong Kong, waar 
met succes grondinstituten waren gesticht die gebruik maakten van het 
staatseigendom van de grond en die profiteerden van grote bedragen aan in-
komsten uit hun grond. Pudong heeft in feite niet nagebootst wat in andere 
succesvolle gevallen is gedaan, maar heeft zich tot het uiterste ingespannen 
om de verschillende technieken aan te passen zodat ze geschikt waren voor 
het eigen district en de afwijkende economische situatie. De institutionalise-
ring van de grondontwikkeling werd op die manier onderdeel van het transi-
tieproces in China, waarbij marktontwikkeling mogelijk werd gemaakt onder 
behoud van het model van de ontwikkelingsstaat. De invoering van een actief 
grondbeleid versnelde de ontwikkeling door nieuwe spelers aan te moedigen 
om te investeren en meer te verdienen aan de verhuur van grond.
De invoering van PPS was ook een interessant aspect van de pragmatische 
benadering van buitenlandse managementtechnieken in Pudong. Voor het 
eerst was de stedelijke planning en stedelijke ontwikkeling niet alleen maar 
een publieke taak, maar de verantwoordelijkheid van een groep belangheb-
benden op een brede basis. Deze interactieve aanpak die nog algemener werd 
in het implementatiestadium vanwege de noodzaak financiële en publieke 
steun te verkrijgen, verschilde sterk van de traditionele Chinese aanpak van 
stedelijke ontwikkeling waarin de centrale rol in het algemeen werd gespeeld 
door de publieke sector en publieke financiering. Een belangrijk punt was de 
manier waarop gebruik gemaakt kon worden van private investeringen in Pu-
dong, niet alleen in onroerend goed maar ook in de industrie en de dienstver-
lening in het algemeen. 
Het voorbeeld van Pudong toonde aan dat de stedelijke ontwikkeling een 
complex, dynamisch en gevarieerd proces is waarbij interactie plaatsvindt 
tussen de staat en de markt die parallel loopt aan de toenemende dynami-
sche mondiaal-lokale interactie. Daarom werd de beleidsvorming niet vooraf 
gepland maar kwam veeleer voort uit de interactie tussen private bedrijven 
en bureaucratische instellingen, waarbij bemiddelende organisaties een be-
langrijke rol speelden. Zoals Mintzberg heeft gezegd, beleidsvorming wordt 
niet ontworpen, zij ‘ontstaat’. 
Conclusies en praktische gevolgtrekkingen
In het onderzoek zijn de stedelijke theorieën en de theorie van de ontwikke-
ling toegepast op het verkrijgen van een begrip van de aard van een groot-
schalige gebiedsontwikkeling in een specifiek Chinese context in een tijdperk 
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van globalisering. De snelheid van de ontwikkeling in Pudong werd mogelijk 
gemaakt door een aantal verschillende factoren die zodanig met elkaar ver-
weven waren dat ze een unieke functie vervulden die door elk van die facto-
ren op zichzelf niet realiseerbaar was geweest. De theorie van de ontwikke-
lingsstaat maakte het mogelijk een aantal kenmerken te verduidelijken van 
het Pudong-project, in het bijzonder de krachtige motieven voor overheidsin-
terventie in lokale aangelegenheden en de netwerkaanpak die werd gevolgd 
door de lokale overheid om doelgericht een coalitie te vormen tussen de staat 
en de markt, mondiaal en lokaal. De beslissing van de staat om in deze lo-
kale ontwikkeling een actieve rol te spelen is echter niet blindelings of sub-
jectief genomen, maar was het resultaat van zorgvuldige observatie en ken-
nis van de mondiale economie, gevolgd door een progressieve aanpassing aan 
het potentieel en de kansen die door de mondiale economie werden geboden. 
De pragmatische aanpassing van vanuit de buitenwereld verkregen geavan-
ceerde kennis aan de omstandigheden in Pudong was een gerichte ontwik-
kelingsstrategie die door de lokale overheid werd geïntroduceerd, waarbij de 
ontwikkelingsstaat gebruik kon maken van alle mogelijke middelen om haar 
ontwikkelingsdoelstelling te bereiken. Het duidelijkste voorbeeld van de prag-
matische aanpassing op het gebied van stedelijke ontwikkeling was het ac-
tieve grondbeleid waarbij een intermediair werd gecreëerd tussen de staat en 
de markt, en mondiale spelers werden aangetrokken voor lokale ontwikke-
ling. Het actieve grondbeleid genereerde niet alleen aanzienlijke inkomsten 
voor de verdere ontwikkeling van een lokale infrastructuur, maar leidde ook 
tot veranderingen in toegangsregels waardoor de private sector betrokken 
kon raken in wat vanouds het domein van de publieke sector was geweest. 
Hetzelfde experiment werd uitgevoerd met de ontwikkeling van de infrastruc-
tuur. Met de latere hervorming van de huisvesting en de opkomst van een 
onroerendgoedsector begonnen de private sector en private financiering een 
belangrijke rol te spelen in de onroerendgoedmarkt, waardoor publieke en 
private financiering samen de ontwikkeling van Pudong begonnen te bevorde-
ren. Een opvallend kenmerk van het financiële mechanisme in Pudong was de 
rol die werd gespeeld door het mondiale Chinese zakelijke netwerk waarbij 
knooppunten in het mondiale financiële netwerk de lokale ontwikkeling en 
financiële markt koppelden aan mondiaal kapitaal. Dit netwerk speelde niet 
alleen een sleutelrol bij het aantrekken van mondiaal kapitaal voor het Pu-
dong-project, maar moedigde ook speculatieve investeerders aan die hoopten 
snel geld te verdienen aan de zich razendsnel ontwikkelende onroerendgoed-
markt in Pudong.
Hoewel het Pudong-project heeft aangetoond hoe krachtig een ontwikke-
lingsstaat de voordelen van mondiale openheid kan combineren met flexi-
biliteit en efficiëntie bij het aanpassen van mondiale veranderingen aan de 
lokale context, dient hier toch een aantal beperkingen genoemd te worden. 
Allereerst is het noodzakelijk realistisch te zijn over het gebruik van netwer-
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ken en netwerkstrategieën en om rekening te houden met de noodzaak zich 
te conformeren aan de duidelijk vastgestelde regels van het mondiale econo-
mische systeem. Ten tweede, hoewel toepassing van een selectieve strategie 
effectief is, moet deze op een zodanige manier worden toegepast dat een toe-
name van ruimtelijke segregatie en economische polarisatie wordt vermeden. 
Ten derde moet worden erkend dat het lokale financiële systeem in toene-
mende mate niet in staat zal zijn om te gaan met de onzekerheid die wordt 
veroorzaakt door de mondiale economische integratie.
Onderzoek naar het Pudong-project heeft enige kennis opgeleverd van de 
complexiteit en dynamiek die moderne gebiedsontwikkelingen kenmerken en 
van de aard van de interactie tussen de mondiale en lokale invloeden. Het Pu-
dong-project bleek een unieke samenstelling te zijn van context-afhankelijke 
processen. Hoewel verwacht kan worden dat er veel overeenkomsten bestaan 
tussen de verschillende strategieën voor stedelijke ontwikkeling en heront-
wikkeling, zal elke strategie evolueren en aangepast worden aan de specifieke 
situatie. Elke individuele aanpak, zoals in het geval van de aanpak van het Pu-
dong-project, moet realistisch worden geëvalueerd om vast te stellen in welke 
mate deze geschikt is om over te brengen van de ene situatie naar de andere. 
In het algemeen kunnen de patronen waarop steden hun ontwikkelingsstra-
tegie voor grootschalige stedelijke ontwikkelingsprojecten baseren worden 
geleend en op een pragmatische manier worden aangepast om ze geschikt te 
maken voor andere locaties waar de omstandigheden verschillen. De vraag 
van de toepasbaarheid kan daarom beter worden geherformuleerd in termen 
van de mate waarin de specifieke lokale, regionale of organisationele context 
kan worden aangepast, zodat kan worden geprofiteerd van in het Pudong-pro-
ject geleerde lessen.
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  概述
本研究对大规模的城区发展给予特别的关注，着重理解在一个迅猛发展的城
市开发项目——上海浦东新区的发展中，全球因素和区域因素的相互作用如
何对区域发展战略的制定产生影响。浦东案例提供了一个极端的情况：国际
和区域因素之间的相互影响发生在这个对外部世界关闭了将近四十年的地
区，发生在其门户开始对外开放之时。本研究对形成于市区层面的张力进行
了具体的解释，并提供了一个可代表当前区域发展进程中的复杂性和动态发
展的例子。本研究所提出的问题是：哪些主要因素推动了浦东的高速发展？
同时，学术研究上的问题是：浦东新区的发展在何种程度上反映了发展型国
家的特点？
本研究的起点在于对全球因素和区域因素之间的相互作用及其对创造城
市空间的影响之理论分析。城市理论是与网络社会和全球城市相关的理论，
被用于解释城市空间建设中所发生的重大变化。一个已确定的影响来自网络
社会的出现，它将运行于城市内部的传统组织之间的关系转变成更为互相牵
制、互相依赖的关系，这为新的城市治理方式提供了背景。另外一个影响来
自经济全球化和全球资本流动所形成的全球城市网络。在全球城市 (global 
cities, Sassen 1991, 1994) 和世界城市等级 (world city  hierarchy, Friedmann 
1986, 1995) 的导引性研究下，世界城市的范式认为城市已变成驱动经济全球
化的力量，同时城市为了存续，日益依赖于它们与全球经济的联系。这些城
市研究的本质在于，它们突出了全球资本流动和信息传递在互相关联的全球
和区域的经济体系、以及城市空间建设中的关键作用。
认识到全球力量和区域力量对城市的作用，我们也应该意识到区域发展
进程中所表现的全球和区域之间的二重性。区域发展战略的规划根植于区域
的政治和经济形势，但也日益受到全球作用的不确定性的影响。如何更好地
制定区域发展战略以应对区域发展过程中的复杂性、变动性和不确定性，直
接受到该地区看待本地区和外部世界方式的影响，也受到区域发展进程中其
政治和经济制度的运行、调整和适应方式的影响。在这种意义上，制定区域
发展战略更是一种学习的过程，在这个过程中为了适应变化的要求，需要应
对新的形势并作出调整。由于中国选择了按照东亚发展模式实施经济改革，
它亦步亦趋地模仿了某些制度结构，这些制度结构帮助其它国家和地区实现
了高速的经济增长。这些战略体现在上海地区，在上海的地方制度体系构建
中发挥了作用。虽然东亚每个发展型国家都有其独特的制度体系，但其中心
思想总是如何取得稳定高速的经济增长。据此，政府在制定产业政策和推动
经济发展的过程中通常发挥积极的作用。此外，为确保高经济增长率，政府
需要与市场之间建立高度信任和紧密的关系。浦东发展的复杂性质提供了一
个独特的机会，不仅可以测试发展型国家理论在地方层面的应用，而且还可
以在检验城市管理和区域发展背景的复杂影响时，将政治经济学和城市研究
这两个不同领域连接起来。
案例研究
为解释浦东地区如何处理全球和区域之间的张力从而取得高速发展，本研究
聚焦于两组相关的变量——区域的和全球的——案例研究深度分析了与浦东
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发展速度相关的具体区域发展措施，包括处理土地开发、基础设施发展、与
地方关系非常紧密的房地产市场等问题的决策程序和管理战略，以及动员投
融资的方式。为提供浦东发展的一幅详细图景，本研究使用了各种方法，包
括文献查阅、互联网搜索、正式的开放式访谈、小组讨论、研讨会、座谈会
和会议。从档案、采访、调查问卷和实地考察中获取数据。
发现
发展型国家理论被用来理解区域发展速度和“政府－市场”互动之间的关
系。我们的分析考虑了不同行为主体面对全球－区域矛盾所作的不同反应背
后的驱动力量，特别是地方政府的动力及其对地方政府制定战略的影响。我
们的分析研究了两个基本关系的结构——政府和市场、以及区域和全球，特
别关注了那些直接影响浦东15年的发展速度的关系。
政府－市场网络
与中国管理地区发展的传统方式——封闭、自上而下、不透明、官僚主义、
政府一手包办的方式——浦东的发展显示了一种不断演变的趋势，更加开
放，更具相互作用，由一种具有特定中国发展模式特征的混合管制模式所主
导。网络战略对于促进发展至关重要。网络使得政府和市场开始寻找相互接
近和相互理解的渠道。在制定新规则从而为市场力量提供准入并给予它们运
作空间时，政府的体制调整实现了政府和市场的普遍合作。我们着重强调网
络战略的四个方面：
发展目标。实施发展型国家的开放政策促进了上海浦东的城市发展。浦
东所采用的发展战略其背后的目的是取得经济发展。从决策到政策执行，地
方政府积极影响了整个发展过程，这一影响有时是公开地进行，有时是谨慎
地加入，完全根据环境和当时的需要。将“经济特区”这一概念应用于一个
巨大的城市开发项目，以及浦东所相应实施的大范围的实验性政策，让人不
禁想起中国仿效发展型国家理论的模型，为了刺激经济增长和外国投资所采
取的类似策略。与其它经济特区一样，浦东对于全中国尤其是对于上海，起
到一个“展示窗口”和“基地”的作用，为中西方文化的互动提供了机会：
外国投资者能更好地理解中国的社会和经济传统，而中国人则有更多机会学
习西方技术、管理和经验。因此，浦东经济特区的地位不仅使上海有充分的
自主权以并入全球资本市场，还使国际企业可以渗透进本地市场，为它们在
中国提供一个可以开展经营活动的解除管制的地带，而中国的大部分地区仍
旧是受到管制的。此外，浦东发展对于上海经济结构调整以及与全球经济连
接的重要意义在于，进驻浦东给了投资者进入外部和内部市场一个重要的立
足点。
地方－中央的协同作用。政府在浦东发展中所发挥的积极作用，是通过
中央和地方政府的联合所实现的，中央和地方政府在浦东发展中相互牵制相
互支持，各自都需要对方提供自身所需的宝贵资源。一旦双方意识到它们的
共同利益——经济发展及其必要性，以及获得对方协助的需要，原先地方发
展的支持者和中央政府之间的冲突便可达成共识，双方都基于自身的理由支
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持浦东的发展。有意思的是考虑中央政府为了平衡上海和其它省份之间的利
益所做的努力，事情会比较有意思。通过这种方式，中央政府就协助建立了
一个“授权环境”，而这是地方政府不可能单独建立的。在发展型国家的中
国版本中，国家和地方的发展积极性之间的“相互依赖”和“相互依存”的
关系，使得中央政府、上海市政府、浦东区政府以及各种成分的开发公司共
同承担起决策、为浦东制定和执行发展战略的责任。地方政府作为浦东发展
的发起人，规划发展理念和战略，游说中央政府，向中央政府争取所需的支
持力度，并向外部世界宣传其发展的宏伟蓝图。国家在促进市场运作中的作
用反映在对更低层级的政府机关和开发公司的使用上，这些机关和公司意识
到市场的变化并对之作出迅速反应，与市场相关的人士一起工作。对中央政
府角色的需要也随着时间的推移而改变。一旦浦东发展步入正轨，中央政府
就能够减少其干预和预算支持，而当发展遭遇困难时，例如在亚洲经济危机
期间，中央政府就介入伸出援手。对决策程序及随后的浦东发展的分析清楚
地显示，长期中政府的角色是怎样从干预变为授权，然后又为了建立政府和
市场的强有力的合作而继续努力。任务在地方和中央政府之间分担，这显示
了一种灵活性，通过这种灵活性，发展型国家可以实施特殊的项目。
制度调整。在浦东的发展中，如果地方发展涉及到市场时，制度设计，
或更准确地说，制度调整就很必要了。为了实现这种调整，上海重点抓好
两项工作：推进市场导向的高质量的行政结构，以有效地提升发展战略；
建立为市场服务的法制系统，确保实现政府和市场的协同作用。为增加透明
度，提供高效切实的服务，浦东所实施的制度设计是“小政府”、“大服
务”和“大社会”的结合。小政府是尽可能少地使用人员和办公室，“大服
务”则强调行政效率，“大社会”是将除了监督和管控以外的职能转交由协
会和非政府组织承担。在设立精干的浦东新区管理委员会时，上海做了大量
工作，加强该管委会的自主性。同时引进了一站式体系，便于更快获得行政
审批，避免通常的官僚主义延误，使投资者的投资项目审批过程更快更省
事。为便于投资者进入浦东市场并展开经营，制定了新法律，为引进市场经
济奠定基础，但是具体细节还很模糊，给今后的解释和执行留下一定的空
间。有些新的法律甚至互相矛盾，这需要随着中国经济改革的深化以及更好
地理解市场运作之后，继续进行修改和调整。为支持区域发展，地方政府为
创新土地制度而做了特别的努力，这将为市场操作提供便利，为寻找机会进
入以前禁止民营开发商进入的房地产市场和部门的外来投资扫除障碍。法律
体系的变动，虽然并非毫无风险，却为地方政府进一步实施试验以发现哪些
做法最符合当地发展，提供了空间和灵活性。此外，强有力的政治体制（强
大的政府）以及由高学历且有经济头脑的官员构成、技术专家支持的能干的
政治领导班子，确保浦东项目在执行过程中对市场的发展敏感且能迅速作出
反应。
选择性战略。发展型国家所学到的最成功经验涉及到选择性干预。正如
中国所阐释的，选择性战略涉及到在广阔的领土上与许多不同地方利益分享
有限资源的一个实用主义方法。国家可以在某一享有特殊优惠政策的地区完
成区域发展，例如在浦东新区的案例中，就是通过探索实施高度选择性的经
[  ]
济特区战略以吸引西方资本、技术、管理技能和经验。在参与决策的各方的
数量中，在组建成外向型经济结构的部门选择中，在部门发展过程中，在国
家预算资金的限制使用中，都反映了这种选择性战略。尽管地方政府的预算
有限，它也采用了选择性战略，将其财政开支集中于每个地区优先选择的领
域中。此外，浦东被当作一块试验特殊设计的示范性项目的试验田，一个试
验新战略和政策的地方。这反映了国家务实、渐进地推进改革的方式。这些
试验，包括行政结构重组和建筑-运作-移交（BOT）、公私合作关系（PPP）
等新的机制，连同务实的方法一起，使得有可能快速引进高效切实的措施，
帮助浦东加快发展，吸引更多的投资。实用主义而非意识形态上的信仰使浦
东尝试了许多新观点。虽然旧体制制造了许多障碍，阻止了新观念的引进—
—旧体制认为这些新观念与既有结构和既有方法相抵触——但仍然可以在指
定的试验区域试验新观点。被证明成功的措施随后可在其它地区推行。浦东
发展显示，发展中所使用的计划手段仍然具有生命力。这种手段重新焕发生
机，应归功于日益增长的市场意识、在国际经济中准备好迎接改变的新型应
变力、以及通过选择性政府干预而利用市场意识的能力。计划手段改变了其
功能，成为一种指示性工具，一种吸引外部世界的公众和投资者注意的推广
手段，以及一种在不同组织和利益团体中达成共识的谈判工具。
区域－全球的关联
在对浦东计划的开发方式进行透彻研究的基础上，我们认为毫无疑问浦东只
是全球化日益扩张的时代中所实施的城市化转型的一个暂时过程。中央政
府和上海市政府将浦东作为一种刺激因素，推动上海通过寻求全球金融市
场的增长、国际服务贸易的扩张以及外国直接投资的结构调整等一系列变化
所带来的好处而实现国际化。在类似的这样一种地区项目中，来自区域、全
球、国内和地区的力量产生相互作用。浦东的发展显示了区域－全球关联的
动态态势，在这种关联中，单个地区积极面对和适应全球挑战，甚至有些时
候还出动出击抢夺所出现的机遇。虽然国家对知识传播和全球资本流动的冲
击心存谨慎（担心出现负面影响），但它同时也意识到，全球资本和先进
知识能够对一个区域发展的项目、以及对地方政府长期所希求的高效切实的
城市治理而言，有多么重大的意义。为从外部影响中受益而非被其吞没，地
方政府（与中央政府相配合）花费大量的时间进行学习和研究之后，才接受
国际——尤其是西方——所普遍流行的观念，并将这些观念在其特定地区灵
活推行。这种积极进取的实用主义并不仅限于对待全球资本流动，还运用在
来自外部世界的知识传播上。将浦东指定为经济特区，创造了一块“国家飞
地”，在这里可以大胆地进行各种市场观念的试验，有助于加快适应信息流
入和知识转移的务实进程。
全球－区域资金流动。浦东成为国际企业和本国企业的枢纽。为了加深
浦东与全球经济和全球资本市场的联系，浦东项目的发起者借用了经济特区
的概念，将浦东从僵化的体制束缚中解放出来，允许其跨越限制上海经济活
动的行政、政治和经济的障碍，试验发展外向型的市场导向经济体制。浦东
吸引外国直接投资的优惠政策并不限于金融和制造业这两个浦东希望迅速建
成其主要经济支柱的部门。人们希望在浦东的城市发展中引进外国投资者和
[  ]
外国投资，特别是在过去仅限于中国公共部门或中国私有部门的领域，将鼓
励外国投资的流入从而改善资金短缺的状态。当地政府表达了欢迎国际公司
进入浦东市政发展和房地产市场的意愿，开放了土地开发项目和基础设施开
发。虽然浦东的房产市场存在巨大的不确定性，政府所提供的机会——未开
发的市场以及高回报的机会——吸引了相当多开发商进来试试运气。浦东
商品房和写字楼售价和租价的急剧上涨，以及上海发展迅猛的房地产市场，
已经显示出危险：与全球房地产市场的不断融合可能导致浦东房地产市场将
不可控制地与中国本土市场分离，同时国家将失去对它的影响。需要强调的
是，浦东的金融结构以及来自香港、台湾和东南亚国家的外国直接投资超常
的比重，显示了全球中华商业网络在引导外国直接投资流入中国和浦东过程
中的重大影响。
全球－区域信息流。浦东还提供了一个有趣的例子，关于外国专家在指
导和协助上海的市政发展、参与规划和建筑设计的不同阶段、建立土地制度
和建设公私合作关系中所发挥影响力的例子。建筑和城市规划是将外部世界
知识运用到浦东现状的两个非常活跃的领域。受自身的职业好奇心和地方官
员急于听取外界意见的心理的驱使，本地专业人员是发起与外部世界互动的
最主要原因，虽然最早的行为更多的是“引进”而非互相影响。通过与外界
专家的互动和交换意见，本地专业人员获得了一种眼光，懂得如何根据西方
规划概念检查本地的项目。由于中国没有经验，这就意味着这些地区可以被
看作是白纸一张。外国建筑师所使用的任何创作借鉴几乎都不是来自中国的
城市，跟当前形势也没有太重大的联系，也很少考虑到执行过程中所遇到的
诸如原有居民区搬迁的问题。实际上当地的背景大部分被忽略了。尽管如
此，所有这些信息和知识对于规划实践并非毫无价值。实际上当地的上海规
划师以此为基础，以更务实和更实际的方式，提出了适合当地条件的不同的
提案。
浦东的土地制度很大程度上是根据其它发展型国家的经验制定的，尤其
是新加坡和香港的经验，这两个地区建立了成功的土地制度以强化土地的国
家所有，并受益于从土地中获得的大笔收入。实际上浦东并没有原样照搬其
它成功案例的做法，而是尽力调整各种技巧以适应他们自身的地区和变化的
经济形势。土地制度化的发展因此成为中国转型过程的一部分，通过维护发
展型国家模型，促进市场的发展。采用积极的土地政策由于鼓励了新的参与
者投资土地并从土地租赁中获得增加的收入，从而加快了发展的速度。
公私合作关系（PPP）是浦东务实地运用外国管理技巧的另一个有意思的
方面。这种做法第一次表明，城市规划和城市发展不仅仅是公共事务，而是
更广泛基础的利益相关者群体的共同责任。这种互动的方式与中国城市发展
的传统方法——其中公共部门和公共财政发挥着核心作用——有很大的区
别，特别是在执行阶段，由于需要获得资金和公共支持，这种互动性变得更
为普遍。主要着眼点在于，私营部门的投资如何才能进入浦东一般意义上的
产业和服务部门，而非只是房地产行业。
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浦东案例显示了城市发展是一个复杂的、动态的和内涵丰富的过程，涉
及到政府和市场之间的互相作用，以及变化日益增多的全球－区域之间的
相互作用。因此，决策并不是提前计划好的，而是在各种中介机构发挥根
本作用的基础上，从私营公司和政府机构的互动中产生的。正如明茨伯格 
(Mintzberg) 所言，决策是“突然出现的”，而不是预先计划好的。
结论及实践启示
本研究运用城市理论以及发展型国家理论，解释了在全球化时代中特殊的中
国背景下大规模的区域发展的特点。许多不同而相互关联的因素造就了浦东
的发展速度，这些不同因素的相互关联发挥出一种独特的功能，而这种功能
是任何这些因素单独所不可能达到的。发展型国家的理论使我们有可能阐明
浦东发展的许多特点，特别是政府干预地方事务背后的强大动机以及地方政
府为谨慎地形成政府和市场、全球和区域之间的关联而运用的网络手段。然
而，国家在地方发展项目中发挥作用的决定并非盲目和主观的，而是在对全
球经济学进行仔细观察和理解、并对全球经济所提供的潜在条件和机会进行
积极适应之后作出的。对来自外部世界的先进技术经验根据浦东实际情况进
行务实调整，是地方政府所提出的特色鲜明的发展战略，使发展型国家可以
使用各种可能手段以达成其发展目标。城市发展领域最具代表性的务实调整
的例子是积极的土地政策，它在政府和市场之间制造了一种中介，并吸引国
际参与者加入到区域发展之中。这项积极的土地政策不仅为进一步发展地方
基础设施带来了可观的收入，还导致了进入规则的变化，允许私有部门参与
传统上公共部门所占主导地位的领域。同样的试验与基础设施发展同时进
行。随后，随着住房改革的发展和房地产行业的出现，私有部门和私有资金
开始在不动产市场中扮演重要角色，从而公共和私有部门的资金一起支持浦
东的发展。浦东金融机制的一个惊人而不同寻常的特征是，全球华人商业网
络所发挥的作用。这些全球金融网络的结点，将区域发展和金融市场连接到
全球资本上。这个网络不仅在吸引全球资本到浦东发展中发挥了关键作用，
还鼓励了投机投资者，他们希望从浦东迅猛发展的房地产市场中获取快速的
回报。
虽然浦东的发展展示了发展型国家模式在结合全球开放的优势、灵活性
和效率方面——发展型国家通过这种模式导入全球变化并使之与国内背景相
适应——的长处，也须承认它的许多局限性：首先是我们必须对网络和网络
战略的利用有一个现实的认识，特别是需要考虑使之遵守全球经济体系中严
格界定的规则；其次，选择性战略的实施确实很有效果，但需要避免空间隔
离的扩大以及经济的两极分化；第三个局限性与这一事实有关，即地方财政
体系越来越无法应对全球经济融合所带来的不确定性。
关于浦东发展的研究给提供了一种见识，让我们可以总体把握当前区域
发展所具有的复杂性和动态，以及全球和区域因素之间的相互作用。研究的
结果显示了独特的环境相关过程构造中的浦东发展。不同的城市发展和再发
展战略也许有共同的基础，但每一个战略都会发展演变并需进行调整从而与
特殊的情境相契合。一种特殊的方法，如浦东发展所使用的，需要就实施情
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况对之进行现实的评估，并根据不同的情况进行移植。通常我们可以说，城
市在大型城市开发项目中制定发展战略的模式可被务实地借鉴和调整，以适
合不同环境的特定地区。因此，我们可以更好地重构适用性的问题到这种程
度，即可以改变区域的、地区的或机构的环境以从浦东发展的经验中获益。
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